By Prof. Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 12/6/22

Professor Boyd-Barrett’s summary of Alexander Mercouris’s analysis of the day.

Missile Strikes
The most recent strikes are routine, with 70+ cruise missiles launched, a large number for one day but, since the missile campaign started in October, this is about the norm. Occasionally there are bigger strikes. Some western publications have said the most recent strike was smaller than usual and less effective, probably an incorrect conclusion.

The NYT has examined, it claims, the debris from what were likely to have been earlier strikes. They conclude that Russian cruise missiles were made in Russia as recently as October: they are new missiles, thus showing that sanctions have not choked Russian ability to make cruise missiles or to keep production lines running. There is no reason to think that the Russians will feel obliged to cease these attacks any time soon, as they can likely continue producing them indefinitely. A knowledgable correspondent has told Mercouris that the kind of chips that these missiles require is not the most advanced of the kind that mainly Taiwan produces, and that Russia has a well established production line for chips of the caliber needed for subsonic cruise missiles, less than 60 microns.

Energy and Refugees
Russia has not sought to cripple all energy in Ukraine. It is careful not to attack the three nuclear power stations that Ukraine still controls. The only way to knock out all of Ukraine’s power would be to knock out the stations that transfer electric power to the nuclear plants or that transfer power from one place to another. At some point, Russia will probably come for these. But for the moment, John Helmer has argued, Russia is calibrating its attacks in order to learn what impact they have and how Ukraine responds. Most western journalists, by the way, are based in Kiev, and Kiev has not been the priority area for the most recent strikes even if Kiev too is affected.

Energy problems are accumulating and Ukrainian people are facing shortages of power and of water even as temperatures approach zero. And this is becoming a massive problem for Ukrainian citizens. The Ukrainian foregin ministry seems to have abandoned Ukrainian refugees in Europe, where they face local exasperation at the problems associated with the scale of the migration. The ministry has not said a word in support of these refugees, perhaps because it does not want to give the impression that it is supporting the refugee influx into Europe. But Ukraine’s policy of trying to keep people inside Ukraine, given the circumstances of energy shortage, seems to be fundamentally callous and cynical, an abdication of responsibility. If the government cannot help these people, then it should alert European governments of this fact.

There has been another Ukrainian missile attack on a Russian facility and another attack on Russian air bases in Crimea. The latter have been unsuccessful. As for the recentr Ukrainian attacks on Russian air bases in Russia, debris has damaged two bombers, but four people were caught in the open and they were killed, suggesting that Russia was not fully tracking the drones as they passed over Russia.

Nuclear Threats
Even if the damage was otherwise not very significant the bases are where the Russia’s strategic bomber force is maintained, the counterforce against the nuclear forces of the United States suggesting it is probable that nuclear weapons are located at the Engels base and quite possibly at the other base (which does not operate very long-range aircraft).

The nuclear weapons are likely in very hardened bunkers but the threat of missiles to nuclear weapons is a pretty serious business. Ukraine presumably knows that nuclear weapons are there, and yet it is prepared to launch cruise missiles towards them. This looks very reckless, as did the repeated Ukrainian shelling of ZPNN – which is continuing, despite reports of an upcoming truce there.

The US also presumably knows all this, which is possibly why it is reported that the US has modified its HIMARS missiles, which are pretty large, so as not to make it possible for Ukraine to use them for that kind of distance. This does not preclude the possibility that one of Ukraine’s allies mightr provide it with one or more of the long distance varieties.

Western mainstream media are ignoring this dimension of the story of Ukrainian strikes. This suggests that there are people in western governments who are concerned about all this and trying to keep a lid on public knowledge and concern. But just as part of the US government is likely trying to prevent Ukraine from being so reckless, there is another part of the government quietly greenlighting Ukraine’s recklessness, as indicated by the visit to Ukraine of Victoria Nuland, assistance secretary of state and a notorious hardliner. It is not possible that Ukraine would not have discussed its strikes with some of its friends in the USA, since Ukraine is totally dependent on US military support. Ukraine would not want that support to be compromised.

