I’m very familiar with Andrei Kortunov and Fyodor Lukyanov, and to a lesser degree Ivan Timofeev. They are part of the foreign policy elite in Russia and have served at various times as advisors to the Kremlin. They are not traditionally anti-Putin, so I would not dismiss their reactions to Putin’s “special military operation” in Ukraine. – Natylie

No consultation: Putin’s solo path to war

Vladimir Putin appears to have acted without consulting others in launching Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Long-standing assumptions and historical grievances contributed over years to that development.

By Fred Weir – Moscow correspondent, Christian Science Monitor, 3/4/22

As the invasion of Ukraine grinds into its second week, many in Russia’s political and foreign-policy elites are scratching their heads over why President Vladimir Putin suddenly decided to abandon a tough diplomatic poker game with the West over NATO expansion – in which he held many cards – and veer into the uncharted territory of war and national isolation.

It may not be the first time a big power has launched an unprovoked attack on another country on false pretenses. But it’s remarkable that Mr. Putin appears to have consulted with almost no one before taking that fateful decision, leaving much of his own policy elite feeling blindsided. And how Russia’s government system, which does have at least some constitutional checks and balances, got to this point, where it appears to have failed so profoundly, is a question that some Russian political experts, particularly opposition-minded ones, are already asking out loud as they try to assess what happened along the way.

Russia has been a highly centralized and militarized autocracy for 1,000 years, and has long sought to protect itself by acquiring territory to serve as a buffer between itself and its outside enemies. But there were always controls, in the form of a czarist dynasty with a traditional aristocracy, or a Communist Party with a collegial Politburo, to moderate the behavior of the person at the top. The system created by Mr. Putin seems to have no effective counterbalances or moderating forces to his decision-making.

Afghanistan and Iraq

That contrasts with more recent examples. In 2002-03, the George W. Bush administration spent months trying to convince the world that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction before invading that country. When the USSR went into Afghanistan in 1979, a collective leadership composed of powerful players in the Politburo made the call.

But when Mr. Putin announced his rationale for war on Feb. 24, he did so with a long, rambling speech that followed a clearly stage-managed meeting of his Security Council. During it, he badgered and scolded members of that powerful body as if they were schoolchildren.

Some say Mr. Putin’s singlehanded grip over the government was inevitable from the time he came to power pledging to restore the “power vertical” after the 1990s, when Russia’s global standing and economy foundered. Others blame conflict with the West, which became intense after a pro-Western street revolt in Kyiv and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, leading to a creeping militarization of Russian politics. They add that Mr. Putin’s isolation was deeply exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and his own apparent fear of contagion, sharply limiting his contacts with anyone beyond his close inner circle.

His long tenure may also have played a role.

“Putin has been in power for too long. I would compare that to a gradual, irreversible case of drug poisoning,” says Georgi Satarov, a former adviser to President Boris Yeltsin, who heads the anticorruption InDem Foundation in Moscow. “His aides have formed an information bubble around him, and he tends to believe only reports given to him by the FSB [security service]. Gradually he has formed a very specific view of himself, the world, and his place in it. And it is, a priori, a distorted image.”

Thousands of mainly urban, educated Russians have taken to the streets in recent days and signed petitions to express their dismay over the unprovoked attack on what has always been regarded as a fraternal country. Most average Russians, however, appear to be experiencing a rally-around-the-flag moment. That may explain a poll released a few days ago by the state-funded VTsIOM agency, which found that 68% supported the “limited military operation” against Ukraine, while 22% did not support it. The impact on Mr. Putin’s vaunted personal popularity rating is murkier. One poll, by the state-owned Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) found that it has surged from 60% to 71%, while a survey by the independent Levada Center puts it at 50-50 in major cities.

Meanwhile, there is a shocked silence from Russia’s large professional foreign-policy community. A few, including people known to have Kremlin access, say they had no idea that an invasion of Ukraine was in the works. They believed the military buildup on Ukraine’s border was meant to get the West’s attention and begin a diplomatic conversation over ending NATO expansion to the east and revising the security order in Europe. Andrei Kortunov, head of the prestigious Russian International Affairs Council, which is affiliated with the Foreign Ministry, told a British TV network, in a breaking voice, that he never believed that an invasion was possible.

