Kautilya The Contemplator: The Price of Empire: Why Elections Cannot End America’s Forever Wars

By Kautilya The Contemplator, Substack, 11/7/26

History seldomly repeats itself precisely but certain patterns remain remarkably consistent. This is especially noticeable when great powers realize that their military capabilities far exceed their political capacity to sustain foreign campaigns. The results of the recent midterm elections are worth comparing with three earlier turning points in America’s political history. These include the 1952 presidential election at the height of the Korean War, the political turmoil of 1968 during the Vietnam War and the midterm elections in 2006 in the midst of the Iraq War. Across these cases, sustained military confrontation contributed to the erosion of public trust in the incumbent administration. It exposed the growing disparity between America’s global strategic ambitions and the willingness of the American electorate to finance them.

In 1952, a prolonged stalemate in Korea cost the Democratic Party the White House ending two decades of political control. In 1968, the Vietnam War jeopardized Lyndon Johnson’s presidency and further sowed divisions among the Democrats. In 2006, growing dissatisfaction with the Iraq War caused Republicans to lose control of both chambers of Congress, delivering a major setback to President George W. Bush. The recent midterm elections reverberate the same reversal of twenty years ago with the Republican Party losing control of Congress amid the turmoil in the Middle East, rising energy prices and high levels of discontent with US military commitments abroad.

Despite these repeated election reversals that are associated with involvement in unpopular wars, the United States continues to sustain those very policies that contributed to those defeats. Presidential administrations change, but the underlying imperatives of American military intervention continue as before.

The question is why. Why have electoral defeats, military stalemates and enormous financial expenditures failed to force a fundamental rethink of America’s reliance on military intervention? Why do the institutions that sustain America’s global military presence survive the political failures of successive administrations?

Three possible explanations can help shed some light on these questions. The first concerns the political economy of US military power. The military-industrial complex has become a permanent gigantic establishment whose interests transcend electoral cycles. The second relates to a consistent misconception across the national security establishment that overwhelming military force against adversaries can bring about desired political outcomes. The third is the weakening capacity of American political institutions to impose meaningful checks on US foreign policy even as the political and economic costs of global military intervention balloon at home. These forces together have resulted in a system where military intervention continues to be insulated by powerful institutions despite specific interventions losing public legitimacy.

The Business of War: Why the Military-Industrial Complex Survives Elections

In his farewell address on January 17, 1961, President Dwight Eisenhower warned Americans against the “unwarranted influence” of the military-industrial complex. The former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, who had helped end the Korean War, understood the dangers of an increasingly permanent military established whose interests extended beyond national defense. Following the end of the Second World War, confrontation with the Soviet Union and the communist bloc necessitated the transition from a period of industrial mobilization to a vast peacetime enterprise bringing together the US Congress, the Pentagon, defense contractors, research institutions and communities that increasingly depended on military spending.

Over time, this arrangement has created powerful incentives for sustaining a high military budget. Major billion dollar weapons programs like the Air Force’s F-35 Lightning II, missile defense and precision strike, support vast networks of arms producers, subcontractors and skilled workers across congressional districts. Legislators have strong incentives to protect the investment and employment generated by federal contracts. Military expenditure, therefore, is meant to serve not just national security but corporate profitability, industrial development and local economic interests.

According to 2023 data, the federal government obligated $433 billion in federal contracts to the top 100 contractors. Around 62 percent (or ~$270 billion) of those largest contracts were earmarked for defense contractors (Figure 2). Of that amount, 63 percent went to five key contractors (Lockheed Martin, RTX (Raytheon), General Dynamics, Boeing and Northrop Grumman). Moreover, according to SIPRI, 39 of the world’s largest 100 arms manufacturers in 2024 were American and accounted for $334 billion in arms revenues in 2024, nearly half the global total of $679 billion. America’s forever wars create continued demand for weapons, ammunition, replacement, maintenance and justify sustaining or increasing the military budget even after specific wars have ended.

