By Paul Robinson, Canadian Dimension, 4/1/22

In March of this year, news came from Russia that former Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais had quit his job as presidential special representative for the environment and left the country. With the exception of President Vladimir Putin’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Sergei Kirienko, there is now almost nobody left in the Russian government who served under Boris Yeltsin as part of the liberal reforming team of the 1990s. Chubais’s departure in some ways marks the end of an era.

Although the Russian political system is not a liberal one, until recently liberalism had a role to play in it. A number of what are known as “systemic liberals” have occupied prominent positions in the government, including not only Chubais but others such as: Elvira Nabiullina, head of the Central Bank; Alexei Kudrin, Chairman of the Accounts Chamber; and Ella Pamfilova, Chair of the Central Electoral Commission. Over time, though, the space available for liberalism has narrowed, and now the war in Ukraine has so restricted it that one may wonder if Russian liberalism is next to dead.

With that, the idea of Russia joining what is called the “West” has taken a near fatal blow. For 200 years, Russian intellectuals have been divided between those who believe that Russia is fated to converge with the West and those who argue that Russia must follow its own path. With the war in Ukraine, it may be that the case for convergence has been decisively lost, and that a new era of divergence has begun.

Explaining this requires a historical digression. In Western Europe, the rise of liberalism was associated with the development of capitalism and the growth of a powerful bourgeois class. In Russia, however, liberal ideas developed at a time when a capitalist bourgeoisie was largely absent. Consequently, as the early 20th century liberal politician Pavel Miliukov put it, “Russian liberalism was not bourgeois, but intellectual.” A similar dynamic has persisted in later periods, with modern liberalism being commonly associated with what are sometimes called the “creative classes.” Russian liberalism has always been an elite phenomenon, and as such has reflected the culture of that elite, which has tended to be positivist and rationalist, viewing history as an inexorable process of progress towards a known end—a liberal society in line with Western models.

One can see this as early as 1825, when a group of army officers known as the Decembrists attempted a coup against Tsar Nicholas I. Expressing their views, one of the Decembrists’ supporters, economist Nikolai Turgenev, wrote: “If one were to ask in which direction the Russian people is destined to march, I would say that the question has already been answered: it must march towards European civilization.” Two decades later, the same view was argued by one of the founders of Russian liberalism, Konstantin Kavelin. He rejected the idea of a Russian nature distinct from that of Europe, and wrote: “The difference [between the West and Russia] lies solely in the preceding historical facts; the aim, the task, the aspirations, the way forward are one and the same.” Likewise, in the late Imperial era, confronted by the complaint that Western European models did not apply to Russia, Miliukov replied that Russia had to obey “the laws of political biology.”

Stalin destroyed liberalism within the Soviet Union for a long time, but from the early 1960s it began to re-emerge, as a small but intellectually significant element of the Soviet elite sought to overcome the divisions between East and West. Particularly notable was the Prague-based journal World Marxist Review, whose staff included several men who would later serve as advisors to Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union’s last leader, such as Georgii Arbatov, Georgii Shakhnazarov, and Anatoly Chernyaev. Their view was that Stalinism had derailed Russia from the natural progression of history, and that what the Soviet Union needed was to “return to civilization.”

The reforms undertaken by Gorbachev in the late 1980s under the rubric of perestroika popularized this line of thinking. In a 1988 article, historian Leonid Batkin stated that at the start of the twentieth century, Russia had had the chance to become Western, but due to Stalin, “We have dropped out of world history… We must in our own way and in accordance with our own historical peculiarities and ideals return to the highroad of modern civilization.”

The idea that Russia must rejoin the West—as this represents the end point of history’s natural path of development—is axiomatic among post-Soviet liberals. Thus the 2012 election manifesto of the liberal Yabloko party declared: “In light of its historical fate, cultural traditions, and geography, Russia is a European country. Its future is indivisibly connected with Europe. The Russian nation’s potential can be revealed only through a creative assimilation of the values of European civilization.”

