By Matthew Blackburn, Responsible Statecraft, 6/25/26

As Western leaders departed the G7 summit in Évian talking of a “strategic awakening in support of Ukraine,” the night sky over Moscow was illuminated by the fires of a burning oil refinery just nine miles from the Kremlin. This unprecedented Ukrainian drone strike on Russian territory was met in Western capitals with quiet endorsement rather than anxiety.

During the tensest moments of the Cold War, Western statecraft was anchored by a healthy fear of the unknown. Today, that prudence has been replaced by confidence that conflict can be precisely managed. When Franklin D. Roosevelt famously declared that “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself,” he was addressing panic during an economic collapse. In contemporary Europe, however, this maxim has been carelessly transposed onto the realm of nuclear redlines.

The prevailing consensus in Europe treats deep strikes into the Russian heartland as a low-cost method of pressuring Moscow into a ceasefire. Assuming Russia is under unsustainable strain, experts continue to argue that Europe can safely coordinate the war, so long as taxpayers accept the costs.

Such a view ignores the risks inherent to a broader unravelling of the global security architecture. Unlike during the Cold War, in which superpowers respected defined chains of command and established redlines, today’s historical guardrails have eroded. The European coalition lacks both coherent leadership and escalation control mechanisms. This makes the conflict far more prone to spiraling into a broader war than commonly acknowledged.

This is keeping with the conflict’s trajectory since 2022 of creeping escalation dressed up as controlled policy. As European states take the primary responsibility for supporting Ukraine, this conflict is reaching a new, more dangerous stage.

Europe’s strategy in Ukraine during Trump 2.0

The Western coalition behind Ukraine fragmented after President Donald Trump’s return to the White House. Throughout 2025, European leaders proposed a “coalition of the willing” to deploy forces and integrate Ukraine into an emergent European Union security space following a ceasefire. They essentially demanded that Russia agree to an unconditional ceasefire while holding the upper hand on the battlefield.

When Trump’s Alaska summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin made it clear Washington would not enforce these demands, Europe switched gears. Its leaders agreed to cover the costs of U.S.-made weapons, ramp up domestic military production, tighten sanctions, and keep the pressure on Moscow to agree to a ceasefire.

Lacking the capacity for large-scale ground offensives, Ukraine’s strategy shifted to defending its frontlines while increasing costs on Russia through deep strikes. These attacks grew in scale and scope even after Trump’s inauguration signaled a U.S. pivot to a negotiated settlement. The most dramatic case was Operation Spiderweb, during which Ukrainian drones struck Russian airbases, damaging strategic bombers tied to Russia’s nuclear deterrence triad. While Kyiv denied targeting Putin’s Valdai residence in December 2025, President Zelensky’s recent open letter defiantly warned the Russian leadership it could not be “comfortable” given Ukraine’s ability to strike state parades and executive residences.

A war without clear guardrails

Striking a nuclear power’s strategic assets and leadership lacks any Cold War precedent. From the British seizure of the Russian shadow-fleet tanker Smyrtos to Zelensky’s recent warning that “Moscow will burn,” the erosion of guardrails continues in real-time. To make matters worse, Western decision-making is now fragmented across a variety of actors; it is reported Kyiv requests approvals for deep strikes from the Pentagon and individual European defense ministries on a case-by-case basis.

Current European strategy assumes an overextended and weak Moscow fears a wider conflict and will keep the war within current parameters. This supports the view that gradual, qualitative shifts in military support can compel Moscow into a ceasefire. Key to this is relocating Ukrainian drone production into Europe, where it is shielded from Russian air strikes. More sophisticated European-made drones are already available to Kyiv; NATO long-range missiles are also now being licensed for production directly in European and Ukrainian manufacturing sites. Kyiv has brilliantly exploited this framework, operating under the assumption that Russia’s hands are tied.

But deep strikes put the Kremlin in a tough spot. Thus far, Moscow has been visibly reluctant to execute wider drone and missile deep strikes with the aim of devastating Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. This restraint is born not of military incapacity but of a calculated political logic: If Russia intensifies deep strikes on Ukraine’s energy grid and water supply, it could trigger a humanitarian catastrophe and an irreversible public relations disaster that is fundamentally in conflict with the Kremlin’s claim it is liberating a “brotherly people.” It would also likely rally Western public opinion behind the war. Thus, unlike Israel’s unrestricted, high-intensity air campaign in Gaza, Russia has operated with restraint to preserve its political narrative.

