By 1895, Lenin had been exiled to Siberia for a year but was afforded enough freedom to continue his research and writing on revolution and even communication with other revolutionaries. Upon his release, he visited Europe where he made many significant contacts but most importantly, he met G.V. Plekhanov (Krausz 2015).
Plekhanov was a former Populist who became one of the most
well-known Marxists in Russia. He made
considerable headway in getting Marxist socialism accepted as a meaningful
alternative to Populism. He advocated
land redistribution and opposed the tactics of Narodnaya Volya, arguing that
terrorism served as a pointless catalyst toward increased government repression
Instead of issuing invectives at his philosophical opponents
in the revolutionary movement, as was the common practice of the time, Plekhanov
relied on the art of persuasion. He
acknowledged the Populists’ desire to mix with the masses and work on behalf of
their hoped-for political awakening, while explaining the practical shortcomings
of this approach.
As a Marxist, Plekhanov was a strict materialist who
believed in the possibility of “absolute objectivity.” This undeniable objectivity would supposedly resolve
the perennial tendency within the revolutionary movement toward
splintering. Furthermore, unlike many
other theorists, by 1884 Plekhanov was arguing that Russia was already in a
condition of capitalism, albeit in the form of state capitalism. He saw this as
evidence of the inevitability of a revolutionary clash between the social
classes within Russia and the eventual triumph of the proletariat (Billington
By this time, Plekhanov saw the peasant commune, held up as proof of a socialist legacy in Russia and a foundation for socialist revolution by the Populists, as falling apart. As it turns out, Russia was not so unique that it could bypass the industrial capitalist stage on its road to socialist revolution. He saw an emerging bourgeois class as playing a major role in revolution and advocated fighting alongside the liberal bourgeois and opposing them after the revolution, if necessary (Deutsch 1964).
Plekhanov would go on to have a complicated relationship with Lenin, whom he saw as a protégé and one who could ultimately execute his ideas (Deutscher 1964). It was later generally recognized that Lenin’s overarching talent was indeed his ability to marry revolutionary political theory and practice.
To be continued
Krausz, Tamas. Reconstructing Lenin: An Intellectual Biography. Monthly Review Press. New York, NY. 2015.
Billington, James. The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture. Vintage Books. New York, NY. 1970.
Though never publicly lauded by Lenin, Pyotr Tkachev is seen
as the philosophical bridge between the Chernyshevksy-inspired Populists and
Tkachev was a radical journalist and agitator who served more
than one stint in prison for his activities. He described himself as a Jacobin
and briefly collaborated with Nachaev from 1868-1869. Although he’s one of the
few colleagues who apparently didn’t fall under Nachaev’s sinister spell, he
also never repudiated Nachaev even after he fell out of favor when his killing
of I.I. Ivanov was exposed.
Tkachev was one of the early Russian Marxists. He believed in historical determinism with
economics as the prime factor, but strikingly he departed from Marxism
regarding how revolution in Russia could realistically be achieved. He advocated the need for a secret
“conspiratorial organization that would seize power by means of a coup d’etat”
Unlike Bakhunin and other anarchists, Tkachev didn’t believe
that a spontaneous peasant rebellion would happen. Nor did he believe – like some other
Populists – that “an isolated coup” was plausible.
Tkachev laid out three central ideas necessary for achieving
a revolution in Russia: 1) it would have
to be established through an intellectually and morally developed revolutionary
minority since the masses didn’t understand their own interests and wouldn’t be
able to advance them – if they could, he argued, it would represent gradual
evolution and would preclude the need for revolution, 2) the revolution was to
be carried out as soon as possible as conditions would become less favorable
the more entrenched the capitalist system became in Russia, and 3) a
revolutionary party was needed to execute the revolution.
That party would engage in organizing a unified and
disciplined entity to carry out the revolution, the dissemination of propaganda
using its own journal as the primary means, and incitement of the revolution
itself (Szamuely 1974).
