From Russian Foreign Ministry website, 2/17/22. English translation via Google Translate.

MEDIA RELEASE

February 17 this year US Ambassador John Sullivan, invited to the Russian Foreign Ministry, was given the following reaction to the previously received American response on the Russian draft treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on security guarantees:

“ – General characteristics.

We state that the American side did not give a constructive response to the basic elements of the draft treaty with the United States prepared by the Russian side on security guarantees. We are talking about the rejection of further NATO expansion, the withdrawal of the “Bucharest formula” that “Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members”, and the rejection of the creation of military bases on the territory of states that were previously part of the USSR and are not members of the Alliance, including the use of their infrastructure for conducting any military activity, as well as the return of military capabilities, including strike capabilities, and NATO infrastructure to the state1997., when the Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed. These provisions are of fundamental importance for the Russian Federation.

The package nature of Russian proposals was ignored, from which “convenient” topics were deliberately chosen, which, in turn, were “twisted” in the direction of creating advantages for the United States and its allies. This approach, as well as the accompanying rhetoric from US officials, reinforces legitimate doubts that Washington is truly committed to fixing the European security situation.

The increasing US and NATO military activity close to Russian borders is alarming, while our red lines and core security interests, as well as Russia’s sovereign right to protect them, continue to be ignored. Ultimate demands to withdraw troops from certain areas on Russian territory, accompanied by threats of tougher sanctions, are unacceptable and undermine the prospects for reaching real agreements.

In the absence of the readiness of the American side to agree on firm, legally binding guarantees to ensure our security from the United States and its allies, Russia will be forced to respond, including through the implementation of military-technical measures.

– In Ukraine.

There is no “Russian invasion” of Ukraine, which the United States and its allies have been declaring at the official level since last fall, and is not planned, so statements about “Russia’s responsibility for the escalation” cannot be regarded otherwise than as an attempt to put pressure on and devalue Russia’s proposals for security guarantees.

Mention in this context of Russian obligations under the Budapest Memorandum1994. has nothing to do with the intra-Ukrainian conflict and does not apply to circumstances resulting from the action of internal factors there. The loss of territorial integrity by the Ukrainian state is the result of the processes that have taken place within it.

The accusations of Russia contained in the American response that it “occupied Crimea” also do not stand up to scrutiny. IN2014. A coup d’etat took place in Kiev, the initiators of which, with the support of the United States and its allies, headed for the creation of a nationalist state that infringes on the rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population, as well as other “non-titular” ethnic groups. It is not surprising that in such a situation, the Crimeans voted for reunification with Russia. The decision of the people of Crimea and Sevastopol to return to the Russian Federation was made by free will in the exercise of the right to self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter. No force or threat of force was used. The issue of Crimea’s belonging is closed.

If Ukraine is accepted into NATO, there will be a real threat that the regime in Kiev will try to “return” Crimea by force, drawing in the United States and its allies, in accordance with Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, into a direct armed conflict with Russia with all the ensuing consequences.

The thesis repeated in the US response that Russia allegedly “ignited the conflict in Donbass” is untenable. Its reasons are purely domestic in nature. The settlement is possible only through the implementation of the Minsk agreements and the “Package of Measures”, the priority and responsibility for the implementation of which are clearly defined and unanimously confirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 2202, including the United States, France and Great Britain. In paragraph 2 of this resolution, Kiev, Donetsk and Lugansk are named as parties. None of these documents mentions Russia’s responsibility for the conflict in Donbas. Russia, together with the OSCE, plays the role of a mediator in the main negotiating format – the Contact Group – and together with Berlin and Paris – in the Normandy format, which formulates recommendations to the parties to the conflict and monitors their implementation.

To de-escalate the situation around Ukraine, it is fundamentally important to take the following steps. This is forcing Kiev to comply with the “Package of Measures”, stopping the supply of weapons to Ukraine, withdrawing all Western advisers and instructors from there, refusing NATO countries from any joint exercises with the Armed Forces of Ukraine and withdrawing all foreign weapons previously delivered to Kiev outside Ukrainian territory.