Yet herein lies the danger. If Moscow concludes that its restraint inside Ukraine is being weaponized by Kyiv to inflict deep, humiliating costs on the Russian heartland, its calculus will shift. Instead of going for Ukrainian infrastructure, Moscow may seek to redress the asymmetry in deep strikes and restore deterrence by targeting the true source of Ukraine’s new capacities: European logistical hubs and the manufacturing facilities.

Even a limited Russian reprisal strike on European soil would severely test its collective political will. European air defence and missile stockpiles would come under severe strain in a rapid tit-for-tat strike exchange scenario. Striking European states would be Putin’s ultimate gamble to turn the tables. Instead of a weak Russia making hollow threats, Europe would be gripped by panic as its leaders scrambled to respond without crossing the nuclear threshold.

This scenario is not imminent. Deep strikes would have to intensify further. In the meantime, we should not expect Putin to sue for peace under the pressure of increasingly disruptive but localized deep strikes. The Kremlin will praise the work of its air defenses and play down the scale of the damage. Yet the more strikes that hit Moscow, the more likely a Russian reprisal strike on Europe becomes. To avoid this harrowing scenario, European leaders must return to the basics of conflict management, investing in diplomacy aimed at the urgent rebuilding of strategic guardrails.

Restoring the balance

The paralysis of the diplomatic track leaves Europe exposed. The E3’s five-point plan, agreed in London last week, illustrates the problem: by demanding an unconditional ceasefire alongside foreign troop deployments for security guarantees, it effectively foreclosed near-term negotiations. Diplomatic inertia means the war may progress to the point an exhausted or exasperated Russia is forced to choose between abandoning its war aims or taking a drastic kinetic step to curb European enthusiasm for continuing the war.

Breaking this policy inertia requires rejecting the myth that Europe can safely manage an unprecedented standoff without statecraft. A fundamental reset is needed: European leaders must agree on explicit escalation controls, communicate them to Moscow, and open a viable diplomatic track. While basing negotiations on the current frontline offers a positive foundation for talks, the core challenge remains striking a compromise between Moscow’s demand for Ukrainian neutrality and Europe’s integration plans for Ukraine.

Developing a diplomatic off-ramp and building a new security architecture are not capitulation, nor do they mean reducing support for Ukraine’s defense. Deterrence and diplomacy are partners. A defined diplomatic track is the only mechanism capable of anchoring Europe’s security to a stable, predictable outcome, rather than gambling on fluid redlines.

Nonetheless, engineering this kind of pivot requires a level of strategic vision and political courage not observable in Europe’s current leadership. Without a fundamental reset, Europe risks learning the hard way that running a war without guardrails is not statecraft – it is brinkmanship without a safety net.

By Sylvia Demarest, Substack, 7/1/26

Introduction

The risk that current wars will expand into a nuclear war continues to grow. While the war on Iran currently consists of sporadic exchanges, it has expanded to more countries. Israel has invaded Southern Lebanon. Iraq, apparently under US pressure, has moved to disarm militias said to be aligned with Iran, perhaps to open a path to a future ground invasion of Iran. Pakistan has moved weapons and military personnel into Saudi Arabia. Israeli leaders have pointed to Türkiye as a potential threat to Israel and former leaders have proclaimed that “Türkiye is the new Iran”. Syria is struggling to avoid being drawn into war in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, the proxy war on Russia continues to intensify. Ukraine, with the help of NATO, the UK, and several EU countries, is both manufacturing weapons for Ukraine, and helping send drone swarms into Russia–oblivious of the risk of Russian retaliation. Meanwhile, President Trump seems supportive as he “escalates to deescalate” the Ukraine war. The “Spirit of Anchorage” is dead since the US refuses to acknowledge or to follow through on the agreements that were reached with Russia back in August of 2025. Diplomacy is now virtually non-existent between Russia the US and NATO. The US does not even have an Ambassador to Russia!

