Meduza, 4/15/24

Last week, Russia’s Finance Ministry released its preliminary report on the federal budget indicators for the first quarter of 2024, revealing results that surpassed expectations. Government earnings soaring above last year’s figures, a surprisingly positive outcome partially attributed to high oil prices and increased consumer spending. With more money in its coffers and the war in Ukraine still raging on, the Russian government is only increasing its spending. However, this upward trend raises concerns about continued inflation. Meduza explains what led to this sudden influx of funds and what economists think about the Russian economy’s outlook.

Why are Russia’s oil and gas revenues up?

In the first quarter of 2024, oil and gas earnings surged by nearly 80 percent compared to the same period in 2023, injecting 2.9 trillion rubles ($31 billion) into Russia’s federal budget. There are a number of factors that led to this sizeable increase. Firstly, oil prices are on the rise. At the beginning of the year, a barrel of Brent crude oil was trading at $80; now, it’s going for more than $90. The U.S. has been replenishing its raw material reserves as OPEC countries cut production, leading to a shortage that’s driven up prices. Furthermore, the conflict between Israel and Hamas has threatened shipments through the Red Sea, raising concerns among investors about potential disruptions to the supply chain. Moreover, Iran, one of the world’s major oil suppliers, has now entered the conflict.

Secondly, Russia has revised its method for calculating the mineral extraction tax (MET). In 2023, revenues were collected based on actual prices for Urals oil, the blend used as the price benchmark for Russian oil exports. However, the returns were unpredictable: discounts on raw materials constantly fluctuated in response to sanctions pressures. Starting this year, there’s a new system in place. If the price difference between Urals oil and Brent isn’t too significant, the authorities still use the actual Urals oil price for tax calculations. However, if the gap widens, the Russian Finance Ministry imposes a maximum discount of $20 per barrel in its calculations. This means that if a barrel of Brent is selling at $100 and a barrel of Urals is selling at $50, the ministry disregards the actual price and levies taxes based on a price of $80 per barrel. This maneuver has proven effective: analyst Kirill Rodionov calculated that at the beginning of last year, the average price used for tax calculations was $51 per barrel. Now, with the new calculations, the average is closer to $70.

The Russian government has also seen an increase in revenues from its quarterly profit-based tax (NDM). Unlike MET, which is paid based on the volume of extracted raw materials, NDM is levied on profits from sales. This allows companies to defer their tax burden until after they’ve become profitable, which, in theory, encourages them to invest in developing new reserves. Likewise, when an oil deposit begins to deplete, the tax starts to drop off, incentivizing companies not to abandon the project. The more companies increase their overall production, the more tax revenue the government stands to make once the companies turn a profit.

When a company transitions to paying NDM, it continues to pay MET, albeit at a heavily reduced rate. Nevertheless, due to the advantages of tax deferral, the profit margins for certain companies remain higher under the combined scheme than when paying only MET at the full rate. Russia has been steadily expanding this profit-based tax regime, growing its share of the federal budget’s oil and gas revenue from 9 percent to 52 percent over the last five years. According to Rodionov’s calculations, federal revenue from NDM went from 211 billion rubles ($2.3 billion) in the first quarter of 2023 to 587 billion rubles ($6.3 billion) in the first quarter of 2024.

The Finance Ministry’s report also highlights a one-time revenue boost from a temporary increase in the MET rate mandated in January 2024. In the fall of 2023, the Russian government halved damper payments, a type of subsidy that compensates oil companies for selling fuel on the domestic market. Unsurprisingly, this led to a sharp increase in gas prices in Russia. The government quickly abolished the unsuccessful reform but decided to compensate for the damper payments through a higher MET.

Since Russian tax legislation doesn’t allow for MET to be applied retroactively, a higher MET rate was imposed on companies in January of this year, allowing the Finance Ministry to make up for last fall’s budget losses. Although the report doesn’t disclose the exact amount, Interfax’s sources estimated it at around 190 billion rubles ($2 billion).