The popular appeal of this point of view is very limited. In the eyes of much of the Russian population both liberalism and Westernism have been discredited due to their association with the collapse of the Russian economy in the 1990s. In addition, acts such as the bombing of Yugoslavia, the invasion of Iraq, the bombing of Libya, and support for the Maidan revolution in Ukraine, have thoroughly tainted the West’s moral authority among Russians. As journalist Dmitry Sokolov-Mitrich writes:

“The first serious blow to our pro-Western orientation in life was Kosovo. It was a shock; our rose-colored glasses were shattered into pieces. … Second Iraq, Afghanistan, the final separation of Kosovo, ‘Arab Spring,’ Libya, Syria—all of this was surprising, but no longer earth-shattering. Illusions were lost: it was more or less clear to us what the West was about. … EuroMaidan and the subsequent fierce civil war made it clear. … We see the blood and war crimes, the bodies of women and children, an entire country sliding back into the 1940s—and the Western world, which we loved so much, assures us that none of this is happening. … It was a shock stronger than Kosovo. For me and for many thousands of middle-aged Russians, who came into the world with the American dream in our heads, the myth of the “civilized world” collapsed completely.”

In light of such views, the continued adulation of the West by Russia’s few remaining liberals leaves them open to accusations that they are unpatriotic. Tatyana Felgengauer of the now-banned liberal Ekho Moskvy radio station noted that, “The average Russian does not like Ekho Moskvy. They constantly blame us: claiming that we are the Echo of the US State Department, that we are not patriots, that we have sold ourselves to the Americans, that we are against Russia.” In 2014, the tensions between popular patriotism and the attitudes of the liberal intelligentsia came to a head following the annexation of Crimea. Whereas the vast majority of the Russian people celebrated Crimea’s “return” to Russia, most Russian liberals condemned it.

The revolution that took place in Ukraine in 2014 was seen by liberals as “an effort to join European civilization.” By contrast, the so-called “Russian Spring,” which arose in opposition to the revolution, and which involved the annexation of Crimea and the uprising in Donbas, was regarded as anti-European. As Yabloko’s one-time head, Grigory Yavlinsky, put it, “The main consequence of the current policy towards Ukraine is the strengthening of Russia’s course as a non-European country.”

In the eyes of many liberals, the Russian Spring revealed some deep psychological failing of the Russian people. As the poet Olga Sedakova wrote, it also demonstrated the gulf between the intelligentsia and the masses:

“The feeling of complete mental derangement arose at the moment of all this story about Crimea. Until then, there remained some illusions. That on the one hand there was the authorities, and on the other hand the people. … But during and after the Crimean epic we saw that the authorities’ actions fully corresponded to the aspirations of the people … Indeed, the great majority of the people truly support the authorities. … It was, of course, a difficult revelation.”

Sedakova’s statement amounts to a recognition that by taking the West’s side in Russia’s struggle against Ukraine, the Westernizing liberal intelligentsia has placed itself in opposition to the mass of the Russian people. As a member of Yabloko’s political committee, A.V. Rodionov, told his colleagues during a debate on the subject of Crimea:

“Russian society has said ‘No, Crimea is ours, and Yabloko is not ours.’ You understand, this is what has happened. We shouldn’t fool ourselves. We have crossed a red line separating society’s understanding … from society’s hostility. … I think there’s been a sort of ethical glitch. We’ve taken the enemy’s side.”

The effect has been to discredit liberalism even further in Russians’ eyes. The invasion of Ukraine has now administered what may be the coup de grâce to Westernizing ideas. Liberals have been outspoken in their opposition. While one may admire the principled nature of their stance, it has once again placed them on the side of their country’s official enemies, earning the wrath both of the state and of the general public, most of whom appear to support the war. Since the invasion, much of what remains of Russia’s remaining pro-Western, liberal-leaning media have been shut down, including the radio station Ekho Moskvy, the TV station Dozhd, and the newspaper Novaia Gazeta. If not actually dead, Russian Westernism is somewhere close to it.

In an article published on March 31, Farida Rastumova of the Latvia-based anti-Kremlin media outlet Meduza, commented that discussions with high-ranking Russian bureaucrats revealed that even those who had initially opposed the war in Ukraine had now rallied around the flag. The sweeping sanctions imposed by the West against Russia have had the effect of consolidating anti-Western feeling. As one official told her: “Those people [in the West] don’t understand who they’ve messed with. This causes a sharp reaction even among those who thought differently and asked questions [of the authorities]. Now they won’t ask questions for a long time. They will hate the West and consolidate in order to live their lives.”

“When I saw what they were doing to those poor Paralympians, that was it for me,” said another, “I don’t care about iPhones. I can use a Chinese phone. I have a German car—let me drive a Chinese or Russian one instead.” “Since they adopted sanctions against us, we’re going to fuck them,” said a third, of whom the article said, he “has long been a member of Putin’s team, but has been a considered a liberal thinker.” “Now they’ll have to buy rubles on the Moscow Exchange to buy gas from us,” he adds, “But that’s just the beginning. Now we’re going to fuck them all.”

