By Anastasia Trofimova, Euronews, 3/3/22

“Guys, where’s the main protest?” asks 28-year-old Ksenia, who’s taken to the street to protest for the first time in her life.

It’s 9 pm in Moscow and the police have already broken up the bulk of the protests. Since anyone with anti-war signs is arrested immediately, protesters casually stroll along until a large enough crowd gathers to shout their opposition to what’s going on in Ukraine.

Two middle-aged women hiss “no war!” to the police before running away, laughing nervously.

“Let’s work, go!” the policeman orders his underlings. A group of three young police officers take off down the street but don’t find any suitable targets. They finally spot a man, who, as he’s being dragged to the police van, is revealed to be very drunk. He is released.

The protesters trickle along smaller streets, following location updates from dedicated Telegram channels. Convoys of police vans follow. It’s a massive game of cat and mouse. The night ends with a 39-year-old man driving a car into the police barriers at Pushkin Square with signs “This is war!” and “Rise up, people!” The car starts to burn; the man is arrested.

On the sixth day of the war in Ukraine, there have been more than 6,000 arrests at anti-war protests across Russia.

“The night of (the invasion), I was in a really great mood,” recalls Ksenia. “My friend and I were celebrating February 23 (Day of the Defender of the Fatherland or, more commonly, Men’s Day).

“We were outside, drinking wine and singing on the swings. At 6:05 am Forbes announced Putin declared the start of the military operation. And that’s it. My world divided into a before and after.”

Ksenia works in PR and speaks bluntly.

“Putin is crazy. No sane person would do anything like this. Ukraine will persevere. Meanwhile, we’re going to be in [the] shit.”

‘It’s been a long time coming’

“You’re not one of those liberals, are you?” asks 49-year-old Yuri. He’s not a fan of anti-war protesters like Ksenia.

“I’m against the war. But to be honest, it’s been a long time coming. The problem is not with Ukraine, but with those Anglo-Saxons who are creeping upon us. Just look at what happened to countries they’ve got into, like Syria. And now they’re trying to get at us (create internal strife) via Ukraine. Therefore, I think all of this is justified and right.”

The liberals that Yuri hates would respond in kind by calling him “a victim of the zombie-box”, or state television. This ideological division runs through many Russian families. However, Yuri’s sentiment is too common to dismiss as crazy talk on the fringes.

The fear of NATO was and is very real here. Examples of Yugoslavia and Libya, two states bombed by NATO forces, are used to drive fears that Russia may be next. The day before the start of the war, Putin told the nation of WWII-era promises not to expand NATO eastward and said those promises had been broken five times. Ukraine’s flirtation with NATO membership pushed those fears into overdrive.

Yuri is one of many seeing the events through a prism of fear.

“If I’m called up, I’ll go,” he said. “Russians are not afraid of the army. All of us have children. At least my children will be protected.”

What does he think of the sanctions on Russia?

“Our people have always been under some type of sanctions. We’re used to it. If we survived during the hunger and sieges, we’ll make it.”

It’s sunny, people are taking selfies on Red Square, while a long convoy of National Guard buses rolls by the Kremlin walls. More protests are expected.

Nikita, 20, tells Euronews: “I’m mostly against war. But I don’t know what I would’ve done in the place of the government. If war didn’t start now, then maybe five or six years down the road Ukraine could’ve joined NATO and the consequences would’ve been much different for our country. Of course, I really feel bad for the ordinary people who cannot influence their government’s decisions.” Do you mean Russians or Ukrainians, Nikita is asked. “All of us. Our guys are dying over there and so are Ukrainians.”

“I’m against war,” said Olesya, 45, who has most of her relatives in the separatist region of Donbas. “But I think this should’ve been done in 2014 and then we wouldn’t have war today. Where was the West, with all its humanitarian concerns, when the Ukrainians shelled the people of Donbas?”

The war in eastern Ukraine broke out in 2014 after Russia annexed Crimea. Next, two separatist regions in Donbas, Donetsk and Luhansk, declared their independence from Kyiv. It sparked a conflict between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists, which has seen casualties on both sides.

But even though justification of the Ukraine invasion can be found among Russians, there have been no demonstrations of support.

On the contrary, the people taking to the streets are those against it, despite threats of arrests. Most Russians have family and friends in Ukraine.

“War is always awful. War never leads to anything good and won’t this time either,” – says 18-year-old Tonya, wearing a bag with a hand-stitched “No war” sign.

