By Kautilya The Contemplator, Substack, 8/28/26

When CIA Director John Ratcliffe recently made an unannounced visit to Moscow, there was much speculation across the media on what he intended to discuss with his Russian counterparts. However, the more pertinent question is why Ratcliffe had to go at all? Washington and Moscow already possess diplomatic, military and intelligence channels designed to function even when relations are at their worst. Furthermore, sending an intelligence chief into the adversary’s territory historically carried significant risk. When former CIA Director Richard Helms visited the Soviet Union in 1987, Time described the Agency’s longstanding inhibition:

“The unwritten but iron rule of the CIA was that no man who holds the secrets puts himself into a hostile environment.”1

Despite this, Ratcliffe boarded a US military aircraft and spent approximately eight hours in Moscow. The Wall Street Journal reported that Ratcliffe carried a warning against Russia testing NATO while other reports suggest Iran was also discussed. President Donald Trump called the visit “semi-routine.”

The significance of Ratcliffe’s journey may lie less in what was discussed than in what US intelligence actually saw that made Washington decide that its foreign intelligence chief had to travel to Moscow in person.

Why the CIA Director?

The choice of emissary provides the first clue to this visit. If Washington wanted conventional negotiations with Moscow, it would have continued with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner (across past administrations this channel is usually maintained by the Secretary of State). If the immediate concern was military deconfliction, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) could communicate directly with Russia’s General Staff. If the objective were a broader political understanding negotiated discreetly on the President’s behalf, the National Security Advisor would have historical precedent behind him. The fact that Washington dispatched its intelligence chief suggests it faces a narrower problem to which it seeks answers. This could entail determining what the adversary might be actually preparing to do based on an assessment of specific intelligence.

President Trump has increasingly used his CIA Director as a personal intelligence emissary in highly sensitive situations when intelligence and coercive signaling converge. Earlier this year, Ratcliffe traveled to Venezuela following the removal of Nicolas Maduro from power. He was also dispatched to Cuba carrying a direct presidential message demanding changes in Havana’s behavior while reportedly warning Cuban officials against hostile military action.

There is another important variable that distinguishes intelligence diplomacy from conventional diplomatic practice: urgency. Presidential envoys can spend weeks exploring compromises. In this sense, intelligence operates on the frontline of national power. It compresses the distance between uncertainty and decision, revealing intentions that conventional diplomacy may uncover too slowly or never at all. Burns went to Moscow as the Biden administration tried to determine whether Russian military preparations would lead to war. Ratcliffe’s journey may reflect a similar need to clarify a consequential intelligence assessment quickly.

As such, reporting by mainstream media of this episode remains incomplete. Warning Moscow against attacking NATO hardly requires an eight-hour visit by the intelligence chief. Russian military planners have studied NATO and escalation doctrine for decades. The more interesting possibility is that Washington needed an answer to a specific and time-sensitive intelligence question. What that was remains unknown.

The CIA Director can also disclose intelligence in a controlled manner to gauge reactions that might otherwise not be discernible through established channels. He may reveal enough to demonstrate American visibility into Russian thinking without exposing the sources behind it. Intelligence thereby becomes not merely a source of knowledge, but an instrument for shaping the adversary’s calculations.

Understanding why such a question might require the CIA Director to personally appear in Moscow requires looking beyond this journey. Intelligence services have long communicated with adversaries while deliberately avoiding this kind of encounter. The history of these channels might help explain why Ratcliffe’s journey was anything but routine.

The Secret Rules of Intelligence Diplomacy

The CIA was not alone in treating such journeys with extraordinary caution. In 1966, Mossad Director Meir Amit considered secretly traveling to Cairo for talks with Egyptian officials prior to the outbreak of war in 1967. Former Mossad chief Isser Harel opposed the mission for fear Amit might be detained and interrogated. Israel prohibited the journey. Contacts continued outside Egypt. The rationale was that intelligence services needed to communicate with adversaries. There was no need to place their chiefs inside enemy capitals to do so.2

During the Cold War, the CIA and the KGB developed the Gavrilov channel, comprising a secure telephone connection between Langley and Moscow.3 This enabled the agencies to manage sensitive disputes through confidential meetings on neutral territory like Vienna. It also provided an emergency mechanism for diffusing any potential miscalculations.