Russians have long debated whether their country should adopt the Western model or go its own way. The comments above suggest that the argument has now been settled in favour of the latter. Following the invasion of Ukraine, the West has almost completely severed connections with Russia. Even benign activities such as cultural exchanges, which continued even during the height of the Cold War, have been cut off. Economic sanctions have been imposed which look likely to be next to permanent. It is very hard to see how either side will be able go back to the way things were. Moreover, the rise of China and other developing countries means that the West is no longer the only paradigm of an advanced, successful political and economic system. Those dissatisfied with the state of affairs at home now have models other than the West to look at.

At the end of the Cold War there was much debate between proponents of two models of the world’s future development—Francis Fukuyama’s End of History and Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations. For Russians this debate reflected their own long-lasting dispute between Westernizing liberal historical determinists on the one hand and conservative believers in distinct paths of civilizational development on the other. The latter have won the day, and there may be no turning back.

The below is a transcript of an email interview I conducted recently with Tarik Cyril Amar about the use and abuse of history in connection with the Russia-Ukraine war. Amar is an historian of the twentieth century, writing about World War Two, the postwar period, as well as our twenty first-century present. He has lived, studied, done research, and worked in Turkey, the United States, Great Britain, Ukraine, Russia, Poland, and Germany and is now teaching at the Department of History of Koc University in Istanbul. His website is www.tcyrilamar.com.

In recent weeks we’ve seen people comparing Putin to Hitler and even going beyond that and implying that Putin is somehow worse than Hitler – e.g. that Hitler didn’t kill ethnic Germans (a claim that Michael McFaul begrudgingly backtracked on) – and then we had Lloyd Blankfein tweeting out that “even Hitler didn’t permit his military to use chemical weapons…”  I’ve found this deeply disturbing on a couple of different levels.  The first – this gross misrepresentation of history when comparing Putin to Hitler.  The second – that it’s clearly being used to manipulate people on behalf of an agenda, to support more escalatory policies.  So my questions are:

NB: We can oppose Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, but comparing him to Hitler who occupied most of Europe and perpetrated a holocaust that killed millions seems like an affront to historical accuracy and to Hitler’s victims.  What are your thoughts?

Amar: Equating Putin and Hitler betrays historical ignorance, disrespect for Hitler’s victims (deliberately or not), and irresponsibility. There is no doubt that Putin has launched a criminal war of aggression, which is a crime in and of itself. Moreover, the Russian military is committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine. Putin is also an authoritarian who has repressed opposition and media at home. And we could go on. 

Yet the fact remains that he is, at least at this stage, not in the same category as Hitler – or, for that matter, Stalin. Regarding launching a war of aggression, he is no worse or better than George W. Bush and Tony Blair (Iraq, 2003); regarding authoritarianism, he has all too many peers, some allied with the West. Regarding war crimes and crimes against humanity, again, he is not, unfortunately, exceptional. There may be differences of degree and, as it were, “style,” but it is a fact that we can find such crimes committed against Palestinians by Israel, for instance, or against Yemenis by Saudi Arabia. It may be depressing, but in our world, Putin, with all his crimes, is much less exceptional (in the statistical, not moral, sense) than equating him with Hitler suggests. In fact, one psychological function of this misguided practice may be to avoid precisely that uncomfortable fact.

NB: I tend to think that a major contributing factor to this phenomenon is that nearly all of the people who fought/lived through WWII are dead now.  The horrors of that war are not in living memory for 98% of the population so there’s not as much pushback on this kind of nonsense.  Do you agree or do you think there’s something else at play?

Amar: It’s possible that the passing of the immediate witnesses makes a difference. But World War Two has always been open to “creative retelling” and misleading, politicized appropriation – in the West as well as in Russia (and, formerly, the Soviet Union). So, I am not sure how important that specific factor is now. Concerning what else may be in play, one powerful factor is the fact that – unlike with, for instance, the Korean or Vietnam Wars – World War Two still has a mostly unquestioned reputation as the West’s and especially the USA’s “good war.” This has to do with the fact that darker sides, such as the horrific crime of dropping of not one but two atom bombs on cities in Japan, an already defeated country, have not been dealt with with sufficient honesty by the public in general. The critical scholarship is, of course, there. But the public image has not responded with a genuine, adequate reckoning. In Russia, meanwhile the narrative of the Great Fatherland War (see below) has made it very hard to honestly come to terms with, for instance, the fact that at the beginning of World War two, there was a period of de facto German-Soviet collusion. Moreover, the biases of that narrative have also contributed to a partial and, of course, deeply misguided rehabilitation of Stalin.