“I’m scared and hurt for my friends in Ukraine, who write to me ‘we’re going down into the bomb shelter’. We joke, ‘It’s been an explosive morning, hasn’t it?’ and she says, ‘It’s been simply bombastic’. In the past three days, I’ve slept for 10 hours in total. The rest of the time I’m crying”.

A war with a country with the strongest historical and cultural ties to Russia was laughable, ridiculous, absurd. Until February 24, 2022. Putin’s attack on Ukraine took most Russians by surprise.

By Thomas Sherlock, The National Interest, 2/28/22

….Russian Elites: The Siloviki as a Source of Putin’s Resolve and Power

An important resource for understanding how the perspectives of Russia’s diverse elites relate to the current crisis is the multi-year Survey of Russian Elites, 1993-2020 supervised by Sharon W. Rivera and William Zimmerman. Release of the 2020 data is in preparation and an analytical report was recently published under the direction of Rivera, who is also an expert on the siloviki. SRE 2020 provides insights into the values and interests of Russian elites in business, media, culture, science, politics, and the military/security services. Among these groups, the siloviki stood apart on several important issues, including their understanding of Russia’s national identity. SRE 2020 asked respondents what they would prefer Russia to be: a modern, prosperous country even if it were not among the most powerful of states, or a leading power that was respected and feared by the world. By a ratio of 86:11, the siloviki wanted Russia to be feared and respected. Similarly, 63 percent of the siloviki in SRE 2020 favored increased military spending (outpacing other groups). In their responses to another question, the members of this group also affirmed that military power rather than economic strength is the most important determinant of the international standing of a state.

Putin’s foreign and domestic policies are entwined with the preferences of the siloviki. Together they have linked and securitized patriotism and the Orthodox faith as key supports for an anti-Western and particularly anti-American ideology. With an inner circle already dominated by leading members of the siloviki, Putin may become even more reliant on this group as he pursues a risky foreign policy of military aggression while further tightening domestic political controls. According to SRE 2020, the siloviki are significantly more committed than other groups of elites to maintaining public order “at any price,” which presumably would include keeping Putin in power at all costs. While the diversity of the sub-groups of the siloviki may weaken its overall political cohesion, the data of SRE 2020 point to their agreement on several core issues, including increased military spending, domestic political regimentation, hard power as the foundation of international influence, the United States as a serious threat to the Russian state and regime, and strong support for close relations with China.

Undermining Putin’s Resolve and Power? Non-Siloviki Elite Attitudes

Against the views of most siloviki, a majority of the other elites in SLE 2020 favor the development of a modern state and a prosperous society that would require better relations with the West. As for still closer relations, 31 percent of SRE 2020 respondents favored the European Union as a desired partner compared to 28 percent for China and 7 percent for the United States. By contrast, only 8.6 percent of the military/security agencies favored the EU as a partner while 46 percent favored China (43 percent selected “None”). No respondents in this group selected the United States.

Elites in the executive and legislative branches favored policies that promote a high standard of living at home over those which advance respect and fear abroad by 51-49 percent. The preferences of other elites were lopsided in favor of prosperity: the “private business” group (77-23 percent); the “media” group (74-26 percent); and science and education elites (74-25.7 percent).

The non-siloviki elites of SRE 2020 also considered Russia’s domestic problems (such as corruption, economic stagnation, etc.) to be of greater concern than the growth of U.S. military power, American information warfare, or a “color revolution” purportedly fueled by the West, each of which the Kremlin has cast as serious dangers. Employing a scale that measures threats from “least” to “utmost,” SRE 2020 found that elite concern over the failure of the Russian state to solve domestic problems had grown significantly as an “utmost threat”—from 32.1 percent in 2016 to 46 percent in 2020.

Worry over the “further expansion of NATO” persisted among all elites in SRE 2020 but was still twelve points lower in the aggregate than anxiety over domestic problems (32 percent of respondents overall viewed NATO as an “utmost threat” in SRE 2020). By contrast, only 25.7 percent of the siloviki group saw domestic problems as an “utmost threat.” And while just over 50 percent of SRE 2020 respondents overall supported the use of military power to defend Russians against discrimination in post-Soviet states, just under 40 percent were unwilling to do so. Although a majority of SRE 2020 respondents favored the independence or annexation of the pro-Russian breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine, it is unclear whether these elites would now view the invasion of Ukraine as an authentic defense of ethnic Russians and other Russian speakers. 

