By Gordon Hahn, Substack, 5/12/26

Note: This article is being cross-posted without editing and any typos are contained in the original.

As Ukraine’s political-military situation both at the front and in the rear deteriorates, the potential for major political crises and coup plots against the rule of Volodomyr Zelenskiy grows. As I have noted earlier, war and revolution often come together; war weakens the state, regime, army and society, leading to political fracture and designs by some to seize power for themselves illegally or asystemically. A classic example is World War I and its effect on Imperial Russia, but other manifestations of this phenomena affected Turkey, Austria-Hungary, Poland, later Germany, and other states as well, including a briefly quasi-independent Ukraine. Various forms of regime change and state collapse occurred in each: the illegal seizure of power by revolution from above, revolution from below, palace coups, including military coups. In Ukraine various warlords, military contingents, and socialist and nationalist revolutionary parties seized power in different parts of the country, with several coups occurring at the ’center’ in Kiev. All this could happen again just as the experience of the 17th century Ukrainian ‘Ruin’ is beginning to repeat itself in this war-torn country.

The most likely candidates to attempt and be capable of a successful seizure of power will be armed ones, and there is no more powerful, potentially revolutionary force than the two Azov army corps: The 3rd Army Corps Azov of the Ukrainian armed forces’ ground forces led by the neofascist Azov organization’s founder Brigadier General Andriy Biletskiy and the 1st Corps of the Ukrainian National Guard under the Internal Affairs Ministry led by Brigadier general Denys ‘Redis’ Prokopenko. What resources do Azov and its Army Corps possess? How much political and ideological influence do they wield inside Ukraine? And what domestic and foreign allies do they have and what do the latter provide Azov? What are the prospects for and obstacles to an Azov-led military or military-backed coup? In this Part 1, I discuss Biletskiy’s 3rd Army Corps ‘Azov.’ I will examine the 1st National Guard Corps Azov in Part 2.

The Rise of the Militant Azov Movement

Azov has its roots in the pre-Maidan neofascist Black Corps (BC), Social-National Assembly (SNA) and the Patriots of Ukraine (PU) parties all founded by then civilian political actor, Biletskiy. BC was the most immediate precursor organization of Azov and was founded during the Maidan revolt, which itself ended in an ultimately violent revolt led by neofascist in February 2014. The Maidan revolt hijacked the originally more popular ‘Revolution of Dignity’ at that time.[1] BC’s members were tied to members and associates of PU. After the Maidan revolt, the BC fought anti-Maidan elements in Kharkiv in March 2014. In May 2014 Biletskiy founded in Berdyansk, the Azov Battallion in Berdyansk. Thus, the battalion was created in the crucible of the Ukrainian civil war that developed in the Maidan revolt’s wake. Originally named in honor of the Sea of Azov, the Azov Battalion was made up of local volunteers, patriots, nationalists, and football ultras, particularly from Metalist Kharkiv.

Azov played a key role during the disturbances that occurred in Mariupol in reaction against the Maidan regime and its declaration of an anti-terrorist organization targeting the Donetsk and Luhansk separatist movements. The battalion suppressed the Mariupol separatists, firing on a police station, killing and wounding many anti-Maidan policemen. “(P)oliced streets”, the battalion had suppressed the rebellion in Mariupol by June 2014. The batallion fought in the defense of Ilovaisk and Marinka in Donetsk Oblast from the Donetsk separatists backed by Russian forces.[2]

The Azov Battalion like other autonomous, volunteer neofascist and ultranationalist battalions that formed were incorporated nominally under the command of the newly formed Ukrainian National Guard (NGU) under the control of the Internal Affairs Ministry in the course of 2014.[3] Thus, from the outset of the Maidan regime in Ukraine, neofascist groups and the siloviki departments (the organs of coercion – military, intelligence, and police organs) demonstrated an affimnity for each other.[4]

On 11 November 2014, the battalion was expanded, becoming the Azov Regiment in the NGU. The regiment’s official name later became “the 12th Special Purpose Brigade Azov.” The Azov regiment then was supplied with equipment from the Ukrainian government, including T-64B1M tanks, D-30 artillery, and various other vehicles. In February 2015, the regiment carried out an offensive east of Mariupol, towards the settlement of Shyokryne, and liberated five settlements.[5] By the time of the larger Russian ‘special military operation’ begun in February 2022, Azov had been incorporated into the Ukrainian armed forces.

Azov has a youth organization, which, according to Clark University Professor Marta Havryshko, who is from Ukraine’s neofascist hotbed Lvov (Lviv) and specializes in studying such extremist groups, “prepares youth for street violence and confrontation with the police” and “has already used political violence against LGBTQI+, leftists, and feminist activists.” Moreover, it has “widened its activities across Ukraine” since the war began. Like its parent group Azov, it maintains close ties and conducts activities with other neo-Nazi groups like the Misanthropic division, Ukrainian Unity in Blood, Ukrainian Galician Youth, and others.[6] Azov’s and Centuria’s cult of violence – so reminiscent of WW II Germany’s Nazis, is evident in a Centuria video posted on the internet.[7] According to Havryshko, ‘Centuria’ celebrates the birthday of OUN anti-Semite and Nazi collaborator Yaroslav Stetsko, who wrote in a 25 June 1941 letter to OUN‘s leader Bandera: “We are are establishing a militia that will help to eliminate the Jews and to protect the population.” Stetsko also called a party colleague “unprincipled” for marrying a Jew and denied him “room at the helm of national life.”[8]

Biletskiy’s Azov and 3rd Army Corps, have a virtual empire, nearly a state-within-the state that includes its own military, technology, and other training programs, an educational institute, ‘educational’ programs in schools, an array of social media, bookstores, consumer products (tee-shirts, flags, etc., etc.).[9]

Azov’s Schism

Azov has seen splits, defections, and spinoff groups. Before the war the influential Azov commander Sergei Korotkikh (nickname ‘Botsman’) defected. At the beginning of the laerge-scale war in February 2022, Azov members based in Kharkiv created their own unit ‘Kraken’ in the Military Intelligence of Ukraine (HUR). This event speaks once more of the affinity between Ukrainian neofascist groups and Ukrainian siloviki.

