All posts by natyliesb

Tarik Cyril Amar: Plan B? Zelensky makes a dangerous move in his faltering fight against Russia

By Tarik Cyril Amar, RT, 1/26/24

Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky has caused a stir. But this time not by haranguing the West on how much it owes Ukraine (in short: everything and then some). Or because prominent Ukrainians (former presidential adviser Aleksey Arestovich, for instance) are plausibly accusing Zelensky of missing a real and favorable opportunity for peace with Russia almost two years ago – two long years of devastating war.

Rumors of intrigues surrounding the military leadership of General Valery Zaluzhny – and perhaps even coups – or accusations of authoritarianism leveled by, for example, the mayor of Kiev, Vitaly Klitschko, are not the reason either. By now, that sort of thing is just Kiev background noise.

Instead, this time Zelensky has managed to get attention by issuing a decree ‘On Territories of the Russian Federation Historically Inhabited by Ukrainians’. Much of this fairly short document, which officially came into force on Ukraine’s Unity Day (January 22) is unsurprising. First, there is a rehash of weaponized/nationalized ‘history’ narratives that would make any serious historian blush, painting Russia (including during the Soviet period) as an evil empire that has ‘systematically’ sought to ‘destroy’ Ukrainian national identity for centuries. In Zelensky’s own words, the decree is meant to “restore the truth about the historical past for the sake of the Ukrainian future.”

But the document itself offers not truth but a silly and crude caricature. In reality, modern Ukrainian identity emerged comparatively late, and the Russian-tsarist authorities did try to curtail and restrict it, while the Soviet authorities attempted to shape it by both attacking it and promoting one version of it (as well as fighting alternatives, including a fascist version that allied with Nazi Germany). As you would expect, beyond politics, the even greater complexity of Russian-Ukrainian interactions – across the realms of (mixed) identities, beliefs, and culture, for instance – finds no reflection either.

Clearly, Zelensky decreeing history is not the place to look for an intellectually adequate, useful discussion of the fact that many more Ukrainians fought for the Soviet Union and against Nazi Germany than for Nazi Germany and against the Soviet Union. Or of biographies where Russian and Ukrainian facets were inextricably interwoven, such as that of the writer Nikolai Gogol and the even more complex cases of the painters Arkhip Kuindzhi and Ivan Aivazovsky.

But let’s be fair, Ukraine and Russia have been openly at war – and on a large scale – for almost two years now. (The causes of this avoidable war are, fundamentally, the West’s reckless, shortsighted, and cynical strategy of expanding NATO come-what-may; the Ukrainian leadership’s unforgivable decision to let the West use Ukraine and its people as a proxy to weaken Russia; and last but not least, great miscalculations on all sides.) Against that background, a Ukrainian president – even one less ill-educated than Zelensky – can hardly be expected to deliver a sophisticated lecture on the discontents of national identity. So, let’s not believe the caricature he is offering us, but let’s not get worked up about it either.

What is more intriguing is another feature of the decree. Its central explicit purpose is to protect the national identity and rights of Ukrainians living in the Russian Federation, including but not limited to six named regions, which the decree labels as “historically inhabited by ethnic Ukrainians.” The list of measures to be taken to do so is predictable and, frankly, not interesting. It is a mix of lawfare, international lobbying, and instrumentalization of academics and experts that you would expect (again with a special mission for those historians eager to let themselves be used as information warfare foot soldiers). The Ukrainian World Congress, Ukraine’s Academy of Science, and the Foreign Ministry, for instance, are all charged with making their contribution to what the decree promises will be a “truthful history” – apparently without irony. Pro tip: Truth in history, insofar as possible, never comes from a government decree.

Of greater interest is the question of what this decree is really supposed to accomplish. It is, after all, a strange document to issue now. Zelensky’s regime is facing a serious, potentially fatal decline in Western backing. The situation on the front lines – think Avdeevka, the crucial fortress town in eastern Ukraine about to be taken by Russia – is so dire that the common Western euphemism of ‘stalemate’ has simply become silly: This is not what a stalemate looks like, this is what being on the verge of losing looks like. Moscow, meanwhile, has signaled no hurry in making peace, especially after recent Ukrainian attacks inside Russia, some with major civilian casualties.

Belgorod plane attack: Why did Ukraine shoot down an aircraft carrying dozens of its own soldiers?READ MORE: Belgorod plane attack: Why did Ukraine shoot down an aircraft carrying dozens of its own soldiers?

Zelensky’s decree, it is true, does not lay any direct claims on Russian territory. Yet it does, of course, imply the possibility of such claims. This seems an odd moment to up the ante in this manner.