In this regard, we draw attention to the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin at a press conference following the talks in Moscow with French President Empress Macron on February 72022. stressed that we are open to dialogue and urge “to think about stable security conditions for all, equal for all participants in international life.”

– Configuration of forces.

We note that in its response to the Russian proposals, the US insists that progress in improving the European security situation “can be achieved only in terms of de-escalation in relation to Russia’s threatening actions against Ukraine”, which, as we understand, implies the requirement withdrawal of Russian troops from the borders of Ukraine. At the same time, the United States is ready to talk only about “mutual obligations … to refrain from deploying permanently based forces with combat missions on the territory of Ukraine” and “to consider the possibility of discussing the problem of conventional armed forces.” As for the rest, the American side passes over in silence our proposals contained in sec. 2 Article 4 and para. 1 of Article 5 of the draft bilateral treaty and states that “the current configuration of US and NATO forces is limited,

We presume that the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on its territory does not and cannot affect the fundamental interests of the United States. We would like to remind you that there are no our forces on the territory of Ukraine.

At the same time, the United States and its allies were moving their military infrastructure to the east, deploying contingents in the territories of new members. They circumvented the CFE restrictions and rather loosely interpreted the provisions of the Russia-NATO Founding Act on the rejection of “additional permanent deployment of substantial combat forces.” The situation that has developed as a result of these actions is unacceptable. We insist on the withdrawal of all US armed forces and weapons deployed in CEE, SEE and the Baltics. We are convinced that the national potentials in these zones are quite sufficient. We are ready to discuss this topic on the basis of Articles 4 and 5 of the Russian draft treaty.

– The principle of indivisibility of security.

We did not see in the US response confirmation that the American side is fully committed to observing the immutable principle of the indivisibility of security. General statements about the consideration by the American side of this postulate directly contradict Washington’s unwillingness to abandon its counterproductive and destabilizing course of creating advantages for itself and its allies at the expense of Russia’s security interests. This is precisely what is happening as a result of the unrestrained implementation by the North Atlantic Alliance, with the leading role of the United States, of a policy of unrestricted geostrategic and military development of the post-Soviet space, including the territory of Ukraine, which is of a particularly sensitive nature for us. All this is happening directly on Russian borders. In this way, our red lines and core security interests are ignored and Russia’s inalienable right to provide them is denied. For us, this is, of course, unacceptable.

Additionally, we remind you that this principle is enshrined in the preamble to the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.2011., on the extension of which for 5 years without any exceptions the parties agreed in February last year, as well as in a number of OSCE and Russia-NATO basic documents adopted at the highest level: in the preamble of the Helsinki Final Act1975., in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe1990., Russia-NATO Founding Act1997., Istanbul Charter for European Security OSCE1999., Russia-NATO Rome Declaration2002. and the Astana Declaration of the OSCE Summit2010.

We note that the response received mentions Washington’s adherence to the concept of the indivisibility of security. But in the text it boils down to the right of states “to freely choose or change the methods of ensuring their security, including union treaties.” This freedom is not absolute and is only half of the well-known formula fixed in the Charter for European Security. Its second part requires, when exercising this right, not to “…strengthen one’s security at the expense of the security of other states.” We cannot consider the letter received from NATO dated February 10 of this year. as a response to the letter sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.V. Lavrov on January 282022. a message to US Secretary of State E. Blinken on this issue. We asked for a response in a national capacity.

– NATO’s “open door” policy.

The US reiterates its “strong support” for NATO’s “open door” policy. But it runs counter to the basic commitments made within the CSCE/OSCE, primarily the commitment “not to strengthen one’s security at the expense of the security of others.” This policy is not consistent with the guidelines of the alliance itself, which following the meeting of the NATO Foreign Minister on June 6-71991. in Copenhagen, he pledged “not to take unilateral advantages from the changed situation in Europe”, “not to threaten the legitimate interests” of other states, not to strive for their “isolation” or “drawing new dividing lines on the continent”.