Azov underwent a split in mid- 2022 resulting from the siege of Mariupol, the port city on the Sea of Azov from whence comes the movement’s name. The long Russian siege eventually ended when the Ukrainian forces, mostly Azov units, encircled by Russian forces underground in the Azov Iron and Steel Works or ‘AzovStal’ surrendered in May 2022 after negotiations. Rather than being sent to Russia, Azov leaders and some fighters were allowed to go into exile in Turkey, where they were supposed to stay until the war’s end by agreement between Moscow, Kiev, and Istanbul. However, Azov fighters returned to Ukraine partially by way of prisoner exchanges and partially by Turkey’s release of many in summer 2023. The returned prisoner-exiles and their commander Denis Prokopenko (nickname ‘Redis’) in the interim had become national heroes for their refusal to surrender for so long and their subsequent exile. Biletskiy and other Azov elements were not in Mariupol or had escaped before the encirclement, and questions arose as to why they were not there. Then Biletskiy formed from among Azov members his military formation, the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, which, because Biletskiy led a propaganda campaign, became known as one of, if not the most effective of Ukrainian military brigades. Upon Prokopenko’s return he re-formed an Azov brigade under the National Guard (Azov NG) and like Biletskiy sold his unit as the most effective fighting unit in Ukraine.

Tensions emerged between the two Azovs. There have been a series of violent episodes between Azov NG and Azov 3rd Brigade soldiers, highlighting the those tensions. In 2024, Azov 3rd Brigade member Semyon Klok (nickname ‘Malysh’ or ‘Little One’), who would beat a 3rd Brigade officer in June 2025, shot and seriously wounded a National Guard officer. On June 2025, the Azov split deepened when a major in the 12th Brigade of the Azov National Guard (Azov NG), Andrei Korenevich (nicknamed “Koren’’), accused fighters of the Azov 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, who, he said, were closely tied to Biletskiy, of beating him up. According to reports, two Azov Corps members beat Korenevich, and two other members accompanied them. The beaten commander said the beating could not have occurred without Biletskiy’s permission or direct order and called upon 3rd Corps members to think over what is happening. Pointedly, Korenevich charged Biletskiy with “criminal habits” and political ambitions: “It is already clear to everyone that after the war he (Biletsky) is going to enter politics. The whole of Ukraine is plastered with his portraits, as if the election campaign has alreadybegun. Guys from the 3rd, give yourself an answer to the question: are we really fighting for Ukraine,led by bandits who do not disdain to organize attacks on their own?”[10]

Deputy commander of the 12th Brigade of Azov NG, Svyatoslav Palamar’ (nicknamed ‘Kalina’) condemned the spread of “thief-like concepts” in the army, presumably Biletskiy’s fault, justifying attacks on brothers. Indeed, one of the Azov 3rd Corps perpetrators of the beating, was wanted on an international warrant for premeditated murder. Indeed, Palamar’ issued a manifesto sorts – “AboutUkrainian Nationalism and Azov” — condemning Biletskiy and the Azov 3rd Corps. Specfically, hecriticized military personnel who “deliberately replaced the commandments of the Ukrainian nationalistwith ‘criminal romance’ and exchanged honor, dignity and ‘fraternity’ for illusory authority, following‘criminal concepts’ and ‘imagined membership in bandit groups.’” Such are “not friends of Ukraine”and are “not on the (proper) path.” “Those who justify attacks on brothers with ‘thieves’ concepts’definitely are not Ukrainian nationalists. The Ukrainian nationalist has never lived, does not live andwill not live according to the ‘concepts’ of banditry. Moreover, he does not have, has not had, and willnot have the right to plant crime and ‘concepts’ among the Ukrainian military.”[11] Even the National Guard itself issued a statement condemning the beating.[12] However, this split proved temporary as evidenced by Biletskiy’s and Prokopenko’s reunion upon the formation of the 3rd Army Corps Azov in 2025.

The split between Azov units in the siloviki – military Azov (Biletskiy’s 3rd Assault Brigade) versus Prokopenko’s Azov NG did not extend to the political movement. Biletskiy denied in October 2023 that such a split existed.[13] In terms of neofascism’s profile within Ukraine, the split mattered little. Both Biletskiy’s and Prokopenko’s Azovs push the neofascist Azov ideology propaganda in schools, universities, and mass and social media. But Biletskiy’s Azov movement and 3rd Army Corps’ has long had a large and growing infrastructure for doing so that now includes its own training school that Prokopenko’s Azov NG endeavors to match.[14]

Despite the 2023-2024 tensions within Azov, Biletskiy’s star continued to rise along with that of his 3rd Assault Brigade ‘Azov’ in the course of the war, even as Ukraine’s military fortunes waned.

Azov at War: Rising Through the Ranks

At the onset of the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Azov 3rd Brigade was stationed on the outskirts of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov and fought to defend the city during the Russian siege of 2024. With the encirclement of the city, the Azov fighters withdrew to the massive underground complex of the AzovStal plant, and all its members being severely wounded, killed, captured, or surrendered and placed into Russian captivity or sent into exile in Turkey under agreement they would only return until after the war. In September 2022, many fighters from the regiment were released from Russian captivity, and the commanders, including Denys Prokopenko ‘Redis’ were returned to Ukraine in violation of the agreement, as noted above.

Between January and February 2023, the Azov Regiment was expanded and reformed into the 12th Brigade of Operational Assignment, which was soon disbanded in favor of the Azov 3rd Seprate Assault Brigade under the Offensive Guard program. The new brigade defended areas of southern Ukraine during its disastrous, NATO-conceived summer counteroffensive in 2023 towards Melitopol. Biletskiy’s first major Azov propaganda campaign and his ensuing growing authority coincided with the 3rd Brigade’s combat efforts during the battle of Bakhmut in 2023. The Azov 3rd Brigade later redeployed to the Serebryansky forest in the Kreminna direction and then to New York and Toretsk in mid-2024. Thus, like the rest of the Ukrainian army, Azov units, under whatever name and structure, have experienced defeat after defeat, forced to retreat further and further west in Donetsk Oblast. Recently, the 3rd Brigade had been deployed on the Northern Donbass and Kharkiv fronts that slowly but surely have been giving way to Russian forces after gritty battles albeit.[15]