The ruble’s depreciation could also have impacted the statistics. At the beginning of 2023, the Russian ruble was stronger, trading at around 70 to the U.S. dollar, meaning fewer rubles for every dollar of oil earnings, notes Evgeny Nadorshin, the lead economist at PF Capital. The ruble weakening to 90 to the dollar automatically led to an increase in budget revenues from oil sold abroad.

Taking all of these factors into account, Russia’s Finance Ministry predicted that oil and gas revenues will continue to exceed the baseline level, saying it observes a “stable positive trend.”

Where else is the money coming from?

While government earnings from oil and gas have certainly gone up, Egor Susin, the managing director at Gazprombank Private Banking, highlights other revenue streams as the primary positive contributors to the budget. Over the course of a year, non-oil and gas revenues have risen by 43 percent, bringing in 5.8 trillion rubles ($62 billion) in the first quarter alone.

The Finance Ministry attributed much of these gains to turnover taxes: taxes levied on the volume of business activity or turnover of goods and services rather than on profits. For instance, value-added tax (VAT), brought in 3.4 trillion rubles ($36.3 billion) in three months. Russia is experiencing a growth in domestic demand, as analysts at Raiffeisen Bank have pointed out, and consumer spending is increasing despite inflation.

As a rule, Russia’s Central Bank sees high demand as a risk for further inflation. For the Finance Ministry, however, the situation is beneficial — at least in the short term. While the government’s budget also suffers due to inflation (e.g. with the cost of infrastructure projects going up), the ministry can acquire funds immediately and then distribute the rise in expenses over time.

The ministry also mentions “planned receipts of one-time non-tax revenues.” Generally speaking, “non-tax revenue” refers to things like fees for the use of state property, customs duties, environmental levies, and so on. It’s possible that in this case, the ministry is referring to the sale of state-owned assets. In 2023, the Russian authorities initially aimed to generate 1.8 billion rubles ($19.2 million) through privatization. However, due to urgent budgetary needs, they ultimately sold off 29 billion rubles ($309.7 million) worth of property. This year, the ministry has set a significantly higher target from the outset: selling 100 billion rubles ($1.07 billion) worth of state-owned assets.

Although the Finance Ministry acknowledged that last year’s low baseline facilitated such noticeable growth, it views the current situation with non-oil and gas revenues as stable and anticipates “continued rapid revenue growth.” Raiffeisen Bank analysts concurred, predicting that consumer activity in Russia will likely remain high “in the coming months.”

Will Russia start spending more?

The Russian government has already ramped up its spending. Compared to the first quarter of 2023, budgetary expenses have increased by 20 percent.

With the onset of the full-scale war in Ukraine, federal budget expenditures acquired a pronounced seasonality, rising sharply at the beginning of the year when the government pays out advances on state contracts. In the first two months of 2024 alone, expenditures amounted to 6.5 trillion rubles ($69.4 billion) while revenues totaled only five trillion ($53.4 billion), resulting in the Finance Ministry nearly exhausting the deficit limit for the entire year. Last year, the same trend raised concerns; in the end, however, the deficit didn’t stray too far from the target.

With current oil prices, Russia’s situation has already begun to improve. While the first quarter saw an overall deficit, March’s budget boasted a surplus of 860 billion ($9.2 billion). Analysts from Raiffeisen Bank say the Russian government’s spending spree at the beginning of the year “shouldn’t be perceived as a risk factor” to the budget. According to their forecasts, the deficit will remain this year, but it will be smaller than in 2023: no more than 2.5 trillion as opposed to last year’s 3.2 trillion ($26.7 billion versus $34.2 billion, respectively). Analyst Semyon Novoprudsky thinks the deficit could be even lower, despite the increase in government spending.