NB: Similarly, we keep seeing commentary and questioning from the US mainstream media and pundits who are minimizing the dangers of nuclear war, like they’re trying to get people to accept the possibility of WWIII as no big deal.  A recent poll in the US found that 35% of respondents thought it was worth supporting policies against Russia that risked nuclear war between US/NATO and Russia.  Again, I can’t help but think that because the horror of the atomic bombs being dropped on Japan is not in the living memory of 98% of Americans, it’s easier for people to take this lackadaisical attitude.  It seems to be an indictment of our education and culture.  As an historian and an educator, what do you think?

Amar: I agree that, in general, we lack a robust awareness of the nature of nuclear war. In the early 1980s, for instance, that was different, at least to a degree. There was widespread and healthy fear of such a war. My sense is that it has largely dissipated. More worryingly, again, is that we see clear attempts to “popularize” the idea of “limited” nuclear war. That toxic illusion could prove devastating, literally.

NB: I know you think that there has been a serious misuse of history in Russia also in relation to this conflict.  Of course, I’m more aware of examples in the US.  Can you discuss how you think the distortion of history on the Russian side has contributed to this conflict?

Amar: The single most important and worst factor is the Russian instrumentalizing of World War Two, or, to be precise, of the memory of the war between Nazi Germany (and its allies) and the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945, known in Russian as the Great Fatherland War. It is true that this has long been an important memory, which, in and of itself, is natural, since it really was a decisive part of the defeat of global World War Two fascism and, at the same time, enormously costly – in human lives and everything else – for the whole Soviet Union. 

What is anything but natural is the nationalist appropriation of that experience and its memory by the Russian leadership, its media, and conformist intellectuals and talking heads. This policy has produced the intellectual and moral perversion of trying to “justify” an attack on Ukraine as “denazification.” This is as pure a case of the abuse of “history” as you can find anywhere.

One key aspect of this specific lie is the false Russian allegation that the far right dominates contemporary Ukraine. In reality, while the latter has played an unusual and worrying role, especially since 2014, it has never ruled Ukraine or represented a majority view, even while it certainly would like to achieve cultural hegemony. 

Russian propaganda, however, is, in essence, equating the Soviet World War Two struggle against Nazism and what is currently, in reality, a Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. This is not only deeply wrong, it also has very disturbing implications: By depicting its war in these false and apocalyptic terms, Russia has made possible massive escalation, including by committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, both of which have already occurred, to one precise extent or the other. 

Ultimately, in retrospect, this Russian propaganda strategy will also do something else, namely sully and diminish the memory of the real struggle against Nazism, that is the one that did actually take place during World War Two. From now on, for many the shadow of the current Russian manipulation and instrumentalization will inevitably fall on this past. It is a stunning and horrifying irony, but the worst offense against a true, or at least a truer memory of the Soviet World War Two fight against Nazism is committed by Russia’s leadership, by it is its decision to misuse this past to seek to “justify” a war of aggression.

By Dmitry Trenin, Global Affairs Journal (Russia), 3/21/22 (English translation via Google Translate); Dmitry Trenin is Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center

February 24, 2022 – the beginning of a special military operation in Ukraine – opened a new period in Russian history and became a turning point in modern international politics. Russia’s relations with the West, which had been steadily deteriorating over the previous decade, have finally collapsed. In response to actions in Ukraine, the West threatens to turn Russia into an international outcast, consistently blocks its foreign economic relations, and tries to influence Russian society by isolating it from the outside world.

Against the background of the consolidation of the West around the United States, Russia and China are drawing closer together. Coalitions of great powers are being formed in the world, opposing each other on the most important issues of the world order and fundamental values. Globalization is being replaced by regionalization, the world is splitting into opposing military-political, financial-economic and technological blocs. Politics dominates the economy. The well-known formula of thirty years ago is turned inside out: It’s geopolitics, stupid!