Did Zelensky feel that he needed something uplifting to offer for Ukrainian Unity Day? Is the decree meant to confirm that the president wants to continue the war, by hinting that as bad as things may look now, in the future, Ukraine will turn the tables? If so, it seems a risky gamble. Among Ukrainians abroad, especially in the so-called ‘diaspora’, such gestures may still play well. (And maybe that is why the Ukrainian World Congress received separate mention.) It is intriguing, in this regard, to watch Zelensky’s public address on the occasion of Unity Day. Produced in his signature high-stagecraft style (complete with a dramatic score that seems to come out of a Hollywood melodrama), it climaxes in a long sequence highlighting Ukrainians abroad. But those Ukrainians actually in Ukraine could feel alienated. For them, this decree at this time may come across as a gimmick, and worse, as revealing (or confirming?) that Zelensky is no longer attached to reality.

But what if the motives behind the decree are more complicated? Could it be an attempt to create a bargaining chip (weak, certainly, but perhaps better than nothing) for a future settlement with Russia? If that is the case, it is most likely to come across as a sign of despair, a case of clutching at straws. For it is difficult to see why future Russian negotiators would care. If Zelensky – and those around him – really still believe that yet another narrative offensive can compensate for real defeat on real battlefields, then they have learned nothing.

There is yet another possibility. And it is the most unsettling one. Recall that, just before the large-scale escalation of late February 2022, many in Ukraine and abroad did not expect the country to be able to fight for a long time. Against that backdrop, there were signals, promoted by the US, that a quick Russian victory would be followed by a shift to insurgency.

That was an awful idea. But it never went away. While most of the war has unfolded more conventionally, as a clash between large armies, there have also been infiltration, sabotage, and assassination campaigns. With the war going badly for Ukraine, some irresponsible strategists in both Washington and Kiev are bound to consider a plan B – namely, answering a Russian victory with an attempt to launch an extended insurgency.

The guerrilla-style operations undertaken up until now have one feature in common with Zelensky’s strange decree – the targeting of areas inside Russia. It may appear far-fetched, and it is a matter of speculation, but we should not rule out the possibility that Zelensky is trying to hint that Ukrainians inside Russia could become an asset in this type of warfare. If so, then the true intention of the decree would be to promote paranoia inside Russia. And the best response is to absolutely ignore it.

Fred Weir: Russia has long sold arms to Iran. Now Iran is returning the favor.

By Fred Weir, Christian Science Monitor, 1/24/24

With the war in Ukraine deepening Russia’s urgent need for weapons untouched by Western sanctions, Moscow is rapidly ramping up its relations with Iran, particularly through arms deals. And, in an unprecedented twist, the arms trade is two-way, with Iran supplying attack drones to Russia.

The two countries have nearly finalized their biggest arms deal in 30 years. Iran is selling drones to Russia that include new models that could greatly improve Russia’s offensive capability in Ukraine. Western reports say that Moscow is also negotiating to buy medium-range ballistic missiles of the new, highly accurate type that Iran has recently been firing at U.S.-linked targets in its own region.

Russia will reportedly supply Iran with its most modern Su-35 fighter planes, submarines, attack helicopters, and jet trainers, at an estimated price tag of $9 billion.

“The relationship between Russia and Iran has grown far more intense than anyone could have imagined a couple of years ago,” says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a Moscow-based foreign policy journal. “Who would have ever believed that Iran could become a major arms supplier to Russia?”

Though Russia and Iran are often lumped together by Western commentators as natural allies, their relationship has developed cautiously and has often been vexed by significant differences. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and turmoil in the Middle East have created mutual needs that are driving a rapid improvement in their ties.

“There is no ideological component to Russo-Iranian relations,” says Andrei Fedorov, a former Russian deputy foreign minister. “It’s purely pragmatic, a bond of ‘brothers in arms’ created by the situation.”

Experts say that Iranian drones, and “swarm” tactics for using them, have helped transform Russia’s early inferiority to Ukraine in drone warfare into a dominant position. Though Russia has no need for ballistic missile expertise, it may be looking for more ammunition than its own factories can produce as it seeks to end the Ukraine war on its own terms.

The two countries have been de facto allies in Syria’s civil war over the past decade, although until recently Russia maintained good relations with Tel Aviv and looked the other way when Israel attacked Iranian assets inside Syria. Experts say that Russia still doesn’t want to abandon its relations with Israel, which have come under growing strain since the beginning of the war in Gaza.

“Neither Russia nor Iran are interested in a big war in the Middle East,” says Mr. Lukyanov. “Despite what they sometimes say, the Iranians are behaving quite cautiously, and the hope in Moscow is that things will not get out of hand.”

