Paul Robinson: The Strange Death of Liberal Russia – Part I

By Prof. Paul Robinson, Russia Post, 8/4/22

In 1935 George Dangerfield published a famous book entitled The Strange Death of Liberal England­, charting the downfall of the once mighty British Liberal Party. One might consider a similar title suitable elsewhere: The Strange Death of Liberal Russia. Back in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, liberalism appeared triumphant in Russia. Liberal reformers manned the highest offices of state, and ideas of democracy, free markets, and human rights had gained broad acceptance. Russia had an advanced economic infrastructure, an educated population, and a large liberal intelligentsia. Most of what one might call the social-economic substructure of a liberal system was in place. There were good grounds for considering it likely that Russia’s future was a liberal one.

Reality proved otherwise. Over the years, Russian liberalism gradually declined as a political force, to the point where nowadays it is almost extinct. Meanwhile, liberal ideas have become increasingly discredited in the popular imagination. What happened? And is there any possibility of a Russian liberal revival in the foreseeable future?

This is the first of several articles devoted to answering those questions. It will look at issues of liberal theory and at the historical background of Russian liberalism. Ensuing articles will examine the rise and fall of Russian liberalism following the collapse of the Soviet Union and discuss liberalism’s prospects in Russia in the near to medium future. It must be noted that the limitations of a short article inevitably lead to a degree of generalization. More detailed analysis will reveal exceptions to much of what is written below. Nonetheless, if one views the ideas outlined in the article as tendencies rather than as absolutes, they are still of value.
Liberalism is a contested concept

Any discussion of liberalism first confronts a definitional problem, namely that liberalism itself is a contested concept. Indeed, many scholars argue that one cannot speak of “liberalism,” merely of a “broad family” of “liberalisms,” some of which appear contradictory. In an article entitled “What is Liberalism?” Duncan Bell argues that these contradictions are so great that one will search in vain for a common core among the various liberalisms. The most one can say is that liberalism is whatever people who have considered themselves liberals have said it is at any time and place. Bell’s position is, however, problematic from a Russian point of view, as Russians who hold apparently liberal views have generally eschewed the liberal label. In the late Soviet and early post-Soviet eras, they preferred to call themselves “democrats.” And in the Imperial era they preferred the term “constitutionalists,” a word that found expression in the name of the leading liberal party of the era, the Constitutional Democratic Party (often known as the “Kadets” due its Russian initials – KD).

Liberalism can refer to an ideology or to a political movement or to a set of political and socio-economic practices. As a general rule, philosophers consider its core feature to be that it is centered on the individual or person, but this feature is hardly unique to it, and in any case begs the question of how to define the individual or person.

Whatever the answer, though, a person was seen as something more than an individual, and the purpose of a liberal order was precisely that it enabled people to develop themselves and achieve “personhood.”

Again, this is not a uniquely liberal perspective, but where liberalism differs from other ideologies is in how it believes that this process of achieving personhood is achieved. In Western liberal thought, this process relies first on certain abstract principles and second on certain institutions that give these principles expression.
Scholars differ in their assessment of what these principles and institutions are, but roughly speaking the former include ideas such as liberty, autonomy, equality, pluralism, universalism, progress and reason, while the latter include institutions such as private property, free markets, democracy, the rule of law, and legally-enshrined human rights.

Elements of all of these can be found in the history of Russian liberalism, but with a specifically national twist. In Western Europe, liberal ideas developed in tandem with the creation of a bourgeois class, and largely represented that class’s material interests. In Russia, the ideas arrived from the West prior to the establishment of a large bourgeois class. Moreover, when such a class came into being, it tended to be quite conservative, in large part because the Russian economic system tied private industry and the state closely together. Liberalism instead became the purview of that part of the noble estate known as the intelligentsia. Its proponents were academics, lawyers, journalists and the like. Not for nothing was the leading liberal party of the late Imperial era, the Kadet party, known as a “party of professors.” Outside urban professionals, the party had almost no support, especially among workers and peasants, who showed little interest in liberalism.