Tkachev spelled out his blueprint for revolution in a
pamphlet called “The Tasks of Revolutionary Propaganda in Russia.” He engaged in a lengthy public and hostile
debate with Pyotr Lavrov who argued that revolution could only legitimately
come from the masses themselves and emphasis must therefore be placed on educating
the masses toward this goal. Lavrov’s
approach would be largely discredited after his Going to the People campaign
fizzled in the mid-1870’s.
Tkachev reiterated to Lavrov and other critics, including
Europeans such as Friedrich Engels, that since Russia had no well-developed industrial
proletariat or representative bodies and no consistently free press, there was
no way to win over the masses to a revolution in the foreseeable future. In Russia’s conditions, in which all the
power was vested in the state with no meaningful independent classes or institutions,
the state was also vulnerable in terms of the universal resentment it elicited
by its oppression and control of all.
This, Tkachev argued, made the Russian state ripe for a “tight-knit,
highly disciplined conspiratorial organization” to facilitate its overthrow
Once power was seized by the revolutionary minority, it would rule as a dictatorship over the course of time needed to implement economic, social and legal changes required by a socialist system (Szamuely 1974). Some of Lenin’s writings would echo and build upon Tkachev’s ideas and tactics, even using titles for his pieces that were strikingly similar to Tkachev’s (Szamuely 1974).
U.S. Army General Curtis Scaparrotti, the top military commander for the U.S. in Europe and an officer of NATO, told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last week that Washington was considering sending another batch of lethal aid to the Kiev government in the near future, citing the need to deter Russia.
According to U.S. News and World Report, Scaparotti was responding to Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK) who pressed him about why Washington wasn’t taking bigger advantage of congressional authorization to provide such weaponry. The delivery of anti-tank Javelin missiles wasn’t enough apparently to placate the hawkish committee member:
Scaparrotti…said the U.S. is considering bolstering the Ukrainian military’s sniper capabilities. But he added of any potential aid shipments, “it has to go through the policy deliberations.” He also expressed concern to the committee about Russia’s modernization of its navy.
“I’m not comfortable yet with the deterrent posture we have in Europe,” Scaparrotti said, when asked about U.S. forces and resources to deter Russia. He later said specifically of Ukraine,
“We need to study their maritime component, their navy.”
Scaparrotti also took the opportunity to reiterate that western powers would continue to flaunt their naval wares in the area, referring to the U.S.S. Donald Cook’s maneuvers in the Black Sea:
“They, frankly, don’t like us in the Black Sea. It’s international waters — and we should sail and fly there.”
Meanwhile, Bloomberg has reported that during the Munich Security Conference last month, Washington attempted to pressure Germany to also send warships to the Kerch Strait to prove a point to Putin about western access in the narrow waterway between mainland Russia and Crimea. Merkel refused but offered a more modest action:
Merkel had indicated she was willing, in coordination with the French, to send a convoy through the waterway as a one-time maneuver but Poroshenko said that wasn’t enough to solve his problem — he wants to ensure the strait is open permanently, the people said. France also refused to take part, judging the idea as an unnecessary provocation, according to another official who declined to be identified.
Fortunately, it appears that western European leaders are keeping cooler heads for now. Let’s hope they continue to do so.
Another excerpt from my forthcoming book, this one from the chapter covering the Russian Revolution of 1917.
Narodnaya Volya (from a previous post) would play another pivotal role in the fate of Russia and its revolutionary future. A young student named Alexander Ulyanov soon fell under the group’s sway and in 1887 was arrested for involvement in a plot to assassinate Tsar Alexander III. Refusing to ask for clemency, Alexander was hanged (Salisbury 1977; Krausz 2015).