The economic ties go well beyond military hardware, with Iranian consumer goods, food products, and even automobiles making their appearance in Russian markets for the first time. In the longer term, the long-discussed North-South Transport Corridor, which would link Iran’s Indian Ocean ports with Russia’s sprawling railway system, is seeing real investment for the first time and could become a reality within five years, says Mr. Fedorov.

“Russia’s view of Iran is that it must be a key part of the post-crisis architecture of the Middle East,” he says. “Russian diplomacy works to that end.”

Gilbert Doctorow: Prime time news programming on Russian State Television has lost its way

By Gilbert Doctorow, Website, 1/20/24

This evening’s Vesti broadcast on Rossiya 1 was all too typical of the narrowing horizons of prime time news programs. It opened with lengthy reporting on the devastation wrought in the city of Gorlovka, Donetsk oblast, by more than 20 incoming Ukrainian rocket artillery projectiles that struck residential apartments in the middle of last night, including from the U.S. made HIMARS system. One person was killed and a dozen more were hospitalized with various injuries.

The next news segment, substantially longer, was reporting from the front lines showing the incessant artillery and drone strikes that Russian forces are delivering near Gorlovka and elsewhere in the oblast at hardened Ukrainian defensive positions, at their infantry, artillery pieces and armored vehicles.

After that the news program moved on to reporting the disruptions to intercity traffic in central Russia due to heavy snowstorms and drifts that have shut down major highways. Truck drivers waiting out the storm were interviewed, as were the emergency workers who are supervising the snow removal and providing hot food to those in need.

From there the Vesti program shifted to commentary about today’s events at the Russian national exhibition (Forum) in Moscow’s VDNKh grounds. And of course there had to follow news about President Putin’s latest activities.

A cult of personality first appeared on Russian state television five years ago with the launch of the embarrassingly servile Sunday evening show entitled Moscow, Kremlin, Putin hosted by the youthful Pavel Zarubin, a protégé of Vladimir Solovyov and of state television news boss Dmitry Kiselyov. The cult has become ever more insistent now that the Russian electoral season is underway and every Vesti show has to give us a good dose of speeches and ribbon cutting ceremonies.

What is missing entirely from Vesti these days is international news. So it goes day after day in formulaic fashion. This, despite the fact that there is no shortage of hair-raising news from Gaza, from Iran and Pakistan, from the Houthi-U.S. confrontation in the Red Sea, among other global hot spots that Russians might just want to know about.

I do not mean to suggest that Vesti news has no merit. The military reporting from the field may be commended for giving the microphone to real Russian soldiers who are not propagandists but are speaking openly about their daily experience. Thus, we hear from the horse’s mouth that those manning the artillery who are firing with high accuracy at Ukrainian targets 37 km away, well behind the enemy lines, are obliged to move their artillery pieces within minutes of firing because there will be artillery counter strikes from the other side. This is a piece of information that puts in perspective the generalizations we in the West are told about how the Ukrainians are starved for ammunition and are firing 8 or 10 times fewer artillery projectiles daily than the Russians. It also tells us that Ukrainian reconnaissance via their own drones or otherwise is not that bad.

In criticizing Vesti I do not mean to suggest that Russian state television generally offers no information about the outside world. That you find in abundance on the talk shows Sixty Minutes and Evening with Vladimir Solovyov. Besides providing live reporting from Russia’s bureau chiefs in Berlin, New York and elsewhere, these shows draw heavily on Western news broadcasts about the major international developments of the day as well as about political events in the West: they feature video clips from CNN, Euronews and other international channels to provide material for analysis by their expert panelists. And those panelists often include area specialists on the Middle East, on China and Southeast Asia or in other topical regions who are given the microphone long enough to set out their broad concepts of what underlies the news at a serious intellectual level.

Both the aforementioned programs have deeply patriotic presenters, but they also strive for balance. True, Solovyov’s film clips and narratives from his almost weekly visits to the front extol the bravery and intelligence of the soldiers and officers with whom he meets. He sings the praises of the Russian military industrial complex, both state factories and the many private enterprises that have become suppliers of critical equipment. And yet he also gives air time to experts who explain at length why and how the Ukrainians may successfully continue the war for years in a defensive posture, so that it would be a grave mistake to be overconfident. This is precisely what I heard on Solovyov’s show this past Thursday. I rather doubt that Colonel Douglas Macgregor or Scott Ritter have lent an ear to these remarks. They should!

My intention is to demonstrate that Russia is a complex society which cannot be described in a useful manner by the simplistic words of infatuation or words of utter condemnation and vilification that predominate in U.S. and European reporting.