Liberalism’s social base has remained equally narrow in modern times. In so far as there was a Soviet liberalism during the communist era, it was to be found among intellectuals and so-called “ITRs” (inzhenerno-tekhnicheskie rabotniki – engineering technical workers). Nowadays, the core of liberalism’s support is to be found in the “creative classes,” described by Mark Lipovetsky as “a strange unity of software engineers, intellectuals, scholars/scientists, architects, designers, university professors, people of art – in a word, those selling the product of their creative activity.” Prior to the 1917 revolution, Kadet party leader Pavel Miliukov commented that “Russian liberalism was not bourgeois but intellectual.” This remains largely true today.

An elitist group

Historians have noted a number of consequences of this phenomenon. These include a tendency towards abstraction and even on occasion dogmatism, as well as a tendency to concentrate on issues that deeply concern intellectuals but have little relevance to the lives of ordinary people. These are of course generalizations, but they contain a germ of truth.

Liberals have helped create this impression by adopting a sometimes contemptuous attitude towards the Russian people, who have often been portrayed as a dark mass of uneducated reactionaries unfit for self-government. As one of the founders of nineteenth century Russian liberalism, Timofei Granovsky, put it, “The victory of the masses would bring about the destruction of the best fruits of civilization.” The Russian revolution accentuated this attitude. For instance, Ariadna Tyrkova-Williams, the one woman in the Kadet party central committee, denounced “the wild beast which is called the people.”

Generalizing somewhat, one might say that Russian liberals have tended to reflect the prevailing attitude of the intelligentsia, viewing themselves as standing above classes, and assigning themselves the role of educating and leading the masses until such time as they are able to reach the same level of enlightenment as the intelligentsia themselves. This attitude re-emerged in post-Stalin Soviet times. Dissident Grigory Pomerants, for instance, wrote that proletarian culture was without value. By contrast, he said, “those engaged in creative intellectual labour are the chosen people of the twentieth century.”

Fear of the mob has produced a rather contradictory attitude towards the institutional framework traditionally associated with liberalism. On the one hand, liberals have been fervent advocates of the rule of law and civil rights (free speech and so on). On the other hand, they have been rather less sure about the benefits of democracy, which Tyrkova-Williams in a moment of post-revolutionary zeal called “a fraud, which politicians have foisted upon us.”

Liberals have often demanded democratic reform, insisting that the state should share power with “society” (obshchestvo). But they have tended to equate “society” with themselves. When the people are given their freedom but instead choose other leaders, the result has been disillusionment.

Furthermore, there has also been a statist trend within Russian liberalism. This trend views the state as the primary mover of reform and regards representative institutions with suspicion as being likely to act as barriers in the way of necessary change. In this vision of the world, liberalism is something best left to what one might call “enlightened bureaucrats,” able to govern for the benefit of all and to resist the influence of individual or class interests. The result is a peculiarly Russian brand of liberal authoritarianism or what nineteenth century Russian thinker Boris Chicherin called “okhranitel’nyi” liberalism, a curious term that is normally translated as “conservative” liberalism but has other connotations not easily rendered into English (okhrana was the name of the Imperial secret police). Okhranitel’nyi liberalism, wrote Chicherin, meant “liberal measures and strong government.”

This thinking to some extent reflected the influence of Hegel. Another Hegelian was Chicherin’s colleague Konstantin Kavelin, who viewed history as a process leading towards the development of personhood. For Kavelin, the creation of the modern state was a crucial step in this process, with the state playing the role of enabling people to overcome the bonds of family and clan and thereby become persons. Western Europe had led the way in this process, but the inexorable laws of history meant that Russia was bound to follow. As Kavelin wrote, “The difference [between Russia and the West] lies solely in the preceding historical facts; the aim, the tasks, the aspirations, the way forward are one and the same.”

As previously noted, universalism and progress are often regarded as core liberal principles. Kavelin’s statement highlights their relevance in a Russian context. Russian liberalism has long contained a strong element of historical determinism that views history as following universally applicable rules of progress, which in the long term will cause all nations to converge on a single model of political and economic life. As Miliukov said, “Civilization makes nations, as it makes individuals, more alike.”

Miliukov and others turned this “is” into an “ought.” Because, in their opinion, it was an observable fact that nations all developed in the same way, they determined that Russia ought to reform itself to head in the same direction. Confronted by the complaint that foreign models did not suit Russian realities, Miliukov replied that Russia had to obey “the laws of political biology.”