The 3rd Army Corps ‘Azov’, formed officially on 4 August 2025, was founded in March 2025 on the basis of the 3rd Separate Assualt Brigade ‘Azov’ to which the 60th Mechanized Brigade and “many other” but identified “support units” were joined in July. The new corps required an immediate reorganization of Azov’s social media channels in August 2025, and Biletskiy’s August announcement included the usual promotional material. He noted that the 3rd Army Corps’ “bridgehead is the last line of defense for the Northern Donbas and Kharkiv region” and that the corps “holds about 150 kilometers – approximately 12% or 1/8 of the entire front line.” Biletskiy added: “It can be confidently stated that the Third Corps is already influencing the course of this war.” By August, the 53rd Mechanized Brigade and the 63rd Mechanized Brigade had also been placed under the command of the corps. The former held positions in the Serebryansky forest, and the latter had been fighting extensively in the Luhansk direction alongside the 60th Brigade.[16] At present, the 3rd Army Corps Azov consists of the old Azov 3rd Brigade, three mechanized brigades joined to it, plus a communications brigade (see Table below).

The Azov 3rd Army Corps consists of anywhere from 6,000 to 20,000 troops, stationed in a privileged unit that is likely to be well-equipped and well-staffed. It is likely that its number of personnel tends towards the upper limit of the indicated range of 6-20,000. Again, its privileged position will ensure a sufficient number of recruits, and those in the best shape will be sent its way.

It is important to note regarding Azov’s control over the 3rd Army Corps that Biletskiy has been successful in placing hardened Azov members into command positions of the 3rd Corps’ subdivisions, most motably in the 53rd Mechanized Brigade. For example, Lt. Col. Ihor Mykhailenko, commander of the 53rd Mechanized Brigade, was appointed in March 2026, when the decision to form the corps was made. Mikhailenko also was appointed deputy commander of the Azov Corps and is a long-time Azov operator and committed neofascist. He volunteered to the Azov Battalion in 2014 and took command of an assault group during clashes in Mariupol. Mykhailenko also took part in the battles at Ilovaisk and Shyrokyne that same year. In late 2014, he commanded the 3rd Company and soon was second in command of the Azov Regiment, holding that position until 2016. After frontline action, Mikhailenko founded the abovementioned ultranationalist “Centuria” organization, focusing on social mobilization through ideological indoctrination and military training.[17] Upon Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Mikhailenko returned to the front and commanded the Azov-Kyiv Special Operations unit until being appointed deputy commander of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade Azov—that is Biletskiy’s deputy. Mikhailenko says that the 53rd Mechanized Brigade under the Azov 3rd Army Corps will prioritize psychological support, the development of air drones (UAVs), and the training of personnel.[18]

The 3rd Army Corps ‘Azov’ units are battle-hardened as well as ideologically oriented. For example, founded in Dnipro in 2015, the Corps’ 60th Mechanized Brigade has had numerous important deployments, including: Kherson Oblast, 2022; Bakhmut, early 2023; Kherson counteroffensive, summer 2023; Kupyansk, January 2024; Liman, March 2024 to present.[19] Commander of the Corps’ 60th Mechanized Brigade, Maj. Dmytro Rohozyuk, has less of an Azov pedigree than the 53rd’s Lt. Col. Mykhailenko but makes up for this with battle experience and planning expertise. Following the full-scale invasion in 2022, Rohozyuk joined the Azov Special Operations Regiment “Kyiv” and took part in the defense of Kyiv and Mariupol. He later became a company commander in the 1st Assault Battalion of the 3rd Assault Brigade, participating in the Bakhmut campaign. He was then appointed Head of the Operations Department as Chief of Planning. Following the creation of the 3rd Army Corps, he has served as its Deputy Chief of Staff, helping to establish corps-level planning structures. Last year Rohozyuk assumed command of the 60th Mechanized Brigade. According to Volodymyr Fokin, a commander from the 3rd Assault Brigade, before Rohozyuk’s appointment to the 60th Brigade, it had poor leadership, a lack of rotation, and little knowledge of its standing forces. By January 2026, Rohoziuk claimed major improvements, including sharply cutting the number of AWOL personnel and integrating experienced units from the 3rd Assault Brigade to train up existing and new personnel in the 60th Brigade.[20]

63rd Mechanized Brigade, like the other units already discussed, is a unit of the Ukrainian Ground Forces and was formed on 14 March 2017 on the basis of a joint directive of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, but its official creation dates from 23 June 2017. Bases in Khmelnistkiy Oblast’ in western Ukraine, the unit was formed from servicemen of the units of Operational Command West. In October 2019 of that year, the brigade was deployed to the “combat zone in eastern Ukraine,” meaning Donetsk or Luhansk. At the beginning of the Russia’s ‘special military operation’ full-scale invasion, the brigade engaged Russian forces in Kherson and Mykolaiv Oblasts, defending for the right bank of the Dnieper River. In November 2022, after the Kharkiv offensive’s success and its troops helped to retake the city of Kherson. The 63rd saw heavy fighting in Bakhmut from mid-December 2022 and from 2024 operated in Luhansk, defending positions to the west of Kreminna in the region that recently had been taken by Russian forces. In March 2025, the brigade received BTR-4 vehicles, becoming the fourth unit of the Ukrainian Ground Forces to receive them. Joining the newly established 3rd Army Corps by August 2025, the 63rd Brigade was reorganized “to streamline the command, recruitment, management, and other procedures within the brigade,” “likely at the initiative of the corps’ headquarters.[21]

The 63rd’s commander is Major Denys Shapoval’, known by his callsign “Shapa.” He is another long-time Azov member. Shapoval joined the Azov Regiment in 2015, undergoing intensive training within a special-purpose unit. He first saw combat in 2016 near Mariupol, seeing further action in Marinka, Krasnogorivka, Shyrokyne, and Novoluhansk in the civil war. After returning “briefly” to civilian life, Shapoval returned to combat with the February 2022 Russian invasion, fighting in Kiev, Kherson, Bakhmut, and Kurdyumivka. He rose through the 63rd Brigade’s command ladder to become from Chief of Staff of 1st Mechanized Battalion of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade Azov before being appointed commander of the 63rd Mechanized Brigade in March 2026.[22] Thus, another long-time Azov soldier has taken command of another brigade pillar of the 3rd Army Corps Azov. The 3rd Corps’ structure is rounded out by the 122nd Communications Brigade that leads the Corps’ technical and drone personnel and operations and is commanded by Ihor Bondarchuk.[23] It is “expected,” according to a supportive social media outlet dedicated to Azov’s military structures, that the 3rd Army Corps “will include a heavy mechanized brigade and a dedicated artillery brigade.”[24] All in all, the well-resourced, battle-hardened, and ideologically-fortified 3rd Army Corps will be a formidable force for both foreign and domestic foes to deal with.

