Aaron Mate Interviews James Carden on Ukraine War and His Upcoming Book “The Great Betrayal”

The interview starts at the 7:47 mark.

YouTube link here.

Uriel Araujo: NATO’s “Nordic model” brings Arctic confrontation closer to Russia’s nuclear bases

By Uriel Araujo, InfoBrics, 11/6/26

Uriel Araujo has a PhD in Anthropology and is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

As Washington shifts Europe’s conventional defense burden onto its allies, the Nordic countries are emerging as a blueprint for NATO’s future – raising questions about Arctic militarization, Russia’s nuclear deterrent, and regional escalation.

Last week, Finnish researcher Matti Pesu argued in Foreign Affairs that the Nordic countries offer a practical path forward for NATO. His proposal, typical as it is of many Western analyses, deserves some attention.

Finland and Sweden, the alliance’s newest members, have deepened defense coordination with Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. Joint air patrols, shared logistics, and intelligence sharing have reached unprecedented levels.

Pesu presents this “Nordic model” as a prototype for NATO 3.0: an alliance in which Europeans take primary responsibility for conventional defense while the United States retains nuclear deterrence and strategic leadership.

This is less about American “withdrawal” than burden-shifting: European states would supply more troops, equipment, infrastructure, and funding – while remaining under the American nuclear umbrella.

One could interpret this as the Europeanization of the costs and risks of “containing” Russia, without a corresponding Europeanization of strategic decision-making.

Pesu himself notes that Nordic military integration would advance the US National Security Strategy’s objective of maintaining favorable regional balances of power. The Nordic “cluster” thus serves wider American strategic goals.

The Arctic dimension carries particular weight: Pesu acknowledges that Finland allows American signals-intelligence aircraft to monitor the Kola Peninsula, where much of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent is concentrated.

Finland’s accession has thus expanded the Alliance’s intelligence and operational access to areas central to Russia’s nuclear forces. From Moscow’s perspective, NATO surveillance and military infrastructure near the Kola Peninsula constitute a strategic threat.

I commented elsewhere on how the Gulf of Finland could become a flashpoint for new conflict between NATO and Moscow – following Finnish and Swedish accession. The same logic now extends into the High North.

Pesu further proposes that subregional “clusters” could act even if NATO itself is paralyzed: these groupings would offer a “hedge”, enabling frontline allies to respond together.

This raises questions about escalation control: if, say, Nordic, Baltic, or Black Sea clusters undertake coordinated operations independently, a confrontation might develop before the alliance as a whole has agreed on its political objectives. Larger members could then face pressure to support actions they never authorized.

Pesu outlines a strategy for organizing NATO’s entire frontier with Russia into interoperable military clusters: a Nordic-Arctic grouping in the northwest, a Baltic-Polish cluster in the center, and a Black Sea cluster in the southeast.

From a Russian strategic perspective, this could be perceived as the consolidation of a continuous NATO military frontier stretching from the Arctic to the Black Sea.

The danger is that it would institutionalize greater military integration along Russia’s western and northern periphery – while potentially allowing regional coalitions to act without NATO-wide political consensus.

Russia then would face not merely an enlarged NATO, but a network of interoperable clusters capable of coordinating airpower, missile systems, intelligence gathering, naval operations, and troop movements along multiple fronts.

A March 2026 SIPRI study explicitly warns that Nordic enlargement and new military capabilities could undermine crisis stability by bringing NATO’s precision-strike systems closer to Russian strategic assets.

Another SIPRI analysis identifies inadvertent escalation, including nuclear escalation, as a significant risk in Northern Europe. In a security dilemma, Moscow’s countermeasures could themselves provoke further NATO deployments, perpetuating an increasingly dangerous cycle.

The Greenland question exposes a deeper contradiction here: the September agreement between Washington, Copenhagen, and Nuuk basically expanded American military access – while (formally) recognizing Danish sovereignty.

Pesu treats this as an opportunity to restore cooperation. Yet Washington is simultaneously asking European allies to assume greater responsibility for their own security and asserting exceptional strategic interests in territories belonging to those allies.

The Nordic countries, it turns out, are being asked to strengthen their capacity to “deter Russia” while accommodating an American administration that has itself openly challenged the sovereignty of a NATO member.

In any case, the biggest omission in NATO 3.0 discussions such as this is any serious consideration of diplomacy. There is little attention to arms control, confidence-building measures, military-to-military communication, or negotiated regional security arrangements.

