The US and its NATO allies need to take a series of steps to avoid a direct conflict with Russia over Ukraine, the Pentagon’s foremost think-tank advised in a report published on Tuesday. Sanctions against Russia have created conditions for one of the escalation pathways already, while the continuing flow of weapons and volunteers to Ukraine may trigger others, the RAND Corporation warned.
Concerns that the conflict in Ukraine will “escalate to a Russia-NATO clash” are “warranted,” said the outfit, which has been doing research and analysis for the US military since 1948. While plausible, such escalation is not inevitable if the US and its allies take some steps to fend it off, according to the report.
RAND researchers laid out “four plausible horizontal escalation pathways,” starting with the anti-Russian sanctions already implemented by the US and its allies. The other three possibilities involve Moscow coming to believe a direct NATO involvement is imminent; that weapons delivered to Ukraine are making a major difference on the battlefield; or that unrest within Russia is threatening the government.
“Moscow has yet to respond directly in any substantial manner,” to Western actions, from sanctions to arming Ukraine, which RAND assumes have “immiserated Russia and led to the death of many Russian soldiers.” The researchers explain this by offering up speculation that the “Kremlin’s preoccupation with its faltering campaign in Ukraine might be consuming senior leaders’ limited bandwidth.”
They also assume that Russia is running out of long-range missiles, a claim Western intelligence agencies have been making since March – and therefore may feel pressured to strike NATO territory if it feels the US-led bloc might get directly involved.
The most acute risk of a Russian decision to escalate directly to a kinetic strike on NATO allies would result from Moscow perceiving that large-scale, direct NATO attacks on Russian military forces in Ukraine are imminent.
Deploying long-range strike capabilities in the Baltic States, Poland, and Romania, or having volunteers from NATO member states take part in the fighting – which has already happened – would promote this conclusion, RAND warns, adding that this pathway may lead to “plausible” use of nuclear weapons.
“Continue to signal that the United States and NATO allies have no plans to directly enter the conflict,” RAND advised Washington, as this is needed to counter public statements by “current or former government officials” about Russian “atrocities” and calls for regime change.
NATO should still “increase force presence in the east” but focus on “defensive” capabilities and re-evaluate activities such as drills “to avoid creating a false impression of preparation for offensive action,” the researchers said.
If Western weapons flowing into Ukraine begin to “turn the conflict dramatically against Russia,” Moscow might target their supply nodes, the report claims. Such attacks could start out as “covert or non-kinetic” and escalate from there; one example given is the 2014 explosion at the Czech ammunition depot, which Western media and the intelligence-adjacent outfit Bellingcat blamed on Russia, without evidence.
One proposed countermeasure is to keep NATO training and supply facilities used to aid Ukraine “dispersed and covert, wherever possible.”
Another admission, buried deep in the report, is that Western weapons assistance has not managed to “turn the conflict dramatically against Russia.”
The last scenario envisions Moscow interpreting large-scale protests as “a non-kinetic NATO attack.” While mass demonstrations are yet to take place in Russia, “the dramatic economic contraction that has resulted from the war might well be the spark for such broader popular unrest once economic pain is felt over the medium to long term,” the RAND report said.
The trouble is that Moscow might perceive such protests as “evidence of a coordinated Western campaign to topple the Russian government,” so NATO needs to “maintain the message discipline” that its objective is “the cessation of conflict, not the end of the Putin regime.”
At the very end, the report cautions that the US and its allies “could be the engine of escalation as easily as Russia could,” and that any escalation spiral is as likely to start with their actions. As the report focused on possible Russian actions, however, that warning was left unexplored.
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RAND Corporation
July 26, 2022
Pathways to Russian Escalation Against NATO from the Ukraine War
by Bryan Frederick, Samuel Charap, Scott Boston, Stephen J. Flanagan, Michael J. Mazarr, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Karl P. Mueller
Drawing on Dima’s reports to the Military Summary Channel, it appears to Mercouris (Mercouris July 29 2022) that the Russian renewed offensive is now in full force, more intensely overwhelming than it has ever been, quite contrary to a recent BBC report.