Political Azov

The Azov Army Corps’s two predecessor organizations – Biletskiy’s 3rd Assault Brigade and Prokopenko’s Azov National Guard unit – had been the most politicized elements in the Ukrainian armed forces writ large. After the fall of Bakhmut, the authority and popularity of Biletskiy and his 3rdBrigade continued to grow through the winter 2023-2024 battle for Avdiivka and later battles. Prokopenko’s Azov project had a lesser profile but is well-known. A new level of power and authority within both army and society came with the elevation of 3rd Separate Assault Brigade to the status of an army corps—the 3rd Army Corps ‘Azov’—and it marked a new high point for Biletskiy’s political ambitions.

Biletskiy, Prokopenko, and their respective Azov projects have been the only military elements allowed to have a political presence and engage in political – and highly ideological – propaganda.[25]Both Biletskiy, Prokopenko, and other Azov commanders intermittently speak out on larger military, war and state issues that other officers are not allowed to address. Politicization of the army and National Guard through their Azov units now is likely to intensify, feeding on mounting multiple crises and Azov’s growing military power and political authority rising.

Azov is well-financed. Rumors circulate among the political elite that Ukraine’s coal oligarch Rinat Akhmetov was financing both Biletskiy’s and Prokopenko’s Azov brigades and their connected universe of social institutions on instructions from, and under the control of, the Office of the President (OP).[26] Zelenskiy’s goal is said to be the creation of a political party that could drain votes away from the popular Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhniy, Kiev’s ambassador to London and former commander of Ukraine’s armed forces and former President Petro Poroshenko’s ‘European Solidarity’ party. If elected to the Rada, Biletskiy’s Azov party would form a parliamentary majority with Zelenskiy’s declining Servants of the People (Slugi haroda) party and ensure Zelenskiy’s control over the Rada and Cabinet of Ministers, sidelining European Solidarity.[27] As noted above, it is rumored that the OP, at least under the management of its former leader Andriy Yermak, is well-predisposed towards Prokopenko’s Azov.[28]

*I will examine the 1st National Guard Corps Azov in Part 2.

By Pavel Devyatkin, Responsible Statecraft, 5/28/26

This month, as delegates from around the world gathered at the United Nations to talk about nuclear nonproliferation, the U.S. and Russia chose to remind everyone just how much destructive power they command.

On May 12, Russia staged a test launch of its Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Russian President Vladimir Putin promptly announced that the Sarmat will go on combat duty by the end of 2026.

On May 20, the U.S. Air Force launched an unarmed Minuteman III ICBM. The missile has been in service since 1970 and may need to operate through 2050 — 14 years longer than planned — because its next-generation replacement, the Sentinel ICBM, is running years behind schedule and billions over budget.

None of these tests made either country safer. Rather, they deteriorated the diplomatic environment. And in political terms, they were corrosive: they further normalized the idea that nuclear policy is about signaling rather than diplomacy at the exact moment diplomats were trying to keep the focus on risk reduction.

The Air Force emphasized that its test was scheduled in advance and “not in response to world events,” but the timing could hardly have been worse: just two days later, the 11th Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference wrapped up at the U.N. in New York City without a consensus final document.

Why the conference matters

The NPT Review Conference is a periodic summit where the world’s nuclear and non-nuclear states gather to negotiate next steps toward disarmament and try to keep the promise of the NPT alive. Held every five years, the conference is one of the main pillars sustaining the global nonproliferation order. When states can agree on a final document, it shows that, despite their differences, they still share common ground on the nuclear threat.

But this year, for the third time in a row, the conference ended in failure. The immediate sticking point was a deadlock between the U.S. and Iran over how to address Iran’s nuclear activities in the final text. Washington wanted direct language naming Iran, while Tehran flatly refused and insisted on condemnation of the nuclear-armed states that had attacked it in the past. The chair, Vietnamese Ambassador Do Hung Viet, didn’t even bother to submit the last draft for a vote. Before the conference opened, he had warned that another failure would be catastrophic: “We may lose the credibility of the NPT itself.”

Yet focusing only on Iran misses the deeper fracture. “Tragically, NPT states missed an important opportunity to formally reaffirm their support for the treaty and its core principles, goals, and objectives at a time of increasing nuclear dangers,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

After a month of talks, the draft outcome document failed even to call on nuclear-armed states to pursue disarmament negotiations “with urgency,” despite the fact that this obligation already exists under Article VI of the NPT. Instead, the text called for a vague “constructive dialogue” that “could facilitate” future discussions.

Meanwhile, nuclear-armed states and their allies worked to water down or block long-established language about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use.

Still, not all was lost. Despite U.S. objections, other states managed to insert language supporting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and opposing any resumption of nuclear explosive testing. That was at least a small defense against an eroding norm; President Donald Trump has floated the idea of resuming testing, with Russia warning it would match any U.S. move.

The conference’s conclusion must also be kept in perspective. As Russian arms control expert Vladimir Orlov points out, the NPT Review Conference is about the review process as well as consensus documents. That review happened, and no country questioned whether the NPT is essential. Even if threats to compliance are growing, the treaty remains in force.

Signaling replacing diplomacy

Actions speak louder than words, and May was full of contradictions between the two. American and Russian diplomats in New York praised the NPT as the foundation of nonproliferation while their military commands showed off capabilities the treaty is meant to restrain.

The Sarmat and Minuteman III launches came alongside large-scale Russian nuclear drills that ran May 19-21. Russia billed these as rehearsals for using nuclear forces if threatened.

“As a result of blatantly provocative moves in the nuclear sphere, strategic risks are increasing, as is the danger of a head-on clash between NATO and our country, with potentially catastrophic consequences,” warned Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov.