The budget for the current year includes expenditures totaling 36.6 trillion rubles ($390.9 billion). However, this figure was approved before President Vladimir Putin announced five new national projects and numerous other social welfare programs during his annual address to Russia’s Federal Assembly. Economists estimated the cost of their implementation at 1.2 trillion ($12.9 billion) per year. This will be likely offset by tax increases, which, just a month ago, was raising concerns among economists.

Now, analysts from the Telegram channel MMI posit that “with current oil prices, there’s no threat to deficit stability.” Egor Susin from Gazprombank concurs, saying that “the budget appears to be in good shape for the next few months.” Faridaily, run by journalists Farida Rustamova and Maxim Tovkailo, predicts that the Russian government “will be able to finance extravagant military spending, social payments, and infrastructure development without any problems.” Meduza couldn’t find any pessimistic comments from experts.

So, Russia’s economy is just fine?

There are certainly still risks for the Russian economy. In theory, an increase in revenue allows the Finance Ministry to spend more than planned — as it did last year. This injects more money into the economy, further fueling consumer demand in the face of limited supply. Russia’s Central Bank consistently stresses that this has adverse effects on price inflation. And while it aims to keep inflation at 4–4.5 percent in 2024, economists have expressed doubts that this target is feasible.

Elvira Nabiullina, the head of the Central Bank, has noted that maintaining a high key rate helps curb inflation. (Currently, the Central Bank has the key rate set at 16 percent.) With interest rates higher, saving becomes more attractive and credit becomes more expensive, which, in turn, cools demand. In the second half of the year, the Central Bank plans to wait for a slowdown in price growth and then begin to reduce the key rate; however, it might postpone the process. Previously, analysts at the government-owned bank Promsvyazbank expected the key rate to be brought down as early as June; now, they’re predicting a decrease no sooner than August.

Increasing budget expenditures also heighten risks for the national currency exchange rate. The Finance Ministry supports Russian businesses by providing them with funds for production, which often requires imported components and equipment. This means companies have more capital to purchase foreign currency for such transactions. Russia’s Economic Development Ministry officially predicts that the average exchange rate for this year will hover around 90 rubles to the U.S. dollar. However, SberCIB Investment Research predicts the ruble will weaken to 95 against the dollar by the second quarter, while the Moscow-based investment company Tsifra Broker expects the exchange rate to hit 100 rubles to the dollar by the end of April.

Government spending won’t be the only influence on this, of course. The overall state of Russian exports will also impact the ruble: declining overseas shipments of raw materials are reducing foreign currency inflow, creating a deficit. Meanwhile, the population is buying more and more dollars and euros. In February, Russians spent 100 billion rubles (the equivalent of $1 billion) on these currencies; in March, that figure rose to 155 billion ($1.66 billion).

The situation may worsen if sanctions on Russian oil begin to take effect. So far, both lax monitoring and loopholes involving third-party sales have largely enabled Russia to bypass the G7 and E.U.-imposed $60 “price cap” on Russian crude oil. Even so, G7 nations have yet to propose an alternative to the price cap; they’ve only threatened to lower it even further. And while Western governments have imposed sanctions on a few companies for circumventing the ban, such measures are not widespread.

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 3/30/24

Russia external debt has been falling steadily and reached $326.6bn in December 2023, compared with $322.3bn in the previous quarter and $383.6bn at the end of 2022. It could pay the entire amount off tomorrow – in cash. (chart)

The Kremlin has been paying off its external debt. Low external debt means Russia doesn’t need to tap international capital markets so is not vulnerable to any sort of sanctions on bond issues, which are easy to apply and enforce.

Coupled with Russia’s strong current account surplus, which was up to $5.2bn in February from $4.5bn in January, thanks to high oil prices, Russia can fund itself easily on this profit. (chart)

At the same time gross international reserves have been rising and are now hovering around $600bn at the end of the first quarter. Half of these reserves are frozen. About $150bn are in monetary gold (up from $135bn pre-war) and the rest in yuan.

