By Dave DeCamp, Antiwar.com, 8/9/26

The Pentagon is reportedly drafting a new nuclear strategy that’s expected to emphasize the use of tactical nuclear weapons to give the president more “options” in a potential nuclear conflict.

The strategy, first reported by NBC News, is being drafted by the Pentagon’s policy chief, Elbridge Colby, who has for more than a decade called for the US to develop additional capabilities to fight a “limited nuclear war.”

The idea would be to shift the US nuclear strategy away from the focus on using strategic nuclear weapons to wipe out an adversary’s nuclear capabilities and focus more on the possibility of using smaller, tactical nuclear weapons in a “regional” conflict.

“If you actually want extended deterrence to be credible, you have to provide the nation’s political leadership with nuclear capabilities that common sense indicates you could actually use,” a source told NBC. “Otherwise you’re reducing our leadership’s options to extreme choices that the adversary won’t find credible.”

While the potential strategy would be carried out in the name of deterrence and preventing war, arms control advocates have strongly warned against the idea of developing more tactical nuclear weapons to prepare for a potential limited nuclear conflict over concerns that it would make nuclear war much more likely and that any nuclear exchange would likely lead to a global catastrophe.

“Without a firm rejection of the option to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict, by building and fielding more tactical nuclear weapons the administration is signaling its intention to use them against enemy forces and industrial infrastructure in a conflict,” the Arms Control Association said in response to the NBC report.

The ACA said that it “strongly opposes the administration’s decision to build more tactical nuclear weapons to supplement the options that exist” and pointed to the fact that the US already has at least two types of tactical nuclear weapons, including B61-12 gravity bombs, which are deployed in Europe, and the W76-2 low-yield warhead for the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile.

The ACA said the US Navy is also “acquiring a new nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) that may be available at the end of the decade for possible use in conflict with China.”

Breaking Defense reported that Colby announced on August 5 that the Pentagon was reviewing the US nuclear posture and repeatedly emphasized the term “options” in a speech he delivered that has not been made public.

Colby has been one of the leading voices in Washington’s policy circles advocating for the US to prepare for limited nuclear war. In a 2015 paper for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) titled “A Nuclear Strategy and Posture for 2030,” Colby said the US “should make a special effort to develop the platforms and weapons, doctrine, planning capacity, and other capabilities needed to fight a limited nuclear war more effectively than plausible adversaries.”

He said that the ideal US nuclear force is “one that is not only highly survivable and able to issue a devastating blow against any adversary under any scenario but that is also capable of conducting effective limited nuclear operations in a controlled fashion while maintaining the ability to escalate to full-scale war if necessary.”

Colby made a similar argument in a 2018 piece written in Foreign Affairs titled “If You Want Peace, Prepare for Nuclear War,” published just a few months after he left the first Trump administration, where he led the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy.

“Washington’s task is clear. It must demonstrate to Moscow and Beijing that any attempt to use force against US friends and allies would likely fail and would certainly result in costs and risks well out of proportion to whatever they might gain,” Colby wrote. “This requires conventional military power, but it also means having the right strategy and weapons to fight a limited nuclear war and come out on top.”

Russia Matters, 7/31/26

The U.S. still relies on Russia for a quarter of its nuclear fuel purchases: Despite all the headlines about US-led global sanctions on Russia, U.S. nuclear industry remains heavily dependent on Moscow for the enriched uranium that fuels reactors, according to Bloomberg. U.S. reactor operators bought about 3.28 million separative work units, or SWUs, of Russian enrichment services in 2025, equal to almost 26% of their total purchases, according to EIA’s data cited by this news agency.

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 8/13/26

Ukraine and Russia continue to hammer each other, with ports, warehouses and increasingly power infrastructure in focus. I’ll do a wrap of warehouses and power today as they are the most painful targets.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy is still hunting for Patriot interceptors and while Greece and Spain are refusing to part with theirs, Poland is feeling guilty and government officials said this morning they might donate some of theirs – a decision will be made “in the next couple of days.”