While a secure channel could transmit information, it could not necessarily resolve uncertainty about the adversary’s intentions. That distinction between communication and assessment helps explain why intelligence officials sometimes still met face-to-face. A December 1987 declassified memorandum helps explain why such encounters matter. During Gorbachev’s Washington summit, Deputy CIA Director Robert Gates met privately with Vladimir Kryuchkov, then Deputy Chairman of the KGB and head of its powerful First Chief Directorate. Gates argued that intelligence services had a special responsibility to ensure that relations between nuclear adversaries rested on realistic assessments of each other’s intentions. Intelligence could reduce the danger of “miscalculation out of ignorance.”4

The same principle survived the Cold War. On October 18, 2022, amid mounting concern over escalation in Ukraine, British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace abruptly cancelled a parliamentary appearance and flew to Washington for talks with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and White House officials. A British defense source later explained that the circumstances made it “important to meet face to face.”5 Days later, on October 23, 2022, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu telephoned his American, British and French counterparts alleging that Ukraine was preparing a radiological “dirty bomb.” The sequence illustrates that while urgent information can be transmitted remotely, governments may sometimes decide that in light of substantial uncertainty, senior officials are required to meet in person.

These precedents provide one clue to Ratcliffe’s journey. Backchannels can transmit information, but personal encounters can help resolve uncertainty by testing how the adversary responds. What circumstances have previously been serious enough for Washington to send the CIA Director himself?

When the Director Travels, the Message Changes

When President Joe Biden dispatched CIA Director William Burns to Moscow in November 2021, the purpose was twofold. First, Burns delivered a warning to his counterparts that the United States had detected Russian preparations for a major military operation against Ukraine. Second, he collected a response. Burns would later admit that even though US intelligence had provided an “early and accurate warning of the war that was coming”, he found Putin and his senior advisers “unmoved by the clarity of our understanding of what he was planning.”6 He returned to Washington believing the danger had increased and subsequently told Biden that Putin was likely to proceed.

An intelligence chief can demonstrate how much his government knows, communicate consequences and evaluate the reaction. The more pressing question is whether the adversary denies the intelligence, challenges its interpretation, offers reassurance or reveals a red line.

What Requires the CIA Director in the Room?

The historical pattern demonstrates that CIA Directors meet their counterparts to assess intentions based on specific intelligence that otherwise cannot be determined through other backchannels. Burns went to Moscow in 2021 when Washington possessed specific intelligence about Russian preparations for war. He again met with Naryshkin in Ankara in 2022 amid public reports that Russia might escalate with nuclear weapons. Whether accurate or not, in both cases the intelligence problem was specific, consequential and time-sensitive. Ratcliffe’s journey thus raises the possibility that Washington again may have confronted an intelligence question that could not wait for the natural rhythms of diplomacy.

The Washington Post reported that Ratcliffe’s mission was preceded by fresh intelligence suggesting that Moscow regarded the United States as depleted by the Iran war and saw an opportunity to escalate against American interests in Europe. The Wall Street Journal separately reported concern over possible Russian action intended to test NATO. This suggests that Washington’s concern extended beyond a generic warning about NATO, toward a more immediate question about Russian intentions.

Ratcliffe’s visit may ultimately tell us more about the nature of Washington’s uncertainty than about the message he carried. The enduring mystery of those eight hours in Moscow may not be what Ratcliffe told Naryshkin. It might be what Trump needed Ratcliffe to find out.

By Gordon Hahn, Substack, 8/20/26

The NATO-Russia Ukrainian War is coming to its endgame in Russia’s favor, sharply raising the temperature of domestic Ukrainian politics. To add catastrophe to disaster, the Ukrainian Maidan regime, state, and army are riven with schisms threatening the existence of them all. Thus, on the ‘left’ and on the right, particularly the far right neofascist wing of Ukrainian politics, pressure on the Volodomyr Zelenskiy iteration of the Maidan oligarchic-neofascist regime is being intensified. On the right, the 3rd Army Corps ‘Azov’, based on the Azov neofascist political movement, has been put in charge of the defense of what remains (approximately 15 percent) of Ukraine’s hold on Russian-claimed Donetsk Oblast. There, in western Donetsk, Russian forces have entered Dobropiliya and are in the process of encircling the Slovansk and Kramatorsk strongholds. To the west of these three towns lies nothing but undefendable open fields leading to the middle of the Dnepr River. To this must be added the increasingly dire situation in Ukraine’s northern oblasts of Kharkiv and Sumy, with their provincial capitols under threat of siege and encirclement. Russian victories in the north would revive the threat to Kiev long dormant since the war’s first months. In the southern oblast of Zaporozhe, the road to its provincial capitol of the same name is about to open with the imminent fall of Orekhov.