Even counting out the frozen funds, Russia can cover its external debt dollar for dollar with cash, whereas everyone in the West is massively leveraged, including the Ukraine where the debt-to-GDP ratio is almost at 100%.

It is these rock-solid fundamentals – no one else in world has even remotely similar metrics – which is the essence of Putin’s Fiscal Fortress. It is a ridiculously strong basis, which means even if the West manages to reduce Russia income from oil and gas exports, it will still have a massive amount of wiggle room.

And its ongoing commodity exports to the global south mean that it will continue to enjoy the raw materials subsidy for its economy. Because of their external debt (USA, Italy, much of G7, everyone in Africa and even China) everyone else is a lot more vulnerable to a global slow down. Russia is probably currently the least vulnerable on a macro fundamentals basis.

Russia’s external debt $bn

Russia’s current account $bn

Having said that, MinFin is increasingly turning to the OFZ domestic T-bill market to fund the deficit – expected to be RUB1.6 trillion year, down from RUB3.4 trillion last year, or 0.8% of GDP and 1.9% of GDP respectively.

Pre-war MinFin used to issue around RUB2 trillion (c$20bn) of OFZ a year, and most of them on a very long maturity of up to 20 years. Yields on these bonds were a hansom 6-7% and foreign investors poured in to buy billions of dollars’ worth.

Post-war of course those foreigners have left with non-rez share falling from a peak of c34% to c7% now. (chart) Moreover, the cost of this borrowing has gone up as yields have risen to c14%. So, this is relatively expensive borrowing.

Moreover, the volumes issued have gone up dramatically. In an underreported story Siluanov said at the start of last year MinFin planned to issue about RUB1.5 trillion of OFZ but ended up issuing RUB2.5 trillion. (It would have been more, but oil prices recovered in Q4).

The plan for this year, at the start of last year, was also for RUB1.5 trillion, but in December Siluanov was already talking about RUB4 trillion – that is almost double pre-war levels. And the $3-6bn of annual Eurobond issues has also obviously stopped.

The total outstanding OFZ has doubled to cRUB20 trillion (chart) since the pandemic started when Russia spent around 3% of GDP on economic relief (globally a very low level). You can see issues jumped again since the war started and total outstanding is now cRUB20 trillion (c$200bn). So, the debt situation is not quite as rosy as first appears.

Still, even $200bn worth of outstanding domestic debt is not bad at all. Firstly there is a pool of some RUB19 trillion of liquidity in the banking sector so again all this debt can be covered in cash by domestic resources.

Secondly, £200bn is about 10% of GDP, so even this borrowing is extremely modest by developed economy standards and easily managed.

By Tarik Cyril Amar, RT, 3/30/24

William J. Burns has published a long piece in Foreign Affairs under the title ‘Spycraft and Statecraft. Transforming the CIA for an Age of Competition’. This is an essay likely to be read with great attention, maybe even parsed, not only by an American elite audience, but also abroad, in, say, Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi, for several reasons. Burns is, of course, the head of the CIA as well as an acknowledged heavyweight of US geopolitics – in the state and deep-state versions. [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/cia-spycraft-and-statecraft-william-burns]

Few publications rival Foreign Affairs’ cachet as a US establishment forum and mouthpiece. While Burns’ peg is a plea to appreciate the importance of human intelligence agents, his agenda is much broader: In effect, what he has released is a set of strategic policy recommendations, embedded in a global tour d’horizon. And, last but not least, Burns is, of course, not the sole author. Even if he should have penned every line himself, this is a programmatic declaration from a powerful faction of the American “siloviki,” the men (and women) wielding the still gargantuan hard power of the US empire.