Ukraine had 152 of these kinds of attack drones before the war; will it convert more into cruise missiles, will it fire more of them, on Russia; and what will Washington do about this? The Russians will be ramping up their air defenses in the light of recent developments, and there will be warnings from Moscow to Washington about the corresponding dangers, and warnings from Washington to Kiev. A few weeks ago, Russia was warning the west that Ukraine was preparing a dirty bomb, a claim that was universally derided in the west, including by the IAEA. But the recent strike certainly shows a certain lack of Ukrainian responsibility. One cannot say that Ukraine would never do such a thing as prepare a dirty bomb.

Putin in Crimea, the Oil Price Cap and a Myth about Insurance.
Putin has visited the recently-attacked bridge to Crimea to examine repairs. The bridge was never totally out of commission and has now been totally repaired. Putin drove across the bridge, an indication that he himself has gone to the frontline, a common practice of Russian leaders.

Putin is now likely determining Russia’s response to the oil price cap. Western media have reported there are 19 Russian tankers waiting for Turkish permits to pass the Dardenelles because of Turkish concern as to whether the tankers have insurance coverage. In fact none of the tankers are Russian and all of these non-Russian tankers have taken out western insurance. None of the tankers that have Russian insurance have been stopped from passing on through the Dardanelles. These are tricky waters and the chance of accidents is high. But the Turkish authorities have been checking non-Russian ships with western coverage, not Russian ships with Russian insurance coverage.

Much of the oil actually going through the Dardenelles is oil from Kazakhstan which is not subject to US sanctions. Yet already the uncertainties created by the oil price cap are impacting transportation of oil that is not targeted by the sanctions war. This will have negative implications for oil prices in Europe. The Financial Times has conceded that the $60 cap is the price that Russian oil is already trading (it ihas been actually higher in the days leading up to the implementation of the cap policy).

Russia is now taking its own counter measures. It will not observe the cap. It will continue to supply countries that do not apply the cap, and it will prohibit Russian producers and shipping and insurance companies from having any dealings with entities that support the oil price cap. It is also slightly cutting down on oil production. If the import ban on Russian oil is lifted and Europe relies purely on the oil price cap, then the Russians have already killed that idea. They will not supply oil to Europe so long as there is a cap. One group that must be very worried must be the Greek ship owners who ship 50% of the oil that is transported. Greek ship owners, who have huge influence, will not be pleased, and one wonders about the stability of the Greek government going forward. No oil economist thinks the cap will be effective. Russian oil was trading at $70 a barrel in Far Eastern markets in the rush to buy oil before the cap was introduced.

Seizing Russian Money
Mercouris has seen some other problems with sanctions policies, namely western freezing of Russian central bank foreign assets, around $350 billion. A paper provided to NATO says that western powers have only been able to track down $100 billion and they dont know where the rest is. Much of that money may have found its way back to Russia by now. This does show how difficult it is to enforce sanctions against a super power. How much more difficult it will be to control the price of Russian oil.

Battlefronts
Russian defense minister, Shoigu, has just identified a string of settlements in the Donbass that Russia has taken in recent weeks. He claims that Ukraine lost 8,000 killed in action in November, and the number is likely comparable for December.

By Eric Horowitz, Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), 11/30/22

The New York Times has found another neo-Nazi militia to fawn over in Ukraine. The Bratstvo battalion “gave access to the New York Times to report on two recent riverine operations,” which culminated in a piece (11/21/22) headlined “On the River at Night, Ambushing Russians.”

Since the US-backed Maidan coup in 2014, establishment media have either minimized the far-right ideology that guides many Ukrainian nationalist detachments or ignored it  completely.