Nobody seriously thinks a first strike is coming. Deterrence is working in that sense. The real problem is the crumbling diplomatic space. Even routine missile tests may be seen as threats. In turn, threats start to look like preparations for war.

Meanwhile, the architecture of arms control is eroding. The last major agreement capping U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arms, New START, expired on February 5. Although the U.S. and Russia appear to be informally observing New START’s numerical limits following the treaty’s expiration, neither side is bound by any legal obligation to do so, and there is no verification mechanism to confirm compliance.

So, where does arms control go from here? The NPT Review Conference was a chance for nuclear states to do the bare minimum: restate their commitments and treat disarmament as essential to security.

They failed. Now, as yet another deadlocked conference fades and missile tests make headlines, the NPT’s bargain that non-nuclear states forgo the bomb in exchange for progress on disarmament by nuclear states looks more lopsided than ever.

History shows that arms races always end with arms control, but often after unnecessary escalation, and occasionally after near-catastrophe. How much brinkmanship will it take before real talks resume?

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 5/17/26

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia had a basic problem: having ignored investing into anything except military technology, the newly independent country found that nothing worked properly. All its technology and machinery was vastly inferior to their Western analogues. And it made no sense to invest millions of dollars in trying to catch up, as at the end of the day, the Western machines would still be better and cheaper than anything a Russian firm could produce. So for most of the last three decades by far the largest import category was machinery.

Sanctions changed all that. Extreme sanctions imposed following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine cut Russia off from even basic things like high quality printer paper, let alone sophisticated computer chips. Central Bank of Russia (CBR) governor Elvia Nabiullina warned businesses in a speech at the time that they should be prepared to go back “at least two generations” of technology if they wanted to keep their businesses going.

Fast forward four years and Russia is rolling out tech innovation after innovation to replace those imported machines it couldn’t make for itself. As IntelliNews reported, thanks to the collapse of the economy in 1991, Russia missed out on at least two revolutions in precision tool making which is at the heart of modern consumer and industrial goods production, left so far behind that it seemed almost impossible that it would ever be able to catch up.

Rosatom expands machine-building ambitions as nuclear orders surge

Russia’s Rosatom is best known as the state-owned nuclear corporation responsible for building and maintaining nuclear power plants (NPPs). Russia’s nuclear exports are booming as uranium is the new gas for Russia’s energy-linked foreign policy.

However, Rosatom is playing a second and probably more important role. It is positioning itself as a major machine-building group as demand rises for equipment linked to nuclear energy, Arctic shipping and industrial manufacturing, according to comments made by chief executive Alexei Likhachev at a congress of Russian engineering companies last week.

Likhachev said more than 200,000 people are now employed in machine-building production across its enterprises, as the government has yet another stab at doing something about its inability to make high quality machines.

Rosatom acts both as a customer and producer of heavy engineering equipment for sectors including defence, nuclear energy and industrial technology projects tied to Russia’s import substitution drive. The group also manufactures equipment for external customers in industries ranging from oil refining to liquefied natural gas. The idea is to learn by doing, and thanks to sanctions it has plenty of customers.

“The nearest horizon we see is 2040, which promises us an order for machine-building products worth around RUB25 trillion ($263bn),” Likhachev said during the congress of the Russian Machine Builders Union.

The nuclear sector remains the largest source of future demand. Under Russia’s General Scheme for the Placement of Electric Power Facilities until 2042, the country plans to construct 38 nuclear power units of varying sizes. Rosatom is also building reactors abroad, with projects under way in Bangladesh, Turkey, India, China, Hungary, Egypt and Uzbekistan.

Likhachev said Rosatom had also reached agreements on future nuclear power plant construction in Rwanda, Vietnam, Myanmar and Kazakhstan, underlining Moscow’s efforts to preserve influence in global nuclear markets despite Western sanctions targeting parts of Russia’s energy sector.

Rosatom’s engineering operations also support Russia’s expanding nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet. The Baltic Shipyard is currently constructing the nuclear icebreakers Chukotka, Leningrad and Stalingrad, vessels considered central to the development of the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic.

Beyond nuclear infrastructure, Rosatom manufactures spiral-wound heat exchangers for LNG production, equipment for oil refineries, battery cells, radiopharmaceuticals and medical technology. The corporation has also expanded training programmes, opening engineering classes and operating 12 colleges in Russia’s nuclear cities. Annual graduate recruitment has increased from 1,300 to 5,400 over the past decade, according to the company.

Aviation catching up

Aviation was one of the sectors that was hardest hit by sanctions. Again, the massive Russian plane-building sector built up in Soviet times was stuck in the past and unable to manufacture the nuts and bolts spare parts needed to keep the fleet in the air. During the boom years, like in the power sector, Russia had largely bought the cheaper, but higher quality foreign-made planes. Cut off from spare parts by sanctions, companies were forced to ground aging planes and started to cannibalise them to keep the rest in the air.

Now Russia is preparing to begin deliveries of domestically produced passenger aircraft as Moscow pushes to reduce its dependence on Western aerospace technology thanks to progress in domestic manufacturing capabilities.

The first import-substituted SJ-100 regional jets equipped with Russia’s PD-8 engines are expected to be delivered to airlines by the end of 2026 or in the first quarter of 2027, according to industry officials and state media reports. Certification of the PD-8 engine has been completed, with aircraft and engine approvals expected to be synchronised before deliveries begin.

The SJ-100 programme, developed by the state-owned United Aircraft Corporation, is central to the Kremlin’s strategy of replacing foreign-made components previously sourced from suppliers in Europe and the US.

In the medium-haul segment, the Tupolev Tu-214 received certification in December 2025 and deliveries are scheduled to begin in 2027. Red Wings will become the first operator under a firm leasing agreement covering 11 aircraft financed through Russia’s National Welfare Fund.

But production volumes remain limited. The Kazan Aviation Plant is expected to assemble three Tu-214 aircraft in 2026, up from a rate of one or two aircraft annually in recent years. However, United Aircraft Corporation has secured preliminary commitments for 100 Tu-214s from Russian carrier S7 Airlines, with deliveries due to start in 2029.

“The entire lineup — from short-haul to medium-haul — is converging at a single point in time,” the report said, describing the emergence of “a fully independent ecosystem”.

