From Russian Foreign Ministry website, 2/17/22. English translation via Google Translate.

MEDIA RELEASE

February 17 this year US Ambassador John Sullivan, invited to the Russian Foreign Ministry, was given the following reaction to the previously received American response on the Russian draft treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on security guarantees:

“ – General characteristics.

We state that the American side did not give a constructive response to the basic elements of the draft treaty with the United States prepared by the Russian side on security guarantees. We are talking about the rejection of further NATO expansion, the withdrawal of the “Bucharest formula” that “Ukraine and Georgia will become NATO members”, and the rejection of the creation of military bases on the territory of states that were previously part of the USSR and are not members of the Alliance, including the use of their infrastructure for conducting any military activity, as well as the return of military capabilities, including strike capabilities, and NATO infrastructure to the state1997., when the Russia-NATO Founding Act was signed. These provisions are of fundamental importance for the Russian Federation.

The package nature of Russian proposals was ignored, from which “convenient” topics were deliberately chosen, which, in turn, were “twisted” in the direction of creating advantages for the United States and its allies. This approach, as well as the accompanying rhetoric from US officials, reinforces legitimate doubts that Washington is truly committed to fixing the European security situation.

The increasing US and NATO military activity close to Russian borders is alarming, while our red lines and core security interests, as well as Russia’s sovereign right to protect them, continue to be ignored. Ultimate demands to withdraw troops from certain areas on Russian territory, accompanied by threats of tougher sanctions, are unacceptable and undermine the prospects for reaching real agreements.

In the absence of the readiness of the American side to agree on firm, legally binding guarantees to ensure our security from the United States and its allies, Russia will be forced to respond, including through the implementation of military-technical measures.

– In Ukraine.

There is no “Russian invasion” of Ukraine, which the United States and its allies have been declaring at the official level since last fall, and is not planned, so statements about “Russia’s responsibility for the escalation” cannot be regarded otherwise than as an attempt to put pressure on and devalue Russia’s proposals for security guarantees.

Mention in this context of Russian obligations under the Budapest Memorandum1994. has nothing to do with the intra-Ukrainian conflict and does not apply to circumstances resulting from the action of internal factors there. The loss of territorial integrity by the Ukrainian state is the result of the processes that have taken place within it.

The accusations of Russia contained in the American response that it “occupied Crimea” also do not stand up to scrutiny. IN2014. A coup d’etat took place in Kiev, the initiators of which, with the support of the United States and its allies, headed for the creation of a nationalist state that infringes on the rights of the Russian and Russian-speaking population, as well as other “non-titular” ethnic groups. It is not surprising that in such a situation, the Crimeans voted for reunification with Russia. The decision of the people of Crimea and Sevastopol to return to the Russian Federation was made by free will in the exercise of the right to self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter. No force or threat of force was used. The issue of Crimea’s belonging is closed.

If Ukraine is accepted into NATO, there will be a real threat that the regime in Kiev will try to “return” Crimea by force, drawing in the United States and its allies, in accordance with Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty, into a direct armed conflict with Russia with all the ensuing consequences.

The thesis repeated in the US response that Russia allegedly “ignited the conflict in Donbass” is untenable. Its reasons are purely domestic in nature. The settlement is possible only through the implementation of the Minsk agreements and the “Package of Measures”, the priority and responsibility for the implementation of which are clearly defined and unanimously confirmed by UN Security Council Resolution 2202, including the United States, France and Great Britain. In paragraph 2 of this resolution, Kiev, Donetsk and Lugansk are named as parties. None of these documents mentions Russia’s responsibility for the conflict in Donbas. Russia, together with the OSCE, plays the role of a mediator in the main negotiating format – the Contact Group – and together with Berlin and Paris – in the Normandy format, which formulates recommendations to the parties to the conflict and monitors their implementation.

To de-escalate the situation around Ukraine, it is fundamentally important to take the following steps. This is forcing Kiev to comply with the “Package of Measures”, stopping the supply of weapons to Ukraine, withdrawing all Western advisers and instructors from there, refusing NATO countries from any joint exercises with the Armed Forces of Ukraine and withdrawing all foreign weapons previously delivered to Kiev outside Ukrainian territory.

In this regard, we draw attention to the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin at a press conference following the talks in Moscow with French President Empress Macron on February 72022. stressed that we are open to dialogue and urge “to think about stable security conditions for all, equal for all participants in international life.”

– Configuration of forces.

