By James Carden, ACURA, 2/13/24

During Mr. Obama’s second term in office (2013-2017), it had become clear that the terms of the public policy debate were undergoing a radical and worrying transformation. In the space of a very short time, certain ideas and policy proposals were being ruled as out of bounds not on the grounds that they were unwise, impractical, or inefficient, but on the grounds that they were products of “disinformation” campaigns on the part of foreign intelligence agencies.

To take one example: Those few who publicly expressed reservations with regard to Mr. Obama’s policy toward Russia and Ukraine found themselves branded not as merely unwise or wrongheaded but as nefarious tools of a foreign disinformation campaign.

The late Obama years witnessed a proliferation of OSNIT (open-source intelligence) outfits helmed by inane YouTube sleuths like Eliot Higgins, a figure with little in the way of formal education and absolutely zero experience in intelligence gathering who somehow became a public figure virtually overnight (Gosh, how did that happen?).

It can hardly be a coincidence that Bellingcat and its imitators sprung up at exactly the same moment that the US foreign policy establishment embarked upon a new and more dangerous cold war (one that has both Russia and China as its target).

Under Obama, the division of the world between “democracies and authoritarian regimes” was made the centerpiece of US foreign policy, animated by a paranoia not seen in this country since the late 1940s and early 1950s. And stoking the paranoia among both the chattering classes and the population at large necessitated the formation of a new information apparatus, and this, in turn, required a revision of a Cold War era law, the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 which heretofore had prohibited the US government from propagandizing its own citizens at taxpayer expense.

Soon after the Smith-Mundt “reform” was passed, the so-called Global Engagement Center was stood up under the auspices of the US Department of State. The Center, now led by former Clinton administration flack Jamie Rubin (husband of the reliably pro-interventionist CNN correspondent Christiane Amanpour), provides grants to “disinformation” outfits such as NewsGuard, which is currently facing a defamation lawsuit filed by Consortium News, the news outlet founded by legendary Iran-Contra reporter Robert Parry.

That aside, it must be admitted that the efforts of the “disinformation” complex have perhaps succeeded beyond the wildest wishes of those who set it in place. The work product of these outfits has been “weaponized” (a favorite term of art of the complex, and a word that has become unfortunately ubiquitous over the past decade thanks to it) to marginalize and stigmatize dissent. By turns vicious and unscrupulous, the tactics of the “disinformation” complex have, over the years, been co-opted by legacy media outlets like the Washington Post and the New York Times. And, as a consequence, policy alternatives are now routinely ruled out on grounds not that they are merely mistaken but on grounds they are treasonous, that they are Manchurian policies that ought to be dismissed out of hand, lest they play into the enemy’s hands.

It has always been the case that the American president is, due to his reliance on the intelligence fed to him by his circle of advisers, in some respects a prisoner of the national security apparatus which he ostensibly oversees. In a 1971 essay titled “The National Security Managers and the National Interest,” Richard Barnet, a founder of the Institute for Policy Studies observed that “National Security Managers exercise their power chiefly by filtering the information that reaches the President and by interpreting the outside world for him.” Picking up on Barnet’s theme, the philosopher Hannah Arendt further observed that “The President, one is tempted to argue, allegedly the most powerful man in the most powerful country, is the only person in this country whose range of choices can be predetermined.” That is, more or less, the role of the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council whose remit is to, among other things, set the agenda and the range of policy options that will be presented by the NSC principals to the Commander-in-Chief.

I would argue that today the chief executive’s choices are even further circumscribed by the existence of the public-private “disinformation” complex which further stacks the deck in favor of the national security state which acts as a buffer to facts, common sense and alternatives by rendering it politically even more difficult (if not impossible) for a president to challenge the prerogatives of the system.

After all, it is one thing to buck your national security advisors, it is quite another to buck your national security advisors, Congress, The New York Times, The Washington Post, large segments of the public and the entirety of official Washington. Precious few US presidents have ever had the courage to do the former – what, do you suppose, is the likelihood of any finding it within themselves to do the latter?

As such, the president is the “disinformation” complex’s most valuable hostage.

By MK Bhadrakumar, Indian Punchline, 3/4/24

The spectre of Armageddon has been raised often enough during the 2-year old war in Ukraine that the reference to it in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state of the union address on Thursday had a familiar ring about it. Therein lies the risk of misjudgement on the part of the western audience that Putin was only “crying wolf”. 

Three things must be noted at the outset. First, Putin has been explicit and direct. He is giving advance notice that he is obliged to respond with nuclear capability if the Russian statehood is threatened. Eschewing innuendos or dark hints, Putin actually made a sombre declaration of epochal significance.

Second, Putin was addressing the Federal Assembly in front of the crème de la crème of the Russian elite and took the entire nation into confidence that the country may be pushed into a nuclear war for its self-preservation.