Alongside this imminent military catastrophe for the recruit- and equipment-starved Ukrainian army has an equally catastrophic political dynamic. The appointment of Azov to defend the last of Donetsk can have several political consequences. If the defense is successful or at least if defeat is drawn out and can be framed as a victory, Azov and its commander, Brig. Gen. Andriy Biletskiy, will receive yet another boon to his reputation. Previous boosts have come from past military efforts and the endorsement of the Azov 3rd Army Corps by President Zelenskiy by way of military promotions, medals, and the expansion of the Azov Brigade to an army corps of some 50,000 personnel. Another heroic battle or two will further promote Biletskiy eventually, leading to a general staff position or to the post of commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, replacing Gen. Mihkaylo Drapatiy or a successor. Azov, with its neofascist ideology, will see another rise of its status within the military and society, putting its 3rd Army Corps in a position to seize power during a regime or state crisis.

Recently, Azov and Biletskiy himself were placed front and center when two former leaders of the World War II era, Nazi-allied Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA) were reburied on Zelenskiy’s orders from abroad to Ukraine, with elaborate ceremonies replete with Nazi symbolism and pomp were led by Biletskiy. It cannot be excluded out of hand that Zelenskiy sought or at least sees the side benefit of the Azov armed element’s weakening as a result of its pitch battles with the more powerful Russian forces. Suspicions on this score could come to the fore within Azov when the body bags come home as the battles are lost. This would enflame a mood within Azov that could facilitate a coup attempt or some other oppositionist machination.

Azov could also be prompted to political action by the ‘leftist-liberal’ protest movement sparked by Zelenskiy’s firing of Mikhaylo Fedorov as defense minister. The Western globalist backers of the Maidan regime and Zelenskiy are behind Fedorov and the protests against Zelenskiy’s firing of Fedorov. The strength of the liberal globalist threat was enough to prompt Zelenskiy to fire commander of the armed forces, Gen. Oleksandr Syrskiy, bringing the more neofascist-friendly Drapatiy to head the army. The foreign-backed globalist demonstrations against Zelenskiy, who has facilitated the rise in the authority and power of neofascism in general and Azov in particular during the war, and their fomenting in war time cannot but raise the ire of Azov types, who are not foreign-, globalist-, Western-, democracy-, or particularly Zelenskiy-friendly by nature. A major confrontation in Kiev could force Azov to play coup poker or outright execute a coup itself in order to ‘save the nation’ and ‘restore order.’

The events of recent days can hardly suggest stability in Kiev. Demonstrations for the return of Fedorov to the Defense Minister’s position, which often include calls for Zelenskiy to hold presidential elections or even resign, Fedorov’s own call for holding presidential elections, and anti-corruption agencies’ raiding of the offices and apartment of deputy head of the Office of the President Irina Mudraya and a series of Rada deputies on the eve of the vote on the nomination of a former SBU official Yevgenii Kharma as defense minister, forced Zelenskiy to fire Mudraya. Although Khmara’s nomination was approved in the Rada vote, the tapes released by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) showing Mudraya talking about taking over money flows, political cliques, and most infamously quoting another, unnamed top official (Zelenskiy?): “He says: ‘Corruption must be systematized and controlled, not struggled against’” (https://strana.news/news/510857-nabu-opublikovalo-audiozapisi-po-delu-forrest-hamp.html).

In addition, the tapes show Murray saying she needs to launder hundreds of millions of hryvna on “the instructions of her boss” 

But Mudraya was not an appointed to the OP under new OP chief Kyryllo Budanov, former HRU director. Rather, she is a creature of Zelenskiy and his recently fired OP chief Andriy Yermak for his ties to the Mindichgate and other corruption cases; she was hired in 2024 before Budanov became OP chief earlier this year. So the target of the new investigation and tape releases is likely Zelenskiy, not Budanov.

Budanov came to the OP leadership position with numerous former Yermak appointees retaining their position and evidence that they and Yermak himself were controlling the Office. So it is possible that Budanov has made an alliance of convenience with the globalists at NABU and SAPO in order to gain full control of the OP and even weaken Zelenskiy, whom he could challenge. So is this anti-corruption case yet another in a series of such cases undertaken by anti-corruption authorities loyal and captive to the West to undermine Zelenskiy or at least to remind him who is his master or is there another more complex configuration at least in this year.