Zelenskiy is also still pressuring the US and said Ukraine could make do with 5% of the remaining stock, which is a downscale from previous requests. I calculate that to be a total of 42, or 7 a month, which is a bit more than the 5 a month I was guessing at earlier this week from the “every month” pledge US President Donald Trump has already offered.

But of course, it is still no way near enough. Ukraine needs 7 per day to have any chance of surviving the winter.

In anticipation of the onslaught, Kyiv just stopped sharing any of its missile info, in a repeat of Russia’s lockdown on most economic and trade info. It is also actively drawing up lists of individuals who “may need to be evacuated.”

Kyiv mayor Vitali Klitschko said last week that Ukraine has about 4,000 portable warming stations it used last year – basically a big tent with a generator where people can go to warm up, have a cup of tea and charge their phones. But he also said there were far too few of them (and men are barred from using them, as they are supposed to be at the front). This is all preparation for Ukraine’s Battle Britain moment, but without the Queen Mum to rally people’s courage.

Russia released some macro numbers today that show GDP growth was 1.3% in the 2Q26, which is a bit better than expected. The last PMI was up too in black territory, but not by much.

“Growth in the second quarter was driven by robust domestic demand and positive dynamics in several real sector industries; consumer activity continues to increase, the Ministry of Economic Development reported. Additional support was provided by government measures to stimulate investment and entrepreneurial activity, increase labor productivity, reduce business costs, and improve the regulatory environment, according to the ministry’s press release. The gradual easing of monetary conditions is also becoming an important factor in the recovery of economic activity, the Ministry of Economic Development noted,” TASS reports.

So CBR governor Elvia Nabiullina’s 600bp of rate cuts are finally starting to have an effect. However, the more important story here is that the Ministry of Finance (MinFin) is starting to struggle to issue more OFZ to fund the budget deficit gap, which also shrank a tiny it in the last month after the budget made a RUB280bn profit in June – the first time this year.

Putin keeps banging on about how low Russia debt is – about 15% of GDP. And that is a great result compared to everyone else in Europe who have debt closer to 100% of GDP. But… There is one big caveat that Putin doesn’t mention: MinFin is currently paying about 14% yields on its treasury bills – an extraordinarily high rate. That is three times the boom year rate. And the volume of OFZ outstanding is up by half from pre-war levels to around RUB32 trillion now.

The problem with this is, although the level of debt in GDP terms is low, the COST of servicing that debt is now eating up 9% of all government spending. That is extremely high as healthy debt service cost spending should normally be about 4% of the total. At 9% that is starting to approach an unsustainable level. But it’s not as bad as the US’ 14% of government spending on debt servicing, which is already passed unsustainable levels (and has already led to downgrades from its AAA rating level), but worse than the UK’s 8.3% and France’s 7% – which are both considered to be basket cases in the increasingly dysfunctional European economy.

The interest rates have become so high that Russian banks – the only source of liquidity available to MinFin – are starting to refuse to buy more bonds. They are demanding even higher rates that MinFin is refusing to pay, that it can’t afford to pay, and MinFin has been forced to cancel several auctions in the last weeks. It could issue the so-called “floaters” but that could make borrowing even more expensive. So the government is starting to have a problem funding the deficit by just using bonds.

Unable to issue more OFZ is a very serious problem, indeed. Is there going to be a crisis? Not yet. But the situation continues to deteriorate. As we argued before, it’s a race between Nabiullina’s relief from cutting rates to boost growth, and the rising cost of unsustainable debt issues. It looks like “Unsustainable” is in the lead over “Recovery” by a head at this point.

The Kremlin still has a lot of things it can do if it needs to. Raising taxes is obvious, but so unpopular that the Kremlin will avoid it as long as it can. Much more likely is it will dip into the National Welfare Fund (National Welfare Fund (NWF), the rainy-day fund to cover budget shortfalls.