One risk is that Ukraine will turn to terrorism. A recent terror attack on a Ukrainian oligarch in Monaco via a package bomb in a hotel is cited as an example. Two people were injured including a woman who had her legs blown off. This is the first terror attack in Monaco. It may not be the last.

These wars and other events could well signal that the current era of globalization, characterized by the free flow of goods and money, is ending. Asset seizures, tariffs, and increasing nationalism are also incompatible with globalization. The Covid lockdown was one blow, resulting in severe supply chain disruptions, the loss of small businesses, and increased inflation. The closing of the Strait of Hormuz is another with increased pressure on supply chains. Companies whose inputs cross three jurisdictions and transpire in several different currencies, could represent a business model for a world that is slowly coming to an end.

Although the focus of the current crisis has been on oil prices, the supply of other critical products has also been affected from fertilizers to lubricants, to pharmaceuticals to helium. The impact of these shortages have yet to fully hit the global economy.

China and Tank Bottom

Critical to the management of this crisis is the fact that China stopped importing oil. Chinese imports fell by 4.7 million barrels a day helping to prevent shortages across the world. Countries around the world also tapped reserves helping to keep oil prices low. Trump visited China from May 13-15. Was a deal cut at that time?

So far, the Trump Administration and the international energy market have managed this crisis remarkably well. Meanwhile, the oil market is still in a race against the clock as global oil inventories continue to fall. Onshore storage now at its seasonally lowest point in recorded history. Strait inbounds remain far below necessary levels. This means Iran still has leverage with little reason to relinquish control. Once the barrels that remain stuck in the Strait are absorbed the calculus shifts to outbound tankers vs. curtailed production vs. the number of inbound tankers. Meanwhile, price manipulation has worked. Massive shorting of oil, and consistent production in the US, has managed prices which are now under $70 a barrel. Market apathy persists with traders believing every tweet that declares imminent peace. Yet, the clock continues to count down to operational lows and tank bottoms.

The extent of market manipulation is also being revealed–namely, by massive shorting oil on the exchange and through various ETFs. In one ETF it is estimated that a huge percentage of the shares have been borrowed to sell short. At some point these trades will have to be reversed. This could lead to a rapid increase in the price of oil.

The War on Iran

On June 17, 2026, the US and Iran entered the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which also extended the cease fire agreement entered on April 8, 2026. The terms of the MOU so heavily favored Iran that many commentators spoke openly of a US defeat. The MOU promised to end the US blockade, lift sanctions on Iran, return to Iran billions of seized funds, create a reconstruction fund of $300 billion to rebuild Iran, end the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon, and perhaps even allow Iran to control the Strait of Hormuz. So far, other than lifting the blockade and allowing Iran to export oil, the US has avoided complying with the MOU.

Regarding the MOU cease fire, in the words of former Ambassador Chas Freeman, it is “a ceasefire with Israeli characteristics, you cease, we fire.”

Controversies over the terms of the MOU quickly developed. These included: the US stating that Iran had agreed to open her enrichment programs to full international inspection by IAEA; that instead of returning Iran’s funds to Iran, the funds would be placed in an account controlled by the US and would only be used to purchase US agricultural products and pharmaceuticals; and pressuring Oman to allow non-fee transit along Oman’s part of the Strait under US control. Oman has signed the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Iran has not. But Oman and Iran are still negotiating, see: After U.S.-Iran War, Oman Said to Propose Hormuz Fee Plan (NY Times).

Iran was to immediately receive some $12 billions of her funds held by Qatar–funds that go all the way back to the Biden Administration. So far, none of these funds have been released to Iran.

The MOU also required the parties to “refrain from the threat or use of force against each other” yet Trump persists in threating to “kill the Iranian peace negotiators in Switzerland”, that he may have to “complete the job” — (if he doesn’t get a very good deal) — which, he says, would take “ about a week”

The terms of the MOU also required the permanent termination of all military operations, on all fronts, including Lebanon. Yet, on March 16, 2026, Israel invaded Southern Lebanon. Instead of complying with the MOU and pressuring Israel to withdraw from Lebanon, Secretary of State Marco Rubio negotiated a “Trilateral Framework Between the United States of America, the State of Israel, and the Republic of Lebanon” with the Lebanese president that allows Israel to remain in Lebanon. This agreement is very controversial within Lebanon and its full implementation is in question. This “Trilateral Framework” should be seen as a direct attack on the MOU with Iran. What is going on?