The Fedorov demonstrations continue after the Rada confirmation vote and corruption scandal and are likely to do so for a while. Meanwhile, the Zelenskiy clique has undergone another humiliating discrediting. Its corruption is abhorred by the neofascists and to a lesser extent by the far fewer republicans as well.

Finally, there is even the potential for the neofascists to cut a deal with the liberal-republican globalists, joining them in a temporary united front against Zelenskiy as a step towards seizing power for themselves. Budanov at the HRU supported Azov and other neofascist initiatives. Another leading neofascist figure has endorsed Fedorov’s protest movement. Azov’s Serhii Sternenko announced his support for demonstrations to back the Fedorov movement (https://strana.news/news/510831-vozle-verkhovnoj-rady-projdet-aktsija-v-podderzhku-fedorova.html). Sternenko has not just a neofascist pedigree but a criminal past as well (https://gordonhahn.substack.com/p/is-the-uk-readying-a-coup-option?utm_source=publication-search; https://gordonhahn.substack.com/p/the-dead-end-of-zelenskiys-great?utm_source=publication-search; and https://gordonhahn.substack.com/p/zelenskiy-weakened-siloviki-strengthened?utm_source=publication-search).

As Kiev destabilizes, the defense front crumbles, the economy collapses under the Black Sea blockade, and Azov personnel are put through the Russian meat grinder, why wouldn’t Biletskiy or other Azov and neofascist elements consider a coup?

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 8/21/26

A fresh corruption scandal broke out in Ukraine – this time, it was racketeering by relative junior members of the Zelenskiy administration. Corruption is not a problem of the system in Ukraine; corruption is the system.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s deputy head of staff, Iryna Mudra, has been arrested and found to have assets of just over $6mn and together with a dozen other high officials, connected to Bankova, to have been running mafia-like racketeering schemes. Before I go on, I should point out that the fact they have been caught, arrested and charged is something of a revolution in Ukraine, but nevertheless, it also highlights how fundamentally corrupt the government of Ukraine is.

Russia is famously corrupt, but I don’t think people realise just how much worse it is in Ukraine. When the war started, the foreign ministries called their embassies for advice and were warned by those that actually lived and worked in Kyiv to be very careful. There is a reason why Ukraine, which has significant resources – agricultural, metals, manufacturing, excellent human capital, etc, and is one of the biggest retail markets in Europe – has been the poorest or second poorest (after Moldova), country in Europe for all of the last three decades. Any money available gets stolen.

Superficially it looks much better than Russia as, unlike Russia, it has a vibrant civil society thanks to two coloured revolutions. And the elections are more or less real. But on the economic front Ukraine is still in the stone ages and even the heroes of Orange Revolution were rotten to the core (with the big exception of Viktor Yushchenko, who they tried to kill).

The way it works is Ukraine’s the lack of progress in setting up institutions and the dysfunctional courts drives corruption. Leaders give deputies lucrative posts that control cashflows and they are expected to help themselves. The hold of the leader becomes his ability to take that job away, which ensures loyalty. The weakness of the legal system and the irrelevance of elections allows deputies to steal with impunity and they are not accountable to public opinion.

Ex-Orange Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko was an early media star with her trademark hair braid and seen as a “firebrand” democratic leader. In Ukraine she is more widely known as the “gas princess” as she is believed to have stolen some $350mn while she was minister of gas. After the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity was over and she was let out to jail, where President Viktor Yanukovych put her, the crowds were happy to see her released but had no interest in seeing her back in power. To highlight the point she has also recently been fingered by NABU in its latest vote buying investigations. She was caught on camera with huge bundles of dollars that she uses to get votes through the Rada.

Yanukovych is even more old school and stripped-mined the country while he was president. He is accused of nicking a third of the country’s hard currency reserves – some $35bn – that has never been recovered. His Mezhyhirya Residence is famously a palace where amongst the many trappings of wealth was a loaf of bread made out of solid gold – and even that has been stolen in the meantime; no one knows where it is.

I had personal experience of this. While in Odesa, Yanukovych had dinner at a very famous restaurant there and liked it so much he decided to take the restaurant over. The owner was a friend of a friend in Kyiv who told me he came to lobby Bankova to back off. He was offered half the value of the restaurant and took it. “Getting half of its value was a pretty good deal under Yanukovych as usually he just takes what he wants and pays nothing.”

Ukraine became a true mafia state under Yanukovych – a label usually reserved for Russia.