This should not be interpreted as wars being started only for profit. Geopolitical considerations also drive military spending. However, there is a key asymmetry that is created by the system in which the political costs of unpopular wars fall on elected administrations while the financial benefits of sustained military spending continue to accrue to contractors regardless of which party holds power.

Consider the Korean War (1950-53). President Eisenhower’s election victory in 1952 reflected increasing frustration with a costly military stalemate. While the 1953 armistice ended major hostilities, American forces remained in South Korea and its broader interests in East Asia endured. The Iraq War demonstrated the same institutional resilience. Despite the 2006 midterm upset, President Bush increased American troop deployments in 2007. Efforts by Congress to impose a withdrawal timetable failed after Bush vetoed the legislation. Congress approved further funding without the same restrictions.

This is not to say that only arms producers determine US policy. These past wars underscore how the institutions and economic interests sustaining American military power have outlasted the elected leaders responsible for specific wars. Eisenhower’s warning, therefore, went beyond corporate profiteering to underscoring how the military-industrial complex had become embedded in America’s political economy. It had created powerful incentives for institutional continuity even when the electorate rejected certain foreign wars. The machinery of war survives the politicians who operate it.

The Fatal Illusion of American Military Supremacy

The US national security establishment has consistently failed to differentiate between military supremacy and political outcomes. Despite bringing overwhelming military force to various theaters, the United States has been unable to convert battlefield successes into favorable political results.

Consider the Vietnam War. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, even though the Viet Cong suffered significant battlefield defeats against American and South Vietnamese forces, they inflicted a stunning political defeat on the United States. The offensive exposed the contrast between official American reporting of making progress in the war and North Vietnam’s capacity to sustain the war, thereby undermining confidence in the Johnson administration. As a result, Johnson abandoned his re-election campaign and the war continued under President Nixon. North Vietnam did not need to defeat the United States on the battlefield. It only needed to play for time and outlast America’s political willingness to fight.

This lesson was apparent in Afghanistan and Iraq when US forces rapidly overthrew the Taliban in 2001 and Saddam Hussein in 2003. However, neither battlefield success produced a durable political outcome in either theater. Iraq faced years of insurgency and sectarian violence, while the Taliban survived two decades of American intervention before returning to power in 2021. American operational prowess was insufficient to overcome the political endurance of its adversaries.

These episodes echo today when despite claims by Trump administration officials that Iran’s navy is “sitting at the bottom of the sea”, Iran has demonstrated its ability to sustain the confrontation. Like North Vietnam and the Taliban, the Iranians are focusing on degrading American political endurance to sustain the fight. However, unlike Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan, the Iranians hold significant leverage in disrupting energy trade that has impacted American households. Rising prices and the broader crisis in the global economy due to restricted energy flows contributed to the major reversal in the midterms.

The Crisis of Democratic Accountability: Why Elections Cannot Restrain the War Machine

The growing disconnect between the democratic processes and the institutions in charge of US foreign policy provide a third explanation. At a fundamental level, both parties have accepted the necessity of America’s global primacy and the need to preserve the unipolar order at all costs. Disagreements have largely focused on how and where force is employed as opposed to the necessity of maintaining a global military presence. Opposition by the Democrats to the Iraq War did not prevent President Obama from deploying additional forces in Afghanistan or returning troops to Iraq in 2014. Similarly, despite President Trump’s campaign promises to end the Ukraine conflict in 24 hours upon taking office as well as end the forever wars, American support to Ukraine has continued while a new war against Iran was launched.

Declining Public Trust

The domestic foundations of American power are weakening. The Pew Research Center assessed that public confidence in the federal government fell from 73 percent in 1958 to 17 percent in 2025 (Figure 3). It has remained at or below 30 percent since 2007. While political fragmentation, declining living standards and institutional failures have contributed to this trend, the forever wars have eroded confidence in the government’s judgment and priorities.

Political legitimacy and popular support remain the bedrock of military power in addition to economic resources and technology. The growing distance between the ambitions of the national security establishment and the priorities of American citizens has rendered those ambitions more precarious than ever.