 “Russia has managed to do what no one in the world has been able to do for decades: displace the US in their monopoly in critical avionics,” the report said.

The effort contrasts with China’s approach to aircraft development. While China’s COMAC has advanced production of the ARJ21 and C919 passenger jets, both programmes continue to rely heavily on Western suppliers, including engines produced by CFM International, the joint venture between GE Aerospace and Safran. One of the only deals that US President Donald Trump was able to strike during his trip to Beijing last week was the sale of 200 Boeing jets to Beijing – and even then the market was disappointed as they were expecting 500 planes to be sold.

One of the biggest innovation is Russia has developed its own engines, the most complicated part of plane-making. The fully indigenous PD-8 engine for the Superjet has officially passed all certification tests. This involved: 

-Over 6,500 hours of gruelling real-world and lab testing completed.

-Extreme icing tests (ground rig at CIAM + in-flight over Arkhangelsk).

-150-hour endurance runs simulating years of heavy operation.

-Bird strike, water ingestion, and fan blade failure trials.

-Full hail cloud simulation.

-And dozens more brutal certification tests.

Russia is building its own future in civil aviation, completely independent of Western supply chains.

“Russia — a slower, but autonomous trajectory,” the report said. “In the long run, the second model gives a strategic advantage.”

Microchip factory

One of the lack of technology’s hardest tells is the weakness in Russia’s missile production: it is still heavily dependent on Western microelectronics for much of the guidance and control systems, but that is changing too.

In the first few years of the Ukraine war, 95% of the electronics in captured unexploded Russian missiles was Western-made, but last year a captured decoy drone was discovered that was almost totally made up of Chinese electronics. Chinese tech has also been making rapid progress. Likewise, during last year’s war with Israel, Iranian drones relied on the US-controlled GPS satellite network for guidance, making them vulnerable to Israeli electronic warfare (EW) countermeasures. This year, Iranian drones have changed over to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, negating Israel’s ability to spoof inbound drones that have been doing devastating damage as a result.

However, it seems that Russia is finally overcoming this hurdle too. Russia has just unveiled its first domestically produced photolithography machine, the Progress STP-350, in a move aimed at reducing dependence on foreign semiconductor equipment amid western sanctions.

The system is designed to manufacture 350 nanometre chips, a generation far behind the most advanced processors used in consumer electronics but one that remains relevant for military and industrial applications. Larger transistors are generally more durable and can operate in conditions that would damage cutting-edge chips.

Russian developers said the chips produced by the machine are resistant to radiation exposure, electromagnetic pulse attacks and extreme temperatures, making them suitable for defence systems, aerospace equipment and critical infrastructure. The components are also designed to withstand vibration and operate at higher voltages of up to 100V, capabilities valued in military hardware and heavy industry.

The launch reflects Moscow’s broader effort to localise semiconductor production after export controls imposed by the US and its allies restricted access to advanced chipmaking tools. Russia has struggled to develop domestic alternatives to highly specialised lithography systems, a market dominated globally by companies in the Netherlands, Japan and the US.

While the Progress STP-350 does not compete with the sub-10 nanometre technology used by leading global chipmakers, analysts say mature-node semiconductors remain strategically important because of their reliability and resilience in harsh operating environments.

These are very large chips compared to the 7nm chips used in today’s smart phones and highlight how far Russia remains in the microelectronics industry, but they are sufficient for use in missiles and many other consumer electronic goods production. By comparison, China is now capable of making 12nm chips and recently announced it was able to make commercially viable 7nm chips.

From cheese to turbines

Sanctions have sparked heavy investment into innovation that is starting to bear fruit. It all started with the famous complete disappearance of European cheese from Russian supermarket shelves after Russian President Vladimir Putin imposed tit-for-tat sanctions on EU agricultural goods in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea.

Cheese suffered from exactly the quality/cost problem, but as Russians were cut off from their favourite cheeses, one woman flew to Paris to buy the cheese moulds and started to produce Siberian camembert. Likewise, the patriotically named Koza Nostra firm began to produce very decent Russian goat cheese. (Koza is Russian for goat, so the company’s name roughly translates into “Our Goats”.) Within about two years after the sanctions were imposed, Russia had its own flourishing domestic cheese industry.

Closing the gap on gas turbines was an altogether more daunting task. German engineering firm Siemens had a total monopoly on high efficiency gas turbines during the upgrade of the Russian power sector during the boom years of the noughties. Russian technology couldn’t come anywhere close to Germany’s high precision engineering these turbines rely on as a result of the missing precision tool industry.

The Russian engineering giant Siloviye Mashiny (Power Machines), owned by sanctioned oligarch Alexey Mordashov, had a joint venture with Siemens and was trying to develop a domestic equivalent, but that effort was stymied after Siemens was reluctantly forced to withdraw from the Russian market.

However, as IntelliNews reported, last year specialists from the United Engine Corporation (UEC), part of the Rostec State Corporation, completed testing of the second prototype of the new AL-41ST-25 industrial gas turbine engine in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, that is almost as good as anything Siemens makes.

It also appears that there has been a technology transfer between Iran and Russia, which has been under a similar extreme sanctions regime for even longer than Russia and has likewise innovated. Last September Iran delivered high efficiency gas turbines to replace Russia’s Siemens gas turbines that were on a par with the German maker’s quality.

Military hardware

With military hardware, Russia has kept its Cold War edge in developing innovative weapons. Iran played a key role here too, as before the war in Ukraine started it was already a world leader in drone technology, sparked by reverse engineering a crashed US drone in its territory.

Following the invasion of Ukraine, Iran sold hundreds of millions of dollars worth of drones to Russia, but in 2025 there was a technology transfer deal between Moscow and Tehran and Russia built its own drone factory in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan. Since then Russia has taken drone technology forward with things like the new Geran-5 jet propelled drones. Some of these innovations have also been showing up on the battlefield in the Gulf war, suggesting the CRINK alliance (China, Russia, Iran and North Korea) are increasingly sharing military innovations with each other.