We note that in its response to the Russian proposals, the US insists that progress in improving the European security situation “can be achieved only in terms of de-escalation in relation to Russia’s threatening actions against Ukraine”, which, as we understand, implies the requirement withdrawal of Russian troops from the borders of Ukraine. At the same time, the United States is ready to talk only about “mutual obligations … to refrain from deploying permanently based forces with combat missions on the territory of Ukraine” and “to consider the possibility of discussing the problem of conventional armed forces.” As for the rest, the American side passes over in silence our proposals contained in sec. 2 Article 4 and para. 1 of Article 5 of the draft bilateral treaty and states that “the current configuration of US and NATO forces is limited,

We presume that the deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on its territory does not and cannot affect the fundamental interests of the United States. We would like to remind you that there are no our forces on the territory of Ukraine.

At the same time, the United States and its allies were moving their military infrastructure to the east, deploying contingents in the territories of new members. They circumvented the CFE restrictions and rather loosely interpreted the provisions of the Russia-NATO Founding Act on the rejection of “additional permanent deployment of substantial combat forces.” The situation that has developed as a result of these actions is unacceptable. We insist on the withdrawal of all US armed forces and weapons deployed in CEE, SEE and the Baltics. We are convinced that the national potentials in these zones are quite sufficient. We are ready to discuss this topic on the basis of Articles 4 and 5 of the Russian draft treaty.

– The principle of indivisibility of security.

We did not see in the US response confirmation that the American side is fully committed to observing the immutable principle of the indivisibility of security. General statements about the consideration by the American side of this postulate directly contradict Washington’s unwillingness to abandon its counterproductive and destabilizing course of creating advantages for itself and its allies at the expense of Russia’s security interests. This is precisely what is happening as a result of the unrestrained implementation by the North Atlantic Alliance, with the leading role of the United States, of a policy of unrestricted geostrategic and military development of the post-Soviet space, including the territory of Ukraine, which is of a particularly sensitive nature for us. All this is happening directly on Russian borders. In this way, our red lines and core security interests are ignored and Russia’s inalienable right to provide them is denied. For us, this is, of course, unacceptable.

Additionally, we remind you that this principle is enshrined in the preamble to the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.2011., on the extension of which for 5 years without any exceptions the parties agreed in February last year, as well as in a number of OSCE and Russia-NATO basic documents adopted at the highest level: in the preamble of the Helsinki Final Act1975., in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe1990., Russia-NATO Founding Act1997., Istanbul Charter for European Security OSCE1999., Russia-NATO Rome Declaration2002. and the Astana Declaration of the OSCE Summit2010.

We note that the response received mentions Washington’s adherence to the concept of the indivisibility of security. But in the text it boils down to the right of states “to freely choose or change the methods of ensuring their security, including union treaties.” This freedom is not absolute and is only half of the well-known formula fixed in the Charter for European Security. Its second part requires, when exercising this right, not to “…strengthen one’s security at the expense of the security of other states.” We cannot consider the letter received from NATO dated February 10 of this year. as a response to the letter sent by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.V. Lavrov on January 282022. a message to US Secretary of State E. Blinken on this issue. We asked for a response in a national capacity.

– NATO’s “open door” policy.

The US reiterates its “strong support” for NATO’s “open door” policy. But it runs counter to the basic commitments made within the CSCE/OSCE, primarily the commitment “not to strengthen one’s security at the expense of the security of others.” This policy is not consistent with the guidelines of the alliance itself, which following the meeting of the NATO Foreign Minister on June 6-71991. in Copenhagen, he pledged “not to take unilateral advantages from the changed situation in Europe”, “not to threaten the legitimate interests” of other states, not to strive for their “isolation” or “drawing new dividing lines on the continent”.

We call on the United States and NATO to return to fulfilling their international obligations in the field of maintaining peace and security. We expect concrete proposals from the members of the alliance on the content and forms of legal consolidation of the renunciation of NATO’s further eastward expansion.

– Batch character of offers.

We note the readiness of the United States to work substantively on individual arms control and risk reduction measures. At the same time, they recorded that Washington had finally recognized the justification of a number of Russian proposals and initiatives in these areas that have been put forward in recent years.

At the same time, we once again draw the attention of the American side to the fact that Russia, in the documents we submitted on security guarantees, proposed to follow the path of a comprehensive long-term settlement of the unacceptable situation that continues to develop in the Euro-Atlantic region. First of all, we are talking about creating a stable foundation for a security architecture in the form of an agreement on NATO’s refusal to take further actions that harm Russia’s security. This remains a constant imperative for us. In the absence of such a strong foundation, interrelated arms control and military risk reduction measures that ensure restraint and predictability of military activity in separate areas, even if they can be agreed upon, will not be sustainable in the long term.

Thus, the Russian proposals are of a package nature and should be considered as a whole without singling out its individual components.

In this regard, we would like to focus on the lack of a constructive reaction from Washington and Brussels to the most important elements of the Russian initiative that we have clearly identified. As for arms control issues, we consider them exclusively in the general context of a comprehensive, package approach to resolving the problem of security guarantees.

