By Dmitry Trenin, Global Affairs Journal (Russia), 3/21/22 (English translation via Google Translate); Dmitry Trenin is Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center

February 24, 2022 – the beginning of a special military operation in Ukraine – opened a new period in Russian history and became a turning point in modern international politics. Russia’s relations with the West, which had been steadily deteriorating over the previous decade, have finally collapsed. In response to actions in Ukraine, the West threatens to turn Russia into an international outcast, consistently blocks its foreign economic relations, and tries to influence Russian society by isolating it from the outside world.

Against the background of the consolidation of the West around the United States, Russia and China are drawing closer together. Coalitions of great powers are being formed in the world, opposing each other on the most important issues of the world order and fundamental values. Globalization is being replaced by regionalization, the world is splitting into opposing military-political, financial-economic and technological blocs. Politics dominates the economy. The well-known formula of thirty years ago is turned inside out: It’s geopolitics, stupid!

In this virtual military situation, the “re-edition” of the Russian Federation is inevitable. The main direction of government measures is the mobilization of all available resources and the maximum expansion of economic freedoms within the country while simultaneously supporting socially vulnerable segments of the population. But these are only the first urgent measures. The country needs fundamental changes: blocking the channels that feed corruption; reorientation of big business to national interests; a new personnel policy to significantly improve the quality of public administration at all levels; social solidarity; the return of fundamental – not monetary – values ​​as the basis of life. These changes, in turn, are impossible without overcoming the remaining elements of offshore oligarchic capitalism, wide rotation and improvement of the ruling elite,

The most important front of confrontation is taking place within Russian society. It is possible to cope with an external challenge only under the condition of self-purification and self-determination. It is necessary to defeat not only theft and embezzlement, but also cynicism, primitive materialism, unbelief; become citizens in the full sense of the word; decide for what a person lives and a country exists – and without what, if this thesis is expanded, life and existence become meaningless; refuse to lie to others and to ourselves. Hopes for such a turn arose during the “Russian spring” of 2014, but they were not realized, which gave rise to disappointment. Now there is a second chance. We must learn the lesson of history: the Russian state is practically invincible from the outside, but it is crumbling to the ground,

Not “second cold”

In Russia’s foreign policy, there has been a transition from the confrontation (confrontation) with the collective West that began in 2014 to an active hybrid war with it. Hybrid war is a sharp confrontation, including armed conflicts (so far indirect) of varying degrees of intensity, with the exception of a general nuclear war; economic, financial and technological blockade; information war; cyber attacks; terrorism; subversion and so on. A hybrid war is not a Cold War II, because the Russian Federation is not the Soviet Union, and the rest of the world has changed a lot over the past decades. But, like the Cold War, hybrid confrontation is an acute form of struggle for a new world order.

The transition from confrontation to a hybrid war means that the time for maneuvers and attempts to convince “partners”, “colleagues” is over, the viscous confrontation with them has been replaced by a sharp confrontation. The degradation of relations over the past two decades has gone from the so-called value gap in the 2000s to to a trust deficit in the 2010s and open hostility in the early 2020s. The United States and its allies (the Russian Foreign Ministry has defined a list of “unfriendly states”) are now not opponents, but opponents of Russia. The West is cutting ties with Russia – both with the state and with society – in all areas. This gap is permanent. The West will not “understand”, will not “soften” and will not “be kind” to Russia. For Western countries, Russia, called a threat and declared an international pariah, has become the most important factor in internal consolidation around the United States, and as such it will be indispensable for the foreseeable future. In any case, the return of relations between the Russian Federation and the West to the past (be it before February 2022 or before February 2014 – you can continue) is definitely impossible.

The goals of the opposing sides are the most decisive. For the West, led by Washington, the main goal is not just to change the political regime in Russia, but also to eliminate Russia as a large independent entity on the world stage, ideally locking it into internal conflicts and contradictions. For Russia, the main goal is to become a self-sufficient and independent of the West in economic, financial and technological terms, a great power, one of the centers and leaders of the emerging new polycentric world order. These goals leave no room for strategic compromise.

Objectively, many tasks of Russia coincide with the aspirations of a number of non-Western states – not only China, but partly India, other members of the BRICS group. At the same time, the world “non-West”, unlike the West, is not a coalition united by common interests and values. The interests of the various countries of this part of the world system are very different, the contradictions between them – for example, between India and China, India and Pakistan, Iran and the Arab countries – are strong and lead to conflicts. More importantly, unlike Russia (and Iran), the rest of the leading countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America remain deeply integrated into the American-centric financial and economic system, and many are politically and ideologically dependent on the United States.Under these conditions, Russia should not count on significant assistance and support from non-Western partners – their actual neutrality, that is, non-participation in anti-Russian sanctions, will be enough. Russia will mostly have to rely on its own strength.

Strategically important Asia

Nevertheless, Russia’s relations with Asia’s two largest powers, China and India, are of major strategic importance. The rise of the PRC naturally led to its confrontation with the United States, which seeks to maintain, if not dominance, then primacy in the world system. At the same time, thanks to the progressive development of Russian-Chinese relations over the past three decades, the quality of partnership between Moscow and Beijing has become unprecedentedly high. The sharp confrontation between the United States and Russia, as well as the escalating confrontation between America and China, are objectively leading to a new type of alliance – “without borders”, but also without strict obligations – between Russia and China. In the context of an economic war with the West, Beijing for Moscow for the foreseeable future is the most important partner in the field of finance, technology, and economics.