Russia is clearly not running out of ammunition, again contrary of recent western media reports. One Ukrainian brigade or perhaps a smaller unit, has had to withdraw from the front line in the Donbass, overwhelmed with the force of Russian artillery, ignoring orders to hold.
The Russians are pushing hard on the Seversk-Bakhmut Ukrainian line and appear to be preparing to storm Bakhmut. There is a large Ukrainian infantry formation in this area that could be caught in a pincer, putting thousands at risk. Russians continue their attack even further south, punching one or even two holes through heavily fortified Ukrainian front lines close to Donetsk City. Shelling and bombing has been particularly heavy here.
Mercouris considers why Russia has been able to do this at this point in time when in the past they appear to have avoided these fortified lines. Perhaps it is because Ukraine has been redeploying troops and artillery from this area to Kherson, thinking, on the basis of western propaganda, that Russians were running out of steam, and that Ukraine did not have too much to worry about its forces in Donetsk. To launch the attack on Donetsk, Russians seem to have by-passed Ukrainian forces in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.
There are increasing indications, meanwhile, that the Ukrainian advance in Kherson is not going well. Its force on the Inguletz river has been thrown back by Russia, with very heavy losses. Some Ukrainian forces are trying to distract from the debacle by calling the advance just a reconnaissance. As for the Antonovsky bridge it looks as though Russia has resolved problems of resupply and is busy building pontoon crossings of the Dnieper; there are plans for three such bridges. The railway bridge across the dam is still possibly fully operational.
CNN has visited this area (Angus and Ivan Watson and others) and is disparaging of Ukrainian claims to have made advances, noting that it is a large area of open rolling farmland, where advancing Ukrainians can easily be detected, and on which Russia has had three months to build strong 3-layered defenses, while western weapons supplied to Ukraine are not suited for ground conditions. Ukraine has no decent air cover, and soldiers lack armor, leaving them dangerously exposed.
Russians are reinforcing their positions in Kherson and in recent weeks large convoys have been moving from Mariupol to Kherson which Russia wants to strengthen so as to be in control of a continuing supply of water to the Crimean peninsula. Ukraine’s line between Mykolayiv and Kherson is struck almost every day. From there to Zaporizhzhia the situation is very contested by artillery. CNN has obtained video footage showing as many as 350 Russian missiles moving towards Kherson by rail from Crimea (Iskander/S300?) indicating an approaching long struggle. All this is interpreted by Mercouris as further confirmation as to the poor likelihood of a Ukrainian counteroffensive. If the CNN report is correct, things do not look good for Ukraine which appears to be short of just about everything.
China, Taiwan, USA
Mercouris reads out the entirety of the Chinese statement on President Xi Jinping;’s recent conversation with Biden. Use of the term “candid” usually conveys something approaching a row. China refers to a world of disorder in which the global population expects the US and China to take a lead. Chinese-US relations are not to be interpreted in terms of rivalry and strategic competition, but in terms of cooperation.
The USA is responsible for the deterioration of the relationship between China and the USA. China and the USA need to maintain communication to protect global supply, energy and security. Sanctions, in other words, are an incredibly bad idea.
Attacks on supply chains will not help boost the USA economy and only the UNSC has the right under international law to impose sanctions. So the West is acting illegally by acting unilaterally. The two sides need to work towards regional de-escalation, to reduce the risk of stagflation and inflation and conform to international law.
On Taiwan, China is uncompromising. The USA is at serious risk of triggering a serious conflict. The Chinese President makes it clear that Taiwan belongs to mainland China. The one-China principle is fundamental to China-US relations. Any move by external forces to challenge that principle will be immediately challenged militarily by China. This is the firm will of 1.4 billion Chinese people. Those who play with fire will perish by it. It is hoped that the USA will be clear-eyed about this, and that its deeds will match its words.
