by Mark Episkopos, The National Interest, 4/16/22

As Russia’s war in Ukraine stretches into its second month, the risks of catastrophic nuclear escalation between Moscow and the West continue to mount.

Spurred by the war in Ukraine, Finland and Sweden are reportedly moving ahead with a possible bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). “Everything changed when Russia invaded Ukraine,” said Finnish prime minister Sanna Marin on Wednesday during a joining conference in Stockholm with her Swedish counterpart, Magdalena Andersson. “I think people’s mindsets in Finland, also in Sweden, changed and [were] shaped very dramatically because of Russia’s actions. This is very clear and that caused a need for a process in Finland to have a discussion about our own security choices,” said Marin.

It was reported earlier this week that Finland is poised to apply for NATO membership before the end of May, with Sweden to soon follow. London has voiced support for the expansion of NATO into Finland and Sweden. “Sweden and Finland are free to choose their future without interference — the UK will support whatever they decide,” tweeted British foreign secretary Liz Truss. NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg has echoed this message, telling CNN earlier in April that the two northern European countries would be “very much welcomed” if they choose to join NATO. The Biden administration has so far been more ambivalent in its public messaging, but has reportedly held behind-the-scenes consultations with Helsinki and Stockholm regarding their possible NATO bid.

Russia has threatened that the NATO accession of Sweden and Finland, which would bolster the alliance’s presence in the Baltic Sea and potentially militarize the 800-mile-long Finnish-Russian frontier, will prompt a new wave of nuclear escalation. “If Sweden and Finland join NATO, the length of the land borders of the alliance with the Russian Federation will more than double. Naturally, these boundaries will have to be strengthened,” said Dmitry Medvedev, a former Russian president who now serves as deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council. “There can be no more talk of any nuclear-free status for the Baltic — the balance must be restored,” he said, implying that the move would prompt Russia to station nuclear weapons in the Baltic region in retaliation.

The West has shrugged off the Kremlin’s warnings: “Russian threats towards the Nordic & Baltic states are not new and only strengthen our unity,” Truss said in a tweet. Carl Bildt, a former prime minister of Sweden, dismissed Medvedev’s statement as a “fairly empty threat,” pointing to the alleged presence of nuclear weapons in Russia’s central European enclave of Kaliningrad.

NATO’s newfound willingness to entertain security options that would previously have been rejected as too risky and needlessly provocative highlights the contours of an emerging, post-February 24 approach to Russia policy. “The age of engagement with Russia is over,” declared Truss at a dinner earlier this month with her NATO counterparts. NATO must instead base its approach on “resilience, defence and deterrence,” she said, adding that the core principle of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act—namely, that the two sides “do not consider each other as adversaries”—is now dead.

As Russia prepares for a new offensive in the eastern Donbass region, the West is doubling down on what has been an unprecedented program of military aid to Ukraine. Washington is not just giving Ukraine weapons but telling it where to point them. According to recent reporting, the Biden administration has significantly loosened internal guidelines with the aim of allowing the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence services to share real-time targeting information with the Ukrainian military. The Biden administration is still reportedly reluctant to provide Ukraine’s armed forces with targeting information against Russian forces in Russia. But with mounting pressure from Republicans and Democrats who argue that the United States is not doing enough to support the Ukrainian war effort, it appears to be only a matter of time until that line is crossed as well.

Even as they continue to provide the weapons and intelligence information to keep the war going indefinitely, NATO’s major members have effectively constrained Ukraine’s bargaining position in ongoing peace talks. “We need to ensure that any future talks don’t end up selling Ukraine out, or repeating the mistakes of the past,” announced the British Foreign Ministry. “We remember the uneasy settlement of 2014 which failed to give Ukraine lasting security. [Vladimir] Putin just came back for more. That is why we cannot allow him to win from this appalling aggression.” The European Union, meanwhile, has demanded that the Kremlin “immediately and unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine,” adding that Russia must “fully respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence within its internationally recognised borders.” In other words, any peace deal that would allow the Kremlin to save face appears to be unacceptable to the West. Any relevant concession, whether in the form of guarantees against NATO expansion or flexibility regarding the status of certain territories to Ukraine’s east, is treated as all but a moral crime.