In this virtual military situation, the “re-edition” of the Russian Federation is inevitable. The main direction of government measures is the mobilization of all available resources and the maximum expansion of economic freedoms within the country while simultaneously supporting socially vulnerable segments of the population. But these are only the first urgent measures. The country needs fundamental changes: blocking the channels that feed corruption; reorientation of big business to national interests; a new personnel policy to significantly improve the quality of public administration at all levels; social solidarity; the return of fundamental – not monetary – values ​​as the basis of life. These changes, in turn, are impossible without overcoming the remaining elements of offshore oligarchic capitalism, wide rotation and improvement of the ruling elite,

The most important front of confrontation is taking place within Russian society. It is possible to cope with an external challenge only under the condition of self-purification and self-determination. It is necessary to defeat not only theft and embezzlement, but also cynicism, primitive materialism, unbelief; become citizens in the full sense of the word; decide for what a person lives and a country exists – and without what, if this thesis is expanded, life and existence become meaningless; refuse to lie to others and to ourselves. Hopes for such a turn arose during the “Russian spring” of 2014, but they were not realized, which gave rise to disappointment. Now there is a second chance. We must learn the lesson of history: the Russian state is practically invincible from the outside, but it is crumbling to the ground,

Not “second cold”

In Russia’s foreign policy, there has been a transition from the confrontation (confrontation) with the collective West that began in 2014 to an active hybrid war with it. Hybrid war is a sharp confrontation, including armed conflicts (so far indirect) of varying degrees of intensity, with the exception of a general nuclear war; economic, financial and technological blockade; information war; cyber attacks; terrorism; subversion and so on. A hybrid war is not a Cold War II, because the Russian Federation is not the Soviet Union, and the rest of the world has changed a lot over the past decades. But, like the Cold War, hybrid confrontation is an acute form of struggle for a new world order.

The transition from confrontation to a hybrid war means that the time for maneuvers and attempts to convince “partners”, “colleagues” is over, the viscous confrontation with them has been replaced by a sharp confrontation. The degradation of relations over the past two decades has gone from the so-called value gap in the 2000s to to a trust deficit in the 2010s and open hostility in the early 2020s. The United States and its allies (the Russian Foreign Ministry has defined a list of “unfriendly states”) are now not opponents, but opponents of Russia. The West is cutting ties with Russia – both with the state and with society – in all areas. This gap is permanent. The West will not “understand”, will not “soften” and will not “be kind” to Russia. For Western countries, Russia, called a threat and declared an international pariah, has become the most important factor in internal consolidation around the United States, and as such it will be indispensable for the foreseeable future. In any case, the return of relations between the Russian Federation and the West to the past (be it before February 2022 or before February 2014 – you can continue) is definitely impossible.

The goals of the opposing sides are the most decisive. For the West, led by Washington, the main goal is not just to change the political regime in Russia, but also to eliminate Russia as a large independent entity on the world stage, ideally locking it into internal conflicts and contradictions. For Russia, the main goal is to become a self-sufficient and independent of the West in economic, financial and technological terms, a great power, one of the centers and leaders of the emerging new polycentric world order. These goals leave no room for strategic compromise.

Objectively, many tasks of Russia coincide with the aspirations of a number of non-Western states – not only China, but partly India, other members of the BRICS group. At the same time, the world “non-West”, unlike the West, is not a coalition united by common interests and values. The interests of the various countries of this part of the world system are very different, the contradictions between them – for example, between India and China, India and Pakistan, Iran and the Arab countries – are strong and lead to conflicts. More importantly, unlike Russia (and Iran), the rest of the leading countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America remain deeply integrated into the American-centric financial and economic system, and many are politically and ideologically dependent on the United States.Under these conditions, Russia should not count on significant assistance and support from non-Western partners – their actual neutrality, that is, non-participation in anti-Russian sanctions, will be enough. Russia will mostly have to rely on its own strength.

Strategically important Asia

Nevertheless, Russia’s relations with Asia’s two largest powers, China and India, are of major strategic importance. The rise of the PRC naturally led to its confrontation with the United States, which seeks to maintain, if not dominance, then primacy in the world system. At the same time, thanks to the progressive development of Russian-Chinese relations over the past three decades, the quality of partnership between Moscow and Beijing has become unprecedentedly high. The sharp confrontation between the United States and Russia, as well as the escalating confrontation between America and China, are objectively leading to a new type of alliance – “without borders”, but also without strict obligations – between Russia and China. In the context of an economic war with the West, Beijing for Moscow for the foreseeable future is the most important partner in the field of finance, technology, and economics.