Anti-war outlets, including FAIR (1/28/22, 3/22/22), have repeatedly highlighted this dynamic—particularly regarding corporate media’s lionization of the Azov battalion, once widely recognized by Western media as a fascist militia, now sold to the public as a reformed far-right group that gallantly defends the sovereignty of a democratic Ukraine (New York Times, 10/4/22; FAIR.org,  10/6/22).

That is when Azov’s political orientation is discussed at all, which has become less and less common since Russia launched its invasion in February.

‘Christian Taliban’

The lesser-known Bratstvo battalion, within which the Times embedded its reporters, is driven by several far-right currents—none of which are mentioned in the article.

Bratstvo was founded as a political organization in 2004 by Dmytro Korchynsky, who previously led the far-right Ukrainian National Assembly–Ukrainian People’s Self-Defense (UNA-UNSO).

Korchynsky, who now fights in Bratstvo’s paramilitary wing, is a Holocaust denier who falsely blamed Jews for the 1932–33 famine in Ukraine, and peddled the lie that “120,000 Jews fought in the Wehrmacht.” He has stated that he sees Bratstvo as a “Christian Taliban” (Intercept, 3/18/15).

In the 1980s, the Times portrayed the religious extremists of the Afghan mujahideen—who were receiving US training and arms—as a heroic bulwark against Soviet expansionism. We all know how that worked out.

In an echo of that propaganda campaign, the Times neglected to tell its readers about the neo-Nazi and theocratic politics of the Bratstvo battalion. Why should anyone care who else Bratstvo members would like to see dead, so long as they’re operating in furtherance of US policymakers’ stated aim of weakening Russia?

Modern-day crusade

The article’s author, Carlotta Gall, recounted Bratstvo’s Russian-fighting exploits in quasi-religious terms. Indeed, the only instances in which the Times even hinted at the unit’s guiding ideology came in the form of mythologizing the unit’s Christian devotion.

Of Bratstvo fighters embarking on a mission, Gall wrote, “They recited a prayer together, then loaded up the narrow rubber dinghies and set out, hunched silent figures in the dark.” Referring to battalion commander Oleksiy Serediuk’s wife, who also fights with the unit, Gall extolled, “She has gained an almost mythical renown for surviving close combat with Russian troops.”

The piece even featured a photograph showing militia members gathered in prayer. Evoking the notion of pious soldiers rather than that of a “Christian Taliban,” the caption read, “Members of the Bratstvo battalion’s special forces unit prayed together before going on a night operation.”

The Times also gave voice to some of the loftier aims of Bratstvo’s crusade, quoting Serediuk’s musing that, “We all dream about going to Chechnya, and the Kremlin, and as far as the Ural Mountains.” Nazi racial ideologues have long been enamored by the prospect of reaching the Urals, which they view as the natural barrier separating European culture from the Asiatic hordes.

While plotting Operation Barbarossa, Hitler identified the Urals as the eastern extent of the Wehrmacht’s planned advance. In 1943, referring to the Nazi scheme that aimed to rid European Russia of Asiatic “untermenschen” so the land could be settled by hundreds of millions of white Europeans, Himmler declared, “We will charge ahead and push our way forward little by little to the Urals.”

‘Mindset of the 13th century’

The only two Bratstvo members named in the piece, meanwhile, are Serediuk and Vitaliy Chorny. While Chorny—who the Times identified as the battalion’s head of intelligence gathering—is quoted, his statements are limited to descriptions of the unit’s fighting strategy. Serediuk’s recorded utterances are similarly lacking in substance.

Far more illuminating is an Al Jazeera article (4/15/15) titled “‘Christian Taliban’s’ Crusade on Ukraine’s Front Lines,” which quotes both Serediuk and Chorny extensively. Serediuk, Al Jazeera reported, “revels in the Christian Taliban label.” In reference to his decision to leave the Azov battalion, the piece went on to say:

Serediuk didn’t leave the Azov because of the neo-Nazi connections, however—extreme-right ideology doesn’t bother him. What does irk him, however, is being around fighters who are not zealous in their religious convictions.

