By Kautilya The Contemplator, Substack, 11/7/26
History seldomly repeats itself precisely but certain patterns remain remarkably consistent. This is especially noticeable when great powers realize that their military capabilities far exceed their political capacity to sustain foreign campaigns. The results of the recent midterm elections are worth comparing with three earlier turning points in America’s political history. These include the 1952 presidential election at the height of the Korean War, the political turmoil of 1968 during the Vietnam War and the midterm elections in 2006 in the midst of the Iraq War. Across these cases, sustained military confrontation contributed to the erosion of public trust in the incumbent administration. It exposed the growing disparity between America’s global strategic ambitions and the willingness of the American electorate to finance them.
In 1952, a prolonged stalemate in Korea cost the Democratic Party the White House ending two decades of political control. In 1968, the Vietnam War jeopardized Lyndon Johnson’s presidency and further sowed divisions among the Democrats. In 2006, growing dissatisfaction with the Iraq War caused Republicans to lose control of both chambers of Congress, delivering a major setback to President George W. Bush. The recent midterm elections reverberate the same reversal of twenty years ago with the Republican Party losing control of Congress amid the turmoil in the Middle East, rising energy prices and high levels of discontent with US military commitments abroad.
Despite these repeated election reversals that are associated with involvement in unpopular wars, the United States continues to sustain those very policies that contributed to those defeats. Presidential administrations change, but the underlying imperatives of American military intervention continue as before.
The question is why. Why have electoral defeats, military stalemates and enormous financial expenditures failed to force a fundamental rethink of America’s reliance on military intervention? Why do the institutions that sustain America’s global military presence survive the political failures of successive administrations?
Three possible explanations can help shed some light on these questions. The first concerns the political economy of US military power. The military-industrial complex has become a permanent gigantic establishment whose interests transcend electoral cycles. The second relates to a consistent misconception across the national security establishment that overwhelming military force against adversaries can bring about desired political outcomes. The third is the weakening capacity of American political institutions to impose meaningful checks on US foreign policy even as the political and economic costs of global military intervention balloon at home. These forces together have resulted in a system where military intervention continues to be insulated by powerful institutions despite specific interventions losing public legitimacy.
The Business of War: Why the Military-Industrial Complex Survives Elections
In his farewell address on January 17, 1961, President Dwight Eisenhower warned Americans against the “unwarranted influence” of the military-industrial complex. The former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, who had helped end the Korean War, understood the dangers of an increasingly permanent military established whose interests extended beyond national defense. Following the end of the Second World War, confrontation with the Soviet Union and the communist bloc necessitated the transition from a period of industrial mobilization to a vast peacetime enterprise bringing together the US Congress, the Pentagon, defense contractors, research institutions and communities that increasingly depended on military spending.
Over time, this arrangement has created powerful incentives for sustaining a high military budget. Major billion dollar weapons programs like the Air Force’s F-35 Lightning II, missile defense and precision strike, support vast networks of arms producers, subcontractors and skilled workers across congressional districts. Legislators have strong incentives to protect the investment and employment generated by federal contracts. Military expenditure, therefore, is meant to serve not just national security but corporate profitability, industrial development and local economic interests.

According to 2023 data, the federal government obligated $433 billion in federal contracts to the top 100 contractors. Around 62 percent (or ~$270 billion) of those largest contracts were earmarked for defense contractors (Figure 2). Of that amount, 63 percent went to five key contractors (Lockheed Martin, RTX (Raytheon), General Dynamics, Boeing and Northrop Grumman). Moreover, according to SIPRI, 39 of the world’s largest 100 arms manufacturers in 2024 were American and accounted for $334 billion in arms revenues in 2024, nearly half the global total of $679 billion. America’s forever wars create continued demand for weapons, ammunition, replacement, maintenance and justify sustaining or increasing the military budget even after specific wars have ended.