Another top expert, Fyodor Lukyanov, head of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, which often advises the Kremlin, told the Monitor that he did not see this coming.

“I tended to interpret signs of war preparations as signs of sophisticated escalation games,” he says. “We underestimated the commitment of the Russian leadership to change the geopolitical and security environment, which they had played no role in forming and found unacceptable for a long time. When efforts to change it failed, they took this action.”

Alexei Konduarov, a former Soviet KGB major-general-turned-political-activist, says he is also in shock. “I never thought this could happen. It is sheer madness, and a personal disaster for Putin.”

He says Mr. Putin’s “transformation” happened after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, which Russians lauded.

“He never met with opposition,” Mr. Konduarov says. “Not when he waged war in Syria, amended the Russian Constitution, or ran for re-election. He got away with everything.”

Stanislav Shushkevich, the former president of Belarus who was replaced 26 years ago by Alexander Lukashenko, shares that perception. “Power is a drug,” he told the Monitor. “Just like [Mr. Lukashenko], he’s been in power too long, and with no democratic constraints, they forget about their state responsibilities.”

All roads now lead to Putin

Mr. Putin came to power in 2000, pledging to restore order after a disastrous post-Soviet decade and build a durable Russian-style democracy. In one of his recent speeches, he even revealed that he once asked United States President Bill Clinton if Russia could join NATO. (He said he did not get an encouraging response.)

In early years, Russia’s political system resembled a big, sprawling corporation with many influential players, and Mr. Putin was like the chairman of the board, says Nikolai Petrov, an expert with Chatham House in London. But that shifted over time.

“We gradually witnessed the construction of one single power pyramid to replace multiple ones, now directly subordinated to Putin,” he says. “The degree of personalization increased in a very direct way. Putin became the single source of legitimacy. He was increasingly less dependent on other players, whether they were regional leaders, corporate heads, government officials, politicians, or even security elites.”

Then came the pandemic, which Mr. Petrov says made things worse. “So, instead of people who might have given him useful advice, he became surrounded by close aides, bodyguards, and such. … Putin is a capable person, but he is the enemy of the internet, and his isolation has become extreme.”

History, too, looms large in Mr. Putin’s mind.

The Russian president has become obsessed with righting what he sees as historical wrongs, says Gleb Pavlovsky, a former Putin adviser-turned-critic, arguing that he has turned away from his earlier interest in state-building to drag Russia into a confrontation with the West that it cannot win.

***

Why Experts Believed an Armed Conflict with Ukraine Would Never Happen

By Ivan Timofeev, Russian International Affairs Council, 3/4/22

Ivan Timofeev is a PhD in Political Science, RIAC Director of Programs, RIAC Member, Head of “Contemporary State” program at Valdai Discussion Club

Most experts, both in Russia and abroad, thought it was extremely unlikely and implausible that Russia would launch a full-scale military operation in Ukraine. Allegations that Moscow was preparing for something like this were laughed off, with this being labeled as another Russophobic campaign pushed by propagandists and radicals. However, it turned out on February 24 that the Russophobes had been right all along, while what the many analysts claimed, regardless of the side of the barricades, turned out to be wrong. How could this have happened?

Well, the experts were clearly aware of the would-be consequences that such a conflict could bear. They were wrong in what they were trying to forecast—still, they were correct in their assessments of these consequences. Even before the special operation was launched, it was clear that it would incur enormous damage to both Ukraine and Russia. Analysts took it as a given that understanding the immensity of this damage would be an argument good enough to thwart any demilitarization of Ukraine. However, while political analysts were correct in assessing the amplitude of possible consequences, they misjudged the attitudes of decision-makers. We made a mistake because we never made a mistake.    

Let’s take, for example, a forecast I made on November 25, 2021, which is three months before Russia’s special operation was commenced. There were clear prerequisites for such a decision to be made, including: Russia’s experience of resorting to force, with the first incidence occurring in 2008; rather painless consequences of those campaigns; a growing dissatisfaction with the status quo under the Minsk agreements; and the fears that it was only a matter of time before military infrastructure of Western nations turned up on Ukrainian soil.

