By Prof. Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 7/19/22

A gathering of Russian forces for a major offensive is reported (Mercouris 07.19.22). Zelenskiy has ordered troops to hold Seversk, where Russians are already present and have exceeded, and which is difficult for Ukrainians to defend. A decision to order troops to defend it might appear to fall in that long line of instances where Ukrainian armed forces are being told to try to hold on to the indefensible, against the odds, rather than simply to retreat back to the next line of defense.

This is either with a view to playing out a narrative of gallantry for domestic and international consumption (with a particular interest in aid revenues) or with a view to delaying the Russian advance by all means available no matter the cost in lives, or both. Or perhaps the order is merely a deception to indicate that Ukrainians still hold something that they do not. Russians are very likely to encircle any Ukrainian groups that are being told to stand ground rather than retreat. Unplanned retreats by Ukrainians meet with punishment. Russians now have more drones to monitor such situations. Mercouris speculates that Zelenskiy is trying to draw a line in the sand, which Zelenskiy almost certainly will not be able to do.

Elsewhere, Ukrainian attempts to advance in Kherson have been repulsed, apparently. Ukrainians are either testing Russian air defenses in this territory or are trying to soften up the area before their much talked about counteroffensive. There is talk of Ukrainian ambitions to destroy both a local dam, and a local bridge in Kherson in an attempt to cut off Russian communications across the Dnieper river. But destroying bridges and dams, opines Mercouris, is not as easy as one might think because these things are built with considerable redundancy so that they can survive more than one bomb, or one HIMAR rocket (which are comparatively small: they have to be launched from the rocket tubes of a conventional multiple rocket system). Russian Iskander-Ms are considerably heavier. Either a bridge or, especially, a dam would probably require quite a few HIMARS. It appears that Ukraine has indeed been supplied by HIMARS (300km range).

A green light has been given for HIMARS attacks on Crimea, which will provoke massive Russian retaliation – at the very least, against western and other bases scattered across Ukraine (helping explain the US embassy’s recent alert that all US citizens should leave immediately). Ukraine is talking about destroying the entirety of the Russian Black Sea fleet, a threat which Russia says justifies its entire campaign and which would also elicit a devastating response.

Russia calculates it is inflicting massive casualties which are likely far greater than those inflicted on Ukrainian forces.

The reason for Zekensiy’s recent decision re. Seversk is probably reflective of Washington neocon pressure and Washington fear that support for Ukraine will wane if Zelenskiytfails to deliver some visible sign of success. This might explain why Zelenskiy is ordering troops to take far more punishment than they need to do. If no counteroffensive in Kherson actually happens, that may very well be an end to at least European support, perhaps even American.

So this may be an issue of running-out-of-time desperation. By mid-October, perhaps at this rate, the Russians will be on the Dnieper river, an existential threat to Ukraine.

This ties in with Zelenskiy’s recent purge of security and intelligence sackings, something that is itself triggering concerns in the West that Zelenskiy’s position is growing increasingly insecure as he talks of treason in every quarter. Perhaps the sackings offer him an excuse for being unable to proceed to a Kherson counteroffensive. Perhaps they offer an excuse for evidence of Ukrainian sales of western arms to Russia (if that is indeed is true).

Zelenskiy’s grip on Ukraine may be starting to slip, and may be reflective of a slow-motion coup in favor of a return of Poroshenko. The new acting head of the SBU is a former associate of Poroshenko.

Ukraine appears to be getting fewer weapons and less financial aid from the West (or less than Ukraine would like). The European Commission is finding it difficult to justify to its auditors its recent scale of aid to Ukraine.

Putin, meantime, in Moscow, has been in a series of meetings to discuss the advance of Russia’s high tech sector, with its own minister, and development of a complete production cycle (like China) of the high tech equipment that Russia needs to guarantee its sovereignty and security. This approach has given China enormous resilience, and it makes sense for Russia to try to do the same (and, in any case, I would add, Russia can import from China). There is no sign of a slowing down in Russian delivery of weapons and ammunition to its troops Ukraine.

Russia seems to think it can handle its problems, problems that appear to be routinely overstated by western commentators, reflecting a lingering and dangerous western fancy (projection?) that Russia is a backward nation.

Putin is in Tehran where he will meet with Turkey’s Erdogan,will likely talk about releasing Ukrainian grain, and how to resolve pressure points in Syria. Also about Iran joining BRICS. Turkey has also shown interest in doing likewise. Because Russia is a major member of the BRICS group, BRICS may be a singularly important focus of conversation. A related topic is the establishment of mechanisms for interbank convertibility, and maintaining a process of integration of Iran and Turkey into EuroAsian institutions and alliances. This is more complicated in the case of Turkey which is a member of NATO, and has candidature status, still (!), to become a member of the EU. There may also be a discussion with Iran about improving relations with Saudi Arabia, which has also expressed an interest in BRICS membership.

There is a concern of course about the relationship of Iran, Israel, and US sanctions on Iran (which have been quite successful up until now). Russians are now showing much more interest in being a part of the Iranian economy, involving among other things more Russian supplies of weapons to Iran, amid other commodities.

When the Iran nuclear deal was in effect, the Russians were very cagey about relationships with Iran because they did not want to be hit by secondary sanctions. Those inhibitions have gone because the Russians are now sanctioned in any case and because the nuclear deal has not been renewed. This may lead to an eroding of the efficacy of sanctions on Iran. Similarly, sanctions may grow less impactful on North Korea, since North Korea is recognizing the independent republics in the Donbass, which implies a closer relationship between North Korea and Russia.

The US has thrown away its leverage over Russia and this is changing the geopolitical opportunities for Russia, Iran and North Korea. This in turn might strengthen Turkey’s perspective on Russia and China’s leadership of EurAsian institutions and development projects, via the Shanghai Cooperation group, etc.

All these considerations may be sharpening the conflict in Ukraine.