We call on the United States and NATO to return to fulfilling their international obligations in the field of maintaining peace and security. We expect concrete proposals from the members of the alliance on the content and forms of legal consolidation of the renunciation of NATO’s further eastward expansion.

– Batch character of offers.

We note the readiness of the United States to work substantively on individual arms control and risk reduction measures. At the same time, they recorded that Washington had finally recognized the justification of a number of Russian proposals and initiatives in these areas that have been put forward in recent years.

At the same time, we once again draw the attention of the American side to the fact that Russia, in the documents we submitted on security guarantees, proposed to follow the path of a comprehensive long-term settlement of the unacceptable situation that continues to develop in the Euro-Atlantic region. First of all, we are talking about creating a stable foundation for a security architecture in the form of an agreement on NATO’s refusal to take further actions that harm Russia’s security. This remains a constant imperative for us. In the absence of such a strong foundation, interrelated arms control and military risk reduction measures that ensure restraint and predictability of military activity in separate areas, even if they can be agreed upon, will not be sustainable in the long term.

Thus, the Russian proposals are of a package nature and should be considered as a whole without singling out its individual components.

In this regard, we would like to focus on the lack of a constructive reaction from Washington and Brussels to the most important elements of the Russian initiative that we have clearly identified. As for arms control issues, we consider them exclusively in the general context of a comprehensive, package approach to resolving the problem of security guarantees.

– “Post START” and “security equation”.

The United States proposes “immediately” to engage in the development of “measures in the development of START” within the framework of the dialogue on strategic stability. However, at the same time, the American side is trying to fix an approach that has not been coordinated with us, which provides for focusing exclusively on nuclear weapons, regardless of the ability of certain weapons to pose a direct threat to the national territory of the other side. Such a one-sided view of things is contrary to the understandings reached at the Russian-American summit on June 162021. in Geneva on the comprehensive nature of the strategic dialogue to lay the foundation for future arms control and risk reduction measures.

Russia continues to advocate an integrated approach to strategic issues. We propose to engage in the joint development of a new “safety equation”.

A set of elements of the concept we propose, which remains fully relevant, was brought to the attention of the American side – incl. during the meetings within the framework of the strategic dialogue and in the2021. working paper for its completion.

– Deployment of nuclear weapons outside the national territory.

In its document, the United States did not react to such an element of the “package” of measures proposed by us as the withdrawal of nuclear weapons deployed outside its borders to the national territory and the refusal of their further deployment outside the national territory, and limited itself to mentioning the need to deal with the problem at the strategic dialogue platform. non-strategic nuclear weapons without taking into account the peculiarities of their deployment and other factors affecting the security of the parties.

We would like to clarify that our proposals are about solving the problem of the presence on the territory of some non-nuclear NATO states – in violation of the NPT – of US nuclear weapons that are capable of hitting targets on Russian territory. This would include the elimination of the infrastructure for the rapid deployment of such weapons in Europe, as well as the cessation of NATO training and exercises in the handling of these weapons, which involve non-nuclear NATO member states. Without removing this irritant, discussion of the topic of non-strategic nuclear weapons is impossible.

– Ground-based intermediate and shorter range missiles.

We regard this issue as one of the priority areas of the Russian-American dialogue on strategic stability. We believe that this category of weapons is a necessary component of the new “security equation” that should be worked out jointly by Russia and the United States.

We continue to proceed from the relevance of Russian initiatives in the field of “post-INF Treaty”, which are based on the idea of ​​reciprocal verifiable moratoriums on the deployment of ground-based INF Treaty in Europe. In principle, we are open to substantive consideration of the ways of its practical implementation. At the same time, we note the continuing uncertainty in Washington’s approaches to the main parameters of potential control measures over these weapons, primarily to their coverage, which should cover all weapons of the appropriate range in nuclear and non-nuclear equipment.