Some are speculating that these two conflicting agreements are reflective of an ongoing conflict in the Trump Administration between Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Vance was involved in negotiating the MOU, some claim Vance was not aware of Rubio’s parallel negotiation of the Trilateral Framework.

Here’s Moon of Alabama: “Via The Cradle we find some interesting speculation how this is an expression of a power struggle within Trump’s White House coterie:”

“The agreement between Lebanon and Israel cannot be understood through bilateral negotiations alone. It also reflects shifting power dynamics in Washington, where US policy toward Lebanon is shaped not only by official institutions, but by competition within the administration and the Republican Party, alongside pressure from pro-Israel lobbying groups, particularly the Zionist lobby and the hardline Lebanese Christian lobby.”

…

“[This] is reflected in the quiet contest within the American right, particularly between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who represents the traditional pro-Israel Republican establishment, and Vice President JD Vance, whose camp has been more cautious about US involvement in West Asia.”

…

“According to sources familiar with the matter, these tensions have extended beyond policy differences. Vance was reportedly angered after learning that Rubio had been planning a tour of the Gulf without consulting him beforehand. He also suspected Rubio of working behind the scenes with US envoys Jared Kushner, and possibly Steve Witkoff, in ways that could undermine Vance’s diplomatic achievements. Those close to Vance increasingly believe that Rubio, Kushner, and Senator Lindsey Graham have formed an informal alliance aimed at sidelining him ahead of the next presidential race.”

“Rubio has long been captured by the Zionist lobby while Vance is creature of tech billionaires. Which side has more firepower if there is a competition?”

US Israeli policy is a complete and inhuman disaster which has allowed Israel to commit genocide in Gaza, appropriate Palestinian land in the West Bank, and invade, displace people, and destroy Southern Lebanon. The fact that this level of depravity persists, with US support, reflects the degree of money and power supporting the State of Israel.

Iran Ships Oil to China

Since the lifting of the blockade much of the oil that has exited the strait has been Iranian oil shipped to China. Iran had millions of barrels of oil in storage and on crude carriers. Part of the strategy behind the US blockade was to use the blockade to force a shutdown of Iranian energy production. This strategy did not succeed, Iranian oil is now exiting the Gulf in bulk. Iran has exported 50 million barrels of oil, mostly to China. This is a rate of around 3.5 million barrels per day versus Iran’s “normal” rate of export of around 1.7 million barrels a day. This means Iran is exporting roughly double the normal amount.

It is estimated that Iran may have another 55 million barrels in onshore oil storage to be exported. If Iran can continue to export at this rate, and this is uncertain since it is unknown if there are buyers other than China, Iranian storage will be emptied in around 2 weeks. After that, it will no longer be advantageous for Iran to keep the blockades lifted–especially in the face of the lack of implementation of the MOU. What happens then? What happens if, by July 15th, the United States still hasn’t released any of Iran’s frozen assets? What is Iran’s incentive to continue with the joint lifting of blockades? At that point could it be advantageous for Iran to reclose the Strait and return to the pre-MOU status but with 105 to 150 million barrels of Iranian oil sold with the proceeds outside the reach of the US?

No recent Assassinations of Iranian Leaders. Why?

Leah Gunn Barret on a You Tube channel called “Transition Protocol” has claimed that a Pakistani Chinese technological breakthrough helped Iran halt the assassination campaign against its leadership after the March 17 killing of Ali Larijani–“Pakistan led Iran to finally find a way to counteract the artificial intelligence-generated killing of their top leadership.” The allegation is that with China’s help, Pakistan cracked the kill chain code and offered the technology to Iran.

In a “division of responsibility” the US allowed Israel to hunt and kill Iranian leaders “using an intelligence apparatus built to assassinate with lethal proficiency.” “Israel has pursued this assignment with ruthless efficiency, killing Iran’s supreme leader in the opening salvo of the war and more than 250 other “senior Iranian officials” since, according to a count maintained by the Israeli military. The latest blow came when Israel said it had killed the naval commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. “

It was revealed that Pakistani intelligence discovered Israel was planning to assassinate a leading Iranian figure at the signing of the MOU, possibly Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. It has been alleged that Pakistan informed Israel that if it tried anything, it would hear directly from Pakistan and “it won’t be pleasant.” The MOU was subsequently signed electronically.

