By Kautilya The Contemplator, Substack, 8/16/26

Ever since Russia’s campaign in Ukraine started over four-and-a-half years ago, much of the daily commentary on the conflict has focused on battlefield developments, “game changing” weapons, war-fighting tactics, strikes, counter-strikes, statements and all the usual reporting that accompanies every conflict in the world. Underpinning all of this is a fundamental question: what does a Russian victory mean? More specifically, what insights does history present about what victory has actually meant for the Russian state and what can it tell us about how the current strategic contest will actually be settled?

Russian forces have been advancing slowly but steadily across the frontlines, dismantling key fortifications that have formed critical nodes in Ukraine’s defensive lines across the Donbas. If the current trajectory continues, Russia is on course to win a decisive military victory that might extend to the capture of the key cities of Odessa, Mykolayiv or Kharkiv. The question remains: then what? Moscow would have captured strategic territory but NATO would still exist, a rump Ukrainian state might continue being hostile to Russia and Europe would continue to re-arm.

Putin has distinguished between settling Ukraine and the larger political objective. In his June 2024 he stated:

«Урегулировав украинский кризис… могли бы приступить к фундаментальной задаче… а именно к созданию неделимой системы евразийской безопасности»1

“Having resolved the Ukrainian crisis…we could proceed to the fundamental task…namely, creating an indivisible system of Eurasian security.”

The Russian leadership’s objectives for victory, as announced by Putin on February 24, 2022, and reiterated over the last four years, can be distinguished at three levels: Military victory entails the destruction of Ukraine’s capacity and ability to wage war. Political victory means a postwar Ukraine that is no longer a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. Taking that further, a systemic victory would mean a re-ordering of the European security architecture on the principles of indivisible security that Russia has consistently articulated. Russia might be able to achieve the first, perhaps the second, but may lack the power to achieve the third. Putin’s wager on time begins in the distance between them.

Given that the last several years have narrowed the scope for a political solution to end the war, what if Putin no longer expects the battlefield to close that distance? The possibility of uncontrolled escalation leading to nuclear war is one explanation as to why Moscow has exercised restraint in retaliating against NATO countries and sparking a direct war with NATO. History, however, suggests another explanation: Putin may be playing for time. He may be wagering that Russia can consolidate military gains while the political order supporting Ukraine proves less durable than those gains. Russian history repeatedly presents the same strategic proposition: today’s political order cannot be confused with tomorrow’s. There is, however, a warning as well as a precedent that history presents. Strategic patience succeeds only when time is moving in your direction. The real question is therefore whether Putin has correctly judged which side time favors.

Victory is Political, Not Territorial

Victory for the Russian state has seldom derived from battlefield success alone. Victory was considered durable only when military power produced a political order that prevented the re-emergence of the strategic threat that caused the war in the first place. In 1709, Peter the Great defeated Charles XII of Sweden at the Battle of Poltava. This historic battle transformed the balance of power in the Great Northern War. However, the fighting continued for another twelve years. Victory was achieved only when the Treaty of Nystad was concluded in 1721, requiring Sweden to cede Baltic territories to Russia. Peter was thus able to secure Russia’s position in a new, altered European balance of power.

Catherine II extended the same logic when Russia annexed Crimea in 1783. The territory altered the political and strategic environment for the Russian state by providing access to the Black Sea, enabling the development of Sevastopol as a naval base and projecting Russian power in a region previously dominated by the Ottoman Empire.

Time as Strategic Depth

Russian history also presents another difficult problem. What if a state cannot defeat a stronger adversary on the battlefield without risking the destruction of the very military power on which its survival depends? In 1812, Tsar Alexander I confronted precisely this dilemma when Napoleon approached Moscow after the Russian armies had fought a devastating battle at Borodino. As the surrender of Moscow was being contemplated, he discovered that Russia possessed another strategic resource besides territory: time. Napoleon needed victory quickly. Alexander merely needed not to lose quickly.

The political value of Napoleon’s victories were diminished with each passing week that Alexander refused to negotiate. French supply lines stretched across an enormous distance. Russian forces regenerated. Winter approached. What had appeared to be strategic depth measured in geography increasingly was measured in time as the balance began to shift in Russia’s favor. Geographic depth creates distance between an enemy and the political center. Temporal strategic depth creates distance between an unfavorable present and a potentially more favorable future.

Alexander’s statements to the French ambassador Armand de Caulaincourt in May 1811 allude to this principle:

«Nous ne nous compromettrons pas, nous avons de l’espace derrière nous, et nous conserverons une armée bien organisée. Avec cela, on n’est jamais forcé, quelque revers que l’on éprouve, de recevoir la paix ; on force son vainqueur à l’accepter… Il faut à l’Empereur des résultats aussi prompts que ses pensées sont rapides : il ne les obtiendra pas avec nous.»2

“We will not compromise ourselves; we have space behind us, and we will preserve a well-organized army”…With that, whatever reverses one may suffer, one is never forced to accept peace; one forces the victor to accept it…The Emperor [Napoleon] needs results as rapid as his thoughts; he will not obtain them from us”.

Mikhail Kutuzov reinforces this logic when he writes to Alexander on September 4, 1812:

«Хотя не отвергаю того, чтобы занятие столицы не было раною чувствительнейшею, но, не колеблясь между сим происшествием и теми событиями, могущими последовать в пользу нашу с сохранением армии…»3

“Although I do not deny that the occupation of the capital is a most grievous wound, I do not hesitate between this event and those events which, with the preservation of the army, may subsequently develop to our advantage…”

And more starkly:

«пока армия вашего императорского величества цела…дотоле еще возвратная потеря Москвы не есть потеря отечества.»4

“So long as Your Imperial Majesty’s army remains intact…the temporary loss of Moscow is not yet the loss of the fatherland.”

Tolstoy would later distill this interpretation of Kutuzov into one of War and Peace’s most memorable formulations:

«Терпение и время — вот мои воины-богатыри»5

“Patience and time are my warriors.”

The words are Tolstoy’s literary reconstruction and not a documented quotation directly from Kutuzov, but the strategy they describe was real.

When Russia Faced Defeat: Time for Regeneration

Russia’s defeats reveal another dimension of strategic time. The Crimean War resulted in Russia losing many of its privileges in the Black Sea. Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov’s response was:

«La Russie boude, dit-on. La Russie ne boude pas. La Russie se recueille.»6

“Russia is sulking, they say. Russia is not sulking. Russia is gathering itself.”

He later explained that “gathering itself” meant Russia should avoid foreign complications that distract from “internal development,” using the interval to “recover from its losses, strengthen its forces and restore its resources.” Fifteen years later, France’s defeat by Prussia ended the balance sustaining the Crimean settlement, allowing Gorchakov to dismantle the 1856 Paris treaty’s provisions. As such, defeat had not ended the contest. Only the timetable had changed.