Yet, it seemed improbable and unlikely that Russia would resort to force, even after Moscow officially recognized the Lugansk and the Donetsk People’s Republics. In the article published on November 25, I outlined seven likely implications that a decision of this kind may have, with all of them becoming a reality in one form or another.     

Implication 1. Prolonged conflict. The Russian Army has inflicted huge losses on the Armed Forces of Ukraine (the AFU). However, the AFU are concentrated in large cities, and entering them would entail significant military and civilian losses. In an urban setting, Russia’s technological and aerial superiority is neutralized. It is obvious that the Ukrainian leadership has recovered from the shock of the first few days of the operation, and any negotiations will give respite to the country’s Armed Forces. That is, Russia faces a difficult choice: 1) to sit down at the negotiating table, knowing that this will give the enemy a much-needed breather; or 2) to continue with the military action, which may well involve fighting in urban locales and, for that matter, entailing more losses. 

Implication 2. The West is rallying around the cause of assisting Ukraine, with such assistance having been increased manyfold. Currently, the West is ruling out the option of an armed confrontation, but it will continue to provide substantial financial and military support to Ukraine. Russian troops are not in control of Ukraine’s western border, which means that weapons and military equipment can technically be delivered. These weapons may feature Soviet-era models from countries that used to be part of the Warsaw Pact—these weapons are more or less compatible with Ukrainian equipment—as well as those “Western” weapons that do not take much training (these could include man-portable air-defense systems and anti-tank guided missile complexes). The ranks of the AFU may be supplemented by volunteers from abroad. A respite would give Ukraine time to remilitarize, and moving on with the special operation would bring the same result, delaying its final success and increasing losses.    

Implication 3. Russia’s diplomatic isolation. Moscow’s actions are clearly—and by default—branded as an act of aggression against a sovereign nation. The West’s stance on this issue is unequivocal and consolidated. Non-Western countries following suit or refraining from commenting on the situation. Few are willing to voice their support for Russia—doing so would far from alter the global narrative of the “Russian aggression”. Such countries are either isolated themselves or remain critically dependent on Russia. Global public opinion, as well as the media, are on Kiev’s side. And we are not talking exclusively about Western countries here.

Implication 4. Unprecedented sanctions against Russia. All the bravado concerning the sanctions and statements claiming that that they are barely affecting the country belie the reality. The economic blow has been swift and devastating—unlike, for example, the case of Iran, where restrictive measures were introduced gradually over a period of time. The goal is to destabilize the economy as quickly as possible. Over the past few years, the economic wing of the government has managed to put in place a sovereign financial infrastructure, which is resilient to external shocks. In the very least, electronic banking has not collapsed, while the Central Bank controls the situation with liquidity. However, the consequences of the sanctions will be severe, both in the short term and in long run, and these may include: inflation, rising import prices, possible interruptions in the import of goods, growing unemployment. In the medium-to-long run, Russia may well be ousted from the global markets for raw materials, weapons and food. This could be a drawn-out process, and those who initiated it would have to pay a hefty price themselves. In any case, politics has engulfed any economic rationality right now. Russia’s opponents are all too happy to exclude it from supply chains, even if it means taking a financial hit. Another issue is that foreign businesses are boycotting Russia and Russian products or suspending transactions with the country, which is going a step further than their own governments. What is more, many Western and non-Western companies have to abide by the requirements of U.S. sanctions, even if they do not operate in the U.S. jurisdiction. The long and short of this is that many commercial projects involving Russian companies have been suspended, whether partially or completely. What these factors mainly suggest is a reduction in the resource base of Russia’s economy as well as a drop in incomes and quality of life for ordinary citizens.

Implication 5. It is still difficult to say whether the Russian forces would be able to establish control over the Ukrainian territory, even if large contingents of the AFU are defeated. In fact, the current situation suggests how complicated the things are. Surrounding cities is tantamount to inviting humanitarian crises, as storming them would bring even more civilian casualties. Establishing control in these areas will be difficult even if Kiev surrenders, which is becoming less and less likely. Keeping a large country with a mostly hostile population in check is an incredibly difficult task.