In the same piece, Chorny invoked the violently antisemitic Crusades of the Middle Ages to describe Bratstvo’s ideological foundation:

The enemy—the forces of darkness—they have all the weapons, they have greater numbers, they have money. But our soldiers are the bringers of European traditions and the Christian mindset of the 13th century.

To circumvent the Times’ exultant narrative, one has to do a certain amount of supplementary research and analysis. But even the most basic inquiry—searching “Bratstvo battalion” on Google—reveals the far-right underpinnings of the unit with which the Times embedded its reporters.

The seventh search result is a June 2022 study from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, which reported, “Another such far-right entity is the so-called Brotherhood (Bratstvo) ‘battalion,’ which includes Belarusian, Danish, Irish and Canadian members.”

The ninth result is an article from the Washington Free Beacon (4/6/22), which quoted a far-right Canadian volunteer as saying on Telegram that he was “fighting in the neo-Nazi ‘Bratstvo’ Battalion in Kyiv.”

SS memorabilia

The New York Times (11/21/22) captioned this photo, “Members of the Bratstvo battalion’s special forces unit prayed together before going on a night operation.”

In a world where journalists actually practiced what they preached, someone at the paper of record surely would have noticed the Nazi insignia appearing in two photos in the piece. In this world, however, the Times either forgot how to use the zoom function—though the paper made extensive use of this capability when reporting on China’s Communist Party Congress the month before (FAIR.org, 11/11/22)—or they simply did not want to report on this ugly and inconvenient discovery.

Totenkopf insignia worn by Bratstvo member in photo above.

One soldier is seen wearing an emblem known as a “Totenkopf” in a photo of Bratstvo’s prayer circle. The Totenkopf, which means “death’s head” in German, was used as an insignia by the Totenkopfverbande—an SS unit that participated in Hitler’s war of annihilation against the Soviet Union, and guarded the concentration camps where Nazi Germany condemned millions of Jewish men, women and children to death.

Totenkopf emblem on eBay.

Individuals donning the Totenkopf also took part in the murder of millions of others in these camps, including Soviet prisoners of war, political dissidents, trade unionists, persons with disabilities, homosexuals and Romani people.

In September, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy posted—and then quietly deleted—a picture on social media of himself with a number of soldiers, one of whom was wearing a Totenkopf patch similar to that seen in the Times’ photo of Bratstvo’s prayer meeting. One can easily find this particular iteration on Amazon or eBay.

Later in the Times article, another photograph of a soldier wearing a slightly different version of the insignia appeared. Here, bathed in the light of an interior room and staring out from the very center of the image, the Totenkopf is even harder to miss. Amazon’s product description for this specific variant reads, “This gorgeous replica piece takes you back to World War II.”

If the Times simply failed to identify the Totenkopf in two separate photos—both of which were taken by a Times photographer while he was embedded with Bratstvo, and were then featured prominently in the article—that would certainly amount to a journalistic failure.

The alternative scenario is that the Times did recognize the SS memorabilia worn by the soldiers they chose to embed with, and decided to publish the images anyway without commenting on the matter.

FAIR ACTION ALERT:

Please remind the New York Times to clearly identify neo-Nazi forces when they appear in coverage, and to refrain from depicting such movements as heroes.

CONTACT:

Letters: letters@nytimes.com

Readers Center: Feedback

Twitter: @NYTimes

Please remember that respectful communication is the most effective.

Article by Andrey Pertsev. Translation by Anna Razumnaya, Meduza, 11/30/22

Russia’s ongoing military defeats in Ukraine and the social burden of mobilization are rapidly cooling the public’s support for the war. Meduza has gained access to the results of an opinion poll commissioned by the Kremlin “for internal use only.” According to the study conducted by the Federal Protective Service (FSO), 55 percent of Russians favor peace talks with Ukraine, while only a quarter of the respondents still support continuing the war.