By the way, whether he has noticed or not, Burns’ intervention cannot but bring to mind another intelligent spy chief loyally serving a declining empire. Yury Andropov, former head of the KGB (and then, for a brief period, the whole Soviet Union) would have agreed with his CIA counterpart on the importance of “human assets,” especially in an age of technological progress, and he would also have appreciated the expansive sweep of Burns’ vision. Indeed, with Burns putting himself so front-and-center, one cannot help but wonder if he is not also, tentatively, preparing the ground for reaching for the presidency one day. After all, in the US, George Bush senior famously went from head of the CIA to head of it all, too.

There is no doubt that this CIA director is a smart and experienced man principally capable of realism, unlike all too many others in the current American elite. Famously, he warned in 2008, when serving as ambassador to Moscow, that “Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin).” That makes the glaring flaws in this big-picture survey all the more remarkable.

Burns is, obviously, correct when he observes that the US – and the world as a whole – is facing a historically rare moment of “profound” change in the global order. And – with one exception which we will return to – it would be unproductive, perhaps even a little churlish, to quibble over his ideologically biased terminology. His mislabeling of Russia as “revanchist,” for instance, has a petty ring to it. “Resurgent” would be a more civil as well as more truthful term, capturing the fact that the country is simply returning to its normal international minimum status (for at least the last three hundred years), namely that of a second-to-none great power.

Yet Burns’ agenda is more important than his terminology. While it may be complex, parts of it are as clear as can be: He is eager (perhaps desperate) to prevent Washington from ending its massive aid for Ukraine – a battle he is likely to lose. In the Middle East, he wants to focus Western aggression on Iran. He may get his will there, but that won’t be a winning strategy because, in part thanks to multipolar trend setters, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, Iran’s escape from the isolation that the US has long imposed on it is already inevitable.

Regarding China, Burns’ real target is a competing faction of American hawks, namely those who argue that, bluntly put, Washington should write off its losses in Ukraine and concentrate all its firepower on China. Burns wants to persuade his readers that the US can have both its big fight against China and its proxy war against Russia.

He is also engaged in a massive act of CIA boosterism, clearly aiming to increase the clout of the already inordinately powerful state-within-a-state he happens to run himself. And last but not least, the spy-in-chief has unearthed one of the oldest tricks in the subversion and destabilization playbook: Announcing loudly that his CIA is on a recruiting spree in Russia, he seeks to promote a little paranoia in Moscow. Good luck attempting to pull that one on the country that gave us the term “agentura.” Moreover, after the horrific terror attack on Crocus City Hall in Moscow, it is fair to assume that Burns regrets having boasted about the CIA expanding its “work” in Russia. Not a good look, not at all.

What matters more, though, than his verbal sallies and his intriguingly straightforward, even blunt aims, are three astonishingly crude errors: First, Burns insists on reading the emerging outcome of the war in Ukraine as a “failure on many levels,” for Russia, revealing its, as he believes, economic, political, and military weakness. Yet, as the acknowledged American economist James K. Galbraith has recently reiterated, the West’s economic war on Russia has backfired. The Russian economy is now stronger, more resilient, and independent of the West than never before.

As to the military, Burns for instance, gleefully counts the tanks that Russia has lost and fails to note the ones it is building at a rapid rate not matched anywhere inside NATO. In general, he fails to mention just how worried scores of Western experts have come to be, realizing that Moscow is overseeing a massive and effective expansion of military production. A curious oversight for an intelligence professional. He also seems to miss just how desperate Ukraine’s situation has become on the ground.

And politics – really? The man who serves Joe Biden, most likely soon to be replaced by Donald Trump, is spotting lack of popularity and fragility in Moscow, and his key piece of evidence is Prigozhin and his doomed mutiny? This part of Burns’ article is so detached from reality that one wonders if this is still the same person reporting on Russian red lines in 2008. The larger point he cannot grasp is that, historically, Russia has a pattern of starting wars on the wrong foot – to then learn, mobilize, focus, and win.