Growing Fiscal Costs of US Power

The fiscal base of American power is also under strain as the United States faces mounting debt obligations. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that federal debt held by the public will rise from 101 percent of GDP in 2026 to 120 percent in 2036 and 175 percent by 2056 (Figure 4). Net interest payments are projected to increase from 3.3 percent to 6.6 percent of GDP over the same period, eventually surpassing federal expenditure on either Social Security or Medicare individually.

While tax policy, demographic changes, entitlement spending and economic crises have all played a role,along with military interventions in the fiscal deterioration, the key problem is that Washington’s expanding global ambitions must increasingly compete with domestic economic priorities and the growing cost of debt servicing. Every additional intervention imposes an opportunity cost that reduces the share of resources available for critical sectors like healthcare, infrastructure and education.

When Military Power Outlives National Strength

The collapse of the Soviet Union offers a historical warning even though it is not a direct parallel to the United States. Unlike Washington, the Soviets did not pursue a similar pattern of global military interventions. Nonetheless, by the 1980s, it retained formidable military and nuclear capabilities even as institutional decay, political and economic stagnation eroded its national power. The Soviet experience highlights a central insight of the concept of the “correlation of forces” that I discussed in my last essay. Military supremacy cannot indefinitely compensate for weakening economic productivity, political cohesion and institutional legitimacy.

The Wars Continue Because the System Survives Their Failures

From the last several decades starting with Korea in the 1950s to Iran today, unpopular wars have eroded public trust. They have imposed significant economic costs on the population resulting in repeated electoral defeats. However, elections have been unable to affect the institutions, economic interests and strategic ambitions that underlie the perpetual cycle of wars.

Arms producers profit from a high military budget, the national security bureaucracy operates beyond the electoral cycles and both political parties remain committed to preserving American global primacy. The electorate can remove administrations but they are unable to influence the machinery of perpetual war in any meaningful way.

At the same time, the foundations of American power are coming under increasing strain. Public trust has eroded, federal debt and interest obligations are growing and foreign wars of choice are competing ever more with domestic priorities. While American decline is not a foregone conclusion, the distance between Washington’s global ambitions and the resources available to sustain them continues to widen.

More than six decades ago, Eisenhower warned that the institutions that were created to defend the republic could acquire greater influence that undermined democratic accountability. His warning is prescient. America’s greatest strategic vulnerability is not defeat by an adversary but a political system that is incapable of restraining the use of its military.

Wars end, administrations change and congressional majorities rise and fall. However, without meaningful accountability and public control over the institutions and ambitions that sustain America’s permanent military establishment, the cycle of interventions, strategic failure and electoral backlash will persist. The ultimate question is whether the United States possesses the political will to stop fighting wars that undermine its own national strength.

Kautilya The Contemplator is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, please consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. I will always be grateful for your support.

Aaron Mate Interviews James Carden on Ukraine War and His Upcoming Book “The Great Betrayal”

The interview starts at the 7:47 mark.

YouTube link here.

Uriel Araujo: NATO’s “Nordic model” brings Arctic confrontation closer to Russia’s nuclear bases

By Uriel Araujo, InfoBrics, 11/6/26

Uriel Araujo has a PhD in Anthropology and is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

As Washington shifts Europe’s conventional defense burden onto its allies, the Nordic countries are emerging as a blueprint for NATO’s future – raising questions about Arctic militarization, Russia’s nuclear deterrent, and regional escalation.

Last week, Finnish researcher Matti Pesu argued in Foreign Affairs that the Nordic countries offer a practical path forward for NATO. His proposal, typical as it is of many Western analyses, deserves some attention.

Finland and Sweden, the alliance’s newest members, have deepened defense coordination with Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. Joint air patrols, shared logistics, and intelligence sharing have reached unprecedented levels.

Pesu presents this “Nordic model” as a prototype for NATO 3.0: an alliance in which Europeans take primary responsibility for conventional defense while the United States retains nuclear deterrence and strategic leadership.

This is less about American “withdrawal” than burden-shifting: European states would supply more troops, equipment, infrastructure, and funding – while remaining under the American nuclear umbrella.

One could interpret this as the Europeanization of the costs and risks of “containing” Russia, without a corresponding Europeanization of strategic decision-making.