A majority coalition of Western governments appears to be working not to facilitate a negotiated settlement to end the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Ukraine, but to draw the Kremlin into a years-long quagmire that would make the Afghan mujahideen pale by comparison.

Kiev is being encouraged by its Western benefactors not to consider pragmatic, creative solutions aimed at swiftly ending the bloodshed, but to pursue a maximalist agenda on the battlefield and the negotiating table. Some congressional Republicans are pressuring the Biden administration to facilitate Ukrainian counter-offensives to retake all territories occupied by Russia, including Crimea and the breakaway Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (DNR and LPR). As the fighting shifts eastward, calls to help Ukraine take the fight to Russia will likely grow louder. The intention among many Western lawmakers is to back Moscow into a corner; but what might happen if they succeed?

There is no indication that the Kremlin, which is convinced its existential interests are at stake in the ongoing conflict, has any intention of backing off in the face of the West’s maximum pressure campaign. To the contrary, all current signs point to further escalation. CIA director William Burns warned on Thursday that if Russia proves unable to reverse its military setbacks in Ukraine through conventional means, Moscow could eventually make the decision to employ low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. As hopes for a diplomatic off-ramp fade, the war in Ukraine is poised to roil the European continent—and further destabilize the international system—with no end in sight.

“Why are you pro Putin?” This was how a woman responded to me on Twitter when I provided some historical context to the current war between Russia and Ukraine, though nothing I had said implied what I thought about Putin either way. It’s a common tactic in media and social media. When someone tries to present a contextual history of the conflict that is inconvenient to the overly simplistic Marvel comic book depiction that is constantly pounded home by most establishment media in the US, they and what they say are equated with being pro-Putin or a Russian propagandist.

It’s a convenient way to avoid engaging with the substance of the argument being made. Indeed, it often is a way to avoid facts the person employing this device doesn’t like. And that represents a disturbing trend highlighted by this conflict – the increasing tendency for people to decide whether to acknowledge facts based on whether they like them or not. Even more disturbing is that this anti-intellectual line of thinking is often being practiced by people who consider themselves to be liberals.

When I was growing up liberals would never have accused a sociologist who studies crime and tries to understand its dynamics of being pro-criminal.  A scientist who studied cancer would not have been considered a cancer apologist. Quite the contrary, liberals would have hailed the sociologist and scientist as carrying on in the best tradition of the Enlightenment principles of open debate and fearless, in-depth exploration of a topic to gain a constructive understanding of it. But if someone tries to apply these same principles in 2022 to geopolitics and a war that has the potential for grave escalations, it’s beyond the pale.

A recent commenter on one of my articles posted to Medium, in which I relayed the thoughts of several people in Russia I’m in contact with about the war and sanctions, asked me why I didn’t say what I thought about Putin and the Russian government. She clearly couldn’t accept the merits of hearing what Russians had to say unless the person who’d reported it had made an anti-Putin statement first. Because I hadn’t done that, my reporting was “sus” as the saying goes these days.  Apparently, Americans are so used to “reporting” that reinforces one viewpoint that they can’t fathom someone reporting what people in another country think that doesn’t jibe with their preconceived ideas. There must be something nefarious going on. As another commenter on the article warned, I might be getting paid by Russia.  After all, a writer who lives in a one room studio and doesn’t own a car must have a Putin-affiliated Russian oligarch benefactor. It’s the only explanation.

What Does “Pro-Putin” Actually Mean?

I’ve stated several times on social media, in a podcast interview in early March, and in my last feature-length article that I oppose Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. I had even made it clear in the Twitter exchange with the lady mentioned above right before she accused me of being pro-Putin. How I could oppose one of the most consequential decisions Putin has ever made and still be pro-Putin is a bit of a mystery to me.  But I’ve seen this thinking even used against solid Putin critics when they don’t engage in the requisite vilification of the Russian president and preface every statement with “I hate Putin.”

