War’s destruction of economies, public services, infrastructure, and the environment leads to deaths that occur long after bombs drop and grow in scale over time. This report reviews the latest research to examine the causal pathways that have led to an estimated 3.6-3.7 million indirect deaths in post-9/11 war zones, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. The total death toll in these war zones could be at least 4.5-4.6 million and counting, though the precise mortality figure remains unknown. Some people were killed in the fighting, but far more, especially children, have been killed by the reverberating effects of war, such as the spread of disease.
The report examines the devastating toll of war on human health, whoever the combatant, whatever the compounding factor, in the most violent conflicts in which the U.S. government has been engaged in the name of counterterrorism since September 11, 2001. Rather than teasing apart who, what, or when is to blame, this report shows that the post-9/11 wars are implicated in many kinds of deaths, making clear that the impacts of war’s ongoing violence are so vast and complex that they are unquantifiable.
In laying out how the post-9/11 wars have led to illness and indirect deaths, the report’s goal is to build greater awareness of the fuller human costs of these wars and support calls for the United States and other governments to alleviate the ongoing losses and suffering of millions in current and former warzones. The report highlights many long- term and underacknowledged consequences of war for human health, emphasizing that some groups, particularly women and children, suffer the brunt of these ongoing impacts.
Arbat Street, Moscow; photo by Natylie Baldwin, May 2017
I don’t know who the people are in Jeremy Morris’s network and how representative they are of Russian opinion. I tend to think some of the points in the article are valid and some are not. I do think it’s important to read a variety of perspectives. – Natylie
How has Russia changed, more than a year after its invasion of Ukraine? Has it become a fascist state with soldiers in the classroom, and people afraid to express the slightest doubts about the war? Are Russians consenting to be mobilised, to kill and be killed on the front? What do ordinary people really think about Ukrainians, the West and their own government?
At the beginning of last year, I spent time trying to answer the question of how war would change Russia – my hunch was “the same, but worse”. I continue to ask that question, both of myself and the dozens of Russians I work with.
I’m the only foreign anthropologist to have carried out fieldwork in Russia since the war began. I’m also (probably) the only researcher with long-term contacts from all walks of life, who can get reliable responses and avoid many of the biases those studying Russia are unavoidably subject to. Explaining the war means that many contradictory things need to be said. For many Russians, the conflict is traumatising yet normalised at the same time.
As I wrote in openDemocracy shortly after the invasion, when people are presented with potentially traumatising information, their cognitive coping mechanisms include denial and avoidance. As time goes by, they gravitate to more ‘sophisticated’ ways of dealing with the disturbing idea that their country is responsible for mass death and destruction, war crimes and worse.
They consolidate defensively around ideas that justify or explain the invasion, and allow them to continue their lives in as mundane a way as possible – that it’s the West who is the aggressor, or that Ukrainians are dupes of their own “fascist regime”.
These are not really ideas, but feelings that tap into deep-seated historical processes and unfinished questions about the nature of Russia and, before it, the Soviet state. These include misplaced and inaccurate perceptions of the Soviet order’s benign governance of Ukraine and elsewhere, as well as accusations of imperialist sins by the West while denying Russia’s same sins.
Geopolitical and historical resentment about the loss of the Soviet project are felt deeply by many Russians. Like all things that people believe about their own countries, these feelings are amplified in a crisis. But even this is not the main thing.
My job as an ethnographer is to observe and record, hopefully seeing through people’s guile and denial. This applies to perspectives in the West too, where we have just as many biases as those in Russia. As someone who has dedicated his professional life to the study of Russia and the broader context of life after the USSR, more than ever I ask this question: what are your claims to knowledge and what biases do they reveal?
I don’t pretend to analytical wholeness, but I do have confidence in my sources and (in the parlance of social science) their ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’. So much of what we see about the war from both the Ukrainian and Russian perspective is filtered heavily. Often what we see is secondary data that has been manipulated, whether consciously or unconsciously.
Four common misconceptions
Let’s take four broad categories of misconception (intentional in some cases).
Active misconception 1: Russians actively approve of the war and the regime’s conduct. A variation of this is that a majority (or large minority) of Russians are animated by nationalist fervour. Those, like me, who question this – whether we’re critical of survey data, or cautious about using samples of social media posts that express genocidal or other enthusiasm – generally get drowned out.