Russia’s relations with India are based on long-standing traditions of friendship and mutual sympathy. The growth of the importance and role of India in the world is in the interests of Russia. The increase in the economic power of India, its technological development expand the potential for interaction with Russia. At the same time, the contradictions between Delhi and Beijing, as well as the political and economic rapprochement between India and the United States against the backdrop of a hybrid war between the US and Russia and ever closer cooperation between the Russian Federation and China, pose a serious challenge to Russian-Indian relations. An urgent task is to strengthen the strategic partnership between Moscow and Delhi in order to bring it to the level of Russian-Chinese cooperation. As politics begins to dominate the economy,

Most of the international organizations in which Russia participates are dominated by the United States and/or its allies. Typical examples are the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Council of Europe. The exit of the Russian Federation from the Council of Europe is a long overdue step. Even the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which originated in the Soviet Union, is under the decisive influence of Western countries. The exception is the United Nations, where Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has the right to veto. It makes sense for Moscow, which has an active position in the UN and its institutions, to focus much more on organizations of non-Western countries – BRICS, SCO, RIC, as well as organizations in which Russia plays a leading role – the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Treaty Organization. security. On all these platforms, it is necessary to develop and promote the global agenda, the outlines of which were outlined in the joint Russian-Chinese statement of February 4, 2022. These theses should be turned into a global platform for the interaction of interested states.

Foreign Policy Tasks

The priority tasks of Russia’s foreign policy in the new conditions seem to be quite obvious: (a) strategic deterrence of the adversary – the United States and its NATO allies, preventing, despite the active hybrid confrontation with them, sliding into a nuclear war; (b) creating favorable conditions for Russia’s self-development, relying primarily on internal resources and maintaining/reorienting its foreign economic relations during the outbreak of the economic war with the West; maximum assistance to Russian business within the country and in foreign economic activity; (c) development of close coordination and interaction with the main ally of the Russian Federation – Belarus; development of economic integration and strengthening of military cooperation with the countries of the EAEU and the CSTO; (d) further expansion of areas of practical interaction and strengthening of mutual understanding with the main strategic partners of the Russian Federation – China and India; (e) active development of ties with Turkey, Iran, and other countries of Asia, Latin America, and Africa that have not joined the sanctions regime against Russia; (f) gradual formation, together with partners in the SCO and BRICS, and other interested states, of the foundations of a new international financial architecture that does not depend on the US dollar.The conditions of a hybrid war do not leave much room for cooperation with unfriendly states – the actual enemies of Russia.

Nevertheless, it is worth maintaining, as far as possible, a situation of strategic stability with the United States and the prevention of dangerous military incidents with the United States and NATO countries. This requires the reliable functioning of communication channels with the US and NATO authorities responsible for defense and security. In solving other global problems – such as climate change, fighting epidemics or preserving nature in the Arctic – the emphasis will have to be placed on national programs and cooperation with friendly states. 

In the Ukrainian direction, the task of Russia’s foreign policy after the end of the military conflict is the formation of new relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, reliably excluding the transformation of Ukraine into a threat to Russia’s security; recognition by Kiev of the status of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation and the independence of the republics of Donbass. A promising goal is the formation of a new geopolitical reality (community) in the east of Europe based on friendly relations between Russia, Belarus, the Donbass republics, as well as relations acceptable to the Russian Federation with Ukraine.

In the context of a sharp reduction in contacts with Western countries (North America, Europe, the Anglosphere), it is necessary to redistribute Russia’s foreign diplomatic resources from the west to the east and south, starting with the neighboring CIS countries, where the diplomatic activity and effectiveness of Russia’s foreign policy are clearly insufficient.

It is time to start strengthening the expert and analytical base of Russian foreign policy, especially in the countries of the former Soviet Union, as well as Russia’s neighbors in Eurasia. Many failures, miscalculations and failures of Moscow’s foreign policy in the Ukrainian direction since the 1990s. are rooted in superficial, apex ideas about the political, social and ideological realities of modern Ukraine. Correcting the situation requires the creation of world-class centers for studying the processes taking place in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Kazakhstan, as well as in the Transcaucasus.

Along with this, it is necessary to shift the focus of foreign policy information and propaganda from Western countries, where a strong anti-Russian consensus has been formed in societies, to non-Western countries, the development of meaningful, respectful dialogues, primarily with the societies of states that have taken a neutral position in the global hybrid war. This applies primarily to the leading states of Asia, Latin America and Africa (China, India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Nigeria, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Algeria). In addition to advocacy resources, Russian research centers dealing with these regions should receive incentive support. 

