By Kautilya The Contemplator, Substack, 7/15/26
Introduction: A Different Question
In an earlier essay, I argued that one of the most persistent misunderstandings of Russian foreign policy is the belief that Moscow negotiates because it trusts its adversaries. History suggests the opposite. From Alexander Nevsky to Sergey Lavrov, diplomacy has rarely reflected confidence in the goodwill of rival powers. Rather, it has been one of Russia’s principal instruments of statecraft used to preserve the state, shape the strategic environment and advance national interests alongside military power.
That essay (link below) answered one question: Why does Russia never stop negotiating? This essay asks another: Why does Russia continue investing diplomatic capital in Donald Trump? At first glance, the answer appears obvious. Trump has repeatedly spoken of ending the war and restoring dialogue with Moscow.

Why Russia Never Stops Negotiating: A Millennium of Strategic Statecraft
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Jul 1
The problem is that American policy tells a different story. The United States continues supplying Ukraine with weapons, intelligence and financial assistance, maintains sanctions, supports NATO’s strategy and backs Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities. Senior officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, have argued that increasing military pressure on Russia will strengthen Washington’s negotiating position, while Trump himself has reaffirmed continued support for Ukraine despite his calls for peace.
Moscow almost certainly understands this reality. It is highly unlikely that Russian policymakers still believe Washington is preparing a fundamental strategic reversal. That is precisely what makes the puzzle so compelling. If Russia recognizes that American policy remains fundamentally adversarial, why does Vladimir Putin continue speaking with Donald Trump? Why does his spokesperson Dmitry Peskov consistently avoid personal attacks on Trump while criticizing Washington’s broader policy? Why has Moscow largely written off Europe’s leaders while preserving dialogue with the White House?
The conventional explanation that Moscow still believes Trump will suddenly transform American policy is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain. The more interesting possibility is that Russia continues negotiating for reasons that have little to do with immediate expectations of peace and much more to do with enduring traditions of Russian statecraft. This essay explores three hypotheses that may help explain why, despite deepening confrontation with the United States, the Kremlin continues to leave the diplomatic door open. They should not be understood as competing explanations. Rather, they describe complementary strategic functions that diplomacy may perform simultaneously. One, two or all three may therefore shape Moscow’s calculations at the same time.
Hypothesis I: Moscow is Negotiating with Washington’s Multi-Institutional System
One possibility is that Moscow no longer views the negotiations as a test of Trump’s intentions, but of the American political system itself. Trump may represent what Russia sees as the last realistic opportunity to determine whether any American president still possesses both the political instinct and the institutional authority to pursue a broader strategic accommodation with Russia. If even he proves unable to alter the trajectory of US policy, Moscow may conclude that the obstacles to a settlement are no longer political but structural, embedded within America’s national security establishment, alliance commitments and post-Cold War conception of European security.
The Soviet Union confronted a similar dilemma during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Nikita Khrushchev deliberately sought direct communication with President Kennedy through private correspondence and the Robert Kennedy-Anatoly Dobrynin backchannel, despite intense pressure from influential military advisers advocating air strikes and invasion. Khrushchev understood that the central question was not simply whether Kennedy desired a peaceful resolution, but whether he possessed sufficient political authority to restrain the forces pushing the United States toward escalation.
Although the historical circumstances differ, the strategic logic remains remarkably similar. Moscow may not expect Trump to deliver peace. It may instead be asking a more fundamental question: does any American president still possess the authority to fundamentally redirect US grand strategy?
This school of thinking has deep roots in Soviet analysis of the United States. Georgy Arbatov, the longtime director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Soviet (Russian) Academy of Sciences (ISCRAN) and one of the Kremlin’s foremost advisers on American affairs, spent much of his career arguing that Soviet policy had to distinguish between the White House, Congress, the Pentagon, the intelligence community and broader political currents.