The FSO poll does not diverge all that much from the results of an October public-opinion study conducted by the Levada Center, Russia’s only large independent sociological institute. In the Levada study, 57 percent of respondents said that they supported, or would probably support, peace talks with Ukraine. Only 27 percent expressed the same range of support for continuing the war.

The FSO’s own polling indicates that Russians’ attitudes about the war have changed. As late as July 2022, only 30 percent of survey respondents favored ending the war by peace negotiations. Comparing the new results to those collected in the summer make the shift obvious:

Two sources close to the Putin administration told Meduza that the Kremlin now plans to limit the polling data that VTsIOM (the Russian Public Opinion Research Center) releases to the public. One source said, “You can get all kinds of results these days — better not to do it at all.” Also speaking to Meduza, a political consultant who works frequently with the Kremlin explained that it’s “best not to reveal the dynamics” of the Russians’ changing attitudes towards the war.

Denis Volkov, the director of the Levada Center, says the share of Russians likely to support peace talks with Ukraine began to grow rapidly following Putin’s September 21 mobilization decree:

“This is sheer reluctance to take part in the war personally. They continue to support it, but they have very little desire to participate themselves. Besides, their support was, from the very start, something they declared with regard to what they perceived as having nothing to do with themselves: “Life goes on — it’s even getting better.” Now, the risks are greater, and people want to start the talks. Still, the majority of people leave this to the government: “We’d like it, but it’s up to them to decide.”

Sociologist Grigory Yudin also links rising public support for peace talks to Russia’s draft. This fall, he says, Russians came face-to-face with the “crumbling of their everyday lives and a sense of danger.” Their “loss of faith in the victory” and the “absence of a convincing account of how exactly Russia might win” also contribute to the shift in opinions, says Yudin. “I wouldn’t be surprised,” Yudin added,

“if this turned out to be mixed with an acute sense of danger to the country itself. In this sense, peace talks followed by legalizing the annexations should make the country safer.”

Yudin says the public’s resentment for how the war is going is not far from outright “apathy.” Still, he doesn’t rule out the possibility of anti-war demonstrations in Russia:

“Protests do not occur simply because people think something but because something makes protest possible. Russia’s protest potential is very high. When possibilities present themselves, there will be protests. Quite possibly, we won’t have to wait that long.”

Kremlin insiders who spoke to Meduza, however, said there’s little concern in the administration about potential mass protests, though they acknowledged that “it’s best not to raise the temperature, and not to anger people if not necessary.” Russia’s state media and propaganda outlets, moreover, have already received instructions “not to dwell on the war.” According to Meduza’s sources, the mass media is now being told to focus instead on a “more positive agenda.”

Political scientist Vladimir Gelman says the dynamics of Russian public opinion are unlikely to pressure the Putin administration into honest negotiations with Ukraine. The Russian side, he argues, is “not ready to make concessions,” and the prospects of any peace talks depend largely on what happens in combat — not in opinion polls.

Last October, Meduza wrote about Vladimir Putin’s unwillingness to abandon his claim on the Ukrainian regions he’s now annexed outright. The Kremlin’s recent hints at possible peace talks are likely a scheme to buy time to prepare a new offensive. Meduza’s sources close to the administration say the president still clings to his plans in Ukraine, and officials will reportedly resume Russia’s “partial” mobilization in the winter. Just how many more men the Kremlin hopes to draft remains unclear.

By Dmitry Trenin, RT, 11/28/22

Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin commented, during a meeting with soldiers’ mothers, that he now regards the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015 as a mistake. This concession was stark in the context of the possibility of peace negotiations to end the fighting in Ukraine.

It is worth remembering that in 2014, Putin acted on a mandate from the Russian parliament to use military force “in Ukraine,” not just in Crimea. In fact, Moscow did save the cities of Donetsk and Lugansk from being overrun by Kiev’s army, and defeated Ukraine’s forces, but rather than clearing the whole region of Donbass, Russia stopped, and agreed to a cease-fire brokered in Minsk by Germany and France.