He was ousted and replaced by former President Petro Poroshenko who was a bit better, but even Poroshenko remains an oligarch, having earned billions from his Roshen chocolate empire. He was supposed to put all his assets into trust after taking office and never did it – maintain business and sales in Russia even after the 2014 annexation of the Crimea and eventually ended up in the Panama Papers leak.

He wasn’t as bad as Yanukovych – I’d say the only leader worse than Yanukovych in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) in the last 30 years was probably Turkmenbashi, the late leader of Turkmenistan – but while he did make some reforms, the old system was alive and well.

One of the good things he did was appoint Lithuanian born ex-investment banker Aivaras Abromavičius, who worked for Sweden’s East Capital and married a local and was appointed Economics Minister. Abromavičius, who I know personally, was the real McCoy and one of the few high ups with real international investment banking experience and could actually spell “corporate governance.”

Abromavičius made a real stab at cleaning things up and, for example, closed down a scheme where uber-oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, and Zelenskiy’s business partner and election sponsor, had injected a “trading company” between the state oil company Ukrnafta and state procurement that was charging 15% for any deal, but did nothing else. That deal was worth tens of millions of dollars a year.

However, eventually Abromavičius gave up and quit in spectacular fashion with a public press conference on February 3, 2016 where he accused the Poroshenko regime of endemic corruption.

“My team and I have no wish to be a cover for open corruption or puppets under the control of those who want to establish control over state money in the style of the old authorities,” he said at the presser. “I don’t want to be part of this free-for-all… but we have to wake up from lethargic sleep. I don’t think things will change quickly.”

The problem he explained to me was Poroshenko tried to appoint a deputy to the head of a ministry department making procurements and control its cashflow; as minister, Abromavičius was supposed to be in charge of all appointments in his own ministry and was trying to oust these placemen as a key part of his anti-corruption efforts. His press conference caused a major political crisis as it completely undermined Poroshenko’s efforts to get the EU and US on board in his escalating war with Russia, which was in the process of splitting the Donbas off from the government’s control.

Some progress

Still, despite all this, some real progress has been made in selected directions. First of all, to note that the creation of the triumvirate of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) and the Anti-Corruption Court (ACC) – forced on Ukraine by its western partners – is a revolution. Nothing like this exists in any of the other FSU states.

Tellingly, Poroshenko couldn’t stop the creations of NABU and SAPO, but successfully blocked the creation of the ACC for years. And NABU has itself been stymied by the powers that be for years; when it arrested its first big fish, Poroshenko’s right-hand man Roman Nasirov in 2017, and charged him with embezzling millions of dollars he spent a weekend in jail. However, before the judge arrived to arraign him on Monday morning, a delegation of Rada deputies showed up along with Nasirov’s wife who brought a bag containing a million dollars to pay his bail – scenes that have been repeated in the last month with high officials close to Zelenskiy coming up with millions of dollars for bail in the Energoatom corruption scandal. Not only did NABU never get Nasirov in front of the bench, he went on to run against Zelenskiy in the 2019 elections.

But the triumvirate is real and has real powers. In what is now widely taken as a sign that Zelenskiy administration is little different from all the others, he tried to close them down last year with Law 21414 in an obvious authoritarian style: the Rada deputies were ordered back from summer holiday at the weekend and the three votes were rammed through in one sitting that would have put the two agencies under direct presidential control. It was a move worthy of Putin, but thanks to Ukraine’s vibrant civil society, demonstrations immediately broke out and Zelenskiy was forced to back down and cancel the law. NABU is now on a roll and actually arresting people from the very top of the tree.

Maybe the most significant change is Kolomoisky has been arrested and is in jail. One of IntelliNews claims to fame is our cover story “Privat Investigations” that uncovered the rampant stealing at Ukraine’s largest commercial bank, caused it to be nationalised in December 2016.

The banking sector has been comprehensively cleaned up by former NBU governor Valeria Gontareva, but she decided to leave the country after Kolomoisky threatened her life and had a coffin with her effigy delivered to the doors of the NBU. She was later hospitalised in London after being hit by a car in what UK police have called “suspicious circumstances.” Oh, and her house in Kyiv was burnt to the ground by “unknown” arsonists.

But maybe the biggest success has been the reforms at Naftogaz, the state-owned gas company. Corruption in the gas business in the 1990s was insane. Ukraine was transiting huge amounts of gas from Russia to Europe and earning $3bn a year in transit fees, not counting the money that could be made from stealing Russian gas from the pipes. Everyone had a hand in this – Russian government officials, Ukrainian government officials, the board members of Gazprom and Naftogaz. It was the major gravy train at time, organised via another set of “trading” companies that did nothing.

