RT, 6/28/26

Russian President Vladimir Putin addressed the convention of his party, United Russia, in Moscow on Sunday, and gave a sweeping speech that touched on development, Western pressure, and global instability.

The convention was held ahead of the parliamentary election in September. 

World in turmoil

Russia is facing a difficult time, with the entire world experiencing a period of “fundamental and systemic transformation,” Putin said, noting the flare-up of regional conflicts and fragmentation of international cooperation.

New artificial obstacles that affect the “economy, technology, science, and even culture, sports and humanitarian cooperation” are emerging, he said.

The proxy war in Ukraine

Western pressure on Russia has reached unprecedented levels, according to Putin.

He went on to say that the Western elites are unable to “inflict a strategic defeat” on Russia, and their efforts to destabilize it from within are proving ineffective.

“Consequently, they keep supporting the Kiev regime, which they have chosen as a battering ram in their struggle against Russia, without any sympathy for the Ukrainian people.”

As Ukraine faces setbacks on all parts of the front line, it has turned to “terrorist activities,” engaging in “targeted attacks on civilians and civilian facilities” and openly recruiting people to conduct terrorist attacks in Russia, Putin said.

The West, meanwhile, turns a blind eye to Kiev’s methods, he added.

National security

Russia is “confidently repelling” all attempts to deter its economic progress, Putin said, referring to the “unlawful” Western sanctions. “We have sufficient resources, means, and political will, and nobody should doubt that.” 

The ultimate goal is to ensure the security of Russia, its people, and its borders “for decades ahead,” he stressed.

Safeguarding the future

Putin vowed to “take Russia’s economy to a fundamentally new technological level,” to create modern, high-paying jobs, and to “support national businesses and advanced industries that guarantee Russia’s sovereignty and leadership.”

He also expressed support for building new housing and roads, as well as new support measures for teachers proposed by United Russia.

He identified the preservation of traditional values and demographics and improving living standards and the quality of life across the country as key priorities.

The upcoming election

Putin praised Russian soldiers, volunteers, engineers, and other workers for serving the country, repeating his view that the veterans are “Russia’s true elite.” Theyshould continue serving in civilian life after military service, he said.

“Many party members, including those who have held high posts in government and business structures, have volunteered to go to the front, and frontline heroes are joining your ranks, winning preliminary elections and running for office at all levels.” 

The upcoming September parliamentary election will be held in strict adherence to the law and with all measures taken to ensure their integrity, including from external influence and manipulation, Putin said.

The people’s trust in the nation’s democratic institutions is the “essential condition of our society’s stability and unity,” he stated.

The Bell, 6/29/26

The Bell is a Russian opposition outlet based outside of the country. – Natylie

Ukraine’s drone campaign against Russian oil refineries has sparked an unprecedented gasoline shortage — just at the height of the typical summer surge in demand. Huge queues at gas stations and fuel shortages have reached Moscow for the first time. Muscovites, who had been almost entirely isolated from the impact of the Ukraine invasion until recently, are again feeling the realities of living in a country at war. For a long time, Vladimir Putin was silent. But this week he appeared at four major public events, using each of them to insist that he will not back down — despite the obvious challenges — and will continue the fight.

Even Moscow runs dry

Fuel shortages are increasing due to Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries. As expected, after the June 16-18 attacks on the Moscow Oil Refinery, supply issues have reached Moscow for the first time since the war began. This photo report from Meduza gives a glimpse of the fuel situation in the capital. In recent days, long lines of vehicles have formed at several gas stations. The specifics vary from company to company. Some only have the cleaner, more expensive Ai-95, while others lack both that and the cheaper and more popular Ai-92 grade. Most networks have also introduced rationing.

AFP, 6/27/26

The EU on Friday proposed stopping granting Ukrainian men of fighting age refugee protection to settle in the bloc, while extending the right beyond 2027 for others from the country.

Brussels said the change follows a request from Kyiv, whose army has struggled with manpower shortages as Russia’s war of invasion grinds into a fifth year.

“Our proposal provides that temporary protection should not be granted to newly arriving persons who are not allowed to leave Ukraine because of their military obligations,” Magnus Brunner, the European Union’s internal affairs chief told journalists.

The 27-nation EU granted Ukrainians temporary protection after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, a measure rolled over several times and currently set to expire next March.

About 4.4 million people currently benefit from the scheme, which grants them residence permits, the right to work, and access to medical assistance, social welfare and education.

Under the commission’s proposal the welcome will be extended until March 2028, including for military-age men already living in the bloc.

The EU on Friday proposed stopping granting Ukrainian men of fighting age refugee protection to settle in the bloc, while extending the right beyond 2027 for others from the country.