Lenin carried the principle further. Facing defeat by Germany in 1918, Bolshevik Russia accepted the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. He later explained:

«пространства мы отдали много, но время выиграли такое, в течение которого можно было окрепнуть…Мы тогда коренных интересов не отдали в жертву, мы отдали второстепенные и сохранили коренные».7

“we gave away a lot of territory, but we gained time in such a way that we could become strong…We did not compromise on our fundamental interests; we gave up the secondary ones and preserved the fundamental ones.”

Space could be traded for time because the latter preserved the state capable of exploiting tomorrow’s balance of power. Eight months later, Imperial Germany collapsed and the settlement imposed at Brest was dismantled.

Across these different eras of history, all three historical figures confronted more powerful adversaries and concluded that the prevailing political order cannot be allowed to impose a lasting defeat on the Russian state. The strategy was consistent: Exchange space for time. Preserve the state. Wait for the strategic environment to change. Alexander I used time to exhaust Napoleon. Gorchakov focused it on regenerating Russian strength. Lenin traded territory for time to consolidate the revolutionary state.

There may be a temptation to regard these episodes as artifacts of another Russia. However, Putin’s own thinking reveals a similar long temporal horizon. In March 2018 during an address to the Federal Assembly, he stated:

«…значимость нашего выбора, значимость каждого шага, поступка исключительно высоки, потому что они определяют судьбу нашей страны на десятилетия вперёд.»8

“…the significance of our choices, of every step and action, is exceptionally great because they determine the fate of our country for decades to come.”

This formulation is significant because it demonstrates that Putin conceives consequential state decisions on a time horizon measured in decades. Moreover, Putin and the leaders before him governed radically different states and faced markedly different challenges. The continuity lies not in ideology or personality, but in the strategic problem confronting the Russian state: what must be secured today, what can be deferred and how can the state preserve sufficient power to exploit a more favorable tomorrow.

Putin’s Wager on Time

Relative to past Russian rulers, Putin faces a different challenge today in the ongoing confrontation with the West. Alexander I needed time because Russia was not yet ready to defeat Napoleon. Putin may need time because defeating Ukraine may not be enough for victory. Russia could impose an armistice without dissolving NATO or compelling the West to accept Moscow’s conception of indivisible security.

Putin may be thus operating on two clocks. The first is the military clock where Russia is degrading enemy capacity and establishing strategic facts. The second is the political clock running through the European security order where Russian control is much weaker. The Ukrainian clock runs in years; the European clock could run in decades.

Putin’s public statements confirm his belief that Europe’s security architecture is temporary. In June 2024 he stated:

«Очевидно, мы являемся свидетелями краха системы евро-атлантической безопасности. Сегодня её просто нет. Ее нужно фактически создавать заново.»9

“Obviously, we are witnessing the collapse of the Euro-Atlantic security system. Today, it simply does not exist. It effectively has to be created anew.”

He further states:

«Понимаем, безусловно, что в нынешней ситуации этот тезис может показаться нереалистичным, однако это сейчас.»10

“We understand, of course, that under the present circumstances this proposition may seem unrealistic. But that is now.”

At the same time, this is not evidence that Putin is consciously waiting for the West to fragment. After all, time only has strategic value if it can be used to improve one’s position on the strategic chessboard. Alexander I used time to regenerate his army. Gorchakov used it to rebuild Russian power. Lenin used it to consolidate the revolution. Putin’s strategy must be assessed on whether a) Western cohesion weakens, and b) whether Russia uses this time interval to strengthen its own relative position.

Evidence currently indicates it is doing so. It has re-wired its economy towards Asia and the non-Western world and succeeded in insulating itself to a large degree from Western sanctions. It’s defense-industrial base has expanded and it has successfully deepened partnerships with key emerging powers including BRICS+ and SCO. The real wager is whether Russia can improve its relative position faster than its adversaries can improve theirs.

Restraint Towards NATO

This wager on time might be another explanation as to why Moscow has displayed remarkable restraint in not retaliating against NATO countries in response to Western-sponsored long-range attacks inside Russia. While Putin is facing pressure to retaliate against the growing number of strikes on critical civilian and (in earlier instances) military infrastructure, the Ukrainian battlefield enables Russia to focus its confrontation with the West in a bounded space. Western military and financial support has been exclusively focused on propping up the proxy Zelensky regime and the Ukrainian military. NATO militaries themselves have directly not entered combat.

A full-scale war with NATO would break that containment. Russia would no longer maintain escalation dominance as it currently does in Ukraine. It would be compelled to fight NATO forces directly across a long frontline possibly including the Arctic, Baltic and Black Sea regions while simultaneously defending Kaliningrad, western Russia and critical strategic infrastructure deep inside the country. It’s armed forces, supply lines and reserve formations would have to contend with a much larger battlefield environment under the threat of uncontrolled escalation and nuclear war. Why trade a geographically constrained conflict where Russia thinks it can prevail for all-out war where it may lose escalation dominance? A war against NATO would merge Putin’s two clocks into one.

On the Western side, a Russian strike on NATO territory could transform European politics overnight. Highly unpopular European governments would see it as an extraordinary strategic gift. It would vindicate years of warnings on Russia, legitimize their commitment to Ukraine, boost their ratings, accelerate rearmament and allow domestic opposition to be suppressed through the imperatives of national security. Moreover, NATO’s purpose would suddenly become self-evident. The coalition Putin may hope time will weaken could be the same one that Russian escalation would reunify.

This is where history holds contemporary resonance. Kutuzov surrendered Moscow because preserving the army preserved Russia’s capacity to continue fighting. Gorchakov avoided entanglements while rebuilding Russian power. Lenin relinquished land instead of gambling away the state that could reclaim it in the future. Putin may be applying this logic in today’s context. Direct war with NATO could transform a war Russia believes it can sustain into one whose escalation could threaten the state itself. While conditions differed across rulers, the underlying principle remains consistent: do not squander the instruments of political and military power on which all future options depend. Preservation of the army preserves the strategic autonomy of the state. The most satisfying retaliation could be the most strategically damaging. As such, Russia must avoid winning the provocation and losing the wager.

The West Understands Putin’s Wager

There exists ample evidence that Putin’s adversaries understand this strategy. Victoria Nuland said Putin believed he could “wait Ukraine out” and “wait out all of us.”11 Former British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak made the counter-wager explicit:

“Putin will never outlast us. We are here for Ukraine as long as it takes.”12

The West views the fight as one of political endurance and are relying on institutional mechanisms to ensure support for Ukraine remains resistant to changes of government. Putin’s weapon is political time. He is wagering that governments change faster than Russian strategic objectives.

When Time Becomes a Trap

Russian history, however, also provides a stark warning. Stalin demonstrates the consequences of misreading time. From the signing of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to the launch of Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union had bought twenty-two months to prepare for war with Germany. In the months and weeks preceding the German invasion, despite extensive intelligence being provided to Stalin warning of an impending attack, he refused to conclude that Hitler was preparing to invade. The consequences were disastrous. The mistake was not buying time but misjudging how much of it remained.