Burns’ second severe mistake is his argument that, ultimately, only China can pose a serious challenge to the US. This is staggeringly shortsighted for two reasons: First, Russia has just shown that it can defeat the West in a proxy war. Once that victory will be complete, a declining but still important part of the American empire, NATO/EU-Europe will have to deal with the after-effects (no, not Russian invasion, but political backlash, fracturing, and instability). If Burns thinks that blowback in Europe is no serious threat to US interests, one can only envy his nonchalance.

Secondly, his entire premise is perfectly misguided: It makes no sense to divide the Russian and the Chinese potentials analytically because they are now closely linked in reality. It is, among other things, exactly a US attempt to knock out Russia first to then deal with China that has just failed. Instead, their partnership has become more solid.

And error number three is, perhaps, even odder: As mentioned above, Burns’ language is a curious hybrid between an analytical and an intemperate idiom. A sophisticated reader can only wince in vicarious embarrassment at hearing a CIA director complain of others’ “brutish” behavior. What’s worse: the tub-thumping or the stones-and-glasshouse cringe? Mostly, though, this does not matter.

Yet there is one case where these fits of verbal coarseness betray something even worse than rhetorical bravado: Describing Hamas’ 7 October assault as “butchery,” Burns finds nothing but an “intense ground campaign” on Israel’s side. Let’s set aside that this expression is a despicable euphemism, when much of the world rightly sees a genocide taking place in Gaza, with US support. It also bespeaks an astounding failure of the strategic imagination: In the same essay, Burns notes correctly that the weight of the Global South is increasing, and that, in essence, the great powers will have to compete for allegiances that are no longer, as he puts is, “monogamous.” Good luck then putting America’s bizarre come-what-may loyalty to Israel first. A CIA director at least should still be able to distinguish between the national interests of his own country and the demands of Tel Aviv.

Burns’ multipronged strike in the realm of elite public debate leaves an unpleasant aftertaste. It is genuinely disappointing to see so much heavy-handed rhetoric and such basic errors of analysis from one of the less deluded members of the American establishment. It is also puzzling. Burns is not amateurish like Antony Blinken or a fanatic without self-awareness, such as Victoria Nuland. Yet here he is, putting his name to a text that often seems sloppy and transparent in its simple and short-sighted motivations. Has the US establishment decayed so badly that even its best and brightest now come across as sadly unimpressive?

Not sure what to make of this. – Natylie

By Allison Quinn, Yahoo News, 4/17/24

The tragicomic tale of a down-on-his-luck Texan who reinvented himself as a renegade war hero in a fake Russian republic took an unexpected turn this week when he was allegedly abducted by Russian troops—after apparently being accused of being a CIA spy.

Russell Bentley, also known as “Texas,” is perhaps the last person one would expect to have pulled off cunning spycraft for the nearly 10 years he’s been living among Russian fighters in Ukraine’s occupied Donetsk region. A Dallas native with a conviction on drug charges back home, Bentley briefly seized international headlines back in 2014 when he was spotted in a cowboy hat with Russian fighters and spewing Kremlin propaganda about “Nazis” in Ukraine. He obtained Russian citizenship in 2020 after remodeling himself as a combat-vet-turned-“journalist” for Kremlin-controlled media.

News of his disappearance earlier this month largely went under the radar until his wife, Lyudmila Bentley, went public Tuesday with claims he’d been snatched and taken hostage by Russian troops.

“Russell was brutally detained on April 8,” Lyudmila Bentley wrote in a statement on Telegram. “I CALL ON EVERYONE to do EVERYTHING POSSIBLE to save my husband, our ‘Texas,’” she said, describing him as a “friend of Donbass and Russia.”

“Perhaps, there is not much time,” she said.

Russian propagandists have claimed Bentley vanished after approaching the site of recent shelling or mortar strikes, and one independent Russian news site said he’d been taking pictures of the damaged buildings. That detail led to a flurry of conspiracy theories about Bentley potentially being a mole.