Putin explained to the mothers that at the time, Moscow did not know for sure the sentiments of the Donbass population affected by the conflict, and hoped that Donetsk and Lugansk could somehow be reunited with Ukraine on the conditions laid down in Minsk. Putin might have added – and his own actions, as well as conversations with then-Ukrainian President Pyotr Poroshenko, confirm it – that he was prepared to give the new Kiev authorities a chance to settle the issue and rebuild a relationship with Moscow. Until rather late in the game, Putin also hoped that he could still work things out with the Germans and the French, and the US leadership.

Admissions of mistakes are rare among incumbent leaders, but they are important as indicators of lessons they have learned. This experience has apparently made Putin decide not that the decision to launch the special military operation last February was wrong, but that eight years before, Moscow should not have put any faith in Kiev, Berlin, and Paris, and instead should have relied on its own military might to liberate the Russian-speaking regions of Ukraine.

In other words, agreeing to a Minsk-style ceasefire now would be another mistake which would allow Kiev and its backers to better prepare to resume fighting at the time of their choosing.

The Russian leader realizes, of course, that many nations in the non-West, those who refused to join the anti-Russian sanctions coalition and profess neutrality on Ukraine, have called for an end to hostilities. From China and India to Indonesia and Mexico, these countries, while generally friendly toward Russia, see their economic prospects being impaired by a conflict that pits Russia against the united West. The Western media also promote the message that global energy and food security is suffering because of Moscow’s actions. Russia’s arguments and protestations to the contrary have only limited impact, since Russian voices are rarely heard on Middle Eastern, Asian, African, or Latin American airwaves.

Be that as it may, Moscow cannot ignore the sentiments of the larger part of humanity, which is now increasingly referred to in Russian expert circles as the Global Majority. Hence, official Russian statements that Moscow is open for dialogue without preconditions. However, any Russian delegation to talks would have to take into account the recent amendments to the country’s Constitution, which name the four former Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson, and Zaporozhye as part of the Russian Federation. As Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has put it, Russia will only negotiate on the basis of existing geopolitical realities. It should be noted that the Kremlin has not retracted the objectives of the military operation, which include the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, which means ridding the state and society of ultra-nationalist, anti-Russian elements.   

As for Kiev, it has gone back and forth on the issue. Having nearly reached a peace agreement with Moscow in late March, it later reversed course to continue fighting (the Russians believe this was done on Western advice). Having achieved operational successes on the battlefield this past fall, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky had all contacts with the Kremlin formally banned and formulated extreme demands which he addressed to Putin’s successors, whenever they may emerge. For the West, this was bad from the perspective of public relations, and Zelensky was asked to make it appear as if he was open for talks, but in reality, nothing changed.

The reality is that the principal parties involved in the conflict in Ukraine, namely Washington and Moscow, do not consider the present, or the near future, as a good time for negotiations. From the US perspective, despite the unprecedented sanctions imposed on Russia by the West and the recent setbacks that the Russian Army has experienced in Kharkov and Kherson, Moscow is far from being defeated on the battlefield or destabilized domestically. From the Kremlin’s perspective, any truce or peace that leaves Ukraine as an ‘anti-Russia’, hostile state, is tantamount to a defeat with highly negative consequences.

Instead, both sides believe they can win. The West, of course, has vastly superior resources in virtually every field that it can use in Ukraine. But Russia is working to mobilize its own substantial reserves in both manpower and the economy.

Where Moscow has an advantage is in escalatory dominance. For the US, Ukraine is a matter of principle; for the Kremlin, the matter is simply existential – the conflict with the West is not about Ukraine, but about the fate of Russia itself.

It looks as if the war will continue into 2023, and possibly beyond that. Talks will probably not start before either side is prepared to concede due to exhaustion, or because both parties have reached an impasse. In the meantime, the death toll will continue to mount, pointing to the essential tragedy of major power politics. In the fall of 1962, then-US President John F. Kennedy was ready to walk to the edge of the nuclear precipice in order to prevent the Soviet Union from turning Cuba into its missile base. Sixty years later, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a military action to make sure that Ukraine does not become an unsinkable aircraft carrier for America.