Reality: If you’d asked Russians before the war whether the Kyiv regime should be replaced in a military coup by Russian forces, those answering ‘yes’ would have been a tiny minority. The idea of a full-scale invasion was unthinkable. Ukraine, Crimea, the Donbas are not salient issues to most Russian people, even now. What matters are jobs, benefits, inflation, corruption, law and order, and other material concerns.
As I have written, survey polling in Russia is an imposition of the norms of the powerful upon the subordinate. It is true that people will readily repeat propaganda tropes about President Zelenskyi being a drug addict, about NATO mercenaries and depleted uranium. But only if you really prompt or push them.
Although people are looking over their shoulders when they speak about the war, they continue, online and off, to openly criticise the conflict, albeit with increasing risks. There are few “hurrah-shouting patriots” to be found. To most people, the regime’s national chauvinism is not an acceptable mobilising ideology.
The evidence for this is clear if researchers are honest about how anti-Ukrainian sentiment, patriotic symbols and ‘wartalk’ are not voluntarily present in everyday life. That’s not to say there isn’t an imperial residue, unpleasantly sticky and hard to wash off – but in this respect, are Russians very different to other post-imperial peoples? It’s unpopular to say so. But while there are some shared feelings between Putin and the Russian people, there is a gulf when it comes to the genuine revanchist and neocolonial intent of the regime.
Active misconception 2: Mobilisation illustrates, at best, passive acceptance by Russians of the war. At worst, it indicates the complete atomisation of society, or the “learned helplessness” (being unable to find a resolution to a difficult situation) of men who really do have the option of resisting, but don’t take it.
Reality: Russia is a big place. For every hapless person mobilised, by consent or not, there are probably three or even four who have more or less actively avoided it. Just as underground groups do what they can to derail trains and graffiti public spaces with anti-war messages, ordinary people have all kinds of visible and invisible tools to dodge the state. (This will not change with the introduction of a digital conscription system – the database will be ineffective and may intensify institutional in-fighting between security services.)
For the vast majority, mobilisation is an occupational hazard that one can take small steps to reduce. Those who go willingly, or even volunteer, are pitied or looked on with disdain as uninformed dupes motivated by greed.
Active misconception 3: Putin’s ‘electorate’ has benefited from the conflict – either because of the money paid to soldiers, or because of other economic changes to do with the war. Another variation is that sanctions have had no effect on Putin’s less-educated supporters.
Reality: Russians are politically as diverse – and fickle – as anyone else. Anyone using terms like ‘electorate’ and ‘loyalty’ is guilty of gross oversimplification.
It’s true that the regime itself thinks in terms of buying people off, and has thrown money at service personnel while trying to index pensions and benefits to the cost of living. However, the reality is that Russia remains a country where inflation exceeds salary rises, and incomes are comparable to struggling middle-income countries such as Colombia and Costa Rica.
Real incomes stagnated after 2010 and, for the majority, increasing costs eroded living standards while access to medical and educational services worsened. The housing market boom is not a sign of health, but a reflection of policymakers as hostages to fortune. There is a surfeit of ‘bad’ jobs (low pay, exploitation, unpredictable management), and most people know they risk losing their lives if they take the only other way out and join the army.
There is no good evidence that the much-quoted figure of 300,000 mobilised new personnel in 2022 was really achieved. Regardless, that number is just 1% of the able-bodied male population. Mobilisation represents Russia’s incoherent and incompetent state in action. ‘Too little, too late, too conditional, too technical, measures ever at counter purposes’ could be the summary of almost every social policy Putin has ever introduced.
Also, there’s no good evidence that Russia at war will stop being an “Empire of Austerity” – as economist Nick Birman-Trickett has called it. Actual services that people use and value are continually cut to the bone and worse. Monies recently allocated to ameliorate the self-inflicted wounds on Russian society sound big, but are not even sticking plasters.
The now-frequent refrains that Putin’s war is intended to reduce demographic decline, or that, conversely, it will precipitate imminent demographic collapse, are not supported by evidence. The argument that the deportation of Ukrainian children into Russia represents “biopolitical imperialism” has to be balanced by the regime’s utter lack of interest in the wellbeing of the vulnerable and their social reproduction in general.