Russia’s relations with India are based on long-standing traditions of friendship and mutual sympathy. The growth of the importance and role of India in the world is in the interests of Russia. The increase in the economic power of India, its technological development expand the potential for interaction with Russia. At the same time, the contradictions between Delhi and Beijing, as well as the political and economic rapprochement between India and the United States against the backdrop of a hybrid war between the US and Russia and ever closer cooperation between the Russian Federation and China, pose a serious challenge to Russian-Indian relations. An urgent task is to strengthen the strategic partnership between Moscow and Delhi in order to bring it to the level of Russian-Chinese cooperation. As politics begins to dominate the economy,

Most of the international organizations in which Russia participates are dominated by the United States and/or its allies. Typical examples are the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Council of Europe. The exit of the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe is a long overdue step. Even the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which originated in the Soviet Union, is under the decisive influence of Western countries. The exception is the United Nations, where Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has the right to veto. It makes sense for Moscow, which has an active position in the UN and its institutions, to focus much more on organizations of non-Western countries – BRICS, SCO, RIC, as well as organizations in which Russia plays a leading role – the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Treaty Organization. security. On all these platforms, it is necessary to develop and promote the global agenda, the outlines of which were outlined in the joint Russian-Chinese statement of February 4, 2022. These theses should be turned into a global platform for the interaction of interested states.

Foreign Policy Tasks

The priority tasks of Russia’s foreign policy in the new conditions seem to be quite obvious: (a) strategic deterrence of the adversary – the United States and its NATO allies, preventing, despite the active hybrid confrontation with them, sliding into a nuclear war; (b) creating favorable conditions for Russia’s self-development, relying primarily on internal resources and maintaining/reorienting its foreign economic relations during the outbreak of the economic war with the West; maximum assistance to Russian business within the country and in foreign economic activity; (c) development of close coordination and interaction with the main ally of the Russian Federation – Belarus; development of economic integration and strengthening of military cooperation with the countries of the EAEU and the CSTO; (d) further expansion of areas of practical interaction and strengthening of mutual understanding with the main strategic partners of the Russian Federation – China and India; (e) active development of ties with Turkey, Iran, and other countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa that have not joined the sanctions regime against Russia; (f) gradual formation, together with partners in the SCO and BRICS, and other interested states, of the foundations of a new international financial architecture that does not depend on the US dollar.The conditions of a hybrid war do not leave much room for cooperation with unfriendly states – the actual enemies of Russia.

Nevertheless, it is worth maintaining, as far as possible, a situation of strategic stability with the United States and the prevention of dangerous military incidents with the United States and NATO countries. This requires the reliable functioning of communication channels with the US and NATO authorities responsible for defense and security. In solving other global problems – such as climate change, fighting epidemics or preserving nature in the Arctic – the emphasis will have to be placed on national programs and cooperation with friendly states. 

In the Ukrainian direction, the task of Russia’s foreign policy after the end of the military conflict is the formation of new relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, reliably excluding the transformation of Ukraine into a threat to Russia’s security; recognition by Kiev of the status of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation and the independence of the republics of Donbass. A promising goal is the formation of a new geopolitical reality (community) in the east of Europe based on friendly relations between Russia, Belarus, the Donbass republics, as well as relations acceptable to the Russian Federation with Ukraine.

In the context of a sharp reduction in contacts with Western countries (North America, Europe, the Anglosphere), it is necessary to redistribute Russia’s foreign diplomatic resources from the west to the east and south, starting with the neighboring CIS countries, where the diplomatic activity and effectiveness of Russia’s foreign policy are clearly insufficient.

It is time to start strengthening the expert and analytical base of Russian foreign policy, especially in the countries of the former Soviet Union, as well as Russia’s neighbors in Eurasia. Many failures, miscalculations and failures of Moscow’s foreign policy in the Ukrainian direction since the 1990s. are rooted in superficial, apex ideas about the political, social and ideological realities of modern Ukraine. Correcting the situation requires the creation of world-class centers for studying the processes taking place in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Kazakhstan, as well as in the Transcaucasus.

Along with this, it is necessary to shift the focus of foreign policy information and propaganda from Western countries, where a strong anti-Russian consensus has been formed in societies, to non-Western countries, the development of meaningful, respectful dialogues, primarily with the societies of states that have taken a neutral position in the global hybrid war. This applies primarily to the leading states of Asia, Latin America and Africa (China, India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Nigeria, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Algeria). In addition to advocacy resources, Russian research centers dealing with these regions should receive incentive support. 

With the change in the situation, the need to formulate a new guiding idea for the foreign policy of Russia in the 21st century has become even more obvious – primarily for the Russian Federation itself, its close friends and for the outside world: neutrals and situational allies.Pragmatism as a strategy is no longer acceptable in the current conditions; he descends to the level of tactics.

We need a modern-sounding “Russian idea” based on a set of values ​​that are organic for the people of Russia, and which includes a number of goals and principles: the sovereignty of states; the indivisibility of international security; justice based on law; co-development; maintaining cultural diversity; dialogue of civilizations. The main task in the ideological direction is the implementation of the declared values ​​and goals in the practical policy of the Russian state within the country, as well as in the international arena.