MinFin has already made heavy use of the NWF and run it down from around RUB9 trillion pre-war to around RUB3.4 trillion now (the deficit is currently around RUB6 trillion). But that is only the liquid part. There is a total of RUB13 trillion ($170bn) in the whole fund – enough to cover the deficit two times over – but the “illiquid” part has been used to invest into things like infrastructure projects so is not in cash.

However, part of the illiquid bit is RUB3.5 trillion of Sberbank shares. Those could very easily be converted into cash as plenty of people would be willing to buy them and as they are shares, the Kremlin would only need to place them on the exchange to get cash back. Of course this would be a pretty radical thing to do – and the Kremlin would likely issue a “golden share” to keep control of the bank – but it is an option.

The point is that Putin is under pressure, but he is not under enough pressure to be forced into peace talks. The reserves are enough for at least another year, and probably a lot longer if the economic recovery continues. Zelenskiy on the other hand doesn’t have as much time as the Ukrainian budget is already under a lot of pressure; it is already short of $20bn this year as Kyiv suffers from the same rising military spending costs that Moscow is struggling to cope with.

However, this growing pain – the Kremlin appears to be reacting to hitting the OFZ issuance ceiling – is probably contributing to the escalation in the tit-for-tat missile war we are seeing at the moment. I have long believed that Putin has long used a gradual escalation in fighting as pressure to try and force Zelenskiy into a negotiated capitulation on the Kremlin’s terms, but the nature of the fighting has changed since July and we are now into what looks like “total war” where the game is simply to crush the other guy; no more graduated escalations. You just send your biggest bombs to destroy as much as you can. I also believe that Trump’s withdrawal from the peace talks have contributed to this decision. Once that became clear Putin has no motivation to go slowly as it means military victory is the only option, with no negotiations and with no chance of lifting sanctions in his lifetime. So, you might as well go all in.

By Kautilya The Contemplator, Substack, 7/22/26

Following the renewal of clashes between the United States and Iran, numerous commentators are speculating that Washington may be compelled to permanently withdraw its military forces from the Middle East. After all, Iranian strikes have demonstrated that America’s network of sophisticated military bases is vulnerable to attack and significant degrading. Moreover, mainstream media reports have underscored how Iranian missile strikes have gained increasing precision and have bypassed air defenses. If this is the case, why continue exposing personnel and high-tech assets to the risk of continued destruction?

Some observers have described recent developments as the beginning of a broader process of “debasification”, which is understood as the gradual expulsion of American military forces from the Middle East through sustained Iranian strikes that steadily render US bases untenable. However, this argument confuses temporary force protection measures with strategic withdrawal and overlooks the broader geo-strategic logic that has sustained the US military presence in the region for decades.

Military bases are not any ordinary real estate that can be abandoned when they become exposed to attacks. They are instruments of geopolitical influence that are built over decades through alliances, logistics and political relationships. Great powers rarely surrender strategically valuable positions simply because the costs of defending them increase. They withdraw only when the strategic value of remaining falls below the cost of staying, or when they possess another equally effective means of protecting their interests.

As such, the reports of extensive destruction across US military installations by Iranian missiles and the relocation of sophisticated assets should not be confused with imminent strategic withdrawal. What matters is whether the political and military ecosystem that supports the American presence remains intact.

The Middle East Remains Strategically Indispensable

The Middle East remains strategically important. It comprises two of the world’s major chokepoints – the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb – through which a substantial portion of global energy exports and international trade passes.

America’s network of military bases provides a permanent forward presence from which it can project power, gather intelligence, sustain military operations, influence regional political outcomes and preserve its position as the predominant external power in the region. These installations also complicate the strategic ambitions of rival powers, including China and Russia, whose growing economic and diplomatic presence could evolve into a more substantial security role over time if the United States were to relinquish its own.

From the prism of grand strategy, these bases preserve American influence across one of the world’s most strategically consequential regions. As long as Washington continues to regard those objectives as vital, increasing military vulnerability alone is unlikely to outweigh the perceived benefits of remaining.