Active misconception 4: People in Russia pay attention to the daily minutiae of the war – such as the ongoing fight for Bakhmut, Prigozhin’s petulant antics, or Ukraine’s recent alleged drone strike on the Kremlin.
Reality: The more unpleasant and potentially real the war becomes to the average Russian, the more they distance themselves cognitively. People feel the unnerving reality of anti-aircraft missiles being installed in Moscow, but even then, they (perhaps rightly) conclude that this is both theatre and intended to protect their betters. It isn’t about them. This is the common refrain: “It’s nothing to do with me.”
Is this cynicism or close to the truth? Can ordinary Russians vote out Putin? Can they protest without risk of torture and 25 years in the worst possible jail conditions? Did they consent to this war? Does their ‘public’ opinion matter, in the unlikely event they are asked it?
Once again, while there are the creeping realities of war, normalisation of the abnormal continues – such as rising prices or the nationalisation of favourite foreign brands. The death of a neighbour’s son at the front or the car-bombing of an ultra-nationalist figure most people have never heard of – these are uncomfortable things, but they can quickly be put out of sight and mind.
Do Russia’s scaled-back celebrations on Victory Day (commemorating the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany) indicate it is no longer possible to ignore the possibility of the war ‘coming home’?
Not really. People will continue to keep their worries, their cares and their remembrances private. People will actively connect and resist, but they will be a minority – just like the minority responding to the call of the motherland to fight and die for an unhinged clique’s vision of Russia resurgent.
British journalist Philip Short has written a long, in-depth biography of Vladimir Putin. The timing of its publication was rather fortuitous, having been released just a few months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The book is one of the better ones about Putin, though it certainly has its flaws. Before going into the good, the bad, and the befuddling, I will make a few general observations.
In terms of overall personality and traits, Short characterizes Putin as having a very analytical and “keen” mind, with a natural inclination to be introverted and reserved. These traits are consistent with the observations of others whom I’ve spoken with who had experience interacting with Putin in the 1990’s. Furthermore, Putin can be charming and affable when he wants, but he can also be rather Machiavellian.
This is an overall even handed biography that undermines the Marvel comic book evil villain depiction that most of the western media has been pushing, particularly since 2014 and even more since Russiagate. This probably explains why glowing blurbs from the likes of Anne Applebaum aren’t splashed across the jacket along with the rest of the usual gang that can be expected to offer reverence to every book that vilifies Russia and Putin that comes down the pike, no matter how full of slop it is. It probably also explains why Short hasn’t been interviewed nonstop on CNN, MSNBC, Fox, etc. since the Russian invasion even though you’d think the media would be lining up to get insight into Putin by someone who’d just done a deep dive into the man.
Generally, the book paints a portrait of a more complex figure who can be ruthless but also is an intelligent pragmatist who is not much of an ideologue. It also provides a chronology of how Putin started out being very pro-Western and offered valuable assistance to the US but received little in return.
As I and others have pointed out, Putin is an arbiter of several different interests in Russia. Two of those interest groups have been the pro-Western neoliberal technocrats and the military and security services who were always much more hardline and suspicious of the US-led west. Over the years, as Russia got the short end of the stick in its relations with the west, despite its cooperation in many areas, and no consideration of its most basic security interests, the hardliners appeared vindicated in their criticisms of Putin from the right for not being proactive enough in dealing with the US-led west’s machinations. These machinations include NATO expansion up to its borders, active support of the 2014 coup in Ukraine that installed a government that was hostile to Russia, and abrogation of several key nuclear arms treaties, to name a few.
Putin started out being more sympathetic to the pro-Western neoliberal technocrat camp, but has now been forced to side more so with the hardliners. The book acknowledges that the US-led west bears a fair share of responsibility for this. It offers a lot of the historical timeline and documentation – though at some key points it omits or obscures certain critical contextual details, which I will discuss below – but I fear this information will likely continue to fall on willfully deaf ears since it undermines the narrative that has been weaved progressively over time in the west.
The Good: Debunking the Worst Nonsense About Putin and Russia
Short admits that the books by Karen Dawisha and Catherine Belton arguing that Putin is a kleptocrat are poorly substantiated and not to be taken seriously. He explains that Putin isn’t corrupt by Russian standards and he explains what corruption actually means in Russia compared to western countries. This tracks with what program developer Sharon Tennison and diplomat John Evans – both of whom interacted with Putin while he was deputy mayor of St. Petersburg in the early 1990’s – have said about Putin’s relative honesty. Short also debunks the theory that the Moscow apartment bombings were false flag operations to catapult Putin into popularity and election to the presidency. Many writers and commentators, including both Dawisha and Belton, have pushed this story.