It was noted that the United States is taking the Russian approach as a basis, which provides for the mutual settlement of mutual concerns in the context of the previously existing INF Treaty. The version proposed by the American side for developing our idea of ​​mutual verification measures in relation to the Aegis Ashore complexes in Romania and Poland, as well as some facilities in the European part of Russia, can be further developed.

As emphasized in the statement of the President of Russia V.V. Putin dated October 262020. and subsequently brought to the attention of the US side on numerous occasions, potential transparency measures with respect to Russian facilities subject to agreement could include monitoring the absence of the Russian 9M729 missile there. We remind you that this step is a manifestation of goodwill, given that the characteristics of the 9M729 missile do not contradict the requirements of the former INF Treaty in any way, and that the United States has not provided any evidence that would confirm the accusations against Russia. At the same time, the American side ignored what we organized on January 23 during the period of this Treaty.2019. voluntary event to demonstrate the device and technical characteristics of the 9M729 rocket and its launcher.

– Heavy bombers and surface warships.

We note the attention of the American side to the Russian idea of ​​additional risk mitigation measures in relation to flights of heavy bombers near the national borders of the parties. We see a subject for discussion and the potential for mutually acceptable agreements. We remind you of an equally important element of our “package” proposal concerning similar cruises of combat surface ships, which also involve serious risks.

– Military exercises and maneuvers.

The United States did not respond to the proposals contained in sec. 2 Article 4 of the Russian draft treaty. The American side, apparently, proceeds from the fact that it is possible to reduce tension in the military sphere by increasing transparency and additional measures to reduce the danger in line with the proposals of the West to modernize the Vienna Document.

We consider such an approach to be unrealistic and one-sided, aimed at “seeing through” the activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Confidence- and security-building measures under the Vienna Document2011. appropriate for today’s environment. To start discussing the possibility of updating them, the necessary conditions must be created. And for this, the United States and its allies should abandon the policy of “containment” of Russia and take concrete practical measures to de-escalate the military-political situation, including in line with para. 2 Article 4 of our draft treaty.

As regards the prevention of incidents on the high seas and in the airspace above it, we welcome the readiness of the United States for appropriate consultations. However, this work cannot replace the settlement of the key problems posed by Russia.

In the midst of increasing ceasefire violations and reports of conflicting responsibility for the shelling of a kindergarten in Stanytsia Luganska, leaders of the rebel republics of the Donbas have reportedly begun evacuating women, children and the elderly to the Rostov region of Russia.

On February 18th, Yaşar Halit Çevik, Chief Monitor to the OSCE’s Permanent Council stated that the current period of increased violations along the contact line had followed a 60% reduction in violations “in the month following 22 December 2021, when the Trilateral Contact Group participants expressed their determination to adhere to the ceasefire.” On the same day, the Ukraine SMM reported hundreds of explosions in both rebel territories, including 177 explosions “close to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska” and was following up on reports of damage to a kindergarten school in the area.

According to reporting by AFP:

On Thursday, a shell punched a hole in the wall of a kindergarten in government-held territory near the frontline in the Ukrainian village of Stanytsia Luganska.

The 20 children and 18 adults inside escaped serious injury but the attack sparked international howls of protest.

“The children were eating breakfast when it hit,” school laundry worker Natalia Slesareva told AFP at the scene.

“It hit the gym. After breakfast, the children had gym class. So, another 15 minutes, and everything could have been much, much worse.”

On Friday, part of the village remained without electricity. Konstantin Reutsky, director of the Vostok SOS aid agency, told AFP that houses and a shop had been damaged. 

The Ukrainian joint command center said the rebels had violated the ceasefire 45 times between midnight and 2:00 p.m. Friday, while the Donetsk and Lugansk separatist groups said the army had fired 27 times in the morning.

Russia’s TASS news agency reported this morning that the first 80 civilians from the Donbas had arrived at a health care center that had been converted to a temporary “accommodation” facility in Rostov where “f]ollowing instructions from Russian President Vladimir Putin, each refugee arriving in the region will receive 10,000 rubles (about $130).” According to the LPR Minister of Emergency Situations, Yevgeny Katsavalov, about 25,000 residents had left the LPR for Rostov by car and 10,000 were set to follow by organized convoy.