In fact, the broader Soviet experience offers a further warning of misjudging which side time favored. Soviet leaders believed that capitalism, with all of its inherent contradictions, would ultimately destroy itself. Nikita Khrushchev is remembered for his declaration that “Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you.”13 Communism would outlive capitalism in the historical sense. It was the Soviet Union that disappeared first.

Putin’s strategy therefore depends on getting four things right: how long can Russia continue the war without causing unacceptable degradation to itself? Will Western unity weaken faster than Russia does? Will Russian victories divide Europe or make it more united against Russia? And finally, when should Russia turn its military gains into a political settlement?

When the Clock Turns

Russia may determine that the clock has turned when a significant shift occurs in the European balance of power that favors Moscow. This may include any combination of recognizing Ukraine’s neutrality, a tectonic geopolitical shift that would require Russian participation in European security, an erosion of the sanctions regime or an American withdrawal from Europe. None of these outcomes can be predicted.

Moscow is wagering that its objectives can outlast Western unity. The West is betting that its institutions can outlast Russia’s capacity to sustain the war. Neither knows which side will prove correct. Thinking in decades is not by itself strategic wisdom. Wisdom lies in understanding what those decades are changing. The question is not whether Putin possesses strategic patience. It is whether he has correctly identified which side time favors.

by VIPS, Consortium News, 8/28/26

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS)

SUBJECT: Dangerous Talk of Putin’s ‘Loss’ in Ukraine

Dear President Trump:

The New York Times is reporting that the outlook for Russia in Ukraine is “bleak.” C.I.A. Director John Ratcliffe is said to have explained that to the Russians while in Moscow Tuesday. He reportedly urged them “to cut a deal before their military and economic situation gets worse.” 

We write you on the chance you may be taken in by this latest song and dance. We believe it is orchestrated by the same kind of geniuses who told President Joe Biden to announce on July 13, 2023, in a major speech in Helsinki, that the Russians had “already lost the war” in Ukraine.

We suggest that you “kick the tires,” if they try to sell you that same car. Nothing could be further from the truth. Your predecessor was ill-served by intelligence. We suspect you are getting the same tendentious treatment from your own advisers. Indeed, many of them seem unconscionably relaxed about risking wider war with Russia over Ukraine.

We offer you, as we offered Biden, the following jogs to memory:

— December 3, 2022: “Russia is using up ammunition quite quickly. It’s pretty extraordinary. Our sense is that Russia is not capable of indigenously producing what they are expending at this stage.” (National Intelligence Director Avril Haines)

— March 18, 2022: “Russia has lost in Ukraine. The West should recognize this Russian defeat.” (Anatol Lieven, Quincy Institute)

— July 1 & July 7, 2023: “Putin’s war has already been a strategic failure for Russia – its military weaknesses laid bare; its economy badly damaged for years to come.” (C.I.A. Director William Burns)

The Church of Latter-Day Pundits

Two NY Times journalists who specialize in intelligence matters report Thursday that this latest version of the Russia-has-already-lost story is “the current C.I.A. director’s assessment.” They warn somewhat quizzically that, despite this, President Putin might ignore it “and choose to keep fighting.” But why would Putin do that?

Indeed, the Gray Lady and her intelligence sources seem quite baffled by why Putin would keep trying when, according to U.S. officials and pundits, he started losing three and a half years ago and continues to lose. Could it possibly be that it was they that were wrong – terribly wrong?

Dismissing that as a possibility, they perform a somersault, straighten up, and chose to blame Putin’s advisers who, the Times says, have not “given Putin honest assessments of the war’s trajectory and toll.”

If Black Humor is at work here, we do not find it funny. The slaughter in Ukraine brings hundreds of victims daily.

Russia is methodically advancing in Donbass along a thousand-mile front, it is weathering drone attacks on its oil and civilian infrastructure with enhanced interception and has enforced a virtual blockade on Ukraine’s largest port, Odessa, with withering aerial attacks. Ukraine’s manpower and interceptor shortages make it impossible for it to ever recover its lost territory, as you acknowledged after your meeting with President Putin in Alaska.

Mr. President, if you were given access to reality-based, honest intelligence, you would be able to decide for yourself whose advisers have gotten it right over these past five years. And, once apprised of the reality on ground (and in the air), you might choose to do what is in your power to end the disaster in Ukraine.

Déjà Vu

This is not the first time we advised a president to seek unbiased advice with a view toward avoiding unnecessary, catastrophic war. We did that just a few hours after Colin Powell’s deceptive presentation to the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003.

Today, we strongly suggest that you broaden your circle of advisers, as we urged President George W. Bush to do then, in our first VIPS Memorandum, which ended with this recommendation:

“After watching Secretary Powell today, we are convinced that you would be well served if you widened the discussion beyond the circle of those advisers clearly bent on a war for which we see no compelling reason and from which we believe the unintended consequences are likely to be catastrophic.”

FOR THE STEERING GROUP, VETERAN INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS FOR SANITY (VIPS)

• Fulton Armstrong, former National Intelligence Officer (ret.)
•   Marshall Carter-Tripp, Foreign Service Officer (ret.); Division Director, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
• Philip Giraldi, C.I.A., Operations Officer (ret.)
• Matthew Hoh, former Capt., USMC, Iraq and Foreign Service Officer, Afghanistan (associate VIPS)
• Larry C. Johnson, former C.I.A. and State Department Counter Terrorism officer
• John Kiriakou, former C.I.A. Counterterrorism Officer and former senior investigator, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
• Karen Kwiatkowski, former Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force (ret.), at Office of Secretary of Defense watching the manufacture of lies on Iraq, 2001-2003
•   Douglas MacGregor, Colonel, USA (ret.) (associate VIPS) 
• Ray McGovern, former U.S. Army infantry/intelligence officer & C.I.A. analyst; C.I.A. Presidential briefer (ret.)
• Elizabeth Murray, former Deputy National Intelligence Officer/NE, National Intelligence Council & C.I.A. political analyst (ret.)
• Scott Ritter, former MAJ, USMC; former U.N. Weapons Inspector, Iraq
• Coleen Rowley, FBI Special Agent and former Minneapolis Division Legal Counsel (ret.)
• Sarah G. Wilton, CDR, USNR, (ret.); Defense Intelligence Agency (ret.)
• Ann Wright, retired U.S. Army reserve colonel and former U.S. diplomat who resigned in 2003 in opposition to the Iraq War

By Pascal Lottaz, Substack, 8/15/26

German MEP Michael von der Schulenburg argues the western narrative of “wonder weapons” turning the tide in Ukraine is a deadly mirage. It is time for peace with Russia, not against it.

Text By Michael von der Schulenburg

As recently as 26 July this year, Ursula von der Leyen appeared full of confidence in victory during her visit to Kyiv: she claimed the tide of the war had turned, that Ukraine had regained the initiative, and that Russia was on the defensive. The cause of this supposed turnaround, after four and a half years of a devastating war, is said to be a new ‘wonder weapon’: drones which, with the help of AI provided by Palantir and others, can carry the war deep into the Russian hinterland and precisely destroy oil refineries and other critical infrastructure there. The Russian economy – particularly the energy sector – is said to be severely weakened, and the war Russia started has now hit the country itself “with full force”.