Pesu himself notes that Nordic military integration would advance the US National Security Strategy’s objective of maintaining favorable regional balances of power. The Nordic “cluster” thus serves wider American strategic goals.

The Arctic dimension carries particular weight: Pesu acknowledges that Finland allows American signals-intelligence aircraft to monitor the Kola Peninsula, where much of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent is concentrated.

Finland’s accession has thus expanded the Alliance’s intelligence and operational access to areas central to Russia’s nuclear forces. From Moscow’s perspective, NATO surveillance and military infrastructure near the Kola Peninsula constitute a strategic threat.

I commented elsewhere on how the Gulf of Finland could become a flashpoint for new conflict between NATO and Moscow – following Finnish and Swedish accession. The same logic now extends into the High North.

Pesu further proposes that subregional “clusters” could act even if NATO itself is paralyzed: these groupings would offer a “hedge”, enabling frontline allies to respond together.

This raises questions about escalation control: if, say, Nordic, Baltic, or Black Sea clusters undertake coordinated operations independently, a confrontation might develop before the alliance as a whole has agreed on its political objectives. Larger members could then face pressure to support actions they never authorized.

Pesu outlines a strategy for organizing NATO’s entire frontier with Russia into interoperable military clusters: a Nordic-Arctic grouping in the northwest, a Baltic-Polish cluster in the center, and a Black Sea cluster in the southeast.

From a Russian strategic perspective, this could be perceived as the consolidation of a continuous NATO military frontier stretching from the Arctic to the Black Sea.

The danger is that it would institutionalize greater military integration along Russia’s western and northern periphery – while potentially allowing regional coalitions to act without NATO-wide political consensus.

Russia then would face not merely an enlarged NATO, but a network of interoperable clusters capable of coordinating airpower, missile systems, intelligence gathering, naval operations, and troop movements along multiple fronts.

A March 2026 SIPRI study explicitly warns that Nordic enlargement and new military capabilities could undermine crisis stability by bringing NATO’s precision-strike systems closer to Russian strategic assets.

Another SIPRI analysis identifies inadvertent escalation, including nuclear escalation, as a significant risk in Northern Europe. In a security dilemma, Moscow’s countermeasures could themselves provoke further NATO deployments, perpetuating an increasingly dangerous cycle.

The Greenland question exposes a deeper contradiction here: the September agreement between Washington, Copenhagen, and Nuuk basically expanded American military access – while (formally) recognizing Danish sovereignty.

Pesu treats this as an opportunity to restore cooperation. Yet Washington is simultaneously asking European allies to assume greater responsibility for their own security and asserting exceptional strategic interests in territories belonging to those allies.

The Nordic countries, it turns out, are being asked to strengthen their capacity to “deter Russia” while accommodating an American administration that has itself openly challenged the sovereignty of a NATO member.

In any case, the biggest omission in NATO 3.0 discussions such as this is any serious consideration of diplomacy. There is little attention to arms control, confidence-building measures, military-to-military communication, or negotiated regional security arrangements.

One may recall that Finland and Sweden were long associated with different forms of neutrality or military nonalignment. They are now being presented as models for a more deeply militarized NATO – and a more NATOized Europe, increasingly “encircling” Moscow.

The “Nordic model” is no longer simply “adapting” to NATO; NATO is actually being encouraged to adapt to the Nordic model.

This way, the Arctic itself is becoming integrated into the alliance’s broader confrontation framework. Moreover, conventional military operations in this region take place close to strategically important nuclear assets.

Consequently, the [results] of a miscalculation could be far greater than those of an ordinary regional conflict.

Leonid Ragozin: Ukraine is running out of options, and Russia knows it

By Leonid Ragozin, Al Jazeera, 11/14/26

The trilateral talks between Ukraine, Russia and the United States that took place in Abu Dhabi this week may not lead to a rapid breakthrough, but they clearly outline the trajectory of a conflict that might, after all, be nearing its end.