One may recall that Finland and Sweden were long associated with different forms of neutrality or military nonalignment. They are now being presented as models for a more deeply militarized NATO – and a more NATOized Europe, increasingly “encircling” Moscow.

The “Nordic model” is no longer simply “adapting” to NATO; NATO is actually being encouraged to adapt to the Nordic model.

This way, the Arctic itself is becoming integrated into the alliance’s broader confrontation framework. Moreover, conventional military operations in this region take place close to strategically important nuclear assets.

Consequently, the [results] of a miscalculation could be far greater than those of an ordinary regional conflict.

Leonid Ragozin: Ukraine is running out of options, and Russia knows it

By Leonid Ragozin, Al Jazeera, 11/14/26

The trilateral talks between Ukraine, Russia and the United States that took place in Abu Dhabi this week may not lead to a rapid breakthrough, but they clearly outline the trajectory of a conflict that might, after all, be nearing its end.

If anything illustrates the political and emotional rift the two sides are yet to bridge, it is President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s remarks in Copenhagen this week, in which he lamented that Russian leader Vladimir Putin was still alive. Ukraine’s harsh reality, however, is pushing him towards an unsavoury compromise with his arch-enemy.

Kyiv was compelled to enter the talks at the most disadvantageous moment, when it has few means to counter devastating Russian air strikes that damage its key industries and cripple essential infrastructure in major cities. One of Ukraine’s top negotiators, David Arakhamia, who leads Zelenskyy’s parliamentary faction, described the negotiations as among the most difficult he had participated in since 2022. He said the Russians had arrived with very strict instructions and that it had been difficult to soften the tone of the discussions. His assessment confirms that Russia sees itself as well equipped to negotiate from a position of force.

Moscow, meanwhile, expressed optimism about the outcome. Putin’s aide, Vladimir Medinsky, said the talks had brought the two countries closer to peace. Even Arakhamia said there was momentum towards reaching a solution before the end of the year. That optimism, it needs to be noted, comes without any signs of Russia changing its position on the contours of the agreement. Just as it has for years, the Kremlin insists on a genuinely neutral, demilitarised Ukraine which honours the rights of its Russian-speaking population.

If all this comes as a nasty surprise to many in the West, that’s because for most of this year, Western politicians and the mainstream media kept insisting that the tide of war was turning and that Ukraine was getting the upper hand. Their optimism was fuelled by Ukrainian long-range strikes targeting Russian oil refineries as well as by the snail’s pace of Russian advances on the battlefield.

As late as September, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda said that “in all but name, Russia has already lost the war”. Around the same time, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said Russia was not doing well in Ukraine.

When NATO leaders convened for the Ankara summit in July, it seemed that even US President Donald Trump had bought into the idea that Ukraine had the battlefield advantage.

But Russia responded to Ukraine’s surge, backed up by European funds and US intelligence-sharing, with round-the-clock air strikes that are bringing Ukraine close to its pain barrier. Moscow’s message was cruel: any damage Ukraine and the West might inflict on Russia would be met with epic devastation in Ukraine, from which it would take decades to recover.

The coming winter spells nationwide humanitarian disaster. Russian strikes on energy infrastructure have disrupted electricity and central heating supplies. Millions of Ukrainians, particularly in major cities, live in apartment blocks dependent on central heating, without which their homes can become virtually unliveable. Generators can provide temporary power, but their use is making the cost of war enormous for Ukraine and Western taxpayers who fund its war effort.

It is these dire circumstances, rather than pressure from Trump’s administration, that have forced Ukraine to enter the talks. Zelenskyy would have waited at least until the spring had he not felt so pressed.

Ukraine’s surge has failed to shift Moscow’s peace conditions one inch. Meanwhile, the Western perception of this war’s realities has undergone a considerable transformation. There are two major signs of the shifting landscape which directly affect the agenda of the Abu Dhabi negotiations.

For the first time since the start of the war, a larger part of the Western establishment appears to be ready to discuss Europe’s post-war security architecture. The subject was first broached by US negotiator Jared Kushner, causing outrage in the warmongering camp. But Medinsky said after the Abu Dhabi talks that it was the central issue on the agenda.

This topic harks back to the agenda which Moscow brought to the table in December 2021, a few months before the all-out invasion. It did so after the US and Ukraine signed a charter on strategic partnership which may have served as the decisive trigger for Putin’s decision to invade. The very idea of discussing Europe’s security architecture with Moscow became a strict taboo in the West for over four years, but clearly it is not any more.