Biden’s response is fuzzy and ambivalent. China clearly don’t believe Biden can be trusted.
Mercouris judges this exchange as the most confrontational since the time of the Clinton administration. China is issuing extremely grave warnings and Biden is personally playing with fire. It still looks as though Pelosi (3rd ranking American politician and therefore not a normal member of Congress and who, as Speaker, is an integral member of the US government) will visit Taiwan, in a preposterous pretense that somehow Pelosi is independent of the Administration. The US President is fully able and entitled to prohibit such a visit. China is not buying the Pelosi claim of Pelosi’s independence, anyway. The Global Times indicates that China will defend its core interests noting that the US follows the logic of power over the logic of reason, and is intent on global hegemony. Now is not the mid-1990s nor is it the 1950s: the time when the US could act as unchallenged global bully is over. today, China has the military power to challenge the USA with every prospect of success.
Mercouris worries that the neocons see this as their last chance to humiliate the Chinese, and that they think the Chinese are bluffing, even though the Chinese President has clearly indicated that he is not. We are closer to a military clash between the USA and China than we have ever been. China will deepen its relationship with Russia and work hard on their joint nuclear capability. American sympathy with Taiwan is not going to help Taiwan in the event of war, any more than Western sympathy with Ukraine has helped the Ukrainians. All this is testimony to the disastrous state of the competence of Western leadership.
In June, the state-run VTsIOM pollster carried out a closed survey of Russians’ feelings about the ‘special military operation’ (as Russia officially describes its war). The survey, called ‘SMO: Problem Zones’, was discussed at a meeting within the presidential administration in late June, a Kremlin source told The Bell. The survey was also reported by Italy’s Corriere della Sera at the weekend, while Meduza uncovered the answers to one question last week.
The key findings from the survey:
The most striking result is the equal split in answers to the question of whether it is more important for Russia to continue pursuing its military activities in Ukraine or enter peace talks. Each option attracted 44 percent of respondents, while a further 12 percent could not answer the question.
Another question about the future of the operation went like this: “Some believe that the military operation in Ukraine must end as soon as possible. Others believe that the fighting should not stop now. Which point of view is closer to you – the first or the second?” Here, a majority supports the continuation of the war – 57 percent versus 30 percent, with the remainder unable to answer.
The proportion of survey respondents who gave positive answers to a question about their support for the ‘special operation’ was 70 percent. This figure has remained consistently high throughout the campaign: the lowest number (65 percent in support) was reported on the day after the war began. Seventeen percent said they did not support the SMO and a further 13 percent were unable to answer.
The 18-24 age group is least likely to support the ‘special operation’, with 37 percent ‘inclined not to support’ and 38 percent ‘inclined to support’ it. In the 25-34 group, these figures are 26 and 50 percent, respectively. Loyalty increases with age: there is 79 percent support among over-45s and 84 percent among the over-60s.
Support for the ‘special operation’ is highest among those who describe themselves as active TV viewers (81 percent against 11). Among active internet users, support for the war drops to 45 percent (and opposition rises to 33 percent).
It was not possible to identify trends among different wealth categories: among those who said their financial situation was ‘good’, support for the ‘special military operation’ runs at 75 percent; among those in a ‘poor’ financial situation, the figure is 61 percent.
Another question read: “Some people believe that due to the economic and humanitarian sanctions imposed on Russia by the West, it is essential to unite around the president and support him even if you do not entirely agree with him. Others believe that even under sanctions there is no need to rally around the president and support him. What do you think?” This question has been posed twice: in late April and on June 21. This time, the figure that agreed with the need to support the president fell from 81 percent to 75. In the youngest age group, those figures were 67 and 43 percent, a drop of 24 percentage points. In the 25-34 age group, the number who saw no need to rally around the president rose from 19 to 26 percent.
Can we trust these numbers?