And it was so blatant. I once sent our Romanian correspondent to the “office” of Eural Trans Gas, one of the main traders doing several billion dollars of business a year. The office turned out to be an empty apartment in a rundown block in Transylvania where neighbours said no one lives. I also interviewed the CEO of Itera, Igor Makarov, the Russian gas trading company in this partnership, who plays gold in his office with a solid golf putter, which he showed me. One of the reasons Ukraine is so poor is that this gas business, which should have funded investment, was bled dry by Ukraine’s own elite and the Russian executives.

That has stopped now. Naftogaz is a well-run business and where it used to be a black hole supported by massive budget grants, it is now the biggest taxpayer in the country. The fact that Zelenskiy appointed Serhii Koretskyi the new Prime Minister is really good news. He is not a politician, but an oil and gas man and comes to his new job from running Naftogaz. He is as close as you can get in Ukraine to a clean and professional pair of hands in charge of one of the country’s biggest sources of cash.

So, there is hope. But there is so much work left to do. The judiciary remains rotten to the core. Brussels downgraded Ukraine to a “B” in its last EU accession bid assessment report precisely because of the lack of progress in the anti-corruption fight and judicial reforms in the so-called “Fundamental” cluster.

Zelenskiy was elected in 2019 on an anti-corruption platform, and compared to oligarch Poroshenko, he was clearly a cleaner pair of hands. And he has taken that pledge seriously, at least until the war started three years in. He broke ties with Kolomoisky and even put him in jail. He forced through the anti-Kolomoisky law in May 2020 that made it impossible for the former owner of a bank that has been nationalised to retake control of it – aka PrivatBank. Hethen followed up with an anti-oligarch speech in March 2021 and anti-oligarch law in September 2021 which has redrawn the map.

But he made almost no progress on reforming the judiciary or beefing up property rights, without which Ukraine has no hope of attracting the circa $600bn of private capital it needs to rebuild. To be fair he has been distracted by fighting a major war against Russia, but he can also be accused of turning a blind eye to the blatant racketeering by deputies who he shares an office with.

Personally, I think it’s because everyone in Ukraine is so inured to corruption they don’t see it as a major problem. A common attitude I have heard in Kyiv is: “If you can, of course you steal. Why not? I would.”

Russia Matters, 8/7/26

Russian confidence in the Ukraine war’s success drops to 50%: The share of Russians who believe their country’s war against Ukraine is “proceeding successfully” has declined by 19 percentage points in the past year, totaling 50%, according to a poll conducted by the {western backed]  Levada Center in 50 regions of Russia in July. As many as 62% of Russians believed in July that it was time to initiate peace negotiations (which is two percentage points less than in June), while some 38% said Russia should continue “military actions,” according to the poll. Some 59% of the poll’s respondents believe that if “peace cannot be achieved for now,” then Russia should “escalate strikes on Ukraine, including with use of new types of weapons.” Only 21% believe Russia should make “additional concessions” to Ukraine and the West in such a scenario. Meanwhile, a July-August poll by KIIS has found that 60% of Ukrainians categorically oppose handing all of Donbas to Russia in exchange for security guarantees, but 59% say they could accept a “freeze” of the war along the current front line. Separately, 45% of Ukrainians now expect the war to last until at least the second half of 2027 or longer, according to Ukrainska Pravda’s analysis of the KIIS poll.

By Sylvia Demarest, Substack, 8/22/26

Introduction

The US has spent the last fifty years weaponizing the US financial system and the US dollar by imposing sanctions on many countries, corporations and individuals. In most cases, these sanctions were planned with and agreed to by US allies. The US and the EU have also jointly engaged in seizures of government and individual assets. Sanctions and asset seizures raise a serious question, are global assets, including the assets of foreign countries, safe in the US and the western financial system? Moreover, under international law, to be legal, sanctions require UN approval. Most US sanctions have not been approved by the UN.

One recent example of unilateral sanctions is the seizure Russian central bank assets and the imposition of severe economic sanctions on Russia in early 2022. The US, UK and EU imposed the “shock and awe” sanctions before Russia launched the Special Military Operation and invaded Ukraine. The trigger for the sanctions was Russia’s recognition of the Donbass republics along with entering a mutual defense pact with the republics that required Russia to intervene when the republics were attacked by Ukraine. The fact that the sanctions were so massive and were announced in coordination with the EU and the UK meant they had been planned and agreed to well in advance. These sanctions, which included banning Russia banks from using the SWIFT international clearing system, were supposed to weaken Russia economically and force President Putin from office. The sanctions failed. The main impact has been to force Russia and her allies to develop alternative structures.