Implication 6. The Ukrainian society appears to be banding together in the fight against Russia, regardless of the regional differences. While radical nationalism and Russophobia were once fringe views, they are now becoming ingrained in the country’s national identity. Civilian losses serve to encourage this process, too. Ordinary Ukrainians are actively involved in the resistance, getting their hands on weapons and ammunition. Armed civilians can play a decisive role in urban battles, as the case of Aleppo in Syria and similar confrontations has shown. No matter how Russia’s special operation ends, the Ukrainian society will continue to regard Russia as an enemy for decades to come.

Implication 7. The actions against Ukraine have revealed a division within Russia itself. The population is split into two camps—those who oppose the special operation and those who endorse it. The former protest Russia’s actions, feeing a sense of hopelessness and trying to deny what is taking place. However, we currently have no reliable sociological data on the real level of concern among the Russian population, nor the ratio of those in favor of the special operation to those who are against it. Simple surveys are of little use here, as we need an understanding of what stands behind people’s answers. This is where in-depth interviews and focus groups are useful. With all that said, there is no denying that people in Russia are deeply concerned about what is happening. On the other side, there are calls for “traitors” to be flushed out. This is extremely dangerous, as this could lead to an unchecked “witch hunt”—or, in extreme cases, show trials set up according to the “martial law.” All of this is unlikely to promote social cohesion. All the more so, as history has taught us, those who denounce the so-called “traitors” later become victims of the vigilante justice. The society may become even more divided, as economic consequences of the restrictive measures imposed against Russia are starting to make themselves felt. Historically, it has been unprotected social groups and the middle class who have suffered from sanctions—rather than the “oligarchs” or the “authorities.”

The consequences of a potential conflict that I predicted three months ago can now be supplemented with another two.

Afterthought 1. Moving towards a significant increase in NATO’s military presence in Eastern Europe. With a number of Western states blocking the airspace, the Kaliningrad Region can successfully be isolated from the rest of Russia. NATO is currently avoiding active engagement in the crisis. However, tensions between Russia and NATO will continue to grow regardless, including the issues pertaining to strategic deterrence. The threat of incidents and escalation to a full-fledged military conflict with NATO is growing, even though neither side wants this. The unfolding events would lead to a radical militarization of Eastern Europe. Russia will be dragged into another extremely costly arms race. As for the West, we can expect a significant increase in defense spending, initializing the modernization of the armed forces, and adopting other decisions that had previously been postponed until later. Another consequence is a possible remilitarization of Germany, with the country overcoming its post-war aversion to pursuing an active military policy, which would mean an emergence of a military powerhouse in proximity to the Russian border, one that has been fine-tuned to contain Moscow. An EU Army would appear, and it would specifically be focused to counter Russia.           

Afterthought 2. Bullying and persecution of Russians abroad, especially in the nations of the West. The events have given rise to a high level of aggression, something that will be taken out on ordinary Russians—just because they are Russian.

What has Russia achieved with its Ukrainian campaign? It could postpone the issue of Ukraine formally joining NATO. This, however, will come at the cost of a complete militarization of Ukraine against Russia or having to control a country hostile to Russia and the Russians. The scale of NATO’s military build-up on Russia’s western borders is likely to devalue any control that Russia may be able to gain over Ukraine. We will be dealing with these consequences for decades to come. 

Perhaps, one achievement of the special operation is the removal of a direct military threat to Donetsk and Lugansk, which have been on the front line for the past eight years, suffering huge civilian losses. But this has come at a price—death of many ordinary Ukrainians and a colossal damage to the country’s infrastructure. What is more, Moscow will fail in refuting the claims that the conflict began with its explicit or covert support. This means that legitimizing the operation will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Moscow to lay the blame for the eight-year-long conflict exclusively on the nationalists and Kiev.    

The bottom line is that the costs far outweigh the benefits, which is what underlies our bleak assessment of the current scenario. This is why our original forecasts were wrong. After all, we were not wrong in our understanding of its consequences.