This should not be interpreted as wars being started only for profit. Geopolitical considerations also drive military spending. However, there is a key asymmetry that is created by the system in which the political costs of unpopular wars fall on elected administrations while the financial benefits of sustained military spending continue to accrue to contractors regardless of which party holds power.
Consider the Korean War (1950-53). President Eisenhower’s election victory in 1952 reflected increasing frustration with a costly military stalemate. While the 1953 armistice ended major hostilities, American forces remained in South Korea and its broader interests in East Asia endured. The Iraq War demonstrated the same institutional resilience. Despite the 2006 midterm upset, President Bush increased American troop deployments in 2007. Efforts by Congress to impose a withdrawal timetable failed after Bush vetoed the legislation. Congress approved further funding without the same restrictions.
This is not to say that only arms producers determine US policy. These past wars underscore how the institutions and economic interests sustaining American military power have outlasted the elected leaders responsible for specific wars. Eisenhower’s warning, therefore, went beyond corporate profiteering to underscoring how the military-industrial complex had become embedded in America’s political economy. It had created powerful incentives for institutional continuity even when the electorate rejected certain foreign wars. The machinery of war survives the politicians who operate it.
The Fatal Illusion of American Military Supremacy
The US national security establishment has consistently failed to differentiate between military supremacy and political outcomes. Despite bringing overwhelming military force to various theaters, the United States has been unable to convert battlefield successes into favorable political results.
Consider the Vietnam War. During the 1968 Tet Offensive, even though the Viet Cong suffered significant battlefield defeats against American and South Vietnamese forces, they inflicted a stunning political defeat on the United States. The offensive exposed the contrast between official American reporting of making progress in the war and North Vietnam’s capacity to sustain the war, thereby undermining confidence in the Johnson administration. As a result, Johnson abandoned his re-election campaign and the war continued under President Nixon. North Vietnam did not need to defeat the United States on the battlefield. It only needed to play for time and outlast America’s political willingness to fight.
This lesson was apparent in Afghanistan and Iraq when US forces rapidly overthrew the Taliban in 2001 and Saddam Hussein in 2003. However, neither battlefield success produced a durable political outcome in either theater. Iraq faced years of insurgency and sectarian violence, while the Taliban survived two decades of American intervention before returning to power in 2021. American operational prowess was insufficient to overcome the political endurance of its adversaries.
These episodes echo today when despite claims by Trump administration officials that Iran’s navy is “sitting at the bottom of the sea”, Iran has demonstrated its ability to sustain the confrontation. Like North Vietnam and the Taliban, the Iranians are focusing on degrading American political endurance to sustain the fight. However, unlike Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan, the Iranians hold significant leverage in disrupting energy trade that has impacted American households. Rising prices and the broader crisis in the global economy due to restricted energy flows contributed to the major reversal in the midterms.
The Crisis of Democratic Accountability: Why Elections Cannot Restrain the War Machine
The growing disconnect between the democratic processes and the institutions in charge of US foreign policy provide a third explanation. At a fundamental level, both parties have accepted the necessity of America’s global primacy and the need to preserve the unipolar order at all costs. Disagreements have largely focused on how and where force is employed as opposed to the necessity of maintaining a global military presence. Opposition by the Democrats to the Iraq War did not prevent President Obama from deploying additional forces in Afghanistan or returning troops to Iraq in 2014. Similarly, despite President Trump’s campaign promises to end the Ukraine conflict in 24 hours upon taking office as well as end the forever wars, American support to Ukraine has continued while a new war against Iran was launched.
Declining Public Trust
The domestic foundations of American power are weakening. The Pew Research Center assessed that public confidence in the federal government fell from 73 percent in 1958 to 17 percent in 2025 (Figure 3). It has remained at or below 30 percent since 2007. While political fragmentation, declining living standards and institutional failures have contributed to this trend, the forever wars have eroded confidence in the government’s judgment and priorities.

Political legitimacy and popular support remain the bedrock of military power in addition to economic resources and technology. The growing distance between the ambitions of the national security establishment and the priorities of American citizens has rendered those ambitions more precarious than ever.
Growing Fiscal Costs of US Power
The fiscal base of American power is also under strain as the United States faces mounting debt obligations. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that federal debt held by the public will rise from 101 percent of GDP in 2026 to 120 percent in 2036 and 175 percent by 2056 (Figure 4). Net interest payments are projected to increase from 3.3 percent to 6.6 percent of GDP over the same period, eventually surpassing federal expenditure on either Social Security or Medicare individually.

While tax policy, demographic changes, entitlement spending and economic crises have all played a role,along with military interventions in the fiscal deterioration, the key problem is that Washington’s expanding global ambitions must increasingly compete with domestic economic priorities and the growing cost of debt servicing. Every additional intervention imposes an opportunity cost that reduces the share of resources available for critical sectors like healthcare, infrastructure and education.
When Military Power Outlives National Strength
The collapse of the Soviet Union offers a historical warning even though it is not a direct parallel to the United States. Unlike Washington, the Soviets did not pursue a similar pattern of global military interventions. Nonetheless, by the 1980s, it retained formidable military and nuclear capabilities even as institutional decay, political and economic stagnation eroded its national power. The Soviet experience highlights a central insight of the concept of the “correlation of forces” that I discussed in my last essay. Military supremacy cannot indefinitely compensate for weakening economic productivity, political cohesion and institutional legitimacy.
The Wars Continue Because the System Survives Their Failures
From the last several decades starting with Korea in the 1950s to Iran today, unpopular wars have eroded public trust. They have imposed significant economic costs on the population resulting in repeated electoral defeats. However, elections have been unable to affect the institutions, economic interests and strategic ambitions that underlie the perpetual cycle of wars.
Arms producers profit from a high military budget, the national security bureaucracy operates beyond the electoral cycles and both political parties remain committed to preserving American global primacy. The electorate can remove administrations but they are unable to influence the machinery of perpetual war in any meaningful way.
At the same time, the foundations of American power are coming under increasing strain. Public trust has eroded, federal debt and interest obligations are growing and foreign wars of choice are competing ever more with domestic priorities. While American decline is not a foregone conclusion, the distance between Washington’s global ambitions and the resources available to sustain them continues to widen.
More than six decades ago, Eisenhower warned that the institutions that were created to defend the republic could acquire greater influence that undermined democratic accountability. His warning is prescient. America’s greatest strategic vulnerability is not defeat by an adversary but a political system that is incapable of restraining the use of its military.
Wars end, administrations change and congressional majorities rise and fall. However, without meaningful accountability and public control over the institutions and ambitions that sustain America’s permanent military establishment, the cycle of interventions, strategic failure and electoral backlash will persist. The ultimate question is whether the United States possesses the political will to stop fighting wars that undermine its own national strength.
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