On Wednesday, Bentley’s friends sought to quash those rumors, with his self-proclaimed “brother-in-arms,” identified only as Vasily, releasing a video appealing to Bentley’s captors to free him and noting that he was only trying to show the world what is happening in the region.

Bentley’s wife also acknowledged rumors that he had been “filming something on his phone.” After finding Bentley’s phone smashed, she wrote, she was able to check it later, saying, “I didn’t find ANY PHOTOS or VIDEOS.”

Graham Phillips, another Westerner who linked up with Russian forces in eastern Ukraine and knew Bentley, issued his own statement Wednesday noting that “a small but active part of the Russian community is already writing against Texas, such as that he was an ‘American spy,’ etc.”

Bizarrely, after writing that such claims are “nonsense” and unfair since Bentley isn’t around to defend himself, Phillips himself went on to subtly trash the Texan native for filming military activity, calling it “illegal and suspicious” to do so.

But, he said, “I am hoping for the best, that our Texas is alive and well.”

Intellinews, 3/31/24

Patriotism in Russia is at an all-time high, according to a recent poll conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) published on March 29.

An overwhelming majority (94%) of Russians identify themselves as “patriots of the country.” The figure includes 62% who declare their patriotism as absolute, marking a significant uptick of 10 percentage points from a similar poll a year earlier.

According to the report, the surge in patriotic sentiment has been unprecedented, tracing its origins back to the autumn of 2014 following Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, which was widely welcomed by the Russian public.

Since then, the proportion of “absolute” patriots has substantially overtaken those who consider their patriotism to be moderate, with 48% in the former category and 36% in the latter.

“The level of patriotism among Russians is higher than ever: today, 94% of our fellow citizens consider themselves patriots, including 62% who are absolute patriots, an all-time high since data began to be collected,” VTsIOM said in its report, cited by TASS.

The survey revealed respondents made a deep connection between patriotism and familial bonds, a sense of belonging, and cherished moments with loved ones. The concept of “homeland” (rodinina) extends beyond Russia’s mere geographical confines and also encapsulating concepts like “haven of safety” and “joy.”

The participants of the survey articulated their love for Russia as a blend of pride, defence, contribution to its development and a profound understanding of its rich history and culture.

“You know someone loves their country if they try to be a decent, responsible, honest and loyal person,” the report says.

In a parallel survey and in the wake of President Vladimir Putin’s recent landslide results in the presidential elections, polls reveal that the respondents continue to place substantial trust and confidence in the president, with figures oscillating between 81% and 84%, according to VTsIOM.

“When asked about their trust in Putin, 84% of respondents answered positively, marking a marginal increase of 1 percentage point since March 10. Furthermore, a similar percentage of the population, 84%, affirm their belief in Putin’s effective leadership as the head of state,” VTsIOM said.

Putin declared a sweeping victory in the country’s presidential election on March 15-17, taking an unbelievable 87% of the vote on a record turnout.

However, the pollster found a slight dip in trust towards Putin, with 80.7% of participants expressing a positive outlook, a decrease of 0.3 percentage points in a poll of 1,600 adult residents conducted between March 18 and 24, in the midst of which Russia was struck by a brutal terrorist attack on the Crocus City Hall shopping mall on March 22 that saw over 140 people die. Nevertheless, the president’s approval rating remains steady at 78.9%, VTsIOM said.

The government under Putin also received mixed reviews, with a 58% approval rating for the government’s job performance, down 3 percentage points from the previous survey a month earlier. Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin’s approval stood at 56%, reflecting a 3 percentage point decrease.

The poll found that the ruling United Russia party enjoyed a 52% support level, witnessing a slight increase of 1 percentage point. Other parties, including the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), saw minor fluctuations in their support levels.

Individual party leaders received varied levels of trust, with KPRF’s Gennady Zyuganov and A Just Russia-For Truth’s Sergey Mironov seeing increases in trust levels, while New People’s Alexey Nechayev experienced a decline.