On the battlefield too, according to these accounts, Ukraine has achieved considerable success with autonomously operating “killer drones”. These drones are said to be capable of automatically detecting and destroying all life at a distance of 30 kilometres on the front line. Technology, it is claimed, has thus more than compensated for the shortage of Ukrainian soldiers. Russian soldiers, by contrast, are now said paying a heavy price in lives without being able to demonstrate any military successes. This must be wearing down the aggressors and forcing Putin to acknowledge that he is going to lose the war.

These accounts were accompanied by media-effective drone attacks on Moscow and St Petersburg. No wonder, then, that the mainstream Western media have been full of victory reports over the past two months. Some even speculated that Russia could only hold out for another six months; a coup in Moscow was deemed possible. The strategically important Crimea was said to have been largely cut off from Russia by Ukrainian attacks. Putin would now be forced to the negotiating table as the loser – and on the terms of the European NATO states, which would amount to a Russian surrender. Their policy of providing massive military, political and financial support to Ukraine, whilst at the same time refusing any talks until Russia was ‘brought to its knees’, seemed to have paid off.

But is that really the case? Or may the tide actually have turned in Russia’s favour?

It is striking that for the past week there have been hardly any reports on the course of the war, and the victory announcements have largely fallen silent. This is because doubts are mounting, both in the US and in Ukraine itself, about the success of the drone war deep within the Russian hinterland. One need only heed the warnings of General Zaluzhnyi: the drone war is not very successful and far too expensive. As a former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and current ambassador to London, he should know. According to the pro-Ukrainian war monitors ‘Dron-Bomber’, the Russians are now reportedly achieving a high shoot-down rate of Ukrainian drones. The dismissal of Ukrainian Defence Minister Fedorov is also likely to be linked to the looming failure of the drone war. Is the realisation taking hold that this conflict cannot be won by a drone warfare alone?

This means that developments on the battlefield remain decisive. However, there can be no question of the military stalemate claimed by the Western media. According to a report by the Ukrainian ‘Telegram Channel’: “in July this year, the armed forces of the Russian Federation occupied 728.45 km² of territory in the SVO (Special Operation) zone, which represents the best result since October 2024 … The pace of the Russian armed forces’ offensive is increasing”. Russian territorial gains are said to have occurred not only in the Donbas but also around Kharkiv and in Zaporizhzhia. This is still proceeding slowly, but it is a war of attrition whose primary aim is the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces. Could this objective be achieved by capturing the last remaining fortified defensive positions around the Donbas cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk?

Even more serious for Ukraine is the fact that its drone attacks have led to a hardening of the Russian position. The Russian leadership is now openly speaking of a war – including a war by NATO against Russia – and has significantly intensified the conflict. In the cruel logic of war, the destruction in Ukraine now far exceeds that in Russia. Another crucial factor is that Ukraine has no air defences to speak of and is barely able to defend itself against massive Russian drone and missile attacks, whilst the intensity of Ukrainian attacks is reportedly waning.

This is already having consequences. The Ukrainian Black Sea ports in and around Odessa are said to have been bombed so heavily that Ukraine has effectively become a ‘landlocked country’. If these reports are accurate, this would be a severe blow: to date, around 70 per cent of all Ukrainian imports and exports, as well as 90 per cent of agricultural exports, have been handled via these ports. Key bridges, such as the Zatoka Bridge, which connects Odessa with the Romanian Black Sea ports, have also been destroyed. Furthermore, rail and road links, petrol stations, the power grid, industrial facilities and warehouses are being systematically destroyed.

The European NATO member states can do little to change this – they lack the military capabilities. Plans to station a ‘coalition of the willing’ in Poland or even to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine are completely unrealistic. The United States has recently announced that it will hand over the leadership of the NATO centre in Wiesbaden, which coordinates military support for Ukraine, entirely to European NATO member states. There is even talk of disbanding this NATO facility, which is crucial for Ukraine. Further, with the Iran war ranging, the US has hardly any weapons left to spare. There can therefore be little question of renewed US military involvement in the war in Ukraine.

Even before the latest escalation of the war, there were clear indications that the Ukrainian army was in considerable difficulty. Upon taking office in January, Minister Fedorov spoke of around 200,000 deserters; other MPs even cited significantly higher figures. Furthermore, some two million Ukrainian men are said to have evaded conscription orders. Whichever figures are accurate, they point to an alarming state of affairs within the Ukrainian armed forces – a situation that cannot be remedied either by forced recruitment on the streets or, as is now becoming apparent, by drones controlled by artificial intelligence. Similarly, a proposal now being discussed by the EU – to withdraw refugee status from Ukrainian men who have fled, in breach of international law, and to send them back to Ukraine to face the war – is further evidence of the hopelessness of the situation.

In May, the Ukrainian Minister for Social Affairs, Denys Ulyutin, stated that the population in the government-controlled part of the country had shrunk from 52 million (at the time of independence in 1991) to possibly 22 million. Of these, around 11 million are on social security, predominantly pensioners and war invalids. He expects the population to continue to fall after the war ends, as young men – once exempt from military service – would follow their families to the West. He does not expect any significant return of Ukrainians living abroad. Added to this demographic decline are increasing impoverishment, deep social inequalities, pervasive corruption, astronomical public debt and the country’s economic collapse.

This is hardly a state – let alone an army – to which the media could realistically attribute an imminent military turnaround or even victory.

Of course, such forecasts must be treated with caution. Yet the apparent failure of the drone war to bring about a strategic turning point should make it clear to the European NATO member states that, at the end of this escalation which we have accompanied with such fanfare, Ukraine may not emerge as the victor, but is instead sliding into an increasingly devastated, depopulated and bled-dry country. This should give us cause for great concern for the suffering people in Ukraine. European NATO-states must ask themselves whether a continuation of the war – which they have demanded and supported – can still be morally justified at all.

The European NATO member states are only harming Ukraine with their illusions of victory and wonder weapons, and must finally base their policy on a more realistic assessment of how the war is unfolding. It is therefore time to consider what would happen if the Ukrainian army’s resistance were to collapse one day and Russia were to capture Kharkiv and Odessa as well. Any remnant of Ukraine that remained would scarcely be viable. It must be in the top interest not only of Ukraine but also of its western backers to prevent such a scenario to develop. But how?

Certainly, this cannot be prevented through direct military intervention by NATO. This would make the situation only much worse – also for Ukraine – as such a course of action would inevitably entail the risk of a nuclear war, which nobody can win. Diplomacy therefore remains the only realistic option. After almost five years of war, it is high time that the European NATO member states actively sought dialogue with Russia. Germany – given its role as the strongest country in the EU, its geographical location and its historical responsibility – should take the first step.

To move beyond the entrenched positions of both governments, an initial rapprochement through a civil‑society initiative involving respected and influential figures may be advisable. Such an approach could open a first, cautious pathway toward renewed understanding after years of silence and mutual demonisation. Europe needs peace, and lasting peace can only be achieved with Russia, not against it.