Likewise, thousands are reportedly in the midst of being evacuated from the DPR to Russia:

The DPR authorities are expecting to evacuate hundreds of thousands of people from the most vulnerable categories of its population from all of its districts to Russia’s Rostov region, a source with the DPR parliament told Interfax.

According to Antiwar.com:

Shortly after [DPR leader] Pushilin’s announcement [of evacuations], a car bomb exploded near the headquarters of the Donetsk People’s Republic, one of two major separatist break-off states in eastern Ukraine. The attack targeted Donetsk’s head of security. No injuries were reported in the attack, but the official’s vehicle was destroyed.

While there was some speculation the car bomb could be the trigger for a Russian invasion, Ukrainian officials continue to downplay the threat. Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov told his country’s parliament on Friday that “We estimate the probability of a large-scale escalation as low,” adding “Our intelligence sees every move that could pose a potential threat to Ukraine.”

Some analysts have suggested that if evacuees from the Donbas remain in Russia – many of them already have Russian citizenship – then it could be a boon for Russia’s demographic crisis and would be a way of assisting the Donbas residents that couldn’t be rationally characterized as “aggression” by the west.

By Natylie Baldwin, Antiwar.com, 2/16/22

The Soviet Union voluntarily agreed to negotiate an end to the Cold War with the US-led West in the late 1980’s and to bring its troops home from Europe. Shortly afterwards, the Russians threw off Communism and opened themselves up to what they hoped would be integration with the West. Polls and interviews with Russians during this period demonstrate that they had good will toward Americans, loved American culture, and admired American innovation and openness.

What did the Russians get in return?

Economic Exploitation of the 1990’s

First, US-led western financial institutions and advisers encouraged a Shock Therapy economic program on the country. This included leveraging needed debt relief and foreign aid. There was also an influx of carpetbaggers from fancy schools and think tanks in the U.S. who helped create or encouraged exploitative projects like the voucher program and the Loans for Shares grift that facilitated and legitimized the acquisition of major Soviet assets for a small group of ethically-challenged members of the nomenklatura and illicit businessmen. Within a year after Shock Therapy was implemented in early 1992, millions of Russians had been driven into poverty with life savings wiped out and salaries and pensions not being paid for months at a time. Corrupt members of the police and security services, along with black market profiteers, created organized crime enterprises that targeted Russian entrepreneurs by charging protection money under threat of violence and property destruction.

By 1994-95, Russia was experiencing a mortality crisis not seen since WWII, with an estimated million men dying from what we now refer to as diseases of despair: alcoholism, suicide, homicide, and heart attacks. Women were often forced to sell whatever they had, from cigarettes to dishes to their bodies, in an effort to provide for themselves and their families.

Yeltsin’s Authoritarianism

These economically exploitative programs were made possible by the leadership of Boris Yeltsin. Mikhail Gorbachev, for all the faults attributed to him by Russians, did not want to impose Shock Therapy. Instead, he wanted to pursue something similar to the Scandinavian model: free markets with a robust set of social programs and public ownership of certain key industries. However, he didn’t seem to have a good plan for how to realistically achieve his vision. Moreover, he was confronted with US-led financial institutions who would not grant him debt relief or significant financial aid without enacting a set of painful neoliberal economic policies that he knew Russians would not support.

Yeltsin, an ambitious rival of Gorbachev’s, had no such qualms about enacting these reforms when he was able to do so. Yeltsin’s prime minister, Yegor Gaidar, removed price controls within months after the Soviet Union was effectively dissolved and Gorbachev’s leadership had been supplanted. This affected the vast majority of both wholesale and retail goods and resulted in an inflation rate of 2500% by the end of 1992, resulting in mass poverty and hunger. In summer of 1992, Yeltsin’s deputy prime minister, Anatoly Chubais got to work on a privatization plan, a scheme by which each Russian was supposed to get a share worth about 10,000 rubles that would represent a percentage of ownership stake in major Soviet assets. Most of the shares were ultimately bought up by factory managers and black market operatives.