Arbatov’s work helped institutionalize three assumptions that arguably continue to shape Russian strategic thinking today: first, that the United States is governed by competing centers of power rather than a single decision-maker; second, that the preferences of the president must be distinguished from what the president is politically capable of delivering; and third, that negotiations are valuable because they reveal – and may sometimes influence – the internal balance of power within Washington. Under Brezhnev, this analysis helped defend détente and sustain arms-control diplomacy against critics in both countries. Under Andropov and Chernenko, it supported a dual-track approach of resisting American pressure while continuing to probe for divisions and openings inside Washington.

That legacy may illuminate Moscow’s treatment of Trump. It can recognize that American weapons, intelligence and sanctions continue while simultaneously distinguishing the president from the institutions and officials surrounding him. Continued dialogue need not reflect faith in Trump. It may instead reflect an older Russian conviction that negotiations reveal whether the American presidency still governs American grand strategy.
Hypothesis II: Russian Diplomacy Treats Negotiations as a Cumulative Strategic Process
A second possibility is that the Kremlin continues negotiating because Russian diplomatic practice has often treated negotiations less as isolated attempts to reach agreement than as successive stages in a cumulative strategic process. Viewed through this lens, every negotiation leaves behind diplomatic capital in the form of knowledge, precedents, personal relationships and institutional memory that strengthens Russia’s position in every negotiation that follows. Individual summits may fail, but the diplomatic capital they generate endures.
The Cold War offers the clearest illustration of this approach. Unlike many foreign ministries shaped by frequent political turnover, both Soviet and contemporary Russian diplomacy have displayed an unusual continuity of senior leadership, allowing diplomatic capital to accumulate across decades rather than electoral cycles.
Vyacheslav Molotov served as Stalin’s principal diplomat throughout the Second World War and the formative years of the Cold War. He was succeeded by Andrei Gromyko, who remained foreign minister for twenty-eight years, negotiating with every American administration from Eisenhower to Reagan across Berlin, Cuba, détente, strategic arms limitation and European security. Today, Sergey Lavrov has occupied the same office for more than two decades, becoming one of the longest-serving foreign ministers in the world. Their exceptional longevity allowed Soviet and Russian diplomacy to accumulate institutional memory, negotiating experience, personal relationships and procedural knowledge over generations, transforming diplomacy into a mechanism for accumulating strategic advantage.
Similarly, Anatoly Dobrynin’s own career illustrates how diplomatic capital was accumulated operationally. Serving as Soviet ambassador in Washington for nearly twenty-four years, he worked with six American presidents from Kennedy to Reagan and participated in every major phase of the Cold War, from the Cuban Missile Crisis and détente to renewed superpower confrontation in the early 1980s. His value lay not simply in longevity, but in the institutional memory, personal relationships and practical understanding of American decision-making that accumulated over decades of continuous engagement. Every crisis, summit, backchannel and negotiation added to the Soviet Union’s diplomatic capital, enabling Moscow to approach each new administration with a deeper understanding of its counterpart than the last.

From this perspective, President Putin’s continued engagement with President Trump may reflect less a judgment about Trump’s presidency than a judgment about the long-term strategic relationship between Moscow and Washington. Moscow may recognize that the current American administration is unlikely to produce a fundamental strategic accommodation. Breaking diplomatic contact would therefore mean discarding diplomatic capital accumulated over years – or even decades – of interaction. From this perspective, no negotiation is ever entirely unsuccessful. Even when agreements prove impossible, the diplomatic capital generated through sustained engagement strengthens Russia’s position in every negotiation that follows.
Hypothesis III: Moscow Negotiates to Demonstrate Its Indispensability in the Emerging Multipolar Order
A third possibility is that Russia’s diplomacy with Washington is directed as much toward the emerging multipolar world as toward the United States itself. Since the beginning of the Ukraine conflict, Moscow has consistently presented itself as willing to negotiate while accusing the West of prolonging the war through sanctions, arms deliveries and the rejection of Russian security demands. Whether that account is accepted in the West is almost beside the point. The more important question is what Russia seeks from the states that have refused to join its isolation.