Third, a specific context is sailing into view precipitated by foolhardy, impetuous western statesmen who are desperate to stave off an impending defeat in the war, which they began in the first instance, with the stated intention to destroy Russia’s economy, create social and political instability that would lead to a regime change in the Kremlin.

In reality, the US Secretary Lloyd Austin’s prognosis on Thursday at a Congressional hearing in Washington that “NATO will be in a fight with Russia” if Ukraine was defeated is the manifestation of a predicament that the Biden Administration faces after having led Europe to the brink of an abysmal defeat in Ukraine engendering grave uncertainties regarding its economic recovery and de-industrialisation due to the blowback of sanctions against Russia.

Plainly put, what Austin meant was that if Ukraine loses, NATO will have to go against Russia, as otherwise the future credibility of the western alliance system will be in jeopardy. It’s a call to Europe to rally for a continental war.

What French President Emmanuel Macron stated earlier last week on Monday was also an articulation of that same mindset, when he caused a storm by hinting that sending ground troops to help Kyiv was a possibility.

To quote Macron, “There is no consensus today to send ground troops officially but … nothing is ruled out. We will do whatever it takes to ensure that Russia cannot win this war. The defeat of Russia is indispensable to the security and stability of Europe.”

Macron was speaking after a summit of 20 European countries in Paris where a “restricted document” under discussion had implied “that a number of NATO and EU member states were considering sending troops to Ukraine on a bilateral basis,” according to Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico.

Fico said the document “sends shivers down your spine,” as it implied that “a number of NATO and EU member states are considering sending troops to Ukraine on a bilateral basis.”

Fico’s disclosure would not have come as surprise for Moscow, which has now put on the public domain the transcript of a confidential conversation between two German generals back on February 19 discussing the scenario of a potential attack on the Crimean Bridge with Taurus missiles and possible combat deployment by Berlin in Ukraine belying all public denials by Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

Aptly enough, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called the transcript “a screaming revelation.’‘ Interestingly, the transcript reveals that American and British servicemen are already deployed in Ukraine — something Moscow has been alleging for months — and such other details too. 

This is a moment of truth for Russia. After learning to live with the steady upgrade of western weaponry supplied to Ukraine, which now includes Patriot missiles and F-16 fighter jets, after having signalled vainly that any attack on Crimea or any attack on Russian territory would be regarded as a red line; after gingerly sidestepping the US-UK participation in operations to bring the war home to Russian territory — Macron’s belligerent statement last week has been the proverbial last straw for the Kremlin. It envisages western combat deployment to fight and kill Russian soldiers and conquer territories on behalf of Kiev.

At the speech on Thursday, which was almost entirely devoted to a hugely ambitious and forward-looking road map to address social and economic issues under the new normalcy Russia has achieved even under conditions of western sanctions, Putin held out a warning to the entire West by placing nuclear weapons on the table.

Putin underscored that any (further) crossing of the unwritten ground rules will be unacceptable — that while the US and its NATO allies provide military assistance to Ukraine but do not attack Russia’s soil and do not directly engage in combat, Russia would confine itself to using conventional weapons.

Quintessentially, the thrust of Putin’s remarks lies in his refusal to accept a fate for Russia in existential terms arranged by the West. The thinking behind it is not hard to comprehend. Simply put, Russia will not allow any attempt by the US and its allies to reshape the ground situation by impacting the front lines with NATO military personnel backed by advanced weaponry and satellite capabilities.

Putin has put the ball firmly in the Western court to decide whether the NATO will risk a nuclear confrontation, which of course is not Russia’s choice.

The context in which all this is unfolding has been pithily framed by the leader of a NATO country, Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orban, while addressing a forum of top diplomats in Antalya in the Turkish Riviera in the weekend when he stressed that “Europeans, along with the Ukrainians are losing the war and have no idea of how to find a way out of this situation.”

Orban said, “We, Europeans, are now in a difficult position,” adding that European countries took the conflict in Ukraine “as their own war” and realise belatedly that time is not on Ukraine’s side. “Time is on Russia’s side. That is why it is necessary to stop hostilities immediately.”

As he put it, “If you think that this is your war, but the enemy is stronger than you and has advantages on the battlefield, in this case, you are in the losers’ camp and it will not be an easy task to find a way out of this situation. Now, we Europeans, along with the Ukrainians, are losing the war and have no idea of how to find a way out of this situation, a way out of this conflict. This is a very serious problem.”

This is the crux of the matter. In the circumstances, the bottom line is that it will be catastrophic speciousness on the part of the western leadership and public opinion not to grasp the full import of Putin’s stark warning that Moscow means what it has been saying, namely, that it will regard any western combat deployment in Ukraine by NATO countries as an act of war.