Strategic Real Estate Cannot be Easily Replaced

America’s Middle East bases represent some of the most valuable real estate in the world. Installations such as Al Udeid in Qatar, the Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain and facilities in Kuwait, Jordan and the UAE function as regional command centers, intelligence hubs, logistics networks and lunching points for operations stretching from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean.

The US has spent 30-50 years building an integrated military ecosystem in the region involving decades of institutional development, political relationships and heavy financial investment. As such, those bases cannot simply be relinquished. Losing them would require rebuilding an equivalent network elsewhere, assuming regional governments were even willing to host it.

Power Vacuums Seldom Remain Empty

Avoiding the creation of a power vacuum is another reason why the United States, as like other great powers, would not withdraw voluntarily. The critical question remains as to who would shape the regional structure that would follow if American forces withdrew? Iran and Russia could expand their influence across the region. China, which is already the largest trading partner of many Gulf states, would likely increase its security presence to protect its commercial interests. Turkiye might also seek an expanded role.

In the past, when a great power has withdrawn from a geography, another has usually filled the vacuum. British withdrawal east of Suez in 1956, the Soviet collapse in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the American withdrawal from Iraq all produced new competitions for influence rather than lasting stability. As such, from Washington’s perspective, withdrawing from the Middle East would amount to surrendering one of the world’s most strategically significant regions to rival powers.

Adaptation, Not Withdrawal, Has Consistently Been the Preferred Option

Great powers generally respond to new military threats by adapting rather than withdrawing. Pearl Harbor in 1941 demonstrated that a US naval base could face significant destruction. However, the US did not abandon it. Instead, it rebuilt and expanded the base, dispersed naval assets and developed layered warning systems. Today, Pearl Harbor continues to remain one of the most important American military bases in the Pacific region. Furthermore, during the 1970s, Soviet SS-20 intermediate range missiles made NATO air bases across Europe increasingly vulnerable. NATO responded to the missile deployments by dispersing its air assets, investing in air defenses and hardening shelters.

Redeployments of key assets to Israel or Europe should thus be understood primarily as force protection measures rather than evidence of impending strategic retreat. Washington has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to modify its military posture without relinquishing its broader geopolitical objectives.

Factors That May Compel an American Withdrawal

There are several possibilities that in some combination could force the United States to relinquish its strategic position in the Middle East.

Destruction Outpaces US Speed of Repair

Iran would need to make the bases operationally unusable. Occasional missile strikes increase costs but do not eliminate military utility. Permanent withdrawal would require Iran to repeatedly destroy runways, fuel depots, command facilities and logistics networks faster than the United States could repair, reinforce or resupply them. While mainstream media has reported significant destruction at these bases from Iranian attacks, there is no public evidence yet that the scale of destruction has outweighed the capacity to repair and resupply.

Internal Political Shift and External Pressures

Washington itself would have to undergo a fundamental political realignment and determine that maintaining permanent combat forces in the Middle East no longer serves US interests. While such a shift could come about due to a re-assessment of geo-strategic priorities such as completing the pivot to the Asia Pacific region, other factors could accelerate this shift. These could be a confluence of pressures in the form of rising casualties among American service members, war fatigue, ballooning financial costs and doubts on the long-term benefits of continued confrontation.

Host Governments Revoke Access

Revoking access to the bases by Gulf countries in a coordinated manner would fundamentally alter the US position. A precedent already exists in Africa where Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso revoked French military access to their bases. Similarly, in those countries with a US military presence, those installations are not owned by the US and their continued operation depends on agreements with the host governments. Iran’s targeting of infrastructure in the Gulf states is to some extent intended to put pressure on those governments to move towards that decision.

Defeat in a Wider Regional War

A possible defeat in a regional war may decisively compel the Trump administration to withdraw, though any such strategic retreat would be cloaked in the language of victory. Iranian attacks against military and infrastructure targets across the Middle East as well as the imposition of a naval blockade by the Houthis on Saudi ports all point to an escalation to a wider conflict.