Since the outbreak of the war, analysts in Russia and the West have debated the extent to which we can trust sociological data from Russia given the state’s effective monopoly on polling and the current wartime conditions. This question is even more pertinent when most polls produce numbers favorable to the Kremlin. There is no clear answer: it’s obvious that a significant proportion of the answers are insincere and polling technology can be steered towards numbers that favor the authorities, but it is not clear to what extent this distorts the findings.
Sociologist Grigory Yudin urges us to remember that the presidential administration is the client for these VTsIOM polls: “The results of these surveys are regarded as a reflection of the will of the people, so VTsIOM will highlight those results that strengthen its client’s position and not show any that are disadvantageous to the customer”. At the same time, Russians themselves believe that these polls are conducted by the state and tailor their answers accordingly. “People are well-attuned to the atmosphere: direct questions about ‘support’ are seen as a requirement to show loyalty. VTsIOM is also aware of this, and therefore asks indirect questions, asking about which scenario seems more favorable to respondents right now. These questions are less pressured and give more problematic answers, so VTsIOM does not publish the results.”
One of the more striking conclusions we can draw from this poll is the generation gap. Young Russians are more minded to halt the war, and their view of the president in the light of the war and sanctions is steadily becoming less positive. A clear split between the generations has emerged on all key policy questions of recent years, Yudin adds. “Putin’s core support comes from the older generation, who have lived through various crises in their middle age.” Independent sociologist Alexander Prokopenko sees this generational split as an important factor: the stability and sustainability of autocratic regimes largely depends on the younger part of the population.
Why the world should care
It’s hard to evaluate specific figures from the VTsIOM poll and during war or large-scale crises, sociology tends to change rapidly. However, it is possible to draw some unequivocal conclusions from the survey – support for Vladimir Putin and his actions is relatively low among young people, and it is falling fast.
As Vladimir Putin starts his gas war, Europe faces a difficult winter
Vladimir Putin has unleashed his most potent economic weapon against Europe: the threat of halting or restricting gas supplies. However, this gas war is no blitzkrieg, but a battle of attrition. After a week and a half of anxious waiting, Nord Stream 1 finally resumed operations – but at 40 percent capacity. This leaves Russia with plenty of wiggle room when it comes to applying future pressure – and clears the way for Gazprom to record increased profits against the odds and generate serious problems for Europe this coming winter.
What happened
Since the start of the war it has been clear that if Russia has any significant economic weapon against Europe, it would be gas. Most European countries are not hugely dependent on Russian oil and Europe itself decided to stop buying oil from Russia this spring. But the EU cannot wean itself off Russian gas so easily, while Russia has scope in its budget to risk some of its gas revenues: even in 2021, amid record prices in Europe, gas exports to Europe represented only a quarter of its total oil-and-gas revenues.
Moscow deployed its gas weaponry for the first time in mid-June. On June 14, Gazprom announced it was reducing the flow through Nord Stream to 60 percent of its planned capacity, followed by a further cut to 40 percent just one day later. The reduction was blamed on delays in the delivery of a turbine being serviced at a Siemens plant in Canada. While sanctions were lifted from the turbine in question, the gas pipeline operated at a reduced capacity for the following month. When, on July 11, it was closed completely for 10 days of planned maintenance, Europe was left to wonder whether the taps would re-open at all. On July 21, the gas pipeline began working once more, but at the same 40 percent of capacity. Putin warned that further repair work was scheduled and made clear that Europe should not count on receiving a full gas flow for the foreseeable future.
What’s the Kremlin’s plan?
Gas market players surveyed by Goldman Sachs at the start of the week (The Bell studied the investment bank’s report) never seriously believed that Nord Stream would stay closed after July 21. They correctly anticipated a restart at 40 percent of capacity, explaining the logic behind this for Russia:
First, cancelling all deliveries via Nord Stream would deny Russia any flexibility in its future decisions – after all, the only way to go from zero is up.
Second, cutting Europe off from Russian gas would ultimately hit the country’s budget.
And third, halting the pipeline would force Gazprom to mothball its production capacity, which is unwelcome if not disastrous. From a technical standpoint, there is no way to redirect gas intended for Europe toward other markets, Goldman Sachs explains in its report.