It is further alleged that Pakistani military intelligence intercepted another threat from Israel to assassinate Pakistani peace mediator Field Marshal Asim Munir at recent US/Iran talks in Switzerland. Pakistan responded by threatening retaliation if it touched the Pakistani delegation.

As this Substack has discussed, the technology behind Israel’s assassination spree belongs to none other than tech giant Palantir. Here’s a chilling description of how Palantir’s Maven program surveils and kills people.

Who’s Pushing These Wars?

Looking objectively at the world, on wonders why some accommodation short of war could not be found to resolve global tensions–yet these wars persist. Why? There are many theories regarding the forces that, throughout human history, have pushed for and profited from war, including the saying “all wars are bankers wars”. One theory offered by Alex Krainer and the people at Promethean is that “Perfidious Albion” i.e. the UK and the remnants of the British Empire and the City of London are to blame. Below is from Alex Krainer’s Substack.

Here’s Alex Krainer’s Take: “Over the past few years, I came to the conclusion that Great Britain was world’s chief arsonist of peace and suggested that if, the City of London, with its supporting structures in British government, banking, intelligence, secret diplomacy, along with a vast network of think tanks, media organizations, NGOs, charitable organizations and gambling casinos around the world could somehow be quarantined, probably 95% of all the world’s wars and other problems would vanish overnight.”

As proof Krainer points to the heavy British influence in the Russiagate scandal, Britian being instrumental in the creation of Israel, and the continuing British hostility to both Iran and Russia.

Krainer goes on to note: “Chatham House published an article by Sir John Jenkins titled, Lasting Israel–Palestine peace will not be possible without a new policy to neutralize the Iranian threat.”

“Sir John’s article was based on a more extensive policy paper published by The Policy Exchange on 17 July 2023 (thus, before “October 7”), titled “The Iran Question and British Strategy.” Both documents spell out much of what we are observing in the region today and the 2023 document even explains the broader framework behind the need to take down Iran: it is an obstacle for Britain’s “Indo-Pacific Tilt.” In its foreword, the paper says that “Iran’s increasingly appalling human rights record, accelerating nuclear program, sponsorship of proxies throughout the Middle East, extensive assistance to Russia in its brutal war on Ukraine, and sponsorship of terrorism and kidnapping makes it an obvious threat to international stability.””

Finally noting: “The authors shed some light on Britain’s disproportionate power, given its minuscule military and disintegrating economy: “The UK’s diplomatic and military toolkit allow it to make a difference in the Middle East. For historic and strategic regions, the UK has deep and longstanding relationships with almost every country in the Middle East. This fact, alongside its UN Security Council membership and military capacity, give it the ability to have an outsized influence on the course of Middle East affairs.””

What do you think?

---

By Brian McDonald, Substack, 6/28/26

Brian McDonald is an Irish journalist who has lived in Russia for many years.

Sergei Ivanov’s death last week closes one of the more fascinating unfinished chapters in the story of Putin’s Russia. Just as his formal retirement earlier this year marked the start of what will be the gradual exit of the political leadership that came to power in Russia in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Ivanov was a silovik who might have been president, who for a time seemed to stand nearer than anyone else to Vladimir Putin’s confidence, and his career rose so high that even its ultimate failure had the proportions of triumph.

At 73, his passing came months after he had left his final post, the ornate but diminished title of special presidential envoy for ecology and transport. It might have seemed a strange last office for someone who had sat at the centre of the state as defence minister, secretary of the Security Council, first deputy prime minister and head of the presidential administration, but he embraced it with gusto and was very obviously an animal lover.

His life was tied to Putin’s in myriad ways as both came out of Leningrad and both passed through the world of Soviet intelligence at the same time. Ivanov was rather dry, brusque, controlled, albeit courteous in private by many accounts, but, in contrast to his old friend, almost entirely without warmth in public where he spoke as if speech were a procedure requiring clearance. Although ironically, he sounded more engaging when speaking English than his native Russian.