By September of 1993, Yeltsin had been ruling by decree – with the permission of parliament – for about a year under the guise of fixing economic problems. Parliament wanted to rescind that power and to roll back the Shock Therapy policies. Consequently, Yeltsin tried to dissolve parliament and parliamentarians threatened to impeach him for abuse of power. After the constitutional court ruled against Yeltsin’s actions, Yeltsin ordered riot police to surround the parliament building (then known as the White House) and had utilities cut. For about 2 weeks, thousands of peaceful protesters filled the streets trying to break the blockade. Yeltsin advisors thought early elections to break the standoff would be too risky due to the Polish having just voted out politicians who’d imposed a Shock Therapy program on them. On October 3, tanks were sent in to shell the parliament building after police fired on a crowd of protesters who’d entered a television station. The death toll is estimated between 187 and 2000 with hundreds more injured. Yeltsin then suspended the existing constitution.

In order to prevent any future such challenge to presidential power, Yeltsin engineered the design of a constitution with a defanged parliament that would essentially serve as a rubber stamp for the president’s prerogatives. The Clinton administration and US media at the time depicted the attack on parliament as a win for democracy and they had no complaints about the resulting Russian constitution that effectively eliminated checks and balances.

Not until Putin came to power, that is. For all of the west’s complaints about Putin’s authoritarianism, he inherited the political framework set by Yeltsin and has been able to use it to further the agenda he sets.

NATO Expansion: Russia’s Security Concerns Ignored

“Combined with claiming “victory” in the Cold War expanding NATO suggested to the Russian public that throwing off communism and breaking up the Soviet Union had probably been a bad idea. Instead of getting credit for voluntarily joining the West, they were being treated as if they had been defeated and were not worthy to be allies.” – Jack Matlock

By 1990, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had voluntarily withdrawn over 400,000 troops from Central and Eastern Europe. He had declined to use force to suppress independence movements in various Soviet republics and negotiated an end to the Cold War with U.S. president Ronald Reagan. By spring of 1991, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. This represented an historical rarity for an empire – not that it ceased to exist, but that it peacefully accepted that its moment of major dominance had run its course.

With this turn of events, it makes sense that a new security architecture could have been negotiated that would have taken into account the interests of all of Europe. This would have sought balance between Russia’s need for a buffer against invasion from its west (as it had experienced numerous times in its past, including the Nazi attack that resulted in 27 million deaths) and the Eastern European countries that had historically feared Russian domination. Furthermore, it was believed by some with more foresight at the time that the best way to encourage Russia’s development as a democracy and for peaceful coexistence on the continent was to gradually integrate Russia into the West rather than continue to treat it as an eternal enemy. That included the leadership of France and Germany. This view would later be echoed by George Kennan in his criticisms of proposed NATO expansion several years later:

“[E]xpanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.”

There is even some evidence that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe did not necessarily see Russia as an eternal enemy. By the mid-90’s, Polish Defense Minister, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, had stated that the motivation to join NATO was to suppress nationalist threats and “not to defend against a Russian attack. We see that attack as a virtual impossibility.” Certainly, another way could have been found to allay nationalist concerns for Poland.

Similarly, a 1993 statement drawn up by the administration of the first Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk, indicates that Russia was not then viewed as a military threat and that a measured and non-confrontational approach would be in the best interests of Ukraine:

“A non-confrontational strategy concerning Russia is warranted still more by the domestic circumstances of Ukraine….Ukraine’s national security is not threatened by Russian military expansion, but by Russia’s potential use of social, cultural and psychological means….The contradictions and dynamics in Russian-Ukrainian relations are similar to those when you try to separate two Siamese twins…..Neither Ukraine’s security nor favorable conditions for her development as a nation are possible without deep and sincere neighborly relations with Russia.”