While Iran continues to maintain escalation dominance and expanding the war plays to its advantage, achieving a strategic victory would require interdicting American reinforcements and supply, maintaining a sustained tempo of attacks across multiple countries, undermining Gulf country cooperation and effectively breaking the alliance structure that underpins American power. This would represent a far higher threshold than striking individual bases.

The Conditions for a Permanent Withdrawal Have Not Been Met

As the conflict increasingly focuses on control of the Strait of Hormuz and enters a cycle of flare-ups, ceasefires and political theater, the more likely outcome is an evolution in military posture rather than a surrender of America’s strategic position.

While Iran has clearly increased the risks of a continued US presence in the region, it has not been able to dismantle the political, economic and military foundations that underpin American power. After all, vulnerability alone has seldom caused great powers to abandon regions they consider strategically indispensable. As long as the strategic and political ecosystem sustaining the US military presence persists, redeployments should be understood as temporary force protection measures, not the beginning of America’s permanent departure from the Middle East.

Kautilya The Contemplator is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, please consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. I will always be grateful for your support.

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 8/13/26

The West’s spree of “shadow fleet” seizures might finally be coming to an end after what Putin just told his Pacific Fleet commanders during his visit to the Russian Far East. As he phrased it, “We can see that the officials of some countries are attempting to restrict the movement of our economic operators’ vessels by peaceful means in violation of International Maritime Law, but recently it occurred to them that they can seize our vessels and sell our looted property. This is nothing short of piracy and plunder.”

He then threatened that, “If this happens, we will have to reciprocate – not necessarily in the waters where they plan to raid our own ships but anywhere we consider necessary or reasonable, including in the Pacific Fleet’s area of responsibility.” Pacific Fleet Commander Adm. Viktor Liina told Putin during his turn to speak that “Between April 24 and August 6, 2026, a total of 1,001 vessels transited the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation along the islands of the South Kuril chain alone.”

He added that “Of these, 379 sailed under the flags of unfriendly states, including 273 bulk carriers and 71 tankers, among which were 26 vessels from the United Kingdom and 9 from France. Simultaneously, Western states are actively enlisting vessels flying the flags of third countries to transport cargo in their interests. In essence, this constitutes their own shadow fleet. We possess the necessary forces to inspect and detain vessels belonging to unfriendly states and their shadow fleet”.

Putin’s threatened tit-for-tat seizures of foreign vessels came half a year after his senior aide Nikolai Patrushev told local media that “If we don’t respond firmly, the British, French, and even the Baltic states will soon become so brazen that they will attempt to completely block our country’s access to the seas”. The Chairman of the Maritime Board then suggested “permanently stationing significant forces in key maritime routes, including in regions remote from Russia, ready to cool the ardor of Western corsairs.”

In retrospect, ever-cautious Putin gave the West the chance to stop its policy of seizing Russia’s “shadow fleet” vessels so as to avoid any reciprocal escalation that could accidentally risk sparking World War III, but this was misinterpreted by them as weakness and only emboldened them. Likewise, the same can be said about Russia holding back on its late-May threat to carry out “systematic strikes” against Ukraine, in response to which Ukraine launched a Western-backed “war of attrition” against Russia.

The self-evident existential stakes of eschewing any reciprocal escalation as Ukraine systematically attempted to deindustrialize and demilitarize Russia with Western support finally convinced Putin to mildly “escalate to de-escalate” in Kharkov and Odessa Regions. This represented the first time that he’s consistently done so since the special operation began, which then arguably emboldened him to now seriously consider doing the same at sea in response to any future seizure of his “shadow fleet” vessels.

To be clear, Putin conditioned Russia’s tit-for-tat seizure of foreign vessels on being “anywhere we consider necessary or reasonable”, so it’s possible that Western vessels will avoid Russian waters and take care to also avoid the Russian Navy wherever they may be in the world. This means that tit-for-tat seizures shouldn’t be taken for granted despite his threat, but the significance rests in Putin once again “escalating to de-escalate” in a bid to restore deterrence, which he had hitherto been reluctant to do.