In the middle years of Putin’s first presidency, Ivanov thrived in the system being built around him, security-minded, European enough to understand the West, suspicious enough not to trust it, patriotic without the circus element of a Zhirinovsky or Rogozin, bureaucratic without being merely grey. He knew languages and the intelligence world, he understood the global system better than most men around Putin and once belonged to the camp that believed Russia could still deal with the old West, or at least with its serious parts.

But he also carried the hard instincts of the security collective and he could be blunt to the point of brutality. As defence minister he presided over an army still crippled by corruption, hazing, bureaucratic rot and the miserable inheritance of the 1990s. The Andrey Sychyov case, in which a conscript was so savagely abused that he lost his legs and genitals, became one of the darkest symbols of that era and Ivanov’s handling of it did him no credit. At the same time, his ministry fumbled the transformation of the Russian armed forces, leaving that task to fall to others.

Yet Ivanov’s defining contest was with Dmitry Medvedev rather than NATO, Washington, Brussels, Ukraine or Chechen militants.

By 2007, the choice of Putin’s successor had become the great court drama of Moscow and Ivanov and Medvedev were elevated together, compared endlessly, and watched for clues in seating arrangements, television coverage, Red Square pageants and presidential body language. Ivanov had the harder profile and where he suggested some form of continuity, the more youthful Medvedev offered a form of progress through legality and modernisation. For a Russia newly rich on oil, with a booming consumer market, but still resentful of humiliation and not yet fully tired of liberal vocabulary, both versions had their uses.

Then Putin went and chose Medvedev, surprising many Russia watchers, and that was the hinge on which Ivanov’s career turned. He didn’t vanish, however, and remained fairly powerful, then became stronger again in 2011 when he was appointed head of the presidential administration, just as Moscow was facing the Bolotnaya protests and Putin was returning to the presidency. In that role he managed the hardening of the system after 2012, the conservative turn, the suspicion of street politics, the tightening attitude to NGOs, media, sexuality, education and the whole world of dissent.

This period was the revenge of officials who regarded the Medvedev interval, with its talk of modernisation, Skolkovo, photo ops with Steve Jobs, burgers with Obama, and cautious media thaw, as frivolous or merely unserious and Ivanov saw liberal gestures as weakness and Western praise as a trap. Although he did show up on a BBC documentary called “Putin, Russia and the West” where he fondly spoke of his relationship with former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

Fundamentally, he was never really master of the machine and his relations with parts of the FSB establishment were complicated because he’d come from foreign intelligence, which meant he was never fully absorbed into the internal-security clan. In Russia, where power is tribal as well as personal, closeness to Putin isn’t always enough as Alexey Kudrin, and a few others, could testify.

His departure from the presidential administration in 2016 was carried out smoothly as he was moved sideways into ecology and transport, as left-field an exit ramp as could be imagined in Moscow. There were rumours of ill health, and a fondness for good whiskey, amid a deeper private grief that engulfed his final decade. In 2005, his eldest son Alexander was involved in a traffic incident in Moscow in which a 68-year-old woman, Svetlana Beridze, was struck and killed on a pedestrian crossing. The case was later closed, but the episode became another Russian parable about rank, influence, elitism, immunity and the excesses of the children of power.

Then, in 2014, Alexander drowned in the United Arab Emirates and his death was said to have struck Ivanov with exceptional force. For years, Kremlin insiders would say he hadn’t gotten over it, and was no longer “the old Sergey.”

Whatever was really going on at home, Ivanov was now more often seen with tigers, leopards, birds and bears than with his old government colleagues. There were meetings with international celebrities, including an almost hard to comprehend set piece with Pamela Anderson, to promote the causes that had become his official brief.

Putinism was made by a generation of Saint Petersburg lawyers, intelligence officers, state managers, security men, technocrats, oil people, court ideologues and opportunists. Some were loud and performative but Ivanov belonged to the less voluble inner species, where he was the confidant who knew where the bodies were buried and was too disciplined to mention the cemetery.



The fact that he could have been president adorns all his media obituaries, but most of them miss the nuance that the presidency in Putin’s Russia wasn’t a prize waiting for the most qualified candidate, and was instead a function inside Putin’s own design. Medvedev received it because Putin needed that version of the future in 2008 and Ivanov didn’t because he represented another one. He also had more potential to form an independent power base and would have been less certain to hand back the keys to the Kremlin after a single term, which likely played a role.