Liberals were not alone in believing in the laws of political biology. But whereas socialists believed that these laws led inevitably towards socialism, even communism, liberals felt that they led to Western European liberal democracy. The West (however defined) was in their eyes the most “advanced” part of the world. It was therefore what Russia was fated in due course to become. From an early stage, therefore, Russian liberalism has been closely bound up with Westernism. Perhaps the most profound belief of Russian liberals is, and always has been, that the West represents “normality,” from which Russia has by some quirk of history been diverted and to which it must return.

“We must return to the highroad of modern civilization”

In contrast to Eurasianist thought, which regards the world as divided up into multiple distinct civilizations, Russian liberalism has generally tended to the view that there is only one “civilization” and its home is the West. This idea played a key role in the thinking of liberal-minded intellectuals in the late Soviet era. For instance, Georgian philosopher Merab Mamardashvili expressed the idea that the USSR had at some point after the revolution “jumped out of history” – in other words, it had been shunted from the inevitable path of historical progress that led towards Europe and put instead on another, incorrect, track. It was necessary, wrote Mamardashvili, “to jump to a new track altogether” and there by “go back to our European house.”

Similarly, historian Leonid Batkin commented that the West “is the general definition of the economic, scientific-technical and structural-democratic level without which it is impossible for any really modern society to exist. … We have dropped out of world history … We must … return to the highroad of modern civilization.” This aspiration remains at the centre of the liberal worldview to this day.

There are, of course, many other strands of Russian liberalism, which require a much longer analysis than is possible here. These strands have waxed and waned over the years and they are not all compatible with each other. But the discussion above reveals, in very broad and generalized terms, two characteristics of Russian liberalism that have remained remarkably consistent over time. The first is liberalism’s narrow social base, resting largely on intellectuals. The second is its tendency towards historical determinism and from that towards Westernism. How these characteristics have affected its fate in the post-Soviet era will be discussed in Part II.

Dmitry Simes: Russia and Iran Strengthen Economic Ties in Bid to Counteract US Sanctions

Flag of Iran

By Dmitry Simes, CNSNews, 8/25/22

Moscow (CNSNews.com) – Russia and Iran are moving to strengthen energy, industrial, and logistical ties as the two countries seek to ease the burden of U.S. sanctions against them.

On Wednesday [August 24th], Iranian Oil Minister Javad Ouji announced that Iran and Russia were close to finalizing a natural gas swap deal, allowing Iran to import Russian gas and then deliver a certain amount of it to third party countries. Ouji told reporters Moscow and Tehran were also negotiating about jointly developing 14 oil and gas fields in Iran.

Last month [July], the two signed a $40 billion memorandum of understanding under which Russian state energy conglomerate Gazprom agreed to help develop seven oil and gas fields in Iran. Habibollah Zafarian, an energy expert at Tehran’s Amirkabir University of Technology, told the Fars news agency that the deal opened the door for Iran to become a “regional hub” for Russian gas.

“Now there is an opportunity for Iran and Russia to sit around the same table and divide the gas market between them,” he said. “Russia is the first and Iran is the second holder of gas resources in the world and they can define an optimal strategy for market development by working together.”

Zafarian argued that Iran could begin purchasing surplus Russian gas that was originally designated for the European market, and then resell it to neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Iraq. Russia has sharply reduced its gas deliveries to Europe in recent months, citing sanctions issues and disputes over payment methods.

Some Western diplomats fear Iran could likewise become a “back door” for sanctioned Russian oil into Europe if the 2015 nuclear deal is resurrected. Politico recently reported that Tehran could begin “importing Russian crude to its northern Caspian coast and then sell equivalent amounts of crude on Russia’s behalf in Iranian tankers leaving from the Persian Gulf.”

Beyond energy, the Kremlin is increasingly looking to Iran for help in filling gaps created by Western sanctions and the exodus of multinational corporations from Russia.

During a trip to Moscow on Tuesday, Iranian Industry Minister Reza Fatemi-Amin declared that the two countries were expanding cooperation in the shipbuilding, car, and aviation industries.

He said Iran hoped to conclude a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union, a Moscow-led trading bloc that includes Russia and several of its traditional allies in the post-Soviet space.

Iran’s assistance is potentially significant since the car and aviation industries are the two sectors of the Russian economy that have suffered the most from sanctions.