Alexander Ulyanov was the older brother of Vladimir Ulyanov –
later known as Vladimir Lenin. Vladimir
and the rest of the family did not know of Alexander’s revolutionary activities
until his arrest. The death of Alexander
deeply affected Vladimir who up to that point had shown little interest in politics,
much less revolution. As one chronicler
of Lenin’s path as a revolutionary stated:
Some critics have tried to find cruelty, single-mindedness, egocentricity, or ultraism in the record of Vladimir’s early years. It does not stand up in the objective evidence of those who knew him. This was no rebel, no iconoclast, no youthful messiah. Vladimir was by all accounts as normal and pleasant a youngster as any parents could have desired (Salisbury 1977).
In fact, those who knew him later in life said that Lenin was not motivated by power but by genuine conviction. Combined with his boundless energy and “iron will,” this gave him tremendous charisma. Compared to Trotsky and Stalin, he was considered to have the least dictatorial personality, taking the time to try to educate and persuade (Krausz 2015).
The Ulyanov boys had grown up in a middle class rural
environment. Their father was educated
in math and physics and enjoyed a career as a local school inspector. He was a liberal reformer who had supported
Alexander II. He and his wife provided
an intellectually stimulating environment for their children, encouraging reading
and games, and instilling reformist values (Salisbury 1977).
By all objective measures, the boys enjoyed a relatively stable
and happy home life. Vladimir was known
as a smart, rambunctious and playful youngster who liked music and chess. His brother, on the other hand, was solemn,
studious and compassionate but Vladimir idolized him, often seeking to emulate
Alexander eventually left home to go to university in St. Petersburg. His journey to radicalization was not uncommon for idealistic youths of the time. Having grown up rather insulated in the provinces, upon arriving in the big city, Alexander witnessed the deplorable conditions of workers as well as brutal crackdowns by the police on demonstrations. In fact, he had participated in a demonstration just weeks before his arrest that had been handled particularly violently by the authorities (Salisbury 1977).
Vladimir was devastated by his brother’s death and the sudden
shunning of the family by others in their community (Krausz 2015). Witnesses describe a young man having trouble
expressing his grief: “It was notable that
in all the accounts no member of Vladimir’s family, none of his friends, offers
any remark or expression made by Vladimir in those days in Simbirsk. Change there was. Everyone noticed that. The gay, laughing boy, full of tease and
jokes and high spirits, overnight became serious, thoughtful, gloomy.”
The effects were still visible four years later in 1891 when Vladimir went to St. Petersburg to take his law exams. While there, he looked up one of his brother’s close friends, S.F. Oldenburg:
[Vladimir] asked many questions about his brother, especially his scientific work. Oldenburg remembered Vladimir as ‘gloomy and silent,’ and said he obviously suffered deeply over his brother’s death. (Salisbury 1977).
The lingering effects of Alexander’s demise would be seen in Vladimir’s now single-minded focus on revolutionary politics. By 1893, after practicing law successfully for around 18 months, he began immersing himself in revolutionary studies. He was already under surveillance and barred from government employment (Krausz 2015; Salisbury 1977). His mother disapproved and wanted him to become a farmer, but she would help to support him financially throughout his career, including during his stints of exile and emigration (Krausz 2015).
As part of his revolutionary education, he repeatedly read What is to Be Done? (Salisbury 1977) and later acknowledged Chernyshevsky to be second only to Marx in influence (Szamuely 1974).
Lenin, however, rejected the use of terrorism and instead advocated a strong centrally controlled movement of dedicated and professional revolutionaries who acted as secret conspirators.
To be continued.
Salisbury, Harrison E. Black Night, White Snow: Russia’s Revolutions 1905 – 1917. De Capo Press. New York, NY. 1977;
Krausz, Tamas. Reconstructing Lenin: An Intellectual Biography. Monthly Review Press. New York, NY. 2015;
Szamuely, Tibor. The Russian Tradition. Fontana Press. 1974.