Since Trump’s Inauguration the US has gone out of its way to tariff, harass, and insult a growing number of the countries of the world, including US allies. Trump has placed tariffs on countries, then taken them off, then threatened tariffs again. Trump has demanded that countries follow US dictates, demanded they invest billions in the US, denigrated their leaders and tried to undermine their governments.

US allies and other countries must be wondering what the possible benefit there could be to being a US ally, especially when Trump insinuates the US may not help them if they get into trouble.

Although the US has weaponized the dollar and the US financial system, we still expect foreigners to not only go along with US policy, and with US sanctions, but to also to stash their savings in the dollar, and the US stock and bond markets. It raises the question; does the US still know how to play the geo-strategic game?

Now the US is demanding that the entire world isolate and refuse to do any business with Iran or face US sanctions.

US Sanctions on Iran

US sanctions on Iran go all the way back to the hostage crisis of 1979. Over the years, the US and her allies have frequently added new sanction on Iran. In many ways, Iran is the most sanctioned country in the world. Now the US wants to place more sanctions on Iran which will include sanctioning any country or entity that does business with Iran. This time, US allies have not been consulted nor have they agreed to abide by these new sanctions.

Here’s Secretary of the US Treasury Scott Bessent: “Oil markets are misinterpreting what this economic pressure means. This is going to be the greatest coordinated economic isolation in the history of the world. We’re going to our allies and saying, you are either with us or against us. If you insist on doing business with Iran, transferring money, buying their oil, or doing seaborne ship transfers, the US Treasury and US gov’t will put their full might and force toward enforcing against you.”

The key bit: “We’re going to our allies.” This means, US allies have not yet agreed. What Bessent is implying is that he and Trump will have to get “allies” to agree. These are the same “allies” that have had tariffs imposed on them and have refused to supply navy ships to assist the US in opening the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran sells 80% of her oil to China. China is now expected to refuse to do any business with Iran. Here’s China’s reaction: China announces it does not accept U.S. sanctions against Iran. Here’s Philip Pilkington: “They’re (China?) ready for a big fight over secondary sanctions.” In fact, China has made it illegal for any Chinese entity to obey unilateral sanctions that are illegal under international law.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs says baseless unilateral sanctions on Iran will only lead to further escalation: “China opposes unilateral sanctions that lack basis in international law and UN Security Council mandate. Military force and pressure tactics will only lead to escalation that serves no one’s interests. We call on parties to act responsibly and solve disputes through dialogue and negotiation.”

As this Substack has discussed, China has a virtual monopoly on rare earths and many other inputs that are essential for weapons and many essential products. Moreover, the US has made it clear that the intent is to weaken China and bring China under US economic and political control. How can the US expect China to fall into line and go along with sanctioning Iran?

Daniel Drumbrill nailed the US dilemma on X: “This is genuinely hilarious, and peak on-brand American tone-deafness.”

“The United States is now asking China, the same China it has spent years trying to economically isolate, sanction, and technologically contain, to help it economically isolate & sanction one of China’s own partners: Iran.”

“US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is telling Beijing to “get with the programme” and join Washington’s “most crushing economic operation” against Iran. “You are either with us or against us.” China is Iran’s largest oil customer. And yet America expects Beijing to help crush Tehran’s economy.”

“This is the same America that put Huawei on the Entity List, expanded the Foreign Direct Product Rule to strangle its supply chain, pressured allies to ban it from 5G, restricted advanced chips and manufacturing equipment, targeted DJI and Chinese drones, and placed hundreds of Chinese companies under export controls, all while talking about maintaining technological superiority and reducing economic dependence on China. That’s the kind of “with us” they were hoping China would continue playing along with.”

“After years of trying to isolate China, they now want China’s help isolating China’s ally.”

“The lack of self-awareness is almost impressive.”

“Still, it’s deeply satisfying to finally see meaningful pushback against the economic tools that have long been used to pressure, constrain, and punish countries around the world.”