Curiously, this broad and vital topic was not the main sticking point at the talks, according to Kushner, who said the territorial issue was the hardest. Moscow has long insisted that Ukrainian forces should withdraw from the remaining part of the Donetsk region for talks to succeed.

But Moscow’s opposition to territorial compromise might be an act of deception aimed at achieving maximum gain on overarching geopolitical issues it considers really vital. At the end of the day, it is only propagandist symbolism that prompts the Kremlin to claim Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

The other sign of change is European governments trying to jump on the bandwagon of peace talks even as this exposes a rift between hardliners, like the EU’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, and pragmatists who believe compromise is unavoidable. The latter most prominently include Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store, who held a lengthy telephone call with Putin on October 27, ahead of the Abu Dhabi talks, with discreet consent from parts of the EU leadership.

Both the US and Ukraine suggested in recent days that Europeans should nominate a single envoy to be at the table during the next round. US envoy Steve Witkoff said on November 12 that Putin had agreed to let European representatives join the next round of talks. Russia didn’t confirm it, while Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov linked the possibility of EU’s inclusion to the personality of its chosen envoy.

Perhaps the most remarkable shift on display in Abu Dhabi was the appearance of NATO’s supreme commander in Europe, Alexus Grynkewich, especially as it was hailed by the Kremlin which tends to see the war as a proxy conflict with NATO.

But even the staunchest of hardliners, like the German and British governments, are visibly changing tack. Chancellor Friedrich Merz suggested he could talk to Putin during the next G20 summit. UK Defence Secretary Wes Streeting unexpectedly called for opening communication channels with Russia.

Others, like Kallas or Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, are finding themselves increasingly isolated and unable to influence rapid developments. So is Zelenskyy, who has sounded extremely bitter about the perceived lack of Western support in his latest appearances. But he is going ahead with the US-brokered peace process because there isn’t much of a choice.

Ted Snider: Yet More Reporting Shows the Ukraine War Was Avoidable

By Ted Snider, The American Conservative, 11/5/26

Following the Maidan coup of 2014, the two regions of Donbas held referenda on some form of autonomy and a civil war ensued. The best available chance for peace was offered by the Minsk agreements, brokered by France and Germany, agreed to by Ukraine and Russia, and accepted by the U.S. and UN in 2014 and 2015. This gave Ukraine the opportunity to keep its territory and Donbas the means to protect its ethnic Russian culture by peacefully remaining part of Ukraine with a new level of autonomy.

But the opportunity was missed. 

According to Putin biographer Philip Short, Ukraine’s then-President Pyotr Poroshenko would later confess that the arrangement envisaged by Minsk was never meant to be implemented. Poroshenko told the Ukrainian media and other news outlets that Kiev’s goal for Minsk was “to delay the war—to secure eight years to restore economic growth and create powerful armed forces.” He says that it worked: “We had achieved everything we wanted.” The “great diplomatic achievement,” Poroshenko told the Financial Times, was that, though Ukraine “didn’t have an armed forces at all… we kept Russia… away from a full-sized war.

Poroshenko’s account has been corroborated by his Minsk partners. Germany’s then-Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s then-President François Hollande have both said they saw Minsk as giving Ukraine the time and space to strengthen its military before another conflict with Russia. 

Even after the 2022 invasion, there was still a chance for peace. Within days, before most of the death and destruction had occurred, contact was made and talks were held between the two sides, first in Belarus and then, most promisingly, in Istanbul.

The historical record suggests that, while Ukraine and Russia were considering an agreement, and were potentially close to an agreement, the U.S. and UK pushed Ukraine off the diplomatic path to peace, and another possibility for peace was missed. 

Recent revelations have added evidence to the already overwhelming case. 

The first testimony comes from the Ukrainian former MP Vadym Novinsky. In an interview with Stana, he provides previously unknown details of the earliest negotiations of the war. He says that on February 24, at the end of the first day of the Russian invasion, he advised David Arakhamia, the head of Zelensky’s Servant of the People Party who led the Ukrainian negotiating team in Belarus and Istanbul, to immediately contact Moscow to begin negotiations. There hadn’t been many deaths yet, “and it was possible to try to turn the situation around.”