Geopolitical analyst Gilbert Doctorow has done an important write-up on Putin’s February 20th speech to the Federal Assembly in which the Russian president provided more details on Russia’s military posture in response to Washington’s abrogation of the INF Treaty and implementation of missile shields in Eastern Europe. An excerpt and link to the complete article are below – Natylie
To the vast majority of Americans, including the foreign policy establishment, the question posed in the title may seem something of a joke. After all, absolute military superiority over Russia and other potential rivals for global influence has been the objective of US military policy for the last twenty-five years or more, at vast budgetary expense. One instrument for its achievement has been the roll-out of a system known as the global missile defense, which in effect encircles Russia and China, posing the threat of massive simultaneous missile strikes that could overwhelm any defenses. To intelligence specialists at the Pentagon, who likely have been watching, as I have done, what the Kremlin disseminated earlier today in Russian only versions so far, the question of Moscow turning the tables is entirely serious and shocking.
When Vladimir Putin first publicly described Russia’s latest state-of-the-art weapons systems in development and deployment one year ago, during his 1 March 2018 Address to the bicameral legislature, he said these systems would ensure the re-establishment of full strategic parity with the United States. Western media sniggered. US politicians, with a very few exceptions, chose to ignore what they considered to be just domestic electioneering during a presidential campaign that Putin was expected to win handily. It was all a bluff, they said.
In his annual Address [on] Wednesday, 20 February, President Putin expanded on those developments in armaments, reported which systems were now entering active service. He made it clear one of them is the planned Russian response to a likely consequence of US withdrawal from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: the stationing by the U.S. of nuclear armed cruise missiles like the Tomahawk on land and directed against Russia, all of which would reduce the warning time of incoming attack in Moscow to just 10–12 minutes and constitute an existential risk.
Putin, being Putin, did not spell out the threats implicit in the prospective deployment of the new Russian weapons systems. He remained always polite and open to discussion in his speech. But as we saw earlier today, he entrusted the task of dotting i’s to a member of his close entourage, Dmitry Kiselyov who is the chief administrator of all news programs on Russian state television while also serving as the anchor of the widely watched News of the Week, a summary newscast shown on two federal channels on Sunday evenings. To expand the circulation still more, the segment dealing with Putin’s Address and the new arms systems was released as a separate 10 minute video on YouTube.com early in the afternoon.
Professor Stephen F. Cohen and his wife, Katrina vanden Heuvel (editor of The Nation) spoke at the First Congregational Church in Berkeley on the evening of February 25th as part of his book tour for the newly released War with Russia? From Putin and Ukraine to Trump and Russiagate, Around 200 people were in the audience for this event, co-sponsored by the local Pacifica radio outlet (KPFA).
Cohen spoke first and much of what he said will be familiar to those who have followed his weekly interviews with John Batchelor and his columns in The Nation over the past five years. The thrust of his remarks involved the delineation of how Washington squandered the possibilities that came with the end of the 40-year cold war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union by choosing to take a triumphalist attitude. The decision to take that path has largely been responsible for the dangerous mess we now find ourselves in with the world’s other nuclear superpower.
Cohen helpfully defined what a cold war is: a relationship between two nations with more conflict than cooperation and no direct “hot” war. Historically, the cold war(s) between the U.S. and Russia have been the most important due to their military capabilities, mainly nuclear. He also pointed out that the U.S. and Russia have experienced 3 cold wars:
1918 – 1933 – During this period, the U.S. refused to recognize the Soviet Union and no dialogue occurred between the two powers; however, this cold war was not very dangerous due to the fact that there was no arms race. It ended when president Franklin Roosevelt pursued detente by officially recognizing the Soviet government.
1948 – 1989 – After the WWII alliance, relations broke down and an arms race emerged after the Soviet Union attained nuclear capability. There were periods of detente, the first was between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, followed by Kennedy and Khrushchev, Nixon and Brezhnev, and Reagan and Gorbachev.
2014 on – Cohen stated that he suspected a new cold war was in the making as early as the Clinton administration when Washington a) reneged on its promise to Gorbachev not to expand NATO eastward if he agreed to allow a reunified Germany into the military alliance, and b) attacked Serbia (a close ally of Russia with cultural and ethnic ties). But any doubts were swept away after the Ukraine crisis of 2013-14.