I’ve even seen famous Russian journalist Vladimir Pozner characterized as pro-Putin. I know for a fact, based on words directly out of Pozner’s mouth, that he “doesn’t like the guy” (referring to Putin) and has publicly criticized the Russian president numerous times over the years. But if you try to explain why Putin’s attitude toward the West changed over the years or you don’t use over-the-top rhetoric about Putin being Hitler, Stalin and Jeffrey Dahmer all rolled into one, then you’re simply pro-Putin.

It’s hard to understand how this childish level of discourse helps anything. I’m guessing that it makes people feel good on an emotional level to disregard what anyone has to say that might cause the slightest bit of cognitive dissonance. But, as an analyst of Russia, I don’t see my job as providing people with emotional comfort. I see my job as providing factual analysis about Russia to the best of my ability. In this vein, I’m not pro-Putin or anti-Putin, but have tried to study and assess the Russian president based on the best information I could find, including the historical, social and geopolitical context of his governance.  I’ve also tried to convey how Russians view him and why.

I’m fallible so there will be – and have been – times when I’m wrong. This is why people should read a wide variety of sources and hear different views and then draw their own conclusions. But this widespread attitude of only wanting to hear what makes one feel good or secure blocks that endeavor by shutting down anything beyond one simplistic and decontextualized viewpoint from the debate.

The bottom line is that if one is interested in figuring out how to end this terrible conflict without a dangerous escalation, then one needs to understand how we got here.  That means understanding the complex contextual background of it and that includes discussing the less-than-innocent role of our own government. Anything else strikes me as empty sloganeering and virtue signaling.

On September 27, 2018, Yale’s Program in Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, and the Poynter Fellowship for Journalism hosted Vladimir Pozner, the acclaimed Russian-American journalist and broadcaster. Pozner spoke on the impact of US foreign policy towards Russia after the Soviet Union had been disbanded, and shared his opinions on a range of issues raised by the audience, from the alleged Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential elections, to Skripal poisoning, to the state of independent media in Russia and the US.

By Andrey Kortunov, Russian International Affairs Council, 4/14/22

Kortunov has a Ph.D. in History and is Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, RIAC member

The interim results of the Russian-Ukrainian talks in Istanbul unsurprisingly produced a surge of optimism among all those in Moscow who consider diplomacy the main tool for achieving peace and solving the “Ukrainian issue”. Within the expert community, they started exploring the prospects for an early Putin-Zelensky meeting, trying to envisage appropriate mechanisms for multilateral security guarantees to Ukraine (as much as to Russia), agreeing on potential compromises on territorial issues and even about blueprints for the post-conflict reconstruction of Ukraine.

However, adherents of diplomatic solutions were immediately confronted by numerous implicit and explicit opponents. Champions of the ‘military solution’ started accusing Russian negotiators of unforgivable credulity, excessive softness and almost of an outright betrayal of Russia’s national interests. In the public space, statements poured in, suggesting that the Ukrainian side is “non-negotiable” in principle, that Kiev needs negotiations only in order to create the appearance of moving forward, and that, therefore, Russia’s special operation must be brought “to a victorious end” in any case, even if it is accompanied by large-scale losses and costs.

Emphasis on diplomacy

These mixed reactions to the results of the Istanbul round of negotiations can hardly be considered accidental. They reflect the two fundamentally different understandings of the desirable and even of the plausible resolution of the ongoing conflict that currently coexist in the Russian society. Part of the society firmly believes that the current conflict can only be ended with a political compromise—for this compromise to be achieved, both sides must demonstrate willingness to make significant concessions. The other part of the society apparently sticks to the vision of the conflict ending with a complete and unconditional surrender of Kiev. Therefore, any significant concessions or compromises on the part of Moscow should not even be considered.

It would be tempting to offer some general explaining the diversion in public positions regarding the special military operation. For example, claiming that the Russian establishment is in favor of a military solution, while ordinary people want peace. Or saying that the military experts tend to focus on the continuation of the special operation, while their civilian colleagues prefer to discuss diplomacy. Or arguing that the older generation demands the unconditional surrender of Kiev, with young Russians tending to look for political compromises.