If anything illustrates the political and emotional rift the two sides are yet to bridge, it is President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s remarks in Copenhagen this week, in which he lamented that Russian leader Vladimir Putin was still alive. Ukraine’s harsh reality, however, is pushing him towards an unsavoury compromise with his arch-enemy.

Kyiv was compelled to enter the talks at the most disadvantageous moment, when it has few means to counter devastating Russian air strikes that damage its key industries and cripple essential infrastructure in major cities. One of Ukraine’s top negotiators, David Arakhamia, who leads Zelenskyy’s parliamentary faction, described the negotiations as among the most difficult he had participated in since 2022. He said the Russians had arrived with very strict instructions and that it had been difficult to soften the tone of the discussions. His assessment confirms that Russia sees itself as well equipped to negotiate from a position of force.

Moscow, meanwhile, expressed optimism about the outcome. Putin’s aide, Vladimir Medinsky, said the talks had brought the two countries closer to peace. Even Arakhamia said there was momentum towards reaching a solution before the end of the year. That optimism, it needs to be noted, comes without any signs of Russia changing its position on the contours of the agreement. Just as it has for years, the Kremlin insists on a genuinely neutral, demilitarised Ukraine which honours the rights of its Russian-speaking population.

If all this comes as a nasty surprise to many in the West, that’s because for most of this year, Western politicians and the mainstream media kept insisting that the tide of war was turning and that Ukraine was getting the upper hand. Their optimism was fuelled by Ukrainian long-range strikes targeting Russian oil refineries as well as by the snail’s pace of Russian advances on the battlefield.

As late as September, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda said that “in all but name, Russia has already lost the war”. Around the same time, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said Russia was not doing well in Ukraine.

When NATO leaders convened for the Ankara summit in July, it seemed that even US President Donald Trump had bought into the idea that Ukraine had the battlefield advantage.

But Russia responded to Ukraine’s surge, backed up by European funds and US intelligence-sharing, with round-the-clock air strikes that are bringing Ukraine close to its pain barrier. Moscow’s message was cruel: any damage Ukraine and the West might inflict on Russia would be met with epic devastation in Ukraine, from which it would take decades to recover.

The coming winter spells nationwide humanitarian disaster. Russian strikes on energy infrastructure have disrupted electricity and central heating supplies. Millions of Ukrainians, particularly in major cities, live in apartment blocks dependent on central heating, without which their homes can become virtually unliveable. Generators can provide temporary power, but their use is making the cost of war enormous for Ukraine and Western taxpayers who fund its war effort.

It is these dire circumstances, rather than pressure from Trump’s administration, that have forced Ukraine to enter the talks. Zelenskyy would have waited at least until the spring had he not felt so pressed.

Ukraine’s surge has failed to shift Moscow’s peace conditions one inch. Meanwhile, the Western perception of this war’s realities has undergone a considerable transformation. There are two major signs of the shifting landscape which directly affect the agenda of the Abu Dhabi negotiations.

For the first time since the start of the war, a larger part of the Western establishment appears to be ready to discuss Europe’s post-war security architecture. The subject was first broached by US negotiator Jared Kushner, causing outrage in the warmongering camp. But Medinsky said after the Abu Dhabi talks that it was the central issue on the agenda.

This topic harks back to the agenda which Moscow brought to the table in December 2021, a few months before the all-out invasion. It did so after the US and Ukraine signed a charter on strategic partnership which may have served as the decisive trigger for Putin’s decision to invade. The very idea of discussing Europe’s security architecture with Moscow became a strict taboo in the West for over four years, but clearly it is not any more.

Curiously, this broad and vital topic was not the main sticking point at the talks, according to Kushner, who said the territorial issue was the hardest. Moscow has long insisted that Ukrainian forces should withdraw from the remaining part of the Donetsk region for talks to succeed.

But Moscow’s opposition to territorial compromise might be an act of deception aimed at achieving maximum gain on overarching geopolitical issues it considers really vital. At the end of the day, it is only propagandist symbolism that prompts the Kremlin to claim Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.