Cohen reminded the audience that the 40-year cold war between the U.S. and Russia (Soviet Union) was a negotiated settlement agreed to be in the interests of both parties and that there were no losers. All western leaders at the time acknowledged this fact. But during his re-election campaign, George H.W. Bush claimed that the U.S. had won the cold war and the conflation of the end of the cold war and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union began.
Cohen pointed out that it was now “axiomatic” and accepted as fact that the U.S. “won” the cold war. He cited the history books that his grandchildren now read in school as perpetuating this falsehood and the dangerous triumphalist attitude that goes along with it. Furthermore, most academic literature apportions blame for the current cold war on Russia, particularly on Putin. By contrast, most serious academic literature apportions blame in a more balanced way for the previous cold war.
He also discussed, of course, the media’s dangerous propagating of this misinformation and the blackout on alternative voices in the NYT/WaPo/MSNBC/CNN and, to a lesser degree, The Wall Street Journal and Fox which are both conflicted about Trump.
He reiterated that this was one of the things that made this cold war more dangerous than the last one: back then, some debate was allowed in the media and advocates of detente were organized and had a voice.
Other conditions that make this cold war more dangerous include the fact that the military divide is now on Russia’s borders instead of Berlin, providing no buffer zone. The proxy wars, such as Ukraine and Syria, are much closer to Russia’s borders rather than somewhere like Africa. Of course, they are very far away from the U.S.
Moreover, the zealous political and media project of characterizing Trump as a Russian asset or agent compromises his ability to effectively negotiate a deescalation of any possible military confrontation that may arise from the above mentioned proxy wars or an accident.
Cohen believes that in order to end this new cold war, Washington must accept that Russia has major power interests. This translates into no U.S./NATO military bases on Russia’s borders. He also believes that existential cooperation needs to happen, such as a partnership against terrorism.
My own thought on this last point is that Washington is not likely to be genuinely interested in going after terrorism when it has such a history of using terrorists to indirectly attack its perceived opponents’ interests. Examples include the use of terrorists in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in the late 1970’s/early 1980’s and Operation Timber Sycamore in Syria in recent years. But the more general point of actively cooperating on major areas of real interest is well taken.
Vanden Heuvel spoke after Cohen. She had a different emphasis with her remarks. One of the first points she made was the toxic effects that “cold wars” have on progressive interests domestically. They narrow the space for dissent, adversely affecting civil liberties and stifling debate on critical issues. They also serve as a self-perpetuating excuse to funnel disproportionate amounts of the budget into “defense,” thereby hobbling the funding of much-needed domestic programs that most Americans want, such as Medicare for All and infrastructure projects.
Another point vanden Heuvel made, which was touched on by Cohen, was the very disturbing trend of criminalizing diplomacy. Anyone who has had contacts with Russia is now being cast under suspicion of traitorous intent. First, it was individuals associated with Trump – many of whom are admittedly shady and corrupt in their financial dealings – but the net seems to have been cast so broadly by investigators that actions that were previously considered a normal part of possible diplomacy have been characterized as disloyal.
Then it spread to those of Russian nationality who have been studying in the U.S. and networking with like-minded Americans to expand civics projects in Russia.
Now Vanden Heuvel recounted the recent experience of a respected independent scholar she knows who specializes in arms control issues who has been asked by the Senate Intelligence Committee to provide all documentation involving his contacts with Russians and travel to Russia.
Cohen has made reference to the fact that he and his wife don’t always agree with respect to their analysis of the domestic Russian political scene or the value (or lack thereof) of the Mueller investigation. This became evident in the Q&A portion of the event, with vanden Heuvel a couple of times interjecting probing questions as Cohen was finishing his answer – a sign that she didn’t entirely agree with what he was saying.