He also explains what NATO expansion looked like from Russia’s perspective, including its history of invasions and the devastation that those invasions wrought that haven’t been forgotten, as well as pointing out that if the US were faced with an equivalent action, it would not be tolerated.
Short acknowledges that Putin was not likely behind the murders of political dissidents such as Anna Politskovaya and Boris Nemstov, but participated in the coverup and protection of those who likely ordered the killings, thereby creating an atmosphere of leniency for such actions. In both cases, it should be noted, the likely culprit was the Chechen leadership. Short does provide some context for why Putin has little choice but to tolerate certain activities by the Chechen leadership that he likely does not like or support. Namely, it is because the current Chechen leadership keeps a lid on any potential extremist behavior that could flare up and result in the kind of deadly terrorism that occurred in the 1990’s.
He does, however, argue that Putin likely ordered the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko. Personally, I think the case for that is less clear-cut than Short does, but that is a good segue into the next section of this review.
The Bad: Still Too Many Western Narratives Taken at Face Value, Obfuscation of Critical Details
While Short dismisses some of the worst lies about Russia and Putin, he still relies heavily on western and pro-western sources. As a result, he takes too much of the western establishment narrative about the poisonings of Alexei Navalny and Sergei Skirpal at face value. I don’t claim to know exactly what happened in either of these cases but I do know that subjecting either of the western narratives on these poisonings to even minimal scrutiny shows them to be far-fetched to put it charitably. Giving the reader a description of the western narrative and then letting the reader know about counter-arguments available would have been helpful in letting the reader use their critical thinking skills to make up their own minds.
I noted some sources that Short used in his book which stood out as very questionable such as Sergei Pugachev who, as I’ve detailed elsewhere, is a self-aggrandizing blowhard.
Chapter 16, titled “Payback,” which dealt with Putin’s pivot toward challenging the west in his third presidential term, was the weakest of the book. While Short gives a decent explanation of why the EU Association Agreement Ukraine was expected to sign in 2013-2014 was problematic, he leaves out important context about the events of Maidan that led up to the annexation of Crimea and eruption of the Donbass rebellion. He doesn’t mention that the agreement mediated by France, Germany and Poland in February 2014 to end the rioting by devolving Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich’s power and bringing early elections was rejected by the ultranationalists who were part of the Maidan protest movement. Short only states that members of Yanukovich’s government “saw the writing on the wall” and police and Berkut units “melted away.”
He doesn’t mention the buses of anti-Maidan protesters from Crimea who were beaten and tortured. He doesn’t mention that the Donbass rebels initially wanted autonomy and the right to speak Russian while remaining Ukrainians and how their desire for independence and unification with Russia evolved as the Kiev government responded to their demands with an anti-terrorist operation rather than a serious negotiation. This reflects either poor research on Short’s part or an intentional desire to omit these important details that would help one to better understand why these events occurred. This is separate from whether one likes or agrees with the events.
Later in the chapter, Short implies that then-Vice President Joe Biden was probably a poor choice by Obama to put in charge of the Ukraine file. I think this is correct, but he claims as part of the reason that Biden had little awareness of the “sensitivities” of Ukraine and Russia issues. It’s true that Biden was not an expert on foreign affairs, but this video from the late 1990’s shows that Biden indeed understood how Russia would view NATO expansion up to their borders. It’s not that difficult of a concept if one looks at a map and has a basic understanding of the events of WWII. Most of the baby boom generation, of which Biden is a member, understood the basic events of WWII, unlike what might be expected by young adults today who are four generations removed. There’s also no reason why Biden couldn’t have called up Jack Matlock or any other competent Russia expert to explain basic history and geography of the region to him or go get some scholarly books to get himself informed about an important area he was supposed to be leading.
In reality, Biden likely wasn’t going to bother putting in any real effort to better inform himself but that speaks to his character. If nothing else, you can rest assured that Biden would understand perfectly well how the US would respond to an equivalent hostile military power on its border. One can’t help but wonder why Short seems to be giving Biden such a pass.
One comment in particular by Short