New car sales have plummeted by 60.5 percent year-on-year during the first seven months of 2022, with many foreign brands ceasing their operations in Russia and domestic manufacturers struggling to acquire critical components. Meanwhile, Russian airlines have begun stripping planes for spare parts no longer readily available due to sanctions, according to Reuters.

Earlier this month [August], Iran’s leading automaker announced that it was paying “special attention” to the Russian market and would begin exporting its cars to the country later this year. On Tuesday, Russian and Iranian automakers and parts manufacturers signed $700 million worth of deals on the sidelines of a car industry show in Moscow.

A similar story has played out in the aviation sector. Last month, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding allowing Iran to begin exporting spare parts and equipment to Russia and to provide Russian aircraft with repair, maintenance, and technical services.

Another way Iran can help Moscow bypass sanctions is by offering itself as a new logistical hub for Russian goods headed to the outside world.

The main option for now is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200 kilometer network of ship, rail, and auto routes connecting Russia and India through Iran. According to a study from India’s Federation of Freight Forwarders, the INSTC is 30 percent cheaper and 40 percent shorter than the traditional Suez Canal route.

Although Russia and Iran have been holding talks about launching the INSTC for more than two decades, the project began to move ahead after the U.S. and European countries in March banned Russian ships and planes from their ports and airspace.

Those new restrictions “virtually wrecked” Russia’s trade logistics, according to Transportation Minister Vitaly Savelyev, and forced the Kremlin to look for alternative routes. At the same time, India’s importance as an economic partner for Moscow significantly increased as New Delhi went on a buying spree for Russian oil.

In June, Iran’s state-run shipping company announced that it had successfully delivered the first batch of Russian goods to India through the INSTC.

Since then, around 3,000 tons of goods and 114 containers have been shipped along the route, according to India’s Economic Times. Iranian officials have indicated that Russia could potentially help to construct new railways in Iran as part of the INSTC, in exchange for oil barter.

Dmitry Trenin – SCO: This Russia-China founded bloc represents half the world’s population and will help forge the new world order

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

By Dmitry Trenin, RT, 8/30/22

Over 20 years after it began as an attempt at cooperation between five-Russian led post-Soviet states and an emerging China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become a major global institution, representing close to half of the world’s population.

From September 15-16, Samarkand, one of the ancient centers of human civilization, will host the annual summit of the group. The Uzbek presidency’s priorities include strengthening the SCO’s capabilities in assuring regional security and stability; promoting friendship and good-neighborliness; raising its global profile; countering threats in the information and ideological spheres; expanding parliamentary links; energizing economic interaction; enhancing connectivity; intensifying cultural and humanitarian contacts; and raising the general effectiveness of the collective and its mechanisms.

All of this looks impressive, but quite anodyne, and the documents to be formally approved at the summit do not promise any major sensations – beyond the long-expected admission of Iran as the SCO’s ninth member state.

Yet the environment in which the Samarkand summit will be held differs greatly even from last year’s gathering in Dushanbe. Russia’s military operation in Ukraine has led to a proxy war between Moscow and Washington. Meanwhile, Sino-US relations, already confrontational, have become palpably strained over the recent visit to Taiwan by US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi.

NATO’s new strategic concept adopted last June in Madrid describes Russia as the most significant and direct threat, and China – for the first time – as a challenge to Western interests, security and values. As a result, the international community has moved visibly closer to a Cold War-style division between two camps in an intensifying rivalry over the world order.

That said, the SCO is unlikely to become the non-West’s version of NATO. While the US-led bloc is now more united than ever in its effort to preserve the order built and developed in the heyday of its global dominance, non-Western nations do not display anything similar to that sort of unity, hierarchy, and internal discipline. Russia and China, although they both reject US global hegemony, pursue very different grand strategies and – despite their public declarations of a cooperation that “knows no limits,” and a partnership that is “more than an alliance” – are careful not to damage their other important connections – e.g., China’s with the US and EU; and Russia’s with India – as they cooperate with each other. Moreover, China and India, not to mention the latter and Pakistan, while all members of the SCO, view each other as major security threats.