Undermining Putin’s Resolve and Power? Russia’s Mass Publics

In comparison to Russia’s elites, the divisions among the country’s mass publics are less prominent. Polling data indicate that most of the Russian population does not support an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy reminiscent of the Soviet era. Surveys in 2021 confirm that most Russians and Ukrainians have positive attitudes toward one other as individuals and that a majority of Russians, unlike Putin, accept Ukraine as an independent state. Other surveys underscore the opposition of most Russians to military aggression against Ukraine. Such attitudes reflect the widespread concern that both ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians, who share centuries of inter-marriage as well as political, cultural, and socio-economic ties, could suffer and perish in significant numbers in war. Participants in pre-war surveys understood that Ukraine would be better prepared for an assault today than in 2014 (when Crimea was annexed) and could inflict heavy casualties on Russian forces even in defeat. Such images now on the internet and in foreign mass media have not restrained Putin. Nevertheless, they have already stimulated anti-war protests in Russia and are likely to have a continued effect on Russian opinion and political behavior.

Russians may also reproach or perhaps turn against the regime because the invasion of Ukraine places their hopes for Russia’s future still further out of reach. When asked in an unpublished 2019 Levada survey whether they prefer that Russia strengthen its military power or improve the well-being of its citizens, the overwhelming majority (82 percent) chose the “well-being of its citizens.” Only 12.2 percent favored a build-up of military power. Similarly, the opinions in an unpublished 2020 Levada survey broadly align with those of SRE 2020 in that 63 percent of participants wanted Russia to have a high standard of living even if it were not one the most “powerful countries in the world.” Only 35 percent of respondents preferred the alternative, that Russia be a “great power which other countries respect and fear.” Another recent survey confirmed these inward-looking attitudes and values: only 19 percent of respondents considered “having a powerful military” an essential attribute for Russia to be considered a great power. These responses emphasize the ongoing struggle among Russians over how to define their national identity and chart Russia’s future…

De-Confliction Line Established Between US and Russia for Ukraine; No-Fly Zone Ruled Out

It has been reported that a de-confliction line has been established between the US and Russia with respect to Ukraine in order to avoid unnecessary escalation or misunderstanding.  According to The Hill:

The U.S. military has set up a channel to communicate directly with the Russian military to prevent “miscalculations” or “escalation” over the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine, a defense spokesperson confirmed to The Hill Thursday.

“The Department of the Defense recently established a de-confliction line with the Russian Ministry of Defense on March 1 for the purposes of preventing miscalculation, military incidents, and escalation,” the spokesperson said.

They noted that the U.S. “retains a number of channels to discuss critical security issues with the Russians during a contingency or emergency.”

Meanwhile, despite repeated requests by the Kiev government, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has ruled out a no-fly zone in Ukraine.  Austin told NBC News yesterday:

“President Biden’s been clear that US troops won’t fight Russia in Ukraine, and if you establish a no-fly zone, certainly in order to enforce that no-fly zone, you’ll have to engage Russian aircraft. And again, that would put us at war with Russia,” Austin said.

Results of Round 2 of Talks

French president Emmanuel Macron had a 90-minute “not-so-friendly” phone conversation with Putin this morning in which Putin reportedly told Macron the Russian military operation in Ukraine was “going according to plan.”

The negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in Belarus resulted in an agreement for humanitarian corridors and the delivery of aid with a temporary ceasefire to facilitate them.  However, there were cryptic statements from a member of the Russian delegation, head of State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Leonid Slutsky, about terms from today’s talks needing to be approved by parliaments:

“Clearly, it will require a third, no less important round of talks, which is due in coming days, to implement these agreements, which I won’t voice today,” he said.

“It will require parliamentary efforts, as some agreements will have to be endorsed and then undergo national ratification procedures,” Slutsky said.

He also said all agreements reached would be fast-tracked on the Russian side.  Ivan Katchanovksi, the Ukrainian academic who undertook an in-depth forensic investigation into the violence of the protests on the Maidan in 2014, has speculated that there could be other terms reached that have not been publicized, such as Ukrainian neutrality.  We’ll see.  More talks are scheduled for early next week.

Meanwhile, one million refugees are now reported to have fled Ukraine to countries on its western border, according to the UN.  2000 civilians have died according to Ukraine’s emergency services department.

Beginning of Counter-Sanctions

Russia has announced it will halt shipment of rocket engines to the US.  According to a Reuters report, the head of Roscosmos, Dmitry Rogozin said:

“In a situation like this we can’t supply the US with our world’s best rocket engines. Let them fly on something else, their broomsticks, I don’t know what.”