This point that Russia was not automatically assumed to be a military threat is buttressed by the fact that the Central and Eastern European nations, including Poland and the Czech Republic, had all decreased their defense budgets, shortened terms of military conscription, and disbanded many of their army divisions by 1995.

Might there have been fears that in the future Russia could have become a problem for them again? Yes, but it’s hard to believe that it wasn’t possible to muster the diplomatic skill to forge a security arrangement that would have created a more stable European environment while balancing interests. This is especially true if the US had chosen to use the massive influence and resources it had at the time to do just that.

As Matlock has stated, based on his experience behind the scenes after the Cold War ended: “There was no need to expand NATO to ensure the security of the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe. There were other ways those countries could have been reassured and protected without seeming to re-divide Europe to Russia’s disadvantage.”

Despite the attempts to re-brand NATO by those who benefited from its continued existence, the military alliance did not appear to Russia as a benign institution just facilitating peace and democracy for the rest of Europe. With NATO’s purpose of defending Western Europe from the Soviet Union having ended after the Cold War concluded, the US defense industry began a strong lobbying effort to expand the alliance. This effort was particularly intense between 1996 and 1998. One of the primary organizations pushing for NATO expansion was the aptly named Committee to Expand NATO, led by an executive of Lockheed Martin, Bruce Jackson. Jackson co-founded the organization with Ronald Asmus, a former Rand analyst who worked with the future leadership of several of the Central and Eastern European states that would later become new NATO members. Asmus became known as the intellectual architect behind the idea of NATO enlargement and how to frame it in a publicly acceptable way – i.e. that the alliance was spreading peace and democracy. Interestingly, the Committee’s board membership during its active years reads like a neoconservative all-star list: Robert Kagan, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Stephen Hadley, Condoleezza Rice, and John McCain. But Democratic hawks were also deeply involved in the group and its mission, including Zbigniew Brzezinski disciple Madeleine Albright, a Czech-American.

The Committee regularly wined and dined US senators as well as politicians from Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, in addition to conducting free “defense planning seminars.” Maps used during these presentations to the Poles reportedly showed arrows pointing from Russia as the origin of a hypothetical attack, playing to historical fears.

They also coordinated their lobbying efforts with the Hungarian American Foundation and the Polish American Congress (PAC). PAC, an ethnic lobbying group, actually called for Poland’s entry into NATO at their National Directors meeting in June 1991, six months before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Three months later, they also called for the entry of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. One of PAC’s most prominent members and a major advocate of NATO expansion was Jan Nowak, who had worked for years for the CIA-funded Radio Free Europe. He then went on to serve as an advisor to the Carter administration, which included his friend Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Polish-American national security advisor who harbored a deep antipathy toward Russia.

Many in the Clinton administration were initially reticent to push for NATO expansion. But the 1994 mid-term elections saw the Republicans take control of Congress and they used the administration’s caution to argue that the Democrats weren’t serious about an enlargement commitment and were too quick to appease Russia. NATO enlargement became one of the few foreign policy provisions of the Republicans’ Contract with America, calling on the U.S. to reaffirm its commitment to include the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe into the alliance. It also contained a specific goal for the entry of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO by January 1999.

Those three countries would be welcomed into the alliance in 1999, despite warnings to Clinton by some experienced diplomats and foreign policy experts. A second round in 2004 under the Bush II administration, known as “the big bang” by lobbyists, consisted of seven new members: Bulgaria Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia on Russia’s border. A third round brought in Croatia and Albania five years later.

By 2009, not only had NATO greatly expanded in terms of membership by twelve new nations in Central and Eastern Europe – along with a public promise to include Georgia and Ukraine in the future, its mandate had also expanded to include peacekeeping, international policing, and counterterrorism activities.

In the meantime, the Russian leadership had begun expressing its concerns about what it saw as increasing threats to its security. Putin had complained at the Munich Security Conference of 2007 about the negative ramifications of the current international order that was driven not by international law or balance of interests but by the interests of one superpower nation. He specifically mentioned NATO’s expanded mandate as well as the nature of the enlargement of its membership. He asserted that the obvious conclusion to be drawn from NATO’s post-Cold War actions was that it was against Russia.