The other sign of change is European governments trying to jump on the bandwagon of peace talks even as this exposes a rift between hardliners, like the EU’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, and pragmatists who believe compromise is unavoidable. The latter most prominently include Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Store, who held a lengthy telephone call with Putin on October 27, ahead of the Abu Dhabi talks, with discreet consent from parts of the EU leadership.

Both the US and Ukraine suggested in recent days that Europeans should nominate a single envoy to be at the table during the next round. US envoy Steve Witkoff said on November 12 that Putin had agreed to let European representatives join the next round of talks. Russia didn’t confirm it, while Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov linked the possibility of EU’s inclusion to the personality of its chosen envoy.

Perhaps the most remarkable shift on display in Abu Dhabi was the appearance of NATO’s supreme commander in Europe, Alexus Grynkewich, especially as it was hailed by the Kremlin which tends to see the war as a proxy conflict with NATO.

But even the staunchest of hardliners, like the German and British governments, are visibly changing tack. Chancellor Friedrich Merz suggested he could talk to Putin during the next G20 summit. UK Defence Secretary Wes Streeting unexpectedly called for opening communication channels with Russia.

Others, like Kallas or Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, are finding themselves increasingly isolated and unable to influence rapid developments. So is Zelenskyy, who has sounded extremely bitter about the perceived lack of Western support in his latest appearances. But he is going ahead with the US-brokered peace process because there isn’t much of a choice.

Ted Snider: Yet More Reporting Shows the Ukraine War Was Avoidable

By Ted Snider, The American Conservative, 11/5/26

Following the Maidan coup of 2014, the two regions of Donbas held referenda on some form of autonomy and a civil war ensued. The best available chance for peace was offered by the Minsk agreements, brokered by France and Germany, agreed to by Ukraine and Russia, and accepted by the U.S. and UN in 2014 and 2015. This gave Ukraine the opportunity to keep its territory and Donbas the means to protect its ethnic Russian culture by peacefully remaining part of Ukraine with a new level of autonomy.

But the opportunity was missed. 

According to Putin biographer Philip Short, Ukraine’s then-President Pyotr Poroshenko would later confess that the arrangement envisaged by Minsk was never meant to be implemented. Poroshenko told the Ukrainian media and other news outlets that Kiev’s goal for Minsk was “to delay the war—to secure eight years to restore economic growth and create powerful armed forces.” He says that it worked: “We had achieved everything we wanted.” The “great diplomatic achievement,” Poroshenko told the Financial Times, was that, though Ukraine “didn’t have an armed forces at all… we kept Russia… away from a full-sized war.

Poroshenko’s account has been corroborated by his Minsk partners. Germany’s then-Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s then-President François Hollande have both said they saw Minsk as giving Ukraine the time and space to strengthen its military before another conflict with Russia. 

Even after the 2022 invasion, there was still a chance for peace. Within days, before most of the death and destruction had occurred, contact was made and talks were held between the two sides, first in Belarus and then, most promisingly, in Istanbul.

The historical record suggests that, while Ukraine and Russia were considering an agreement, and were potentially close to an agreement, the U.S. and UK pushed Ukraine off the diplomatic path to peace, and another possibility for peace was missed. 

Recent revelations have added evidence to the already overwhelming case. 

The first testimony comes from the Ukrainian former MP Vadym Novinsky. In an interview with Stana, he provides previously unknown details of the earliest negotiations of the war. He says that on February 24, at the end of the first day of the Russian invasion, he advised David Arakhamia, the head of Zelensky’s Servant of the People Party who led the Ukrainian negotiating team in Belarus and Istanbul, to immediately contact Moscow to begin negotiations. There hadn’t been many deaths yet, “and it was possible to try to turn the situation around.”

Novinsky says that on February 25, he was contacted by the head of one of Ukraine’s intelligence agencies, who requested that he begin to organize negotiations. The intelligence chief said that the request came from the president of Ukraine. Within minutes, Novinsky was talking to Zelensky. Novinsky says that he succeeded in organizing the first talks in Gomel, a city in Belarus near the Ukrainian border. 