There is not much time left for this.

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Michael von der Schulenburg is a Former UN Assistant Secretary General and currently a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) for the German BSW party.

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By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 9/1/26

At the conclusion of the 26th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Bishkek on September 1, 2026, leaders adopted the Bishkek Declaration alongside 28 major outcome documents focusing on regional security, multipolar governance, and economic cooperation. The complete official text of the Bishkek Declaration at the time of my writing, had not yet been fully transcribed or translated in its entirety by official English-language outlets following its signing. However, key excerpts and provisions addressing global governance, unilateral sanctions, and economic cooperation are documented across member state portals and regional reports.

Leaders signed a joint statement criticizing Western economic sanctions against member states and (without mentioning the US or Israel) condemning military actions against Iran, labeling them violations of international law. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized building a more equitable global governance system to reduce Western, unilateral economic and political influence. The summit approved programs to create an SCO Green Technology Corridor (2026–2030), adopted memorandums on artificial intelligence cooperation, and established new anti-drug and counter-terrorism centers.

The joint declaration was signed by the heads of all member countries, including Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and the leaders of Pakistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan at the close of the 26th meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State.

The SCO meeting will be followed in two weeks’ time (September 11-13) by the 18th summit meeting of the BRICS.

India stood with the SCO bloc on paper against US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s sweeping “Operation Economic Outcast” secondary sanctions campaign in a collective display of unity against Washington’s economic coercion and the extensive economic penalties and upcoming banking secondary sanctions threatened by Bessent.

By participating alongside Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, India supported the SCO’s goal to limit US dominance over global trade and the dollar-based financial system.

However, India’s underlying diplomatic and economic motivations diverge from those of Beijing and Moscow. India engages in perpetual attempts to hedge against the inevitability of multipolarity and the sinking of US hegemony, seeking to balance SCO ties while maintaining vital, strategic partnerships with the US and Europe.

Broadly aligned against Western pressure on the Ukraine and Middle East fronts, Indian Prime Minister Modi has also advised President Putin that “the war in Ukraine must end” and reiterated support for peace efforts (although peace proposals from the US, or Europe, or Ukraine itself, invariably turn out to be totally unrealistic demands for a ceasefire along current front lines to be followed by NATO “peace-keeper” (i.e. warmongering) feet on the ground in Ukraine).

China actively circumvents US measures via “dark fleets” and private “teapot” refineries. India opposes unilateral sanctions on principle but aggressively protects its own banking and tech sectors from triggering catastrophic US secondary tariffs or dollar exclusions – which is all very well, except that India absolutely must continue to consumer Russian oil in the absence of a flow of Iranian oil through the closed Strait of Hormuz. Ultimately, India’s presence at Bishkek allows it to prevent Russia and China from completely dominating Central Asian geopolitics. India will sign collective SCO statements denouncing Scott Bessent’s economic offensive to maintain regional ties, but New Delhi will continuously make a show of adapting (in a sometimes misleading way) its trade to avoid crossing Washington’s red lines while continuing to be a major consumer of Russian oil.

Perhaps even more significant than all that is Xi’s statement today that China is going to increase its coordination with Russia over Ukraine. This, more than anything, tells the world that it must prepare for Russian victory against NATO…

…Zelenskiy is complaining that Europe is on vacation and not helping Ukraine and finds this very “unpleasant.”

Massive Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukraine continue on an almost continuous basis, far outweighing the impact of Ukrainian attacks on Russia. In addition to strikes on Kiev and Odessa, and to strikes on numerous other Ukrainian cities, Putin has ordered massive strikes on Ukrainian energy systems whose consequences will include the complete shutdown of port facilities and the unlivability of parts of Ukraine in advance of winter. Western embassies are advising their citizens in Kiev to leave. Russia had advised the embassies as long ago as May to remove their embassy staffs from the city.

Ukraine has used many flamingo missiles supposedly of its own construction, but Russia claims to have shot down 90 of these over August, of which as many as 17 were shot down on August 15. Russian strikes on Kiev last night included the targeting of Fire Point production facilities where the flamingoes are constructed. Russia appears to have shot down the majority of the 500 ATACMS missiles estimated to have been supplied to it by the US since late 2023. Additional procurement and transfer approvals – such as a mid-2026 arrangement involving 70 M39 ATACMS missiles backed via international defense channels are believe to have continued to supplement the inventory.

Russia’s principal weapon in the air war, as indicated in a recent post, is the Geran 4 and its successor the Geran 5, in addition to Iskander, Zircon and Kalibr ballistic and hypersonic missiles. These will soon be supplemented by the comparatively cheap ballistic Dan T missile. The Dan-T is a new Russian hybrid weapon that combines a jet-powered kamikaze drone with a simplified cruise missile. It has a range of up to 500 kilometers (about 310 miles) and can carry 135 kilograms (about 300 pounds) of explosives. It can be fired from ground launchers, fighter jets, or helicopters. It is built to hit light infrastructure, armored vehicles, and fortified positions. Russia plans to build about 10,000 Dan-T missiles in 2027. The design is built to be cheaper and easier to mass-produce than traditional cruise missiles. The large volume is meant to drain and overwhelm air defense systems.

In August, Russia launched over 2,800 “loitering” or “Green” drones over Ukraine. A loitering drone – more formally called a loitering munition – is an armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed to hover or circle over a target area until an enemy or objective is spotted, and then crash into it to detonate. The European Commission’s foreign minister Kaja Kallas has helpfully ruminated over the possibility of gifting Ukraine with Europe’s remaining interceptor missiles, those approaching their expiry dates.

In Zapporizhzhia oblast Russian forces have reportedly penetrated deep into Russian territory to take the villages of Cervonaya Krenitsa (located well to the west of what had previously been reported as Russia’s further advance, and fairly close to Orikhiv, and, near Dnipro, Novopavlivka, which is located close to the western boundary of Orikhiv. Orikhiv is being described by some sources as having been surrounded by Russian troops and its supply roads having been cut off. Its fall will very likely to be quickly followed by an escalation of Russia’s offensive on the city of Zapporizhzhia itself.

Russian forces continue to advance on the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk conurbation and, in the northeast of Kharkiv are executing maneuvers whose end result will be the integration of a large swathe of Kharkiv into Russian-controlled territory.

***

Putin says Russia is winning on battlefield, will not negotiate with ‘terrorists’

Reuters, 9/1/26

By Dmitry Antonov and Maxim Rodionov

MOSCOW, Sept 1 (Reuters) – President Vladimir Putin said on Tuesday that Russia was winning the war in Ukraine and portrayed the Ukrainian leadership as “terrorists” with whom Moscow could not negotiate.

Putin, in his most detailed ‌comments on the war for many weeks, acknowledged that Ukrainian attacks inside Russia had inflicted real damage and said that drones ‌posed a particular challenge.