Novinsky says that on February 25, he was contacted by the head of one of Ukraine’s intelligence agencies, who requested that he begin to organize negotiations. The intelligence chief said that the request came from the president of Ukraine. Within minutes, Novinsky was talking to Zelensky. Novinsky says that he succeeded in organizing the first talks in Gomel, a city in Belarus near the Ukrainian border. 

Novinsky says that the agenda included three main points. The most important was Russia’s insistence that the clause on Ukraine’s NATO aspirations be removed from its constitution and be replaced by one asserting “non-aligned status and neutrality.” The second was that Ukraine would recognize Crimea’s “special status” but not “as part of the Russian Federation” for 30 years. The third was that Ukraine would recognize “a special status” for Donbas. There could be negotiations about Donbas remaining in Ukraine. At this point, there was “still the option of keeping Donbas within Ukraine… within a framework of a confederal union.”

Novinsky says that he “coordinated every point with President Zelenskyy. And he agreed to everything then.” The process of developing the agreement lasted the month leading up to the Istanbul talks.

The striking thing about Novinsky’s testimony is that, if true, Russia was prepared in the first month of the war to trade a potentially intact Ukraine for a promise not to join NATO. But perhaps most astonishing it the revelation that it was not Russia that backed away from diplomacy—it was Ukraine. When asked by the interviewer why the Istanbul process failed, Novinsky responded, “I am absolutely certain that it was the fault of our leaders.” He says Boris Johnson, UK prime minister at the time, may have been involved, or it could have been “Zelensky himself”; but, in any case, it was the Kiev leadership that walked away from the diplomatic path to peace.

A similar story is told by a new report of a previously unknown back channel that was opened several months later. According to reporting by the Financial Times, the American lawyer Richard Conn and the American investment banker Bob Foresman managed to open a diplomatic back channel by reaching Russian President Vladimir Putin through a former East German spy named Matthias Warnig and Zelensky through a Ukrainian film maker who had, reportedly, already helped set up the promising peace talks in Istanbul months before. According to Short’s biography of Putin, Warnig arranged for Putin’s wife’s medical exam when she was badly injured in a car accident and was “one of the very few foreigners admitted to Putin’s inner orbit.”

The team conveyed a message to Putin from the senior director for Russia on the U.S. National Security Council, Eric Green, to the effect that Washington was neither pursuing regime change nor trying to destroy Russia—its aim was to broker a piece. The message, Green said, came from directly the White House.

In an interview with The American Conservative, Foresman said that Conn had communicated with Green extensively. There was a dangerously low level of communication between Washington and Moscow. Foresman says that Green made it clear to Conn that the White House “acknowledged and encouraged” the back channel and that they felt it was “constructive.” The team felt there was no question that the U.S. government encouraged the back channel.

Putin sent a message back, saying he had “no choice but to conduct military operations” but that he was “very open to negotiations.” Foresman told TAC that Warnig had a uniquely close relationship to Putin, and that he assured them that Putin was serious about his willingness to negotiate.

He wanted the talks to be elevated to the level of his own aide, Yuri Ushakov, and Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. The Wall Street Journal soon reported that Sullivan did hold confidential conversations with Ushakov “in an effort to reduce the risk of a broader conflict over Ukraine and warn Moscow against using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.”

Russia’s position had hardened by now, but was still far more favorable to Ukraine than any offer that remains on the table today. Russia would pull back to its prewar position. Ukraine would recognize de facto Russian control of Crimea, but, according to Ukrainian opposition MP Oleksiy Goncharenko, who has confirmed the Financial Times story, would not have to de jure “recognize it as Russian.” Russia would return the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to Ukraine and commit $300 billion in frozen assets to the rebuilding of Ukraine. The ceasefire would be ensured by protection from NATO states while Moscow began discussing a permanent security arrangement with Washington.

Once again, Putin said that Ukraine could not be allowed to join NATO. He had softened his position, though, and would not stand in the way of Ukraine joining the European Union. He was willing to discuss the suggested frozen line as well as a security arrangement based on the one discussed at the Istanbul talks. “If we can agree on the border and on NATO, then we can discuss everything else,” Putin reportedly told Warnig. 

By this account, Zelensky and his people barely looked at the offer and refused to make any concessions on Ukraine’s borders. The U.S. would also pass on the opportunity. According to Warnig, Sullivan had made it clear to Ushakov that the U.S. had not approved the back channel and that they saw no need for it. The rest is history.

The Duran: The War Behind the Gate

The Duran, 11/4/26

In a prolonged war, battlefield losses are only one measure of attrition. The other is a state’s ability to replace the men who leave the front while retaining the confidence of the society from which they are drawn.