One of these questions had to do with whether they thought Trump could possibly be a vehicle for peace with Russia. Cohen said that even if we disagree with other things that Trump does, we should support his intent and any actions he may take to deescalate with Russia. Vanden Heuvel made it clear that she didn’t think Trump’s actions indicated he was capable of being a vehicle for peace. She asked Cohen whether he agreed that peace wasn’t just the absence of conflict or the aversion of crisis.
A man in the audience behind me shouted out, “But that would be a great start right now, wouldn’t it?”
Over the President’s Day weekend, I attended my first San Francisco Writer’s Conference. During a short break on the second day, I perused the area where tables were set up in which vendors offered their services and some attending authors had their published books for sale.
Imagine my delight when I came across this book by fellow attendee Robert Riggs – especially since I’d just been working on the chapter of my own book involving Alexander II. I immediately plunked down my $20 and started reading it later that night in my room and finished it within a couple of days. I later encountered the author at a session for non-fiction writers. He signed my book and we had a short but interesting discussion on historical Russia.
This is actually the first published book in a series Riggs is doing on what terrorists have in common in terms of personality and background, so the emphasis is on how Sofia Perovskaya – who masterminded the assassination of the reformist tsar – fits a profile of a long list of terrorists. Future books planned for the series will cover other perpetrators of political violence such as John Brown, John Wilkes Booth, as well as more recent individuals.
Based upon the studies of Walter Lacquer, Riggs reiterates that terrorism is not a product of poverty, injustice or any particular religion, ethnicity, etc. Furthermore, terrorists themselves do not typically come from the aggrieved groups on whose behalf they claim to be acting. From the introduction, Riggs writes:
By no means poor and oppressed beings, they are generally children of wealth and privilege who go overboard in adopting the cause of others….There is an identifiable constellation of personality traits, what we call here a profile, that is strongly associated with persons who act out as terrorists, regardless of the particular cause or value structure that the terrorist happens to be supporting….Unfortunately, we see that under certain conditions terrorists can “grow” other terrorists by exploiting, cultivating and bringing out its inherent personality attributes, especially among young people. (pp. iii – iv).
While I certainly found this thesis fascinating, I was very interested in the historical background provided by Riggs of Russia during the 1860’s and 1870’s, including the revolutionary philosophy that was influential during this time.
Riggs gives a detailed outline of the 1863 novel What is to Be Done? by Nikolai Chernyshevsky, which captured the imagination of a segment of restless young revolutionaries. The book illustrated the ideals of a utopian future filled with socialist coops and equality between the sexes. However, it also was interpreted as having oblique references to the necessity of destruction and even suicide to achieve the utopian goal.
The novel greatly influenced other writers and revolutionary thinkers, including Mikhail Bakhunin, who in turn, influenced a segment of frustrated reformers and activists such as Perovskaya, a veteran of the largely unsuccessful “peasant movement” that was aimed at raising the consciousness of peasants toward rebellion.
Bakhunin and his fellow travelers preached the “necessity of violence for suppressing the privileged classes.” There was no more patience for gradual reforms, consciousness-raising, or non-violent forms of direct action such as strikes, blockades, etc.
Bakhunin eventually teamed up with Sergey Nechaev in Switzerland. Nechaev was known for being manipulative and stridently intolerant of those with differing viewpoints. He had fled Russia after engaging in violent activities that had earned him attention from the authorities, including the murder of an early follower who had turned against him.
Together, they wrote Catechism of a Revolutionary which outlined the requirements for revolutionaries to be successful. The requirements included: the forsaking of all other interests and attachments for the revolutionary project; the suppression of empathy and engagement in anti-social activity on behalf of opposing all established civil order, institutions, customs and morality; the only criteria for determining morality was whether something advanced the revolutionary project or not; the ends justified the means; willingness to die and endure pain for the revolutionary project; and, in the service of expediting the revolution, it was permitted for conditions to actively be worsened for the future beneficiaries of the revolution. (pp. 95-98)
Within the original organization that Perovskaya had been active in, a split emerged between those who advocated terrorism and those who preferred other direct actions along with the continued education and propagandizing of workers and peasants.