– “Post START” and “security equation”.

The United States proposes “immediately” to engage in the development of “measures in the development of START” within the framework of the dialogue on strategic stability. However, at the same time, the American side is trying to fix an approach that has not been coordinated with us, which provides for focusing exclusively on nuclear weapons, regardless of the ability of certain weapons to pose a direct threat to the national territory of the other side. Such a one-sided view of things is contrary to the understandings reached at the Russian-American summit on June 162021. in Geneva on the comprehensive nature of the strategic dialogue to lay the foundation for future arms control and risk reduction measures.

Russia continues to advocate an integrated approach to strategic issues. We propose to engage in the joint development of a new “safety equation”.

A set of elements of the concept we propose, which remains fully relevant, was brought to the attention of the American side – incl. during the meetings within the framework of the strategic dialogue and in the2021. working paper for its completion.

– Deployment of nuclear weapons outside the national territory.

In its document, the United States did not react to such an element of the “package” of measures proposed by us as the withdrawal of nuclear weapons deployed outside its borders to the national territory and the refusal of their further deployment outside the national territory, and limited itself to mentioning the need to deal with the problem at the strategic dialogue platform. non-strategic nuclear weapons without taking into account the peculiarities of their deployment and other factors affecting the security of the parties.

We would like to clarify that our proposals are about solving the problem of the presence on the territory of some non-nuclear NATO states – in violation of the NPT – of US nuclear weapons that are capable of hitting targets on Russian territory. This would include the elimination of the infrastructure for the rapid deployment of such weapons in Europe, as well as the cessation of NATO training and exercises in the handling of these weapons, which involve non-nuclear NATO member states. Without removing this irritant, discussion of the topic of non-strategic nuclear weapons is impossible.

– Ground-based intermediate and shorter range missiles.

We regard this issue as one of the priority areas of the Russian-American dialogue on strategic stability. We believe that this category of weapons is a necessary component of the new “security equation” that should be worked out jointly by Russia and the United States.

We continue to proceed from the relevance of Russian initiatives in the field of “post-INF Treaty”, which are based on the idea of ​​reciprocal verifiable moratoriums on the deployment of ground-based INF Treaty in Europe. In principle, we are open to substantive consideration of the ways of its practical implementation. At the same time, we note the continuing uncertainty in Washington’s approaches to the main parameters of potential control measures over these weapons, primarily to their coverage, which should cover all weapons of the appropriate range in nuclear and non-nuclear equipment.

It was noted that the United States is taking the Russian approach as a basis, which provides for the mutual settlement of mutual concerns in the context of the previously existing INF Treaty. The version proposed by the American side for developing our idea of ​​mutual verification measures in relation to the Aegis Ashore complexes in Romania and Poland, as well as some facilities in the European part of Russia, can be further developed.

As emphasized in the statement of the President of Russia V.V. Putin dated October 262020. and subsequently brought to the attention of the US side on numerous occasions, potential transparency measures with respect to Russian facilities subject to agreement could include monitoring the absence of the Russian 9M729 missile there. We remind you that this step is a manifestation of goodwill, given that the characteristics of the 9M729 missile do not contradict the requirements of the former INF Treaty in any way, and that the United States has not provided any evidence that would confirm the accusations against Russia. At the same time, the American side ignored what we organized on January 23 during the period of this Treaty.2019. voluntary event to demonstrate the device and technical characteristics of the 9M729 rocket and its launcher.

– Heavy bombers and surface warships.

We note the attention of the American side to the Russian idea of ​​additional risk mitigation measures in relation to flights of heavy bombers near the national borders of the parties. We see a subject for discussion and the potential for mutually acceptable agreements. We remind you of an equally important element of our “package” proposal concerning similar cruises of combat surface ships, which also involve serious risks.

– Military exercises and maneuvers.

The United States did not respond to the proposals contained in sec. 2 Article 4 of the Russian draft treaty. The American side, apparently, proceeds from the fact that it is possible to reduce tension in the military sphere by increasing transparency and additional measures to reduce the danger in line with the proposals of the West to modernize the Vienna Document.

We consider such an approach to be unrealistic and one-sided, aimed at “seeing through” the activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Confidence- and security-building measures under the Vienna Document2011. appropriate for today’s environment. To start discussing the possibility of updating them, the necessary conditions must be created. And for this, the United States and its allies should abandon the policy of “containment” of Russia and take concrete practical measures to de-escalate the military-political situation, including in line with para. 2 Article 4 of our draft treaty.

As regards the prevention of incidents on the high seas and in the airspace above it, we welcome the readiness of the United States for appropriate consultations. However, this work cannot replace the settlement of the key problems posed by Russia.