The Strait of Hormuz

Martin Armstrong’s recent essay: “The Strait of Hormuz is Repricing the Entire World Economy” discusses the dilemma the US faces in dealing with the consequences of the illegal war on Iran–the impact of the closing of the Strait of Hormuz on prices and inflation. Here’s Armstrong:

“The politicians continue to speak about the Strait of Hormuz as though this were merely a regional dispute between Iran and its neighbors. That is complete nonsense. The strait is one of the most important arteries in the global economy, carrying roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas shipments. Brent crude has moved above $91, but the headline price of oil is only the beginning. The real economic damage appears in shipping rates, insurance premiums, refinery margins, diesel prices, electricity costs, and ultimately government borrowing. War does not remain confined to the battlefield. It enters every household through inflation.”

“Washington claims the strait is open while Iran insists it remains closed. Both statements are political propaganda because it is the shipowners, insurers, and commodity traders who determine whether a waterway is commercially open. A tanker can theoretically pass through Hormuz, but that means nothing if the insurance premium becomes prohibitive or the crew refuses to accept the risk. Most politicians have never operated a business and do not understand that commerce depends upon confidence—not government declarations. Once confidence collapses, trade will retreat regardless of how many officials stand before cameras insisting that everything remains under control.”

“The more serious warning is coming from refined products, particularly diesel. Politicians obsess over crude because that is the price quoted every evening on television. Yet modern civilization runs on diesel. Trucks transport food and consumer goods, farmers operate machinery, construction companies run heavy equipment, and emergency generators protect hospitals and critical infrastructure. When diesel rises, the cost of virtually everything rises with it.”

Diesel is now above $5.00 a gallon in most places. Moreover, US diesel prices are currently sitting at just below $190 per barrel. That’s higher than all but three days in March-April and trending toward the all-time highs of 2022. All with crude prices much lower and the crack doing much of the work.

The Proxy War on Russia is also not going well–the impact on wheat exports and food prices

Simplicius goes through the reasons why the proxy war on Russia is failing and what Zelensky’s probable reaction will be: “The closer Ukraine comes to battlefield defeat, the more it will redirect all of its available resources to targeting Russian civilian infrastructure in order to spur some kind of popular uprising of discontent against Putin.”

“The problem for Ukraine is, this creates an accelerating feedback loop of self-defeat: the more resources Ukraine pours into hitting militarily insignificant targets, the more Russia’s actual military might remain unaffected by Ukrainian combat power, which means the faster Ukraine’s collapse will accelerate on the real front. In essence, Ukraine is vesting its entire strategy into a war against Russia’s civilian sentiment, which is as risky a move as it was for the US in Iran, wherein strikes against civil infrastructure turned even the diehard anti-clerical contingent against the US and enshrined their support of the Iranian leadership.”

One serious impact of the proxy war on Russia is on the export of wheat by both Ukraine and Russia, two of the largest wheat exporters globally. This unfortunate war will have a huge impact on future food prices if the export of wheat continues to be blocked. Here’s one reaction: “It’s worse for the #wheat market than Hormuz was for crude.” Capacity in the region cut from about 3.3mn tons a month to about 250,000 tons at Russia’s only remaining operational facility at the Black Sea port of Tuapse.

The three-year high reached in wheat futures in July could soon be surpassed as the war continues to block wheat exports.

One Other Potential Impact: The US Stock Market

The Economic Longwave points to the current “extreme valuations” of the current US stock market as financial managers navigate what he calls “late Financial Autum” in preparation for “Financial Winter.”

“According to the Advisor Perspectives composite of four major U.S. stock-market valuation measures, the market ended July 2026 at roughly 176% above its long-term geometric mean. This means that stocks are not merely expensive, it means that stock valuations are historically extreme. The composite includes: Crestmont P/E, Cyclically Adjusted P/E, Q Ratio, S&P Composite relative to its long-term regression trend. Individually, each measure has limitations. Taken together, however, they tell a powerful story.”

As this Substack has pointed out, the U.S. stock market is trading at valuation levels that exceed those seen around several of the most famous speculative peaks in modern financial history. This includes: the late 1920s; the late 1960s; the technology bubble of 2000; the post-pandemic speculative surge. Yet this creates a conundrum. Extreme valuations do not mean that valuations cannot get more extreme and while risk may be high, there is no way to know if or when the market might fall or how such a market decline might progress.

Right now, global money flows continue to support US stock prices, but this could change. As they say, the US is still “the cleanest dirt shirt”. The US stock and bond markets not only depend on global money flows but also hold the savings of not only millions of Americans, but the rest of the world.

Conclusion

We live in interesting, complex, and very dangerous times.

“When plunder becomes a way of life for a group of men living together in society, they create for themselves in the course of time a legal system that authorizes it and a moral code that glorifies it.” Frédéric Bastiat’s “The Law”, 1850.

---