Brussels said the change follows a request from Kyiv, whose army has struggled with manpower shortages as Russia’s war of invasion grinds into a fifth year.

“Our proposal provides that temporary protection should not be granted to newly arriving persons who are not allowed to leave Ukraine because of their military obligations,” Magnus Brunner, the European Union’s internal affairs chief told journalists.

The 27-nation EU granted Ukrainians temporary protection after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, a measure rolled over several times and currently set to expire next March.

About 4.4 million people currently benefit from the scheme, which grants them residence permits, the right to work, and access to medical assistance, social welfare and education.

Under the commission’s proposal the welcome will be extended until March 2028, including for military-age men already living in the bloc.

But newcoming males aged 23 to 60 — who are prohibited from leaving the country under Ukraine’s martial law — will be excluded from the scheme once the plan is adopted by EU member states, the commission said, noting that however they will still be able to apply for asylum.

Brussels said it will also develop a pilot program to support Ukrainians who wish to return home with practical support in areas such as jobs, housing, and education.

“As the war continues, our support must also continue,” Brunner said, adding that the commission’s proposal took into account “Ukraine’s evolving defense needs and recovery needs.”

“This is something the Ukrainians asked us to do,” he said of the decision to limit protection for men of fighting age.

Adult men account for about 27 percent of all Ukrainians currently benefiting from EU protection, with women making up 43 percent of the total and minors another 30 percent, according to EU data.

Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic host the largest communities.

By Uriel Araujo, InfoBrics, 6/29/26

Uriel Araujo is an Anthropology PhD and a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

While the spotlight remains on Iran and the Middle East, the proxy Western war against Russia in Ukraine could be gaining traction again. In recent weeks, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has sought to project strength: with a fresh EU financial package in hand, he has portrayed Ukraine as building decisive long-range strike capabilities that could shift the momentum against Russia.

In his June 24 speech, Zelensky highlighted expanding long-range strike capabilities and argued that (with the right support from G7 partners), his country could “force Russia to choose peace”. He pointed to Ukraine’s growing ability to hit “deeper” inside Russian territory as evidence of increasing pressure, while emphasizing plans to bolster domestic weapons production.

It is true that Kyiv has intensified its long-range campaign, striking military, defense-industrial, and energy targets inside the Eurasian great power. For example Ukraine struck targets in Ufa on June 25, hitting Rosneft-linked refineries.

These developments generate striking images and tactical disruption. Yet the reality on the ground is something else: Ukrainian drone warfare has had an impact, but this has not prevented Russian forces from continuing offensive operations, artillery barrages, missile strikes, and their own drone attacks along the front.

Russian advances have in fact been steady: for one thing, its Armed Forces have reported control over settlements including Krasny Liman, Konstantinovka, among others. And the territorial gains continue in key sectors.

Zelensky is, in any case, leveraging the new EU support (roughly $102 billion) to present Ukraine as standing a credible chance.

One may recall that countries such as Slovakia, and the Czech Republic (and initially Hungary) had opted out of financially participating in the EU’s joint package. Post-Orbán, Hungary has reversed its obstruction and facilitated implementation, though Budapest still raises concerns over minority rights in Ukraine and accession issues.

Against this backdrop, UK Prime Minister Starmer announced his resignation, while French President Macron is constitutionally barred from seeking a third term in 2027.

All of that adds uncertainty to the politics and the financial angle of the conflict, in a continent that has long been experiencing “Ukraine fatigue”.

No wonder Zelensky works hard to account for these funds by showcasing military progress.

Kyiv is also purchasing drones (including Hornet ones) in large quantities. The Kremlin, however, still maintains a larger drone inventory for close-range and other responses, not to mention ballistic missiles.

Furthermore, the Ukrainian Armed Forces face a serious shortage of interceptor missiles, including for Patriot systems, with no quick domestic fix in sight; and making their own Patriot missiles would be no solution, as Jennifer Kavanagh (a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities) points out.

Moreover, Kyiv is unlikely to receive major new air defense or offensive systems like Tomahawks in the near term.

Thus, Zelensky, again, seeks to create the appearance of successful defense and even turning the tide. This effort helps justify the massive aid to EU creditors amid Europe’s growing fatigue with the conflict and its economic fallout.

Be as it may, Ukraine’s manpower challenges are underreported, with skilled fighters in short supply after years of attrition.

As I’ve argued, too much is often made of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian energy assets: while visually dramatic, damage to refineries has proven relatively limited and repairable. Russia has after all absorbed dozens of such strikes, mitigating impacts through spare capacity, rerouting, increased crude exports, and adjustments at other facilities.