More generally, both Russia and China have run far ahead with a family of super weapons. Most importantly is the family of hypersonic missiles that can penetrate any US air defence and is a class of weapons America does not have yet. Since 2018, Putin has rolled out several more groundbreaking super weapons, including the Oreshnik cruise missile that can hit any capital in Europe, the “unstoppable” Poseidon nuclear torpedoes, which were just deployed last week, and most recently the super heavy Sarmat cruise missile, the biggest ever made that can hit any target on the planet. America and Europe are currently defenceless against all these weapons, experts say. At the same time, Russia has ramped up its drone production to over 7mn units a year, whereas the US cheap drone equivalent is still in its pilot development phase and Europe has no large-scale drone production at all.

The same thing happened in China 

During his trip to Beijing last week US President Donald Trump offered to reverse CHIPS, the Biden-era US ban on exporting top flight microchips to China, but Chinese President Xi Jinping refused the offer, as in the meantime, China has developed its own equivalents.

The CHIPS ban was supposed to stymie Chinese tech development and ensure that the US stayed at least one, if not two, generations ahead in the race. But according to a report by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the export controls backfired in spectacular fashion.

“The US has imposed export controls to deny China access to strategic technologies [but] we find no evidence of reshoring or friend-shoring. As a result of these disruptions, affected suppliers have negative abnormal stock returns, wiping out $130bn in market capitalisation, and experience a drop in bank lending, profitability, and employment. [US firms’] total number of customers declines, potentially inflicting collateral damage upon the same US firms whose technology export controls are trying to protect,” the report said.

What happened was the reverse: it forced a consolidation of a fragmented sector and a massive investment impulse that has seen Chinese technology race ahead and is now increasingly displacing the US from the lead in sector after sector, starting with green energy tech and EVs. China has gone from a net importer of technology to a net exporter in the last few years.

RT, 5/29/26

Russian President Vladimir Putin took questions from reporters during his trip to Kazakhstan on Friday, providing an update on the Ukraine conflict and tensions with NATO in Europe.

He also commented on the recent drone incident in Romania, which NATO blamed on Russia, and touched on foreign policy debates in Armenia, a former Soviet state and longtime Russian ally.

Russia has the upper hand on the battlefield

The Ukraine conflict is nearing the end as the Russian military continues its offensive on all fronts, Putin said, adding that it would be “unwise” to provide a specific timeline.

“The situation on the battlefield gives reason to believe that (the conflict) is drawing to a close.”

He went on to say that although Moscow maintains “certain contacts,” no peace talks are being held at the moment.

While the US has been preoccupied with the Iran conflict, some EU officials have begun floating the idea of resuming talks with Russia, which were suspended in 2022.

Western leaders must stop misleading their people

The president reiterated that Russia has no intention of attacking NATO or EU members, dismissing claims to the contrary as “brazen lies.” He reiterated Russia’s position that it was forced to intervene in Ukraine after Kiev failed to implement the 2014-15 Minsk accords with the breakaway Donbass republics, which later voted to become part of Russia.

Western leaders are using the conflict to justify “unreasonable” military spending hikes, Putin argued. “They should not mislead their own people.”

Aggressors will be razed to the ground

Putin warned, however, Russia has the capability to “raze to the ground” any country that attempts to attack it.

He was responding to Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kestutis Budrys, who said this month that, in the event of a conflict, NATO must demonstrate that it “can break into” Kaliningrad Region, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania.

He warned that Russia would treat all Ukrainian drone launch sites as legitimate targets, even if they operate from the Baltic states.

Romania should share data on drone incident

Putin called for an objective investigation into a drone strike on a residential building in the Romanian city of Galati near the Ukrainian border on Friday, which injured two people. Romania, along with its NATO allies, blamed Russia for the intrusion.

The president said Romania should provide objective data about the incident, just as Russia handed over decoded flight data from a Ukrainian drone shot down last year en route to one of Putin’s residences. He noted that suspected Ukrainian drones have veered into the Baltic states and Finland in recent months.

Western media outlets ‘making fools of’ their own audiences

Putin said the Western media is “a tool for making fools of people” that is used to channel more money into Ukraine. He blasted foreign news outlets for their failure to cover the Ukrainian drone strikes on a college in Starobelsk last week, which killed 21 students and injured more than 40 others.

“Not a single word was said about the tragedy in Starobelsk, where our children were deliberately killed. Not a single word, as though it never happened,” Putin said.

Moscow has criticized outlets including CNN and the BBC for declining an invitation to travel to Starobelsk.

Armenia’s economy will suffer if it cuts ties with Russia

Commenting on the upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia, Putin said the country’s drive for closer integration with the EU could eventually become incompatible with its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Leaving the EAEU would cost Armenia at least 14% of its GDP, he said.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who was recently endorsed by US President Donald Trump, said Armenia is not planning to terminate its membership in the EAEU at this stage, but that voters would ultimately decide between the two economic blocs.

Russia is Armenia’s largest trading partner and provides the country with discounted natural gas.

Advantages in AI technology

Russia is one of the few countries with the human capital and energy resources to develop its own sovereign artificial intelligence, Putin said.

“We have enormous capabilities in nuclear and hydroelectric power, particularly in Siberia,” he said, adding that Russia has “clear advantages” in the global AI race.

By Riley Waggaman, Substack, 5/12/26

It’s hard not to notice that Scott Ritter and Col. Douglas MacGregor have made a lot of predictions throughout this war that have not panned out. I think both are speaking in good faith but obviously they need to be read and listened to with discernment just like any other source. – Natylie

Riley Waggaman is a journalist who lives in Russia.

On February 20, 2026, a “Flamingo” long-range cruise missile hit the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, a defense enterprise located in Russia’s Udmurt Republic—more than 1300 km from the border with Ukraine.

Moscow has very clear protocols for responding to these types of attacks: Russian state media publishes a comment from Scott Ritter about how it’s not a big deal and Ukraine is about to collapse anyway.

For example, when Ukraine began using US-supplied ATACMS missiles in 2024, Ritter proclaimed that “there [was] no magic weapon” that could prevent a decisive Russian victory.

“We are looking at the beginning of the collapse [in Ukraine],” TASS quoted Ritter as saying two years ago.

But something was different about this Flamingo strike…something was off.