Conscription necessarily involves coercion. Yet compulsory service under law and the exercise of military authority without adequate scrutiny are different things. The first may be a wartime obligation; the second, if established, can weaken the political legitimacy that makes sustained mobilization possible.

This is Ukraine’s increasingly difficult calculation. The demand for manpower continues, but the institutions responsible for meeting it face growing resentment, desertion and questions about accountability. A confrontation on Kyiv’s outskirts has made that contradiction unusually visible.

The House and the Competing Accounts

On November 2, a crowd gathered outside an ordinary house in Petropavlivska Borshchahivka, west of Kyiv, following allegations that men were being held and mistreated inside. The confrontation escalated into violence against security personnel and vehicles. Kyrylo Budanov, the former military intelligence chief who now heads the presidential office, arrived with senior National Guard officials.

One central fact is no longer disputed. Ukraine’s 1st Azov Corps confirmed that the house was a temporary National Guard facility containing newly mobilized personnel and soldiers returned after unauthorized absence. Four men required hospital examination. Allegations of torture and unlawful confinement remain under investigation; claims of deaths and dozens of civilian hostages have not been substantiated. The State Bureau of Investigation has opened proceedings concerning possible abuse of military authority.

There are also serious questions about the unrest itself. Ukrainian journalists found inconsistencies in the credentials of a woman presenting herself as an ambulance worker who helped publicize the accusations. Authorities suspect a coordinated provocation. That possibility warrants examination, as does the assault on soldiers. But a manipulated protest would not, by itself, establish that the treatment of every man inside was lawful.

The Meaning of Budanov’s Remark

Budanov acknowledged at the scene that many similar buildings exist. This was not an admission that Ukraine operates a network of secret prisons. The National Guard says dispersed temporary accommodation is necessary because conventional bases cannot house all recruits safely or conveniently during wartime. That explanation is plausible, particularly under persistent Russian attack.

It does, however, expose the scale of a system that deserves scrutiny. What authority governs the transfer of mobilized men or returning absentees into such sites? Can they contact relatives, obtain medical care, challenge their treatment or seek legal assistance? Who inspects the facilities, and who is answerable when a complaint arises? These questions are not answered by changing the label from holding site to deployment point.

Azov and the Boundaries of Command

Azov’s involvement makes the episode more consequential. The 1st Azov Corps is an established National Guard formation under Denys Prokopenko; Andriy Biletsky’s 3rd Army Corps operates within the armed forces. Their institutional roles are distinct. Both have been prominent in the fighting in Donetsk, making their place in Ukraine’s internal security and mobilization machinery a legitimate subject of public interest.

The Duran’s battlefield commentary raises the possibility that Azov formations have become less visible around Lyman and Dobropillia. But reduced reporting is not proof of withdrawal, still less evidence that combat units were secretly transferred to Kyiv. Azov continues to describe its 1st Corps as holding the Dobropillia sector. The relevant question is therefore not whether an unverified redeployment proves a political conspiracy. It is whether the increasing reliance on powerful combat formations for sensitive rear-area personnel functions creates a dangerous confusion of responsibilities.

The Price of Manpower

The pressure is measurable. Ukrainian prosecutors recorded more than 311,000 proceedings for unauthorized absence and desertion between the start of the full-scale invasion and October 2025. These are case counts, not a count of unique deserters. In January 2026, Ukraine’s defense minister said roughly 200,000 troops were absent without leave. Numbers on this scale help explain the state’s determination to recover personnel, but they cannot settle the question of how that power should be exercised.

At the same time, the intensifying Russian drone and missile campaign places further strain on infrastructure, logistics and civilian endurance. Military attrition and domestic consent are no longer separate problems. The harder the war becomes to sustain, the more tempting administrative shortcuts may appear—and the more costly they become if the public ceases to trust them.

The strongest conclusion from the Kyiv incident is not that every allegation circulating online is true. It is that Ukraine’s system of mobilization has reached a point where an ordinary house can become a national crisis, drawing the presidential chief of staff into the street and forcing multiple official investigations. Western media have already covered the confrontation; what matters is whether scrutiny continues after the immediate spectacle fades. A government can lawfully require sacrifice in wartime. It cannot preserve confidence indefinitely by treating the conditions under which that sacrifice is demanded as a secondary question. In a war of endurance, legitimacy is itself a strategic resource.

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