By Andrei P. Tsygankov, Canadian Dimension, 2/26/23
In Neville Chamberlain’s expression, in war, whichever side may call itself the victor, there are no winners, but all are losers. The brutal war in Ukraine is now in its second year with no serious prospect of ending. All the main parties—Russia, Ukraine, and the West—remain committed to victory rather than a mutually acceptable settlement based on negotiations without preconditions. What follows is a preliminary assessment of the main parties’ relative gains and losses per their stated objectives. These gains and losses incorporate political, military, and economic dimensions.
Ukraine and its people—those living in the territories controlled by Kyiv and those claimed by Russia in the eastern and southern parts—are the war’s most significant victims. Millions of refugees, thousands of killed civilians, and well over a hundred thousand soldiers killed or wounded on a battlefield is a gruesome but incomplete list of human suffering in the country. The Ukrainian economy survives only on foreign assistance. Nearly one-third of the potential labour force is unemployed.
While the Ukrainian state has survived, it has already lost about 20 percent of its territory with bleak prospects of regaining it. Ukrainians are united and committed to fighting, but the costs are extremely high and growing.
Ukrainian leaders, encouraged by the West, have refused to negotiate with Russia and continue to believe in achieving full victory before the end of 2023 or even earlier. However, judging by the past year’s record, Ukrainian officials have been unsuccessful in securing their country’s peace, prosperity, and territorial integrity.
Western nations set the high bar in what has become a proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. According to their goals, Russian military power should be degraded, while the Russian economy should be severely undermined, making it exceedingly difficult to continue with the war. As a result, Ukraine should be able to insist on its peace terms.
Not only have these goals not been achieved, but there are growing signs they cannot be reached in principle. Indeed, the West’s own military and energy resources are dwindling. There are also increasing signs that Western populations are tiring of the war and its costs.
Americans and Europeans are not roused by the brave rhetoric of the existential fight for the “rules-based international order” or securing freedom from autocracies. The increasing costs and the low capacity for ideological mobilization will make it difficult to sustain the West’s course of defeating Russia on the battlefield.
Additional military supplies—air defence, tanks, long-range rockets, and fighter planes—will take time to produce, deliver, and train Ukrainians to use. In the meantime, Russia is also adapting to the realities of military escalation by increasing its military production and remaining prepared to engage in more intense warfare. Even without resorting to nuclear weapons, Russia has the capacity to attack critical transportation and logistical centres, mobilize additional troops, and target the Ukrainian leadership.
What’s more, the conflict is being gradually internationalized, with Iran, China, and other powers increasingly backing Russia. From the beginning, the war has been conducted in the nuclear shadow, and the potential for a nuclear escalation should not be taken lightly. Those who think that Vladimir Putin is bluffing have been unpleasantly surprised in the past and may be surprised again.
The West cannot win the Ukraine war by defeating Russia and it is losing the ability to end the conflict. The deterrence strategy without dialogue was flawed from the beginning and now has eliminated the prospect of negotiating a peaceful settlement. By not encouraging negotiations in Istanbul in March 2022 and placing bets on coercing Moscow to accepting peace on Western terms, the United States and NATO countries have strengthened anti-Western attitudes among Russians.
Although most Russians are unwilling to fight the Ukrainian army, Russians are increasingly convinced that the West is their real enemy. Most of them now share the Kremlin’s narrative of fighting a long war for national survival in the manner of past conflicts against Napoleon and Nazi Germany.
Because the West has set such ambitious goals, it now painfully realizes the impossibility of meeting them. The Western nations are, therefore, losing the war per their stated objectives and their position in the first half of the year. Instead of developing a face-saving strategy, the US today, as earlier in Vietnam and Afghanistan, is becoming a hostage of its own uncompromising, values-driven stance.
Russia is no longer losing the war and has improved its strategic and tactical position following the withdrawal from Kherson in August 2022 and the partial mobilization in September-October 2022. The Russian military continues to make incremental gains in Donbas. Meanwhile, the Russian economy has survived the pressure of Western sanctions, losing 2.1 percent of its GDP in 2022, against expectations of about 12 percent.
The Russian leadership is preparing for a protracted war and estimates that it has resources sufficient for several years of fighting without major social and economic disruptions in the country
In addition, Russia’s reputation with non-Western countries remains significant. According to a recent poll, most Chinese, Indians, and Turks view Russia as an ally or necessary partner. They also think Russia remains strong or has become stronger since intervening in Ukraine. Russia’s great power status has been preserved at least in the eyes of non-Western nations.
However, on balance and by its standards, Russia is not set to win and is not winning the war. Although Moscow has improved its position since the early months of the invasion, it has not moved closer to its stated goals of “demilitarization” and “de-Nazification” of Ukraine. Just as the West cannot demilitarize Russia, Russia cannot accomplish this fully in Ukraine. In addition, because of the war’s brutality, Moscow lost the support of many Ukrainians who favoured strong ties with Russia.
Ukrainian political and military resolve remains strong, as is the West’s commitment to military aid, intelligence resources, and financial assistance. Russia’s military advancement is based on heavy Russian losses and remains slow. For example, as acknowledged by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group, it would take the Russian army one and a half years to secure control of Donbas and three years to capture broader territories east of the Dnieper River.
Russia’s military escalation will have to come with high political costs at home and abroad and may not be undertaken except in response to a significant escalation by Kyiv or NATO.
Overall, none of the parties has met its political and military objectives. The paradox is that neither is rational enough to indicate an openness to robust negotiations and a political compromise. Russia’s signalled preferences include preserved control over newly gained territories. These preferences are opposed to Ukrainian and Western demands, as summarized in Zelensky’s peace plan.
A recent Chinese proposal to stop the fighting in Ukraine and begin negotiations without Russia’s withdrawal from Ukrainian territory is also not acceptable to Ukraine and the West
Therefore, moving toward a compromise will take more human suffering and military escalation. As difficult as it is to accept, things will have to get worse before they get better.
Andrei P. Tsygankov is Professor of International Relations at San Francisco State University. He is the author of Russian Realism (Routledge, 2022) and The “Russian Idea” in International Relations (Routledge, 2023).