The intern imprisoned in TASS’ basement and forced against his will to watch “Judging Freedom” in search of juicy Ritter soundbites, found… nothing. Not one soothing or even slightly reassuring word from Scott Ritter about a Ukrainian (British, really) cruise missile hitting a critically important defense enterprise situated 1300 km from the Ukrainian border. Unthinkable! the intern thought to himself. The intern knew that when his editors found out they would chain him to his computer and force him to watch Colonel MacGregor interviews. He lowered his head, a single tear trickling down his cheek.

Yes, it’s difficult to believe, but in a sharp departure from his weekly forecasts about Moscow’s soon-to-be total victory in Ukraine, Scott Ritter wrote, two days after the attack on the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, that Kiev was “develop[ing] the military capacity to strike Russia’s strategic interior in an effort to pressure Russia into ending the conflict on terms less than those previously set forth by President Putin”.

He continued:

If the Russian-Ukrainian conflict ends on such terms, then Russia will have conceded the very thing it said was a red line back in December 2021—the deployment of NATO-affiliated intermediate-range missiles on the soil of Ukraine.

It will represent a strategic defeat for Russia in every sense of the term.

What does Ritter mean by all this?

In December 2021, Moscow presented a list of security demands to NATO, including a prohibition on the “deployment of medium- and shorter-range ground-based missiles in areas from which they are capable of hitting targets on the territory of other Participants”.

This was not a polite request to NATO, but an ultimatum. The Russian government warned of “military-technical measures” should the trans-Atlantic alliance reject the proposed treaty (spoiler alert: NATO rejected the treaty). Russia launched its “special military operation” to “demilitarize” Ukraine two months later, in February 2022.

Ritter actually understated the importance of the missile deployment issue for Moscow: it was much more than just a “red line”. A red line triggers a response when crossed. (Not in the Not-War, of course. But we’ll return to this topic later.)

Among other objectives, the SMO was supposed to preempt the possibility of NATO deploying missiles in Ukraine. Unfortunately, after more than four years of appalling Slav-culling, the SMO has achieved the total opposite result. The missiles that have been deployed in Ukraine are not just “capable” of hitting targets inside Russia, but are in fact hitting targets inside Russia.

Naturally, it would be rather unfortunate if the SMO ultimately achieves what it was supposed to prevent. Currently we are heading in this direction. This is what Scott Ritter means when he writes ominously of “strategic failure” in Ukraine.

In fairness, “demilitarization” is an ongoing process—one that might take another 4+ years of thorough and methodical snail offensives. The battle for tiny hamlets in preparation for a frontal assault on Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast (located 70 km from Donetsk city—only a short walk to Zelensky’s HQ in Kiev) remains fluid and highly dynamic. Advances of several hundred meters could occur at any moment.

Also, let’s not forget that nearly three months have passed since Ritter warned that continuing to allow Ukraine to lob cruise missiles at Russia could lead to strategic defeat for Moscow. A lot can change in three months. We need a more up-to-date SITREP.

Gazeta.ru reported on May 5:

In Chuvashia, a Ukrainian Armed Forces attack killed two people, and the number of injured rose to 34. Twenty-eight apartment buildings were damaged in the city, and one business was also hit. A state of emergency was declared in the republic. The Investigative Committee has opened a terrorism investigation. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed that Flamingo cruise missiles were used in the attack on Chuvashia.

Hours later, the Russian government confirmed that Chuvashia—located approximately 1200 km from the Ukrainian border—had been targeted by cruise missiles.

The situation has not improved since Ritter penned “The Flamingo Effect” on February 22. If anything, the threat of long-range Ukrainian (NATO) missile attacks has become part of the new normal in Russia, alongside mobile internet shutdowns and “falling drone debris” somehow capable of turning oil refineries into ash.

Speaking of “drone debris”…

Although the Flamingo represents “a tangible demonstration that the deep Russian rear is no longer invulnerable” (source: Russian Z-patriot news portal Military Review), the low-accuracy, relatively high-cost missile does not currently represent the greatest threat to “mainland” Russia: this dubious distinction goes to drones. Russia is being swarmed with drones.

Drones are hitting Belgorod. They’re hitting Kursk. They’re hitting Crimea.

They’re blowing up ports, refineries, and critical infrastructure from the Baltic to the Black Seas. From Ust-Luga to Novorossiysk. The oil refinery in Tuapse was hit multiple times, resulting in a days-long inferno that caused oil to rain from the sky. Samara, Rostov-on-Don, Yaroslavl….PERM (which also reported “oil rain” after being attacked).

As I type this article, at this very moment, Perm is bracing for another drone attack.

What to do? Ritter explored this prickly conundrum three months ago:

Russia is at a crossroads.

In the short term, Russia needs to find a solution to the Flamingo threat to Votkinsk and other strategic defense industries located in the Ural regions that are now under threat of attack (a solid rocket motor production facility in Perm, for example). Given the role played by Europe in designing, funding, and manufacturing the Flamingo, a response limited to striking targets inside Ukraine would achieve no fundamental change.

Missiles would still be built, and these missiles would continue to be launched at strategic targets deep inside Russia.

If Europe is not deterred once and for all from delivering this kind of military assistance to Ukraine, then Russia will be at risk of dying a death by a thousand cuts.

Ritter then insinuates that the Russian government is considering the use of tactical nukes. It’s not exactly clear if he thinks tactical nukes might be used against Ukraine, or its European sponsors, or both.

Instead of nuking Europe, Russia resumed oil supplies to NATO states via the Druzhba pipeline in April.

Ritter was close. At least he got the “Europe” part right?

Ritter wants you to believe that Moscow, which provided NATO with gas from a pumping station in Kursk Oblast OCCUPIED BY THE UKRAINIAN MILITARY, would all of a sudden decide to NUKE Europe.

He’s honestly just the inverse of the clowns on CNN: both scream about how Putin wants to nuke all the gay people. NO! Putin wants to give the gay people gas. As much gas as they want, and at a generous discount! THIS IS FACT.

I feel obliged to mention that Ritter’s 4-year grift-narrative about the Brilliant War of Attrition That Has Murdered Hundreds of Thousands of Ordinary Slavs For No Good Reason Whatsoever makes absolutely zero sense if Ritter is now acknowledging that the long-term threat posed by Ukraine’s rapidly developing military capabilities means Moscow might need to drop a tactical nuke on London if it wants to avoid “dying to a death of a thousand cuts”.

The longer the war goes on, the better—right?

Four more years.