There is a lesson to be learned from this. Whatever Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev thought about his right to counter US missiles pointed at Moscow from Turkey with weapons of his own targeting Washington and New York from Cuba (with Havana’s consent), and whatever successive US presidents thought about their right to expand the NATO military bloc to include Ukraine (at Kiev’s wish), there is always a horrendous price to pay for the failure to take into account the rival power’s security interests. Cuba went down in history as a narrow success for common sense. Ukraine is an ongoing story, with its outcome still hanging in the balance.

By Andrew Beck, National Interest, 11/28/22

Andrew Beck is Partner at Beck & Stone, a brand consultancy connecting enterprises and institutions to culture.

When missiles struck Polish territory last week, killing two Poles, the world was quick to point the finger at Russia. Despite the danger of magnifying an event that could spark a world war, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy insisted that Russia was behind the strike and called for heightened aggression on his country’s behalf: “This is a Russian missile attack on collective security—a very significant escalation. We must act.”

The Biden administration has repudiated Zelenskyy’s claims of Russian involvement but has simultaneously asked Congress for an additional $37.7 billion in aid to Ukraine. This is the latest of many bipartisan spending bills passed on Ukraine’s behalf by Congress—in addition to aid from other countries.

What drives such strong rhetoric and financing to repudiate and combat one country—sometimes in spite of facts? The clear answer: perception. In September, US News & World Report announced that Russia was experiencing a precipitous decline in its “Best Countries” ranking. Seven months after the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in February, Russia saw a 12 percent drop in its year-over-year global standing—one of the largest in the project’s history. The Russians’ lack of international support makes them an easy target for abuse.

This drop in rankings is not surprising when you consider US News’ methodology and audience. The company polls over 17,000 people from regions around the world as to whether they associate a country with terms like “human rights” and “strong international alliances.” According to SimilarWeb analytics, nearly all of the media company’s 20 million readers live in English-speaking countries, and Ukraine makes up just a tenth of a percent—Russia, even less.

But despite the difficulty of measuring something as fluffy as sentiment, Russia’s standing in the international community is a salient question. No country can exist as an island fortress. Without friends and allies, national sovereignty cannot last long.

Seven years ago, I co-founded a brand consultancy that specializes in cultural entrepreneurship—helping companies delve into their local culture or subculture and express themselves in those terms. My work often calls for thinking about how brands can be patriotic, historic, and even mythic—and what each national culture means to the rest of the world.

In America, our national brand—our standing—has long been a political football. President Barack Obama controversially embarked on a European tour during his 2008 campaign to spread the message that under his leadership, America would more closely resemble Europe in diplomacy. A major point of opposition against both President Donald Trump and President Joe Biden was that they have damaged how other countries in the first world perceive us. In every case, Americans seem preoccupied with that elusive prize of being liked by an international, first-world audience.

But how much does this global standing factor into matters of foreign policy? To what extent should international relations preoccupy our country’s leaders and decisionmakers? The answer is the same for nations as it is for brands: what matters most is not being universally liked, but the loyalty of your core audience of customers, stakeholders, and investors. In politics, the focus is on citizens, public servants, and partners—the rest are collateral at best, inimical at worst.

One type of brand that closely parallels the concept of national standing can be found on another US News ranking: universities. Aside from major scandals, universities are generally consistent from year to year in how they are perceived and how they attract new students or donors. Like most countries, universities are led by presidents and an administration with a balance of powers. But the college’s core brand is older, deeper, and stands apart from whichever educrat is currently at the helm.

Ask any development department and they’ll tell you what really matters is how a university is perceived by its most important audiences: prospective students, alumni donors, and prospective employers. This is why Ivy Leagues don’t bat an eye when they’re nipped at by higher education watchdogs or conservative academics. Nor do colleges like Hillsdale or the University of Dallas care when they catch flak from the political left. It takes a long time and consistent adherence to a brand persona to build or destroy an institutional brand; and there is no institution more prominent in the modern mind than national identity.