Perovskaya and her supporters ultimately decided to focus solely on assassinating the tsar. They made several failed attempts that involved the tunneling of areas beneath routes Alexander was supposed to take in his travels around St. Petersburg.
They finally achieved their goal on March 1, 1881 with a series of assassins stationed at intervals on the tsar’s route, each armed with a homemade bomb to toss at the imperial carriage.
Ironically, word had gotten out shortly before that Alexander had decided on another round of reforms which would have laid the groundwork for a constitution. Some of Perovskaya’s colleagues had voiced misgivings at this point about continuing to pursue regicide, suggesting the possibility of giving the reforms a chance.
But Perovskaya’s mind was made up and enough of her colleagues agreed to participate in the plan.
After the assassination, police were able to get some of the revolutionaries to turn on others. This, along with surveillance and a sharp investigator, eventually led to the capture of all the perpetrators. After a sensationalist trial, they were all publicly hanged.
Although I approached this book primarily with an interest in Russian history of the period, I also found the psychological portrait of Perovskaya and her partners in crime to be compelling.
By the time the Mongols first invaded in 1223, the Kiev Russian territory had degenerated into rivalries between princes who lorded over around “a dozen or so” independent areas which resulted in disorganized rule (Szamuely 1974).
Subsequently, the Mongols were able to burn, sack and massacre
virtually all cities and towns of the territory in short order. Around two thirds of the population perished
and many survivors retreated into the forests, taking solace in their Orthodox
faith (Massie 1980). They eventually
migrated further out to less vulnerable areas, closer to Moscow. As Tibor Szamuely described in The Russian
Tradition, these Russian refugees migrated to form:
…thousands of tiny, self-contained, scattered peasant communities existing largely in isolation, using their primitive implements to clear small patches of subsoil amidst the great forests, and, having exhausted them, moving on again along the banks of numerous rivers (Szamuely 1974).
The Mongols reigned over the land through the 13th and 14th
centuries, forcing the surviving Russians into complete subjugation. They were able to impose their centralized
and absolutist rule on the scattered Russians who had lost their complex Slavic
tribal bonds in the process (Szamuely 1974).
Massie describes an important aspect of this rupture of bonds among the
Slavs who’d constituted Kiev Rus:
Earlier as the Slavs had expanded and absorbed the land, they had fallen into two natural divisions: the Great Russians in the north and the Little Russians in the south. After the Mongol invasion, the Little Russians were cut off from the Great Russians. While the Great Russians became vassals of the Mongols, the Little Russians, who were later known as Ukrainians, were taken over by the Poles and the Lithuanians (Massie 1980).
The Mongols, for all of their viciousness, did have a socio-political
ideology. It required absolute
submission to the power of the Khan, who embodied the state. This Khan owned all of the land and had
unqualified authority over his subjects.
Land might be temporarily given to others to be overseen at the pleasure
of the Khan who could withdraw the privilege at any time. The overall objective was to create an empire
that, after quick and dirty wars of conquest, would be ruled over by the Khan
as a “worldwide social order based on justice and equality,” living in eternal
peace (Szamuely). The price for this
security and justice was perfect submission.
The efficient rule of the Mongols, which lasted for almost 250 years,
was achieved by re-establishing a form of national unity from the top,
delegating responsibility at the local level for maintaining peace (with
quarreling princes, no less), collecting tribute (taxes), and enforcing the law
to those princes and those among their entourage who showed
trustworthiness. Faithfulness to the
Khan/state was rewarded through a system of seniority among the princes (Szamuely
The basic principles of Mongol rule – security and justice in exchange
for submission to an absolute central authority – would influence Russian
governance into the 20th century.
The one city that was spared was Novgorod. Due to a combination of fortuitously bad
weather that prevented the invaders from penetrating the city and the continual
payment of tribute by its ruler, Alexander, Novgorod remained intact. Alexander also fought off a Swedish invasion
instigated by an opportunistic pope who hoped to capture Novgorod and convert
it to Catholicism (Massie 1980).