The answer may be less support than recognition that Russia remains one of the indispensable poles of the emerging international order. Moscow does not require China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia or other non-Western powers to endorse every Russian action. It requires something more limited, but strategically more important, that they continue treating Russia as a great power whose exclusion would undermine any durable international settlement. Continued negotiations with Trump publicly reinforce that claim by presenting Russia not as a state rejecting diplomacy but as one whose participation remains necessary to resolve Europe’s largest security crisis since the Cold War.
This strategy has an important Soviet precedent. In a memorandum following the 1988 Moscow Summit, Georgy Arbatov acknowledged that “serious progress” with the outgoing Reagan administration was unlikely. Yet he did not conclude that diplomacy had failed. He argued that the summit had weakened the West’s entrenched “enemy image” of the Soviet Union and urged further initiatives that would “impress European public opinion” and improve the political environment for negotiations with the next American administration. His reasoning revealed a deeper principle: diplomacy could fail to produce an agreement and still succeed by changing how third parties understood the Soviet Union’s place in the international order.
The contemporary audience is no longer primarily Western Europe but the collection of states seeking greater strategic autonomy within an increasingly multipolar system. Many have resisted Western pressure to isolate Moscow not because they necessarily endorse Russian policy but because they reject the principle that one bloc alone may determine which powers are entitled to shape the international order. Maintaining relations with Russia therefore becomes less an endorsement of Moscow than a practical affirmation of multipolarity itself.
Every conversation with Trump therefore serves two simultaneous purposes. It explores the possibility of agreement with Washington while demonstrating to the wider international community that no durable settlement can be reached without Russian participation. Should negotiations fail, Moscow can argue that it remained prepared to negotiate while the United States chose continued escalation. More importantly, it reinforces the broader proposition that Russia cannot be isolated from the construction of the emerging international order because it remains one of the major powers upon whose participation that order ultimately depends. The immediate interlocutor may be Washington, but the larger negotiation concerns Russia’s role in the emerging international order. Every conversation with the United States therefore becomes simultaneously a negotiation over whether Russia continues to be treated as one of the indispensable architects of the multipolar system now taking shape.
Diplomacy as an Instrument of Statecraft
Much Western analysis treats diplomacy as the opposite of conflict. Negotiations imply moderation. Dialogue suggests compromise. Russian strategic thought has long rejected this distinction.
Whether one accepts none, some or all of the hypotheses presented here, they point toward a common conclusion: Moscow appears to judge diplomacy less by whether it produces immediate agreements than by whether it advances Russia’s long-term strategic position. Negotiations reveal the internal balance of power within an adversary, accumulate diplomatic capital across generations and reinforce Russia’s standing as one of the indispensable poles of an emerging multipolar order.
More than two millennia ago, Kautilya recognized this logic. In the Arthashastra, the dūta (envoy) was not merely a messenger but an instrument of statecraft who gathered intelligence, cultivated relationships and shaped the political environment in which military power would later be employed. Diplomacy and war were not opposing activities but complementary instruments serving the same strategic purpose.
As such, Moscow’s continued engagement with President Trump becomes far less paradoxical. Every conversation tests intentions, preserves strategic options, shapes international perceptions and prepares the political terrain on which future decisions will be made. Moscow is not negotiating because it expects peace. It is negotiating because it expects the strategic competition with the United States to continue long after the Ukraine conflict has ended. It is negotiating because, in the Russian tradition of statecraft – as in Kautilya’s realism – the negotiating table is itself one of the battlefields on which great-power rivalry is waged.
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References:
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office)
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, October 1973–May 1974.
- Georgy A. Arbatov, The System: An Insider’s Life in Soviet Politics (New York: Times Books, 1992).
- Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to America’s Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986) (New York: Times Books, 1995).
- Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994).
- Alexei G. Arbatov, The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, various publications)