Independent energy expert Sergei Vakulenko explains Russia’s strategy thus: On the one hand, it demonstrates legal responsibility (‘We are fulfilling every obligation that we can given the force majeure situation that Europe along with Ukraine has created’) and does not completely sever trade relations with Europe, making it easier to restore them when the situation returns to normal (as the Russian side seems to expect). On the other hand, Russia continues to generate substantial revenues. All of this continues at a level that does not prevent Europe from falling into an energy crisis this winter.
The ultimate aim, as in any war, is to inflict enough pain on the opposition to force it to change its policies; in this instance, to force Europe to abandon its support for Ukraine and renew its relations with the Kremlin, Vakulenko concludes.
How will Europe survive the winter?
Closing Nord Stream would have been a catastrophe, but limiting gas flows to 40 percent still leaves Europe with serious problems. At this rate, Russian gas exports to Europe by the end of 2022 will fall from 150 billion cubic meters a year to 50 billion, an international oil and gas analyst calculated for The Bell.
Europe’s supply-and-demand situation on the gas market is ‘hanging by a thread’, James Henderson, head of the gas program at the Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, told The Bell. The EU’s gas storage facilities are currently 65 percent full, a figure that should reach 80 percent by Nov. 1 – but Henderson warns that this will not be enough in itself. If Russia cuts off the gas closer to winter, those storage facilities cannot compensate. This is because they are normally used to supplement the flow of imported gas.
“If pumping continues at 20-40 percent the situation will remain manageable only if the winter is not too cold,” said Henderson. A cold winter could increase demand by 20-30 billion cubic meters for a half-year, and if Russian supplies stop, Europe’s industrial production will begin to slow. Based on this figure, the European Commission’s latest recommendation is to reduce demand by 15 percent.
Both business and the general population in Europe have yet to feel the full increase in gas prices – actual retail prices for gas and electricity in many countries remain lower than the exchange prices, an analyst from an international company added. In the second half of the year, the increased price burden will steadily shift onto consumers and he believes this will bring a very severe price shock to businesses and civilians alike.
European politicians are aware of this. On Wednesday, speaking about negotiations with Canada to lift sanctions on equipment for Gazprom, Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said: “If we don’t get the turbine, we won’t have gas. Then we won’t be able to support Ukraine because instead we will be busy with popular uprisings.”
What risks does Gazprom face?
None. Every expert approached by The Bell agrees that increased gas prices will fully compensate for any reduction in Gazprom’s exports. Russian gas expert Marcel Salikhov assumes that the cost of gas exported via the pipeline will rise by 50-60 percent over the course of 2022, enabling Gazprom to post a 15-20 percent increase in profits even after making allowance for the strengthening of the ruble and the decline in domestic demand for gas.
Why the world should care
Gas is the last economic weapon available to Vladimir Putin. The president himself understands full well that within as little as three or four years this threat will lose its potency – so while it exists, he will have no hesitation in using it to the fullest extent. This winter, Europe will have to pay for its support of Ukraine.
State Duma pursues a complete ban on “homosexual propaganda”
In the fifth month of the war, having dealt with the independent media, ‘foreign agents’ and opposition to the war, the Russian authorities remembered their antipathy toward the LGBT community. State Duma deputies from the Communist Party and the LDPR introduced a bill for a complete ban on “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships” and “denial of family values”. The current ban only affects “homosexual propaganda” aimed at under-18s. Immediately after the bill was launched, leading tennis player Darya Kasatkina became the first major athlete to come out as gay – and sparked a scandal on state TV.
The law banning “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relationships among minors” came into force in Russia back in 2013 and carries fines of up to 200,000 rubles ($3,000) for individuals or up to 1 million rubles ($15,000) for businesses (which can also be liquidated if found to be breaking this law). But in the context of the current conflict with the West, Duma deputies fear this is not enough. Six deputies from the Communist Party, A Just Russia and the LDPR are proposing a total ban on “gay propaganda”.