To be sure, if Russia faces the risk of military defeat in Ukraine at the hands of NATO forces on combat deployment and Donbass and Novorossiya regions are at risk of being subjugated once again, that would threaten the stability and integrity of Russian statehood — and challenge the legitimacy of the Kremlin leadership itself — wherein the question of using nuclear weapons may become more open.

To drive home the point, Putin glanced through the Russian inventory that buttresses its nuclear superiority today, which the US cannot possibly match. And he further de-classified some top-secret information: “Efforts to develop several other new weapons systems continue, and we are expecting to hear even more about the achievements of our researchers and weapons manufacturers.”

Emphasis by bolding is mine. – Natylie

By Mark Galeotti, The Spectator, 2/29/24

Secret documents have been leaked that reveal Russian scenarios for war games involving simulated nuclear strikes. They shed light on Moscow’s military thinking and its nuclear planning in particular, but ultimately only reinforce one key factor: if nuclear weapons are ever used, it will be a wholly political move by Putin.

The impressive twenty-nine documents scooped by the Financial Times date back to the period of 2008 (when Vladimir Putin was technically just prime minister but still effectively in charge) to 2014 (after the sudden worsening in relations with the West following Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity and the annexation of Crimea). Although this means that they are a little dated, they nonetheless chime with our understanding of Russian doctrine today. As a result, they give a useful sense not only of the circumstances in which Moscow might use nuclear weapons, but also the degree to which China — for all the mutual expressions of friendship — is still regarded as a potential threat by the Russian military.

They spell out a series of criteria for the use of tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), with yields of “merely” Hiroshima-level, compared with the kind of larger warheads which could level whole cities. All of them, in keeping with the state nuclear policy adopted in 2020, allow for the first use of nuclear weapons as a response to a serious and material threat to the state. Quite what this means seems to range from a significant invasion onto Russian soil to the loss of 20 percent of the country’s nuclear missile submarines. Overall, their use is envisaged in situations where losses mean that Russians forces could “stop major enemy aggression” or a “critical situation for the state security of Russia.”

Although the nuclear threshold looks a little lower than we might have previously thought, we need to be cautious about drawing too concrete a set of conclusions from the war game scenarios — not least because of how old the plans are. It is essentially a given that major Russian exercises will include a simulated nuclear strike for training ground purposes. To this end, they may be massaged to ensure such an outcome.

Yet there are two specific sets of questions that the FT‘s scoop does raise. The first relates to Ukraine. Could, for example, a major Ukrainian incursion into territories Moscow claims to have annexed trigger a nuclear response? The honest answer is that — in theory — it could, as these are now considered Russians. However, we have to be clear that any use of NSNWs would be a political one: it will be Putin, not some doctrinal flow chart, that makes the decision.

The documents are also interesting in the light they shed on Moscow’s relationship with Beijing. It should hardly be a surprise that the Russians wargame a clash with China. First of all, that’s what militaries do: prepare for even unlikely circumstances. Secondly, they’re not necessarily that unlikely, especially as nationalists in and outside the Chinese government periodically question the “unfair treaties” imposed on it in the nineteenth century, including the 1858 Treaty of Aigun and the 1860 Treaty of Peking. The latter, for example, saw some 390,000 square miles surrendered to Russia. Finally, there is a deep-seated suspicion of China within many of the security elite.

These documents post-date the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between China and Russia. In recent years, the Sino-Russian relationship has strengthened, but even so this is more than anything else because the enemy of my enemy is my strategic partner. It is a deeply pragmatic relationship, though. Beijing uses Moscow’s desperation for oil and gas sales to force down the price, while Russia’s security services have been stepping up their hunt for Chinese spies (and finding them).

There remain fears that Beijing might some day seek to take the under-populated Russian Far East for their land, their resources, and their historical importance. Even before the Ukraine invasion, there was no meaningful way Russia’s thinly-stretched forces in the Far Eastern Military District could stop such an attack, and thus it is no surprise that in the exercise notes, NSNWs are to be deployed “in the event the enemy deploys second-echelon units.”

Of course, both Moscow and Beijing have disputed the authenticity of these documents. However, they are not so much proof that Russian nuclear policy is more permissive than we had assumed but a reminder of the political aspect of their use. At sea, the Russians are more quickly willing to use NSNWs, not least because of the presumed lower risk for civilian “collateral damage.” On the eastern front, they are an essential equalizer when facing a more populous and rapidly-arming frenemy. In the west, they are an information weapon, a threat to brandish in the hope of scaring electorates into demanding Kyiv be forced into an ugly and unequal peace to avert potential escalation. The real unknown is quite what Putin thinks about using them in his Ukraine war, and that is not something we can find in any doctrines or documents, alas.