However, it seems that the lines of divergence have more emerged within various professional, social and age groups rather than between them. Let us recall, for instance, a public appeal to the President and citizens of Russia, by Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, published on the eve of the special operation, warning against attempts at a military solution to the “Ukrainian issue”. It is difficult to associate someone like General Ivashov with political dissidents, or armchair experts who have never sniffed gunpowder, or with yellow-haired chicks with no life experience. The conflict in Ukraine has produced completely new coalitions and alliances cutting across traditional partisan groupings and old political preferences.

What are the main disagreements in the assessments of the Ukrainian crisis? First of all, proponents of a diplomatic solution perceive Vladimir Zelensky as the legitimate leader of a large European country—an indispensable, even if not the most convenient partner for negotiations. Those who endorse a military solution would like to present Zelensky and his negotiating team as puppets of the West with no political ‘subjectivity’, which is why they claim it makes no sense to seriously discuss anything with them but the terms of surrender.

The diplomatic approach implies an intention to treat Ukraine as a young and not fully matured, but an unquestionably sovereign state that has an inalienable right to make an independent choice on the vector of its economic, social and political development. The rejection of the diplomatic approach reduces Ukraine to an unenviable position of a platform for geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West, a “no man’s land”, an eternal “Wild Field”, which possesses no destiny of its own and has neither national sovereignty nor national identity.

Hawk’s peck

The emphasis on diplomacy means Russia’s readiness to limit itself to the already well-known set of specific and generally negotiable demands on Kiev, including Ukraine’s abstention from attempts to join NATO, certain restrictions imposed on the offensive capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces, legislative measures taken to counter radical ethnic nationalism and other forms of political extremism, ensuring the security of the proclaimed Donbass republics, etc. The rejection of diplomacy suggests that Russia has to insist on a complete reset of the “Ukrainian project” as such, including a change of the currently existing political regime in the country and a subsequent revision of the fundamental principles of the Ukrainian statehood.

The diplomatic approach is set up to reach peace agreements “here and now”. With the full understanding that any agreements will not be perfect at all, they will leave many sensitive issues unresolved to face inevitably stiff resistance not only in Kiev but also in Moscow. It is not difficult to predict the emergence of multiple problems related to the practical implementation of agreements, to their interpretation by each of the two sides, to the subsequent clarification of specific provisions and to politically driven attempts to revise the latter.

Abandoning the diplomatic approach suggests the course of actions under the slogan “victory at any cost”. This means a further continuation—rather than a downscaling—of the special military operation, including the most difficult and potentially disastrous tasks of capturing all major Ukrainian cities. Further, it involves establishing Russian military administrations and ensuring control of the entire territory of Ukraine for a long term, the country’s entire perimeter of borders, as well as long-term fight against very likely guerrilla warfare and terrorist acts on this territory (possibly on the territory of Russia, too).

To find a diplomatic solution, all the necessary and sufficient preconditions are already in place. There are two negotiating teams, an unlimited choice of external mediators, numerous proposals of experts and the already emerging convergence of the positions of the parties on a number of important matters. Proceeding with a military solution will require a further horizontal and vertical escalation of the conflict, not excluding a general mobilization in Russia. In this case, new combat losses and new civilian casualties are unavoidable, not to mention the risks of the Russian special operation escalating into a major European war.

Today, the Russian society is in a state of extreme excitement and even exaltation. From the pages of newspapers and from TV screens, hawkish pecking is heard much louder than pigeon cooing. Public sentiments, however, can and should be managed. Otherwise, when (and if) the country’s leadership does make a choice in favor of a political solution, the central topic of public discussions in Russia will inevitably be the sacramental question: “Who stole our victory?”. Then, it will be very difficult for the authorities to prove to an agitated society that the desire for compromise is better than the demands for unconditional surrender, and the bickering of diplomats is better than the exchange of missile strikes.