A preview of additional actions to counter the west’s sanctions can be found in proposed parliamentary legislation.  Interfax News has reported the following on a bill proposed in the Duma:

The bill cancels inspections at small, medium and IT companies until the end of this year, liberalizes public procurement terms and procedure, and restricts drug exports. The bill allows the government to additionally raise non-contributory pensions, pension points, and the fixed payment pension during 2022.

The bill clarifies the application of business legislation, including the rules for calculation of net assets’ value in 2022 and legislation on loans and borrowings, gives the government the right to derogate from a number of rules on licensing and accreditation and certain provisions of laws in the field of shared construction and intellectual property. There will be a special procedure for the establishment of the subsistence minimum and the minimal wage.

The sentence clause I have bolded could relate to what Pepe Escobar recently suggested about Russia no longer recognizing intellectual property and patents from the west.

Censorship

RT America has shut down operations, which had offices in New York, Washington DC, Los Angeles and Miami.  All of the staff have been permanently laid off.  It’s my understanding that some staff had received threats of violence.  The EU has begun banning RT and Sputnik as I already mentioned earlier this week.  Attempts to access RT on both Google and DuckDuckGo browsers have been difficult. YouTube and various apps have been kicking the Russian state broadcasters off.  RT will now be available through Rumble and Odysee.  One can also download the apps for RT and Sputnik at the Huawei AppGallery store. These will purportedly work on an Android phone.

I’ve noted that the OSCE Media Freedom representative has been silent on these actions from the west but has voiced condemnation of Russia’s suppression of non-establishment media outlets. 

A 65 year-old substitute teacher in Arlington, Virginia has been suspended from his job for reportedly providing a balanced perspective on the war – which included the Russian perspective – and admonishing his students to seek out different perspectives before making up their minds about important issues.  Here is a Fox5 report on the story:

A 65-year-old substitute teacher and journalist has been suspended from teaching in Arlington, Virginia for giving his students a balanced perspective on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Mainstream media says he "spread Russian propaganda." So much for freedom of speech. pic.twitter.com/qSix0FBdvl

— Alex Rubinstein (@RealAlexRubi) March 3, 2022

I will reiterate here what I posted on Twitter about this:

If you disagree with what someone is saying, you provide a counter-argument, you don’t censor. Only people who are very insecure in their positions demand censorship.  Those who cheer for censoring their perceived political opponents will see the boomerang come back to them.

I wonder if Russia, in retaliation, will ban RFE/RL and VOA from their country.  My understanding is that American sponsored media in Russia is significantly more influential than RT/Sputnik is in the west.  Something about a nose and a face comes to mind.

By MK Bhadrakumar, Indian Punchline, 3/2/22

MK Bhadrakumar is a retired Indian diplomat.

A veteran Indian journalist and world class war correspondent, recently wrote with a touch of humour that when BBC’s Lyse Doucet landed in Kiev a week ago, he was reminded of the howling cry of monkeys in the Corbett Park alerting the jungle that a tiger was on the prowl. “As soon as I saw Doucet I knew that “action” would begin (in Ukraine),” he wrote. 

However, BBC erred this time around. The MI6 probably anticipated a devastating Russian attack on Kiev — something like the horrific British-American firebombing of the Dresden on February 13-15, 1945, when heavy bombers numbering 1300 planes dropped more than 3,900 tons of high-explosive bombs on the city and killed an estimated 22,700 to 25,000  people. 

Indeed,  a full week has passed and the Russian bombers are nowhere to be seen. But this doesn’t mean that Kiev is not a prime target. Russia seems to be counting on an eventual “implosion” in the city as a climactic moment of the war, triggering the eclipse of the western-backed regime installed in Kiev February 2014 following the CIA-sponsored coup.

Arming Ukrainian civilians was a horribly cynical propaganda stunt by the regime, acting on the advice of western mentors. But the blowback has begun. Armed gangs are roaming the streets of Kiev adding to the mayhem. If it continues, an army takeover cannot be ruled out at some point.

The Russian forces would much rather avoid fighting the Ukrainian army as the “enemy” — with the exception, of course, of Neo-Nazi formations (as in Kharkiv and Mariupol, or elsewhere in the southeastern Donbass region.) 

Evidently, Russians do not want to destroy Ukraine. The objective is revive Ukraine’s sovereignty under a Ukrainian leadership and help in its build-up as a strong enduring buffer against any future western invasions. 