Subsequently, at conferences where he had an audience with western media, Putin also explained his grave concerns about the security implications of the US withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and the emplacement of missiles that have offensive capabilities in Romania and Poland. For example, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June of 2016, Putin stated:

“There’s no [nuclear] threat [from Iran], and the missile defense system [in Europe] is still being built, so we were right when we said they are deceiving us, they are not sincere with us referring to the alleged Iranian nuclear threat during the construction of the missile defense system….We know approximately which year the Americans will get a new missile that will have a range of not 500 kilometers but more, and from that moment they will start threatening our nuclear potential. We know what will be going on by years. And they know that we know…. People feel no danger and that is alarming for me. Can we see that we are dragging the world into an utterly new dimension….I don’t know where it [the deployment of the US missile defense system in Europe] might lead to but I know for sure that we will have to answer….[and Russia] will again be accused of aggressive behavior, although it is just an answer.”

The Russian leadership has proposed several times to negotiate a mutually agreeable solution to these problems. Most notably, in 2008, Putin ordered the Russian Foreign Ministry to draft a proposal that Dmitry Medvedev took to Brussels, outlining a security plan that would cover all of the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, obviating the need for NATO’s continued existence, much less its expansion.  That, along with its other past proposals, had been rejected or ignored.

It should be noted that since it began enlargement, NATO has never publicly acknowledged that Russia has any legitimate security concerns, much less specifying what they might be.

Conclusion

Any country that had been economically exploited by outsiders, lost its independence, and was not allowed to have its own security interests recognized would have taken the opportunity, when possible, to regain its sovereignty and defend its security interests. That should have been totally predictable to anyone who had an ounce of knowledge of geopolitical history or a basic understanding of human psychology. The fact that it was Putin who engineered this turnaround – insisting on economic and security arrangements that are not at Russia’s expense and bolstering its ability to back them up – is what has made him the super-demon depicted by the US political class, not because he meets any objective criteria for being overly aggressive or illiberal compared to other leaders approved of or tolerated by the US.

We can’t know for certain whether a more inclusive approach would have led to a better outcome, but one thing we can say is that the approach that was in fact taken by the post-Cold War West – and has been doubled down on in the face of numerous Russian complaints over the years – turned out to be an excellent blueprint for creating the resentment and backlash by the Russian leadership that we’re currently confronted with.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken gave a speech before the U.N. Security Council this morning about the current tensions regarding Ukraine and Russia. After bombarding the world with assertions of false flag attacks and an imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine – even offering dates – that never materialized, the Biden administration has decided to double down, with Blinken claiming that Russia could invade Ukraine “at any time” and “in coming days.”

Blinken also mentioned the need to protect national sovereignty. That’s right, the nation that bombed Yugoslavia and invaded Iraq without UN sanction and violated its UN mandate to facilitate regime change in Libya suddenly wants to bust out their harmonica and sing us all a sad song about the inviolability of national sovereignty.

Blinken has set up his story so that if Ukrainian forces were to attack the Donbas – if this happened it would likely be forces not directly under Zelensky’s control as he certainly realizes by now that it’s not in his interest to invite a Russian military attack – any Russian military assistance to the Donbas would be framed as aggression based on Russia lying or having executed a false flag. Blinken even frames any attempts by Russia under those circumstances to attempt diplomatic action, by calling meetings of the UN Security Council, as “insincere.”

As is customary for the US government in the post-Cold War era, no evidence was presented to back up any of this. After babies in incubators, WMD’s, Viagra-pumped Qaddafi mass rape forces, and moderate rebels in Syria, we’re supposed to just take all of this on faith.

Of course, if none of this comes to pass in the next couple of weeks, Biden can go into his State of the Union and into the mid-term election season with a political win by claiming that he stared down Putin and Putin blinked.

The Biden administration obviously thinks they’re being clever with this stunt, but they sure aren’t being wise.