Despite such diversity and complexity, however, the SCO, at the start of its third decade, is not only still in business, but is steadily getting more active and becoming more attractive to others. In 2001, it started at six; after 2017, the membership expanded to eight, with another 20 countries or so listed as observers, dialogue partners, or in the process of joining. Iran’s accession this year is spurring the interest of Turkey and a number of Arab countries, notably the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar. The SCO community could potentially include much of the Eurasian continent between Belarus and Cambodia. Such enlargement carries obvious risks in terms of even wider diversity of interest, conflict, and frictions between the countries that aspire to join. Yet, the example of China and Russia; India and Pakistan finding the SCO useful to their interests is a convincing argument for accession.

In fact, the SCO’s lack of a single leader; its consensus-based decision-making procedures; its emphasis on national sovereignty and non-interference is a welcome contrast to the US-dominated NATO or like-minded groups such as the G7. Being in the SCO does not mean following Beijing’s or Moscow’s guidance. So far, so good. Yet, to flip the coin, what can the SCO actually give its members, observers, and partners? The general answer is, security in their mutual relations and stability across the continent. The organization, after all, originated from talks on border and military security issues between China on the one hand, and Russia and the Central Asian states on the other. Membership itself does not guarantee that there will be no conflicts, but it provides for means to prevent or manage them. Thus, it provides a unique platform for regular high-level and top-level contacts between Delhi and Beijing. Anti-terrorist cooperation – for all the differences in defining ‘terrorism’ – is another obvious bonus. After last year’s US withdrawal from Afghanistan, SCO member states have stepped up their efforts to bolster stability in the region.

Economic development has long featured as one of the key areas of SCO cooperation. China’s Belt and Road Initiative has been followed by the North-South corridor linking Russia, Iran, the Arab countries, and India. Peace in the South Caucasus could be cemented by restoring connectivity within the region and its links to the north and the south. The unraveling of ‘Chimerica’ and the EU-Russia decoupling in the wake of the Ukraine war signal the replacement of globalization with regionalization. Asian and Eurasian countries which for the past couple of centuries were much more closely involved with distant Western powers than with their own neighbors are now focusing on opportunities in their dynamic neighborhood. Western economic sanctions imposed on Russia are also opening doors much wider to Asian and Middle Eastern investment in Russia and trade with it. 

A new impetus for Eurasian interaction has been created in the post-Ukraine environment by the seizure by the West of half of Russia’s currency reserves. The central issue that has entered a number of countries’ strategic calculus is the reliability of the US dollar-based global financial system. Increasingly, national currencies of the SCO member states and observers, such as the Chinese yuan, the Indian rupee, the Turkish lira, the Iranian riel, as well as the Russian ruble are being used in trade between these countries. In parallel, national payment systems of these and other countries are becoming connected, allowing them to conduct transactions directly, rather than via Washington or its allies. At this point, the mechanisms are still cumbersome, but therein lies the beginning of a new international financial system which is free from diktat by a hegemonic outside power. The sanctions imposed on Iran, and now on Russia, could in the future be slapped on other nations that find themselves in conflict with the US.    

The international system as it emerged from the end of the Cold War is going through a deep crisis which will take a long time to resolve. The present system is founded on organizations either rooted in or inspired by the Cold War – like NATO or AUKUS, or heavily dominated by Western powers, like the international financial institutions, the OSCE, and the UN system as a whole. It is doubtful that the prime beneficiaries of the existing situation will do more than budge a little to make room for emerging players; they will certainly do their best to retain control over the system that they have devised and operated. While the future of the world order is being decided in the ongoing major power competition, a practical way of altering the situation to better serve the interests of the growing number of autonomous players is through developing organizations such as the SCO – independent, non-hegemonic, and inclusive. Potentially, the SCO could become a model for the 21st century order in the world’s most important regional space.

Dmitry Trenin is a Research Professor at the Higher School of Economics and a Lead Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. He is also a member of the Russian International Affairs Council.   

Jeffrey Sachs: “Dangerous” U.S. Policy & “West’s False Narrative” Stoking Tensions with Russia, China

Link here.

Sachs’ comments on his attempts to reach the White House prior to February 24th regarding diplomacy based on Russia’s concerns and the response that it wasn’t going to happen – this is consistent with State Department official Derek Chollet’s comments during an interview in April that the US wasn’t going to seriously negotiate NATO expansion with Russia.