With the change in the situation, the need to formulate a new guiding idea for the foreign policy of Russia in the 21st century has become even more obvious – primarily for the Russian Federation itself, its close friends and for the outside world: neutrals and situational allies.Pragmatism as a strategy is no longer acceptable in the current conditions; he descends to the level of tactics.

We need a modern-sounding “Russian idea” based on a set of values ​​that are organic for the people of Russia, and which includes a number of goals and principles: the sovereignty of states; the indivisibility of international security; justice based on law; co-development; maintaining cultural diversity; dialogue of civilizations. The main task in the ideological direction is the implementation of the declared values ​​and goals in the practical policy of the Russian state within the country, as well as in the international arena.

The original article at Wall Street Journal is behind a paywall, so I’ve only been able to see a couple of excerpts and summaries by other outlets such as the one below from RT. A few thoughts come to mind.

First, if this report is true, then German Chancellor Schotz, after Zelensky’s refusal, should have publicly declared that Germany’s official position on Ukraine’s membership in NATO would be to veto it. The fact that he did not shows that at the moment of truth, Schotz chose to defer to a provocative agenda and the ridiculous position of Ukraine’s president, at the expense of Europe’s long-term stability and security. Ditto for Macron of France. Neither had the backbone to be a true statesman in the runup to this war.

Another thing this report reveals is that Zelensky – far from being the one-dimensional superhero he is being made out to be in western media – is an arrogant fool who wildly misjudged his leverage and the people of his country are paying a horrible price for it. – Natylie

Zelensky rejected peace offer days before Russian offensive – WSJ

RT.com, 4/3/22

German chancellor Olaf Scholz had offered Volodymyr Zelensky a chance for peace just days before the launch of the Russian military offensive, but the Ukrainian president turned it down, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) has reported.

Scholz had made what the US outlet described as “one last push for a settlement between Moscow and Kiev” less than a week before the Russian forces were sent into Ukraine on February 24.

The chancellor told Zelensky in Munich on February 19 “that Ukraine should renounce its NATO aspirations and declare neutrality as part of a wider European security deal between the West and Russia,” the paper writes. The daily also claims that “the pact would be signed by Mr. Putin and Mr. Biden, who would jointly guarantee Ukraine’s security.”

However, Zelensky rejected the offer to make the concession and avoid confrontation, saying that “[Russia’s President Vladimir] Putin couldn’t be trusted to uphold such an agreement and that most Ukrainians wanted to join NATO,” the WSJ reports, without revealing its sources for the information.

“His answer left German officials worried that the chances of peace were fading,” the report points out…

Read full article here.

By Fred Weir, Christian Science Monitor, 3/31/22

Editor’s note: This article was edited in order to conform with Russian legislation criminalizing references to Russia’s current action in Ukraine as anything other than a “special military operation.”

Anna Afanasyeva, a fifth-year nursing student at St. Petersburg’s Pediatric University, admits she was feeling vague anti-war emotions as she went about her business in the city center March 2. But she says she had no intention of participating in any protests.

Nevertheless, she suddenly found herself grabbed by police near the Gostiny Dvor metro station in downtown St. Petersburg, where no rally even seemed to be happening, and thrown into a police van along with several other people.

She spent two nights in police detention before being taken to court. A sympathetic judge considered the charge of participating in an illegal assembly, noted that Ms. Afanasyeva had no previous record, and let her off with a light fine. That was just the beginning of her troubles.

“Without even waiting for the court decision, my university summarily expelled me,” she says. “There was no due process according to the rules for expelling a student. I was just told to leave. I am trying to solve this, hopefully without suing the university. If I go that way I can lose a year or more of studies. … I am just so upset about all this. I’ve heard that there is a blanket order to expel all students who participate in anti-war activities, and I just fell victim to it.”

Welcome to Russia in the second month of the “special military operation” in Ukraine, where the social and political atmosphere – never very receptive to dissenting opinions – is rapidly chilling. Military conflict can have harsh effects on any society, proscribing criticism and tarring anti-war sentiments as treason. But for many Russians trying to find their feet and feel their way through frightening political restrictions not seen in the lifetimes of most, the dangers remain the source of deep uncertainty.