Novinsky says that the agenda included three main points. The most important was Russia’s insistence that the clause on Ukraine’s NATO aspirations be removed from its constitution and be replaced by one asserting “non-aligned status and neutrality.” The second was that Ukraine would recognize Crimea’s “special status” but not “as part of the Russian Federation” for 30 years. The third was that Ukraine would recognize “a special status” for Donbas. There could be negotiations about Donbas remaining in Ukraine. At this point, there was “still the option of keeping Donbas within Ukraine… within a framework of a confederal union.”

Novinsky says that he “coordinated every point with President Zelenskyy. And he agreed to everything then.” The process of developing the agreement lasted the month leading up to the Istanbul talks.

The striking thing about Novinsky’s testimony is that, if true, Russia was prepared in the first month of the war to trade a potentially intact Ukraine for a promise not to join NATO. But perhaps most astonishing it the revelation that it was not Russia that backed away from diplomacy—it was Ukraine. When asked by the interviewer why the Istanbul process failed, Novinsky responded, “I am absolutely certain that it was the fault of our leaders.” He says Boris Johnson, UK prime minister at the time, may have been involved, or it could have been “Zelensky himself”; but, in any case, it was the Kiev leadership that walked away from the diplomatic path to peace.

A similar story is told by a new report of a previously unknown back channel that was opened several months later. According to reporting by the Financial Times, the American lawyer Richard Conn and the American investment banker Bob Foresman managed to open a diplomatic back channel by reaching Russian President Vladimir Putin through a former East German spy named Matthias Warnig and Zelensky through a Ukrainian film maker who had, reportedly, already helped set up the promising peace talks in Istanbul months before. According to Short’s biography of Putin, Warnig arranged for Putin’s wife’s medical exam when she was badly injured in a car accident and was “one of the very few foreigners admitted to Putin’s inner orbit.”

The team conveyed a message to Putin from the senior director for Russia on the U.S. National Security Council, Eric Green, to the effect that Washington was neither pursuing regime change nor trying to destroy Russia—its aim was to broker a piece. The message, Green said, came from directly the White House.

In an interview with The American Conservative, Foresman said that Conn had communicated with Green extensively. There was a dangerously low level of communication between Washington and Moscow. Foresman says that Green made it clear to Conn that the White House “acknowledged and encouraged” the back channel and that they felt it was “constructive.” The team felt there was no question that the U.S. government encouraged the back channel.

Putin sent a message back, saying he had “no choice but to conduct military operations” but that he was “very open to negotiations.” Foresman told TAC that Warnig had a uniquely close relationship to Putin, and that he assured them that Putin was serious about his willingness to negotiate.

He wanted the talks to be elevated to the level of his own aide, Yuri Ushakov, and Biden’s National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. The Wall Street Journal soon reported that Sullivan did hold confidential conversations with Ushakov “in an effort to reduce the risk of a broader conflict over Ukraine and warn Moscow against using nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.”

Russia’s position had hardened by now, but was still far more favorable to Ukraine than any offer that remains on the table today. Russia would pull back to its prewar position. Ukraine would recognize de facto Russian control of Crimea, but, according to Ukrainian opposition MP Oleksiy Goncharenko, who has confirmed the Financial Times story, would not have to de jure “recognize it as Russian.” Russia would return the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to Ukraine and commit $300 billion in frozen assets to the rebuilding of Ukraine. The ceasefire would be ensured by protection from NATO states while Moscow began discussing a permanent security arrangement with Washington.

Once again, Putin said that Ukraine could not be allowed to join NATO. He had softened his position, though, and would not stand in the way of Ukraine joining the European Union. He was willing to discuss the suggested frozen line as well as a security arrangement based on the one discussed at the Istanbul talks. “If we can agree on the border and on NATO, then we can discuss everything else,” Putin reportedly told Warnig. 

By this account, Zelensky and his people barely looked at the offer and refused to make any concessions on Ukraine’s borders. The U.S. would also pass on the opportunity. According to Warnig, Sullivan had made it clear to Ushakov that the U.S. had not approved the back channel and that they saw no need for it. The rest is history.

Analysis & Book Reviews on U.S. Foreign Policy and Russia