The bill’s authors propose to regard “promotion of non-traditional values” – i.e. any publication or statement LGBT relationships or identity – in the same light as distributing pornography or inciting ethnic hatred. The draft bill does not include any new level of legal responsibility, but one of the deputies spoke of the need to introduce criminal liability for violations. Meanwhile, the bill specifically calls for a list of all movies that “promote LGBT” and stripping them of their distribution licenses.
One of the bill’s authors is Communist Party deputy Nina Ostanina. Journalists immediately recalled how, in spring 2011, Ostanina was part of a group of Russian opposition figures who met with then-U.S. Vice President Joe Biden on his visit to Russia. Others at that meeting included, for example, Boris Nemtsov (killed in 2015) and Garry Kasparov (who emigrated long ago and adopts a radical anti-Putin position). After that meeting, Ostanina said that she complained to Biden about electoral violations, discussed the fall of authoritarian regimes and presented the U.S. president with a copy of the communist newspaper Pravda.
Sources told Meduza and the BBC Russian service that this particular bill will not pass into law, since no United Russia deputies are involved. But this does not mean we will not see a new ban. At the start of July, State Duma speaker Vyacheslav Volodin directly called for a ban on the “propaganda of non-traditional values”. According to Meduza, United Russia is already drafting its own equivalent legislation.
Ironically, on the day that the bill was introduced, Russia faced its most notable ‘coming out’ of recent years. In an interview on YouTube, Russia’s top female tennis player (ranked No. 12 in the world) Darya Kasatkina announced her homosexuality, talked about her girlfriend and added that she was considering changing her citizenship. This is the first time ever that a Russian athlete at this level has come out.
Two days later, Kasatkina was discussed on a recently launched scandal-seeking talk show on Match TV, a national sports channel owned by Gazprom. The host devoted 45 minutes to Kasatkina in the company of State Duma representatives and veteran athletes. The participants concluded that Kasatkina came out in an attempt to curry favor in Spain, where she lives, and gain Spanish citizenship. They added that homosexuals in general – and Kasatkina in particular – “revel in dragging people into the dirt”.
After the broadcast, Match TV’s chief tennis correspondent Sofya Tartakova, who is also Kasatkina’s PR agent, called the program “a freak show for tongue-tied deputies, pseudo-experts and people seeking their five minutes of fame”, adding that no active tennis player would have any further contact with Match TV. In response, the channel removed the journalist from the airwaves.
Why the world should care
The man behind the latest ban on LGBT propaganda, Vyacheslav Volodin, is one of those senior officials whose stock has been rising since the start of the war. He speaks even more radically than Putin himself (ex-President Dmitry Medvedev is another striking example of this). A complete ban on gay propaganda can be seen as an attempt at further political prestige. As long as the war continues, the number of repressive measures that are not directly related to the conflict will also increase.
When news broke that Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi will visit Taiwan next month, China responded how everyone expected it to. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijiang condemned the visit, saying it would “severely undermine China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” and “gravely impact the foundation of China-U.S. relations.”
“If the U.S. were to insist on going down the wrong path, China will take resolute and strong measures to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Zhao added. (Those “strong measures” could include a military response from Beijing, according to U.S. sources who spoke with the Financial Times.)
But few would have predicted that the Pentagon would take Beijing’s side. As President Joe Biden told reporters Wednesday, the Defense Department thinks the visit is “not a good idea right now,” a nod to growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait.
The unusual point of agreement highlights the dangers of Pelosi’s trip, according to experts who spoke with Responsible Statecraft. From Beijing’s perspective, Washington has been gradually shifting the goalposts on Taiwan toward explicit support for Taipei’s independence, a red line for Chinese officials. And a visit from a top U.S. politician would only make things worse.