Timur, another St. Petersburg student, was briefly detained by police for alleged illegal protesting and let go. But he has been expelled from his university. The vice rector called Timur into his office and told him that “you are the kind of person who would stab us in the back and spit on the graves of our soldiers. … You are not wanted here.” Timur has retained a lawyer to appeal the expulsion, and faces military conscription if he can’t get the decision reversed. “I really want to finish my studies,” he says.

According to the Latvia-based online news service Zerkalo, a dozen members of Russia’s National Guard from the southern region of Krasnodar refused to deploy to Ukraine in late February on the grounds that their duties were confined to Russian territory, and were immediately fired. They appealed to lawyers and sued for reinstatement.

One of the lawyers, Mikhail Banyash, says that of the original 12 guardsmen, most have quit and only 3 are still pressing the case.

“The pressure they have been subjected to testifies that their case is sound,” says Mr. Banyash. “But it’s a complicated case, and I can’t predict how it might turn out.”

“True patriots” vs. “scum and traitors”

The tone has been set by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who recently adopted rhetoric that hasn’t been heard in Russia for a very long time. Apparently referring to Russians with a pro-Western point of view as internal enemies, he said: “The collective West is trying to divide our society using, to its own advantage, combat losses and the socioeconomic consequences of the sanctions, and to provoke civil unrest in Russia and use its fifth column in an attempt to achieve this goal. … But any nation, and even more so the Russian people, will always be able to distinguish true patriots from scum and traitors and will simply spit them out like an insect in their mouth, spit them onto the pavement.”

So far the police crackdown on people who allegedly express opposition to the ongoing military operation has been relatively mild by Russian standards. According to the protest-monitoring group OVD-Info, about 15,000 people have been detained by police since the operation began, the majority of them receiving administrative fines rather than prison sentences.

The main impact to date of the crisis has been the shock and emotional dislocation that has been disproportionately suffered by more youthful, educated, and professional Russians, with many thousands quitting their jobs or even leaving the country. Critical media voices, both independent and mainstream, have been effectively silenced, with Novaya Gazeta being the last independent outlet to close its doors.

Ironically, the same segment of society has also been affected most immediately and deeply by the intensifying Western-imposed sanctions regime, as a result of being cut off from family, property, work, and travel to the West.

Polls suggest popular support is actually consolidating behind Russian authorities as the conflict intensifies, though Lev Gudkov, director of the independent pollster Levada Center, says that under-30s tend to be far more skeptical of official claims than their elders.

“Russian youth are far more negative toward the military operation, those between 15 and 30,” who make up about 15% of the population, he says. “They are scared of the consequences of war, particularly young men who face the prospect of military service. … Perhaps half of the youth are opposed to the operation, but many are also indifferent, who don’t want to notice events. But on the whole, there seems little appetite for public protest.”

“I don’t believe that I should hide”

For the moment, at least, many politically active young people seem to think that they can adapt to the situation and navigate around the increasingly draconian laws against “fake news” concerning the special military operation.

Nikita, a liberal political activist, publishes carefully calculated criticism on social media, but says he would rather his full name not appear in a U.S. newspaper “under these circumstances.” Still, he’s happy to discuss the dangerous ambiguities that regulate any sort of political speech in Russia today.

“We are faced with new rules. We just don’t know where the boundaries are, or what it’s going to be like tomorrow,” he says. “I am just not sure what I can say. Will I be punished or not? On the first day [of the operation] I posted a note on one of my social media pages that I believe in diplomacy, but not the diplomacy of the tank. It doesn’t seem to have been noticed, but who knows? … I think we just have to wait, survive, until this operation ends. Then we will see what Russia has changed into, what is the new Russia? Then we’ll have a better idea about how to go forward.”

Egor Kotkin is a left-wing activist who has no problem with speaking plainly. He has long lived an openly gay lifestyle in Moscow, and says he finds Russians to be generally much more tolerant and open-minded than their leaders.

A promotional writer for IT companies, Mr. Kotkin says he never watches TV, has generally opposition-minded co-workers, and mainly encounters pro-Kremlin views through his partner’s family and his relationship with his mother. She is a big fan of Mr. Putin, he says.

“My mother has formed a relationship, through the media, with Putin and the regime. She sees them as part of her life; she trusts them on a personal level. I try not to touch that, because it would spoil my relations with my mom. I guess a lot of families are like that,” he says.

“I don’t believe that I should hide. But we seem to be living under something like martial law. So, anything can change.”