Germany’s rearmament must be ringing alarm bells when French, German and British military budgets already exceed three times that of Russia’s. The deep involvement of France and Germany in post-2014 Ukraine is not in the public domain. They kept their heads below the parapet but were digging in for the long haul. That explains the scale of their wrath toward Moscow. 

Unless this complex matrix is understood, the dynamics of the current Russian campaign cannot be grasped. From available indications, the Russian operation appears to have three objectives:

• subject Kiev and other major cities to siege warfare (attrition); 
• cut off the escape route for the Ukrainian forces deployed in the east to retreat to Kiev; and, 
• consolidate in Donbass and a contiguous coastal belt along the northern Black Sea coastline .  

The above map below shows the state of play as of Monday, 28th February. The Russian operation is going on in the Donbass region in southeastern Ukraine and along the Northern coastline of Black Sea but this is escaping attention. The propagandistic western media is concentrating on sensational stories, although the regional balance in south and southeastern Ukraine is hugely consequential.  

Interestingly, Moscow has recognised the two separatist regions in eastern Ukraine Lugansk and Donetsk as independent states as per their boundary claims. President Putin said in his remarks on the issue that Moscow has recognised all these two regions’ “fundamental documents.” 

What does this imply? Clearly, Russia’s recognition of the borders claimed by the two separatist republics’ as per their respective constitutions means boundaries containing all the areas they had controlled on the day of their “founding” in 2014 from where they have since been systematically pushed back by the Ukrainian (Neo-Nazi) forces through organised violence against the Russian population during the past 8-year period. It stands to reason that Russian operations will aim at restoring the lost territories  to Lugansk and Donetsk. 

Meanwhile, Moscow also has a score to settle with the neo-Nazi militia deployed in Donbass and the Black Sea region who committed terrible atrocities against the hapless Russian communities, which is an emotive issue within Russia. Putin calls it “genocide”. A dossier on the atrocities has been sent to the US. 

The “denazification” campaign aims to ruthlessly suppress the neo-Nazi groups. The Russian intelligence has prepared a “hit list” of the notorious ring leaders to be brought to justice.

As of Tuesday, the Russian advancing column in the south reached Kherson oblast, which also has an important port on the Black Sea as well as on the Dnieper River and is the home of a major ship-building industry. Further to the east, the strategically important port of Mariupol, the steel centre on Black Sea coast, has also been secured.

Equally, Russian troops have destroyed a concrete dam built in Ukraine’s Kherson Region in 2014 to cut off water to Crimea in reprisal for its annexation by Russia. This solves the problem of acute water shortage in Crimea, which is a major political issue.

Kherson is just about 145 kms east of the great port city of Odessa (founded by Catherine the Great) with a concentration of Russian population despite the “Ukrainisation” in the demography in recent years. It remains to be seen whether the Russian operations will now move toward Odessa and further along the Black Sea coastline leading all the way to the breakaway region of Transnistria (Moldova) where Russians comprise around one-third of the population.

Sandwiched as a thin stretch of land on the Moldova-Ukraine border, Transnistria remains the de facto forward operating base for Russia’s interests in the broader region.

Moscow considers the US military base in neighbouring Romania a significant threat; therefore, it likely considers the military presence in Transnistria to be more important than ever. A land route from Rostov-on-Don (Russia) all the way to Transnistria (Moldova) along the Black Sea coastline can be a strategic asset. 

In all of the above, a sub-text cannot be overlooked — namely, that Donbass is both Ukraine’s rust bet and granary. It is a heavily industrialised region that has a great future in economic development with the string of Black Sea ports providing easy access to the world market.

The above map of regional economic development of Ukraine displays the strong industrial base of Donbass. To be sure, the Russian objective will be to rapidly build up Lugansk and Donbass as economically viable regions that will not be a financial drain on Moscow.

Evidently, a great deal of thinking has gone into the planning of the Russian operation, starting with the historic decision to recognise Lugansk and Donetsk as independent states. The fury with which Berlin and Paris are reacting is self-evident.

With the ‘big picture’ in mind of rebuilding Ukraine to its past glory as the most prosperous ex-Soviet state, Putin thoughtfully picked one of his trusted aides, Vladimir Medinsky, to lead the delegation for the talks with the Ukrainian officials. Medinsky was born in Ukraine.

Apart from being an accomplished political scientist and historian and a senior figure in the ruling United Russia party, he bears a famous name. His father, Rostislav Medinsky, while serving as colonel in the Soviet Army, became a national hero, having taken part in the disaster management at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986.