The point is that Kyiv can temporarily disrupt operations, but Moscow can count on dozens of refineries, redundant capacity, large reserves, and the ability to adapt. Analysts from the International Energy Agency, for instance, have confirmed that outages cause temporary dips without crippling the sector.

In other words, tactical successes far from the front do not automatically translate into battlefield victory. Wars are still decided by manpower, artillery, logistics, industrial output, and territorial control. Moscow continues expanding production of tanks, shells, glide bombs, missiles, and drones; its defense industry has shifted to wartime footing, with ammunition and drone output rising significantly despite sanctions. In addition, Russia has adapted by dispersing assets, hardening sites, enhancing electronic warfare, and speeding repairs, thus reducing the long-term bite of strikes.

Additionally, Moscow still fields larger strike campaigns with hundreds of drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic systems in major waves, retaining superior long-range capacity overall. Kyiv in turn faces persistent constraints: personnel shortages, air defense gaps, ammunition imbalances, and aid dependence.

While drone strikes matter, territorial advances remain the more telling indicator, which is why organizations such as the Institute for the Study of War track control maps so closely.

All of this means that Ukraine’s “deep” strikes carry real psychological weight and can impose costs, but they should not be confused with decisive strategic effects.

Moscow after all holds advantages in aggregate resources, industrial base, and in operational momentum across many front sectors. Ultimately, the conflict’s outcome depends less on dramatic drone footage than on hard realities of attrition and negotiation.

The Ukrainian leader’s latest push may buy time and headlines, but the ground situation suggests a far more difficult path ahead, from Ukraine’s perspective. Europe’s patience and resources, in turn, are not unlimited, and the political landscape could face changes soon.

Below my latest article in Responsible Statecraft on the currently moribund peace process for Ukraine. With a possible end to the war against Iran in sight, I hope the Americans can reinject energy into the Ukraine peace process; the Europeans have shown themselves unable to do so, and I expect little to emerge from the E3 Ambassadors’ meeting at the Russian MFA yesterday.

Lots of people talk about there being a single peace deal for Ukraine, but in truth it will be far more complicated than that, requiring separate deals on an end to the hostilities, Ukraine’s EU future, NATO, and on the future EU/UK relationship with Russia after the war ends.

Meanwhile, Zelensky is already asking for another $20 billion in military aid, hot on the heels of the EU finally agreeing its 90 billion package after the Hungarian elections removed the final barrier to aid. Zelensky has absolutely no desire to see the cash cow of war end and I continue to be amazed (though not surprised) that European leaders continue to pander to his every ask, while forced mobilisation becomes ever more repressive on the streets of Ukraine, corruption remains rampant, and the neo-Nazis have an ever tighter grip on the Ukrainian military and intelligence apparatus.

We should stop sending money to Ukraine. That appears the only way to force Zelensky’s hand and bring real energy to the peace process. I suspect, however, Ursula von der Leyen and co will continue to stack up debt to keep the war rumbling on.

I hope you find my article interesting.

The time is ripe for European leaders to set aside the self-licking summits in European capitals and get in the room with the U.S., Ukraine, and Russia to orchestrate a modern-day Helsinki Conference.

A durable peace for Ukraine will require several interlocking agreements, each of which will be incredibly difficult to negotiate, but all of which will be vital if we are to avoid a general war in Europe.

In a recent post on X, former U.S. diplomat Dan Fried, commenting on the June 7 E3 Leaders’ Statement on peace in Ukraine, said, “If Russia wants to end the war it can, you know, end the war.”

It’s important to pause here and note that Fried was the State Department Coordinator for Sanctions Policy from 2013 until 2017. I know, because I was directly involved at the time, that Fried is the architect of the policy of making Russia sanctions permanent by linking them to the full implementation of the Minsk II agreement, which Russia and Ukraine interpreted in radically different ways. The main aim of sanctions conditionality was therefore to delay any possibility of peaceful settlement, and in that it succeeded.

Eleven years on, Fried’s remark echoes a common line of argument in pro-war Western circles: that Russia could simply end the war without a negotiated settlement. And yet an unconditional about-face by Russia is quite obviously never going to happen, and so the comment serves only to prolong the war.

The E3 statement flowed from the same logic. It offered nothing new or unexpected. Critically, it reiterated the line that roughly $300 billion of Russian assets will remain immobilized until Russia “ceases its war of aggression and compensates Ukraine for the damage caused by the war.”

The current World Bank estimate of the cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine stands at $588 billion. So, the E3 position amounts to confirmation that Russia will never see its money again and moreover will still have $288 billion left to pay.