Rumble link here.

Kremlin website, 2/12/24

The meeting was attended by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, First Deputy Prime Minister Andrei Belousov, Deputy Prime Minister – Chief of the Government Staff Dmitry Grigorenko, Presidential Aide Maxim Oreshkin, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, and Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Good afternoon, colleagues,

As we agreed, today we will discuss the current situation in the Russian economy, including the 2023 economic performance, current trends in key industries, and of course, we will review further plans to strengthen manufacturing, finance, foreign trade, and the economy in general. I suggest we look into both the tasks at hand and the long-term priorities until 2030.

As I have already said, last year’s economic growth surpassed forecasts. Our calculations indicated Russia’s GDP growth at 3.5 percent, but according to the latest data, it is even 3.6 percent. It is higher than the global average, which is three percent. The economies of the developed countries are growing at a rate of 1.5 percent.

It is very important that this dynamic has been reached, primarily, on the basis of our internal capacities. Thus, industrial output has grown by 3.5 percent over the year, and the processing industries by 7.5 percent.

Double-digit growth is seen in sectors like computer manufacturing, aircraft production, shipbuilding, and the production of furniture, electrical equipment, and vehicles. For your reference: computers and peripherals saw an increase of 32.8 percent, while vehicles, particularly aviation equipment and ships, experienced growth of 25.5 percent. Furniture production increased by 20.7 percent, the leather and leather goods sectors, by 12.3 percent, while motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers recorded a growth rate of 13.6 percent.

In turn, the real economy’s positive performance and the business sector’s confident work are making public finances more resilient. Last year, the federal budget deficit amounted to 1.9 percent of the country’s GDP. At the same time, non-oil-and-gas revenues increased by about 25 percent. In the fourth quarter, they exceeded projected estimates by almost 500 billion rubles. In January 2024, they soared by about 85 percent compared to 2023 levels. This once again confirms the growing role of the non-resource, processing sectors.

In January, the federal budget deficit totalled 308 billion rubles. Mr Siluanov, as far as I understand, this is much less than last year, is that right?

Minister of Finance Anton Siluanov: Yes, Mr President, definitely. We spent a lot of money in January 2023, and, of course, we posted a much higher deficit. We made substantial advance payments while financing multiple expenditures; and the deficit was therefore much higher.

Vladimir Putin: My data shows that it has dwindled by 1.3 trillion rubles on 2023. This is a serious indicator.

Speaking of regional budgets, we have balanced most of them. Last year, we recorded a small deficit totalling 0.1 percent of GDP. In January, total budget revenue of all Russian regions exceeded expenditure by 14 billion rubles.

I would also like to note that, according to current data, nationwide economic activity remains high. The situation is developing in accordance with the Government’s expectations and those of expert circles. For example, consumer demand remains strong, just about as high as in the fourth quarter of 2023. It is very important that this has a positive effect on the mood and plans of national businesses.

Of course, we should pay special attention to inflation and measures for curbing it. In late January, annual inflation was 7.2 percent. Of course, we know that consumer prices increased by 7.4 percent in 2023. This means that inflation is beginning to subside. I would like to note the joint actions of the Government and the Bank of Russia in this connection.

At the same time, against the backdrop of the increase in the Central Bank’s key interest rate – of course, this was predictable – lending slowed. Thus, in January, the corporate lending portfolio shrank by 0.2 percent, while the retail lending portfolio, on the other hand, increased slightly – by the same 0.2 percent. I know that my colleagues are closely monitoring these parameters. Of course, we will talk about this today as well.

The parameters I mentioned, of course, affect the growth rate of our economy both in the short term and in the long term. There are pluses and minuses to everything – I won’t go into detail now, we understand it well. I will only repeat: it is extremely important to maintain a balance between the overall goals of development, increasing investment and lending, preserving employment, and ensuring price stability.

I would also like to note that in the coming years, given the challenges facing the Russian and the entire global economy, we need a proactive, incentive-based policy that will enable us to unlock Russia’s industrial, agricultural, transport and high-tech potential at a new level and to create and revamp production facilities with modern, well-paid jobs in all constituent entities of the Federation.

We are now entering the final stage on our socioeconomic action plan for the next six years. Among other things, it will cover such key areas as investment support, ensuring technological sovereignty, upgrading and building infrastructure, comprehensive development of populated areas, and much more. At the same time, our main goal, our unconditional priority, is to improve the incomes and quality of life for our citizens and the well-being of Russian families.

Once again, I would like to emphasise that in implementing all the plans outlined, it is important to maintain the stability of public finance and adhere to the same principles of macroeconomic stability as in previous years, which, in fact, allowed us to overcome today’s challenges with such dignity. I ask my colleagues to proceed from these basic considerations.

Let’s move on to the discussion.