When the “global standing” of Russia becomes a news item in the Western press, readers wearing American-centric spectacles might see a drop in a US News ranking as signaling the impending doom of Vladimir Putin’s regime. It is a validation of what they saw unfold in the weeks after the war began, with companies and institutions and celebrities across the global American economic and cultural empire “canceling” Russia for its actions, some with punishing sanctions and divestment, the majority with projections of solidarity with Ukraine and high-fisted moral outrage at Russia. Who does not like to see proof that their distant participation in an active war is working?

But the opposite is closer to the truth: Russians are more likely to treat the Western media’s approbation as a badge of honor than a sign of their nation’s decline. They have built themselves an identity for a hundred years around the idea that Russia is the alternative to, if not the antidote for, the United States and the broader cultural trends we represent. Moving further away from America’s ideal is closer to the ideal they want for themselves. What appears to be a civilizational decline in the eyes of Americans is validation for Russians.

Many years ago in Russia, there was a sense of economic superiority: America was greedy, hierarchical, and oppressive—stealing from the poor to give to the rich. Russia and its Soviet Union were the champions of the downtrodden and had real equality under communism.

Eventually, after much pain and suffering, Russians let that particular farce fade away, but that did not mean they believed themselves to be defeated culturally. Their national myth is just as strong as that of Great Britain and perhaps stronger than that of the United States. As the American cultural empire became increasingly more modern and less traditional, Russia emerged from communism with a zeal for a pre-Bolshevik past. They doubled down on distinctly Russian sentiments by investing in cultural institutions like the church, the arts, and the academy, to restore their ties to each other and protect themselves from America’s soft power of cultural influence.

These institutions have in turn reaffirmed Russia in its identity as a fundamentally good nation with a storied history that uses setbacks as stones to build on their great inheritance. In the later 2000s, Russia found herself rising economically with America, but going in the opposite direction of America’s depleted, secularized, progressive culture.

This narrative has accelerated under Putin, a figurehead of cultural resistance who conducts the pieces of a national orchestra playing to an appreciative audience. Thus, his leadership fuels Russian resolve to be more “on brand,” leaning into the identity that their enemies wish to pillory them with.

We saw this same dynamic play out in the 2016 presidential election, when a supposedly brilliant diplomat, Hilary Clinton, called anyone who would vote for Donald Trump a “deplorable.” Everyone remembers the result: what was meant to be an epithet turned into a trademark banner to rally the Trumpist troops, uniting them against a common foe who openly despised them. The lesson here is that being disliked by the “right” people has the opposite effect intended.

Ultimately, neither America, the United Kingdom, nor any other nation can browbeat Russia by attacking their national brand. Putin’s core customer base—Russia’s voting public—affords him astounding levels of support that haven’t been seen since Ronald Reagan in the United States, even taking the country’s election integrity concerns into consideration. And internationally, Russia suffers from no shortage of friends: major players like Israel, Turkey, China, and India have not fully bought into the West’s renewed crusade against Russia. Perhaps they are pragmatists, not wishing to permanently destroy an economic ecosystem that was starting to reap rewards, or maybe under the surface, they know their own sensibilities are more closely aligned with old, familiar identities held together by borders, language, local customs, and self-interest.

The diplomatic tidepools that pit Russia against certain geopolitical foils and pair her with confederates are inevitable. Every brand eventually establishes a position in the public’s mind, and no amount of censure or promotion can forestall this inevitably. It is the law of perception. Russia’s brand draws crude lines in the international marketplace, a perception that Putin has not only exacerbated, but given the Russian people a cause to glory in: fighting against the perennial enemy of American global influence. The Western elite polarizing their institutions and media organs against Russia will not influence Putin or Russians to change their brand trajectory, but steel their resolve to triumph with it intact.