This, I fear, is another example of Fried’s logic — that peace in Ukraine is indeed possible, but only on terms that Russia would be unable or unwilling to accept. As Western mainstream media carpet bombs the world with news that Ukraine is turning the tide in the war and could still win, then the calculus may be among Western policy hawks that continuing the war is no bad thing.

It’s certainly clear that no one appears in a rush. The E3 statement follows a sixteen-month period of endless and repetitive meetings by European leaders and Zelensky in which everyone violently agrees, but to which the Russians are never invited.

Only in recent months, notably since President Donald Trump’s Alaska Summit with Putin, has the topic of a negotiated end to the Ukraine war slowly bubbled to the surface in Europe. President Alexander Stubb of Finland, President Emmanuel Macron of France, Prime Minister Bart de Wever of Belgium have at various times dipped their toes in the water of suggesting diplomatic talks with Russia.

Last week, Zelensky himself issued an open letter to Putin about a possible meeting.

But, being that the letter contained several pages of personal barbs and insults about Putin, it is hard to see this as anything more than a self-licking stunt, of the type Dan Fried would support. The Europeans and Zelensky appear dug in for the long haul.

A senior Russian contact remarked to me recently that the Europeans spend a lot of time talking about the possibility of talks, but not the substance of what might be on the agenda. In truth, a vast amount of work will be needed in preparatory negotiations to map out the shape of a future peace settlement, requiring a clarity of focus that has hitherto been missing.

A durable peace for Ukraine will require several interlocking deals, possibly negotiated separately with different signatories. Talk of a single ‘peace deal’ for Ukraine is a lazy over-simplification. The latest E3 statement bundles up separate issues in the same basket as does the now dormant US brokered plan. A peace settlement for Ukraine will require, inter alia, the following.

A bilateral peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, brokered by the U.S. and others. The existing U.S.-brokered draft is the right place to start, as that includes the most contentious issue of territory, and in particular the future status of the remaining territory in Donetsk which Russia has not conquered. It would also need to cover sensitive topics such as the size of Ukraine’s army, Ukrainian children who were removed to Russia, and minority languages in Ukraine.

A clear plan and timeline for Ukraine to join the European Union. This can only be negotiated bilaterally by the EU and Ukraine, without U.S. or British involvement. It is arguably as difficult as a bilateral peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia.

Zelensky has said he wants to see Ukrainian accession by 2027, but this is not going to happen, and not only because the war may still be ongoing. The Europeans aren’t over eager about Ukraine joining because Ukraine is nowhere near ready, and Europe can’t afford it. Chancellor Merz has recently resurfaced the idea of “associate membership,” in which Ukraine gets no voting rights or money. Every rational observer should be able to judge that many Ukrainians will want clarity on the glidepath towards EU membership as a condition for ending the war.

An agreement between Russia and Europe, including the United Kingdom, on the future shape of their relationship. The third issue is equally as complex. Should Ukraine eventually join the EU, then it would join existing former Soviet and Warsaw Pact members (the Balts and Poland) who frame Russia as an existential threat. Relations between Europe and Russia are more shuttered today than they were during the Soviet era.

Europe needs cheap energy to stem the tide of self-imposed deindustrialization; Russia would like European investment again and a more open people-to-people relationship. There will need to be a settlement on how sanctions against Russia are eased during a post-war period. Ignoring an EU-Russia deal risks pressing the pause button on a future general war at a time when Europe is rapidly rearming,

An agreement within NATO. A peace settlement for Ukraine will only land when its future NATO aspiration is taken decisively off of the table. Anyone who still believes that Russia will give up on this clearest of redlines is dangerously misguided.

Ukraine needs cast iron security guarantees that should involve a hard commitment to boots on the ground should Russia renege on its commitments.This will require Russia to have confidence that NATO isn’t stoking the fire in the background to reignite tensions as a pretext for intervention. These are incredibly complex issues and will require U.S. leadership to shift the Europeans into line. The NATO-Russia Council could have provided a forum for discussion and deconfliction but was formally disbanded in December 2025. Perhaps a NATO-Ukraine-Russia Council might emerge, to take its place, reopening a vital avenue for military dialogue and deconfliction.

Amid signs that the Trump Administration is tiring of the Ukraine peace process, the time is ripe for a serious push to bring the disastrous war in Ukraine to a close. Rather than the Europeans and Americans tussling over who should be in charge of the negotiations, the truth is that every Western nation will have a role to play, together with Ukraine and Russia, to hammer out the various agreements needed for peace. That may require a grand summit similar in scale to the Helsinki Conference of 1975. On the back of the E3 Statement, however, I am not holding my breath.