But he said that Russia was advancing on the battlefield and told reporters: “I have no doubt the enemy will crumble.”

He declined to say when that ​would happen.

Rumours that Russia would be forced to order a new military mobilisation were “utter nonsense,” he said.

PUTIN SAYS RUSSIAN ADVANCES ARE ACCELERATING

Four and a half years into the war, Russia controls about a fifth of Ukraine. U.S.-mediated peace talks broke off in February after the United States and Israel went to war with Iran.

Opinion polls suggest growing war fatigue in Russia and influential voices are warning about the strain on its economy.

But Putin struck ‌a confident, hawkish tone as he rattled through ⁠a detailed version of developments on the front line, saying Russian advances were accelerating.

Russian troops had captured 270 square km (104 sq miles) of the Donetsk region in eastern Ukraine in August and two large groups of Ukrainian ⁠troops – one comprising 4,500 to 4,800 men, the other up to 2,000 – were surrounded, he said. Reuters could not independently verify those assertions.

Russia continues to advance towards the cities of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, Putin said, adding that Moscow’s forces were preparing to launch massive strikes against energy infrastructure in Ukraine.

Putin said ​that ​Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s warning to airlines that Ukrainian drones would effectively shut ​down Russian airspace sounded like “state terrorism” and that Moscow ‌would find a way to respond if it happened.

Speaking at a news conference after a summit in Kyrgyzstan, Putin said it was not possible to negotiate with “terrorists”.

He also said, however, that Moscow was open to talks aimed at ending, rather than freezing, the war, and restated its willingness to talk to U.S. President Donald Trump’s envoys.

“If someone makes, or can make, a tangible contribution to this process, we are all in favour,” Putin said.

“The only thing we would want to avoid is the process spinning its wheels pointlessly. However, if someone is capable of bringing ‌something positive to these negotiations – which, as we understand it, are currently somewhat ​frozen – then, generally speaking, we are not opposed.”

Putin specifically acknowledged that Ukrainian drone strikes ​had caused damage to Russian oil refineries, although without referring ​to widespread fuel shortages that have resulted from those attacks.

But he said that the level of protection had ‌improved, and “we only have 10% of our refineries left to ​repair”.

Putin responded scathingly to an accusation ​by the German government on Tuesday that Russia was to blame for an attempted drone attack at Leipzig airport last month.

He said the government of Chancellor Friedrich Merz was pointing the finger at Moscow to distract from domestic problems and falling approval ratings.

Putin ​accused Germany of planting evidence in order to ‌frame Russia for the drone attack, but he did not say what he was basing that accusation on.

(Reporting by Dmitry ​Antonov in Moscow and Maxim Rodionov in London; additional reporting by Ksenia Orlova, Filipp Lebedev, Darya Korsunskaya, Anton Kolodyazhnyy, Gleb ​Stolyarov and Andrew Osborn; writing by Mark Trevelyan; Editing by Sanjeev Miglani)

By Scott Ritter, Substack, 8/11/26

The German Journalist Michael Martens recently made headlines by asking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky how Europe can help Ukraine kill more Russians soldiers. I caution Mr. Martens and anyone else in Germany and Europe who thinks such a quest is somehow virtuous and viable—be careful what you ask for.

Michael Martens was born in 1973, in the city of Hamburg, in what was then West Germany. Hamburg was one of the major cities of Nazi Germany, and paid the price for this status in the form of heavy allied bombing, including the infamous firebombing attack that transpired in late July-early August 1943 that killed an estimated 37,000 people. Today Hamburg is Germany’s second largest city, after Berlin. The devastation caused by the firebombing of Hamburg is commemorated in the form of the St. Nikolai Memorial, which serves as a haunting reminder of the destruction caused by the war. Hamburg also has maintained several bomb shelters from that time, likewise as a means of remembering the horrors of war.

Martens today serves as the Balkans correspondent for the German tabloid Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), and it was in this status that he attended a press conference this past Sunday convened for the visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to Serbia. There, Martens asked Zelensky the following question: “Can you tell us Europeans what specifically we can do to help you kill more Russians?” Martens then amended his question, noting “More Russian soldiers, of course,” as if the original intent was not clear enough.

Martens’ question invoked justifiable rage amongst people of conscience everywhere. His own editors at FAZ sought to distance themselves from Martens’ question, noting in a statement released following widespread demands for the newspaper to fire Martens that “the question was worded ambiguously, which we regret. It is not the editorial position of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that as many Russian soldiers as possible should be killed.” Instead, the editors at FAZ opined that the real issue was “how the Russian army could be placed under such pressure in terms of manpower that Russia would be compelled to enter peace negotiations.”

Martens himself expressed “surprise” over the public backlash to his question, noting that “Outside Barbieworld, this is how wars are fought,” and adding in an additional commentary of the controversy “Because killing Russians as many Russian soldiers as possible is what is important to end the war.”

Martens is a man possessing zero experience when it comes to the art of war, and the taking of life necessitated by such. The closest brush with anything resembling actual military death is the myth of Josef Schulz, a German soldier serving with the 714th Infantry Division who, according to legend, refused to participate in the execution of 16 partisans on July 20, 1941, in the town of Smederevska Palanka in Yugoslavia. For this act of moral clarity, Schultz was himself sentenced to die by the same firing squad. Martens helped promulgate this myth in his 2011 book In Search of Heroes. The Story of the Soldier Who Didn’t Want to Kill.

The story, however, was a lie; Schultz had been killed in fighting with the partisans the day prior to the execution. The manufacturing of a myth of noble sacrifice in the face of evil that grew around Schultz was promulgated by those who sought to create and sustain the corresponding mythology of the noble German soldier who was not programmed to kill but rather was confronted with the horrible choice of either obeying the horrific orders he was given or face the certainty of death.

The rehabilitative nature of such fiction has become ingrained in the German DNA, if for no other reason that the reality of collective guilt in the crimes of Nazi Germany on the part of those who participated in the war was manifested so clearly that Germany could not build itself back up unless done so in the image of a hero that simply did not exist, and could not have, in any case, existed, given the reality that virtually all of Germany was stained with the sin of the Nazi crimes—especially the Wehrmacht.

Martens himself has had to wrestle with such demons. He himself is the progeny of a grandfather, Hans-Hermann Martens, who was not only a member of the Nazi Party, whom he served as a prosecutor in the pre-war years, but also was an officer of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff during the war, where he served as a military judge who is said to have sentenced German soldiers to death for the crime of desertion. Hans-Hermann went on to serve as a lawyer and politician in post-war West Germany—another Nazi war criminal rehabilitated by a people subjected to voluntarily self-induced amnesia.

This amnesia carried over through successive generations, so much so that Germans like Michael Martens have “forgotten” the role their country played in not only committing mass murder against the Russian people, but also in reviving and sustaining the malignancy of Banderism—the odious western Ukrainian ideology so closely linked to the Nazi roots Germans have whitewashed and forgotten.

Unlike Martens, I know a few things about war and the concept of killing Russians. From 1984 through 1988, I spent nearly every waking moment training in the art of modern military conflict with a singular focus on the Soviet (i.e., Russian) threat. I had steeped myself in Russian history, culture, literature and language at the college level in preparation for this mission, which became all consuming. I was furthered in this regard by the propaganda being promulgated by the US Defense Department, which had begun publishing an annual threat review entitled “Soviet Military Power.” Not only was this publication considered mandatory reading, a select number of Myrmidon such as me were dispatched to the Defense Intelligence College for a week-long immersion program on—you guessed it—Soviet military power. Through lectures, briefings, tours and discussions, we were exposed to the doctrine, strategy, ideology, and actual weapons which, in the aggregate, comprised “Soviet Military Power.”

But these experiences fell into the category of “why we fight”, not “how we fight.” That only came with my assignment to the Fleet Marine Force and, more specifically, to the 5^th Battalion, 11^th Marines, a self-propelled field artillery unit which served as the direct fore support battalion for the 7^th Marine Amphibious Brigade—the Marine component of the Rapid Deployment Force.

When I arrived at the battalion, I was confronted with the fact that Marine Corps doctrine regarding artillery fire support at the time had not meaningfully progressed since the Vietnam War. If my immersion into the concepts that made up “Soviet Military Power” taught me anything, it was that the Soviets enjoyed massive superiority in artillery, meaning that if we sought to engage them in traditional linear fashion, we would lose the resulting war of attrition—decisively.

How does a junior Second Lieutenant, with zero combat experience and virtually zero experience in the nuances of war, convince officers (and enlisted) possessing decades of experience in both that what they are doing not only is wrong, but will get them killed if we were actually to square off against the Soviet enemy. The Department of Defense had published an outstanding three-volume series of publications—FM 100-2—on the Soviet Army, its operations, tactics, doctrine, and equipment. These publications were the definitive source of unclassified information on Soviet ground forces and the Soviet model of combined arms warfare.

And yet while they were readily available to all Marines, they were rarely read and even more rarely acted upon.

The US Army had what it called the OPFOR—”opposing forces” organized, trained and equipped to fight as the Soviets did—who operated from the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, just north of where I was stationed in 29 Palms, California. The US Army would rotate brigade-sized formations through the NTC, where they would be put through a series of force-on-force exercises where they would face off against two regiments of OPFOR. The exercises always ended with a massed armored attack by the OPFOR which almost always resulted in a decisive defeat of the US Army forces involved. The entire event was designed to be a giant wake-up call for the units involved—either adapt to confront and defeat the Soviet way of war—or die.

I contacted the OPFOR at Fort Irwin and arranged to have my battalion commander ride along with the OPFOR during their final assault on the US Army positions. The end result was everything I hoped would be—the OPFOR rolled through the Army like a hot knife through butter.

Killing Russians—even simulated ones—wasn’t an easy thing at all.

My battalion commander walked away knowing that if we went to war against the Soviet threat based upon the tactics and operational art we were currently trained to employ, we would be similarly destroyed.

I was given virtual carte blanche to re-do the battalion training plan, incorporating more realistic training which emphasized shooting, moving, and communicating faster—much faster—than our Soviet enemy. We were David fighting Goliath, and we had to remain nimble enough to avoid being caught in the destructive power of the enemy’s fire potential, and yet skilled enough to deliver our own fire at the right place and time so as to weaken the enemy and create opportunities for Marine maneuver units to locate and destroy through firepower and maneuver.

To help with the exercises, I created a battalion-level Tactical Training & Exercise Control Group (TTECG)—basically a war game system—where I was able to develop scenarios using enemy forces that employed doctrinally correct Soviet tactics and operations. Using this TEEGC system, I ran the battalion through the paces, using increasingly complex scenarios designed to stress the importance of maneuver and speed when fighting the Russians.

The TEECG was so successful that I was asked to support the training of other Marine units at 29 Palms, including the infantry and armor battalions.

5/11 was a nuclear-capable battalion and was tasked with being prepared with delivering nuclear artillery fires using its 155mm and 203mm self-propelled guns. This made us a prime target for any Soviet forces we may have gone up against. To better prepare for the reality of fighting the Russians, I created my own OPFOR unit, designed after Soviet special forces, or Spetznaz. When my battalion took to the field, I would insert my Spetznaz unit into their area of operation using helicopters and offroad vehicle infiltration and then hunt them down and kill them. We ambushed the batteries as they moved, we attacked them at night when they set in, and we harassed them throughout the operation. In short, we killed them far more than they killed us.

Killing Russians—even simulated ones—was no simple thing.

When the Marines held a major division-sized exercise in 29 Palms, I was tasked with working with a US Army battalion from the 7^th Light Infantry Division to prepare a Soviet-style defense that the Marines would then attack.

Using Soviet defense tactics and doctrine, this battalion stopped the Marines in their tracks before they even reached the forward defensive positions.

On three separate occasions, the exercise controllers stopped the exercise and brought all the dead Marines back to life so they could restart the scenario. Each time the results were the same: the Marine attack was defeated before it even had a chance to begin.

The attack was supposed to represent the first phase of a three-phase scenario that saw the Marines breakthrough the defense and maneuver to surround the Soviet defenders.

Finally, the commanding general stopped the exercise and assembled his staff and the commanders and staff of the subordinated units, chastising them on their inability to defeat a Soviet-style threat. Everyone was sent back to the drawing board to rethink their approach toward training.

The commanders of the tank and infantry unit that had used the OPFOR TEECG in their training had repeatedly tried to persuade the regimental and division staff that the plans they proposed would not succeed. Each time they were overruled and rode out to their death.

It turned out Russians—even simulated ones—were pretty good at killing Marines.

But the biggest wake up call came during a separate division exercise where we were tasked with opposing a simulated Soviet incursion into Iran. In the end, the superior Soviet forces broke through the blocking positions that had been set up by the Marines, and 5/11 was tasked with firing a nuclear artillery round to halt the Soviet advance. We did so, and then suddenly the exercise came to an end—the Soviets, upon having a nuclear weapon used against them, responded with overwhelming nuclear retaliation, killing everyone.

The Russians—even simulated ones—were better at mass death than we were.

I was fortunate that I never had the opportunity to test my anti-Soviet military acumen in the real world. Instead, I was dispatched to the Soviet Union as part of an arms control team tasked with eliminating the very weapons that had killed us in the Iranian exercise—the SS-20 intermediate range missile.

In the end, learning to live in peace with the Russians proved far more conducive to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness that training to kill them.

This should have been a universal lesson of the ages, one that would motivate future generations to avoid the pitfalls associated with war—especially war with Russia.

Michael Martens did not heed this lesson, even after four years of conflict between Russia and Ukraine proved the futility of trying to kill Russians on the field of battle.

Lessons the Mongols, Swedes, French and Germans had learned previously.

A lesson the Marines learned in simulated fashion back in the 1980’s.

According to Martens, “There is nothing ‘scandalous’ about the question of how Europe can help Ukraine kill more Russians. That’s exactly what we need.”