Ivanov was also known to take a dim view of those who stole and would most likely have launched a major anti-graft crackdown if he’d found himself calling the shots, which earned him enemies in advance.

In the end, Sergei Ivanov showed what one possible Putin succession might have looked like, harder, colder, more openly security-driven, less theatrical than today’s ideological circus, but no less committed to the supremacy of the state. Like so many players in Russian history, he became something more melancholy than a failure, a man with the knowledge that the warm breeze of the future had once passed close enough for him to feel its heat.

RT, 6/28/26

Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the convention of his party, United Russia, in Moscow on Sunday, and gave a sweeping speech that touched on development, Western pressure, and global instability.

The convention was held ahead of the parliamentary election in September. 

World in turmoil

Russia is facing a difficult time, with the entire world experiencing a period of “fundamental and systemic transformation,” Putin said, noting the flare-up of regional conflicts and fragmentation of international cooperation.

New artificial obstacles that affect the “economy, technology, science, and even culture, sports and humanitarian cooperation” are emerging, he said.

The proxy war in Ukraine

Western pressure on Russia has reached unprecedented levels, according to Putin.

He went on to say that the Western elites are unable to “inflict a strategic defeat” on Russia, and their efforts to destabilize it from within are proving ineffective.

“Consequently, they keep supporting the Kiev regime, which they have chosen as a battering ram in their struggle against Russia, without any sympathy for the Ukrainian people.”

As Ukraine faces setbacks on all parts of the front line, it has turned to “terrorist activities,” engaging in “targeted attacks on civilians and civilian facilities” and openly recruiting people to conduct terrorist attacks in Russia, Putin said.

The West, meanwhile, turns a blind eye to Kiev’s methods, he added.

National security

Russia is “confidently repelling” all attempts to deter its economic progress, Putin said, referring to the “unlawful” Western sanctions. “We have sufficient resources, means, and political will, and nobody should doubt that.” 

The ultimate goal is to ensure the security of Russia, its people, and its borders “for decades ahead,” he stressed.

Safeguarding the future

Putin vowed to “take Russia’s economy to a fundamentally new technological level,” to create modern, high-paying jobs, and to “support national businesses and advanced industries that guarantee Russia’s sovereignty and leadership.”

He also expressed support for building new housing and roads, as well as new support measures for teachers proposed by United Russia.

He identified the preservation of traditional values and demographics and improving living standards and the quality of life across the country as key priorities.

The upcoming election

Putin praised Russian soldiers, volunteers, engineers, and other workers for serving the country, repeating his view that the veterans are “Russia’s true elite.” Theyshould continue serving in civilian life after military service, he said.

“Many party members, including those who have held high posts in government and business structures, have volunteered to go to the front, and frontline heroes are joining your ranks, winning preliminary elections and running for office at all levels.” 

The upcoming September parliamentary election will be held in strict adherence to the law and with all measures taken to ensure their integrity, including from external influence and manipulation, Putin said.

The people’s trust in the nation’s democratic institutions is the “essential condition of our society’s stability and unity,” he stated.

The Bell, 6/29/26

The Bell is a Russian opposition outlet based outside of the country. – Natylie

Ukraine’s drone campaign against Russian oil refineries has sparked an unprecedented gasoline shortage — just at the height of the typical summer surge in demand. Huge queues at gas stations and fuel shortages have reached Moscow for the first time. Muscovites, who had been almost entirely isolated from the impact of the Ukraine invasion until recently, are again feeling the realities of living in a country at war. For a long time, Vladimir Putin was silent. But this week he appeared at four major public events, using each of them to insist that he will not back down — despite the obvious challenges — and will continue the fight.

Even Moscow runs dry

Fuel shortages are increasing due to Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries. As expected, after the June 16-18 attacks on the Moscow Oil Refinery, supply issues have reached Moscow for the first time since the war began. This photo report from Meduza gives a glimpse of the fuel situation in the capital. In recent days, long lines of vehicles have formed at several gas stations. The specifics vary from company to company. Some only have the cleaner, more expensive Ai-95, while others lack both that and the cheaper and more popular Ai-92 grade. Most networks have also introduced rationing.