As Russians fled from Kiev and surrounding areas, Moscow – once
considered a small and unimportant “trading post in the wilderness” (Massie
1980) – gradually developed into a prominent city that was influenced by the Mongols
instead of the west and by a mystical rather than scholastic emphasis by the
Orthodox Church (Billington 1970).
The princes of Moscow collected tribute from their subjects which they,
in turn, used to pay tribute to the Mongols.
In exchange, the Mongols gave the local princes liberty to administer
their domain however they wished (Massie 1980).
The Moscow princes expanded the city mostly through annexation,
increasing its power and wealth. It’s
location between major river routes, which enabled communication, travel and
trade, contributed to its growing success (Szamuely 1974). The leader of the Orthodox Church, called the
metropolitan, moved from Vladimir to Moscow in 1326, adding to the city’s
importance (Massie 1980). Moscow
developed in a series of concentric rings around the center as churches and
villages sprang up on the periphery.
The Moscow prince who founded the dynasty that would rule Russia after
the Mongols and through the 16th century was Ivan I, also known as
Kalita. Ivan was ruthless when it suited
him to get rid of rivals and in the service of his Mongol bosses who rewarded
his subservience with increased power and prestige within his fiefdom. In 1327, the Mongols conferred upon Ivan the
title of “Great Prince” (Billington 1970).
He was granted exclusive judicial authority and right of tax collection
over all the other princes after he brutally put down a rebellion initiated by
another prince attempting to overthrow Mongol rule (Szamuely 1974).
Wars were a major feature of the next three centuries, including wars of aggression and expansion as well as wars of defense and of internal conflict. There were six wars with Sweden and twelve with Poland-Lithuania alone (Szamuely 1974). Much of this martial conflict was driven, at least in part, by Russia’s geographic situation between Europe and Asia.
When the Golden Horde’s dominance eventually faded, the Tartars based
in the southwestern area of Crimea, terrorized Russia with constant raids on
horseback that killed or captured Russians, selling the victims into slavery in
surrounding territories. This only ended
when Catherine the Great annexed the area in the latter 18th
Due to the Tartar aggression, Russian men were conscripted from Spring
through late Autumn every year to defend against the violent incursions. The situation also forced Russia to focus its
colonization efforts on the harsher areas to its north and east.
Szamuely asserts that, from a psychological standpoint, when it came to their long conflict with the Muslim Tartars, Russians believed that they’d invested their blood, sweat and tears not just in defending their own land and people, but in preventing Tartar expansion further into Europe, enabling the Europeans to develop more rapidly as a result of their relative period of peace and stability (Szamuely 1974).
Ivan IV, also known as Ivan the Terrible (or “Ivan the Formidable” in Russian) finally defeated the last of the Mongol-controlled areas of Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberia in the 1550’s.
Massie, Suzanne. Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia. HeartTree Press. Blue Hill, ME. 1980.
Billington, James H. The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture. Vintage Books. 1970.
Szamuely, Tibor. The Russian Tradition. Fontana Press. 1974.
East Bay Peace Action & Ecumenical Peace Institute present
Natylie Baldwin speaking on
Russia and the West:
What’s True, Exaggerated and False?
Natylie Baldwin is the author of Understanding Russia and U.S.-Russia Relations: A Primer, forthcoming in Spring of 2019. She is also co-author of Ukraine: Zbig’s Grand Chessboard & How the West Was Checkmated. She has traveled to Russia twice, visiting 6 different cities and interviewing a cross-section of Russians on various issues, including their views of Putin, the economy, US-Russia relations, the Yeltsin era, and the Russian Revolution. She writes for Consortium News and blogs at natyliesbaldwin.com.
“I’m not sure there’s been a better book published this year …. I’m confident there’s not been a more important one.” – Author and activist David Swanson, re Ukraine: Zbig’s Grand Chessboard. . .