Martens has been preparing for this moment for months now, having invested considerable time and effort in drafting an essay titled “Killing Russians: What Europe Must Do.”

Martens’ muse for this project was Sir Fitzroy Hew Royle Maclean, 1st Baronet, whose memoirs, Eastern Approaches, in which he details his time working with Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia, inspired Martens so—the title of Martens’ essay is drawn from a conversation Winston Churchill had with Maclean notifying him that his job was “simply to find out who was killing the most Germans and suggest means by which we could help them to kill more.”

This is where Martens lost himself in his self-induced blood lust.

The target of Maclean’s mission was German Nazis, and the tool he was seeking to employ consisted of partisans drawn from the ranks of a civilian population that had been terrorized by these same Nazis.

Motivation means everything.

Especially when it comes to the people being asked to do the killing.

Martens would have benefitted from perusing David Grossman’s classic work, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, which described the inherent resistance on the part of most soldiers during World War 2 to killing—most soldiers did not fire their weapons, and those that did, often did so without aiming.

Killing a man is no easy thing, a fact Martens—who has never served in the military—would do well to reflect on.

Even when improved training techniques designed to break through the psychological barrier that exists in most humans to taking life succeeds, there is a huge cost that is paid for this “success”—the psychological ruination of a man who has done what no man should ever be asked to do—kill his fellow man.

There is nothing glorious about war, since war in its most basic form is simply about mankind killing itself.

Sometimes, however, the cause is such that a society embraces war as the only means of collective survival.

Tito’s Yugoslavian partisans were engaged in such a conflict.

So, too, were the Russians and other nationalities of the Soviet Union.

Their collective enemy were the German Nazis and their allies, who were killed in great numbers.

And each year the Russians of today celebrate their victory of Nazi Germany, not to glorify killing, but to honor the dead.

27 million of them.

Martens would benefit from a course in Russian history of that time.

Or perhaps he could turn to Soviet cinema. I would recommend he watch four movies: Ballad of a Soldier, The Cranes are Flying, Fate of a Man, and Come and See.

Killing is the easy part of war.

Dealing with the consequences of killing is the hard part.

A nation collectively pays this price, and it is a cost that carries over generations.

Killing should never be so glibly embraced, as Martens has done.

But the most damning part of Martens’ ignorance-laced effort to recast himself as some sort of modern-day Fitzroy Maclean is the side Martens has opted to align himself with while glibly espousing the death of others.

The cause of Zelensky’s Ukraine, a literal modern-day manifestation of the German Nazis Maclean was tasked with killing.

The same Nazis the ancestors of the Russian soldiers fighting today sacrificed their lives in defeating.

Martens should ask himself if he truly has what it takes to kill Russians.

Of course, he won’t—cowards never do the actual killing themselves but stand on the sidelines while others engage in this blood sport on their behalf.

The Marines I served with were not cowards—they were prepared to engage the Soviet “threat” in mortal combat, even when empowered with the knowledge that to do so would invite almost certain death.

Martens lacks such moral fiber.

But, more importantly in this regard, so, too, his fellow Europeans.

Let’s take Martens’ own Germany, which is currently leading the way in pounding the drums of war when it comes to Russia.

Skip over the part where the German economy cannot bear the costs associated with building a military machine worthy of a Fourth Reich.

Let’s talk about the mettle of the German men who would be called upon to kill Russians in such a war.

It is a short conversation—there simply isn’t a will to fight.

After embarking on a massive propaganda campaign designed to motivate hundreds of thousands of German men to rally to the cause of the Fourth Reich, German manhood produced only 530 such souls.

There is no will to fight the war Martens and his ilk so gleefully embrace.

And if the German government were so foolhardy as to implement forced conscription, it would collapse in the face of massive public protest.

All of Europe is infected with this lack of desire to serve a cause that no one believes is worth dying for—the European political and economic elite may want to kill Russians, but the populations of the constituent nations of Europe do not.

Which means when erstwhile heroes like Martens speak of killing Russians, he speaks of Ukrainians doing the killing.

Let me remind Martens of two harsh realities in this regard: every month, tens of thousands of Russian men volunteer to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense so they can fight in the Special Military Operation, the term used by the Russian government to describe its ongoing conflict with the collective west.

And every month, gangs of Ukrainian “recruiters” forcefully kidnap Ukrainian men by the thousands to serve in the Ukrainian military.

There is no comparison.

Martens’ call for “killing Russians” exposes everything that is wrong about Europe today. This ugly reality has been operating in the open for some time. In 1993 it was given voice by George Soros, who postulated a new US-European “partnership” where “the combination of manpower from Eastern Europe with the technical capabilities of NATO would greatly enhance the military potential of the Partnership because it would reduce the risk of body bags for NATO countries, which is the main constraint on their willingness to act.”

Let others die for the causes you espouse—this is the mantra of Martens and his ilk.

And what cause does Martens espouse? Here we need only delve back into the Nazi roots of his family tree.

Generalplan Ost was Nazi Germany’s vision for the creation of Germanized Lebensraum carved from captured territory in Eastern Europe involving the large-scale ethnic cleansing of Slavs, including Russians and Ukrainians.

German lawyers like Hans-Hermann Martens, Michael Martens’ Nazi grandfather, were responsible for envisioning and implementing this plan.

The apple doesn’t fall far from the tree, it seems.

Martens pretends to support the Ukrainians, and claims all he wants to do is “kill Russians.”

But the war he supports is, by design, intended to send Ukrainian troops to the slaughterhouse as well.

To transform Ukraine into a Kamikaze nation hell bent on suicide.

By pitting Slav against Slav, Martens and all those erstwhile “friends” of Ukraine have exposed themselves as nothing more than the modern-day versions of the Nazi scourge the world defeated back in 1945.

But the Nazis were never eradicated, as the fate of Martens’ grandfather proves.

Instead, they were rehabilitated and honored, their horrific crimes whitewashed and put in an intellectual limbo until which time the ideology of hatred that facilitated the commission of those crimes took root in a new generation of German Nazis who dream of the fulfilment of their sick fantasies of “Lebensraum” predicated on the extermination of the Slavic people.

One day this war will end, and when it does people like Michael Martens need to be held accountable for the role they played in seeking the modern-day genocide of the Slavic peoples of Europe.

Until then, anyone possessing a moral compass must call out Martens and those like him who advocate “killing Russians.”

Because what they really mean is the genocide of Slavs, and the promotion of a European master race (one only need recall Josep Borrell, the European Union’s former foreign policy chief, who likened Europe to a “garden” and the rest of the world a “jungle”).

“Killing Russians” is a sick metaphor for all that is wrong with Europe and the collective West today—a perverse vision of cultural supremacy that can only exist from the sacrifice of the Slavic people.

Martens and his fellow caste of European (and American) “gardeners” should take heed of history, however: beware what you ask for.

History has shown that those who promote the “killing of Russians” quickly find out that not only are Russians hard to kill, but they are also adept at killing those who present an existential threat to their survival as a people and culture.