“[Chinese officials] see it through the lens of how their own political system works,” said Shelley Rigger, a political science professor at Davidson College and a leading expert on Taiwan. “What they’re seeing is that the U.S. is sending the number three in their national hierarchy to Taiwan. How is this not a statement or an affirmation of Taiwan statehood?”
Pelosi waved off concerns about the trip Thursday, saying that the Pentagon was “afraid our plane would get shot down, or something like that, by the Chinese.”
The speaker also downplayed Beijing’s concerns about a potential shift in U.S. policy. “None of us have ever said we’re for independence when it comes to Taiwan,” she argued. “That’s up to Taiwan to decide.”
America’s favorite diplomatic fiction
The challenge revolves around one of Washington’s most confusing yet successful strategies: the “One China Policy.” Since 1979, the United States has recognized the government in Beijing as the sole legitimate Chinese government while acknowledging — but never endorsing — Beijing’s view that Taiwan is an integral part of China. This requires a careful balancing act known as “strategic ambiguity” whereby Washington implies that it would defend Taiwan from an invasion but never says it outright. So far, this policy has stopped either side from crossing a point of no return (namely, Beijing invading Taiwan or Taipei declaring full independence).
If you find that a bit hard to follow, you’re not alone. The policy is flexible by its nature and has looked different over the years, with U.S. officials dialing public support for Taiwan up or down depending on how close each side is getting to the other’s red lines. But that complexity has been remarkably effective, allowing Taiwan to transform into a full-fledged democracy with a strong economy.
Despite increased tensions, experts say that U.S. policy is still best understood through the lens of strategic ambiguity. In the minds of American officials, any changes to Washington’s approach are simply a reaction to Beijing changing the status quo.
But, as Asian security expert Van Jackson noted, China “probably holds a mirror image of that view.” With growing calls from China hawks to abandon strategic ambiguity, officials in Beijing have become increasingly concerned that Washington is all in for Taiwanese independence. (Biden seemingly confirmed those concerns in May, when he said the U.S. had made a “commitment” to defend Taiwan before walking it back shortly after.) From China’s perspective, Pelosi’s visit would represent “a huge retreat from commitments the U.S. has made” to Beijing in the last few decades, according to Rigger.
“Politicians don’t appreciate the gravity and the risk of messing around in this policy area,” she said.
Little room for error
The last House Speaker to visit Taiwan was Newt Gingrich, who stopped through Taipei on his way back from a trip to China in 1997. As Jackson explained, the stakes of that trip were much lower than today.
“[W]e were deep into a project of integrating China into global capitalism,” he told Responsible Statecraft in an email. “We were on strategically very good terms with Beijing, which provides a cushion against instability.”
This time around, the room for error is a lot smaller. “The context for a Pelosi visit in 2022 is radically different,” Jackson added. “We’ve replaced a posture of détente with rivalry.”
Though they’re unlikely to say it publicly, even Taiwanese officials seem wary of the trip, according to Rigger. When she asked people in Taiwan’s foreign ministry if the visit was dangerous, they were evasive, saying “things along the lines of, ‘well, that is a very perceptive question.’” But underlying that evasiveness is a fear of upsetting Taipei’s most important foreign partner.
“Your survival depends upon making someone happy and stroking the ego of various American politicians,” Rigger said, “[so] you’re not going to say ‘we don’t want this kind of love.’”
So the main question for many observers is the following: How can the Biden administration mitigate the impact of Pelosi’s visit? One step is to distance itself from the visit by not sending Pelosi on a military plane, which would make the exercise look “like a military operation,” according to an official who spoke with Politico.
Another is to do more to incorporate Chinese concerns into U.S. strategy, starting with an open mind about how Beijing views the situation, according to Rigger.
“I would just encourage people to consider another possibility, which is that […] PRC leaders are sincere when they express the concern that things, especially in Taiwan, are turning against China,” she said, noting that Beijing views the challenge as existential. “So everything that the U.S. does to respond to what it perceives as Beijing’s increasing aggression just reinforces that fear that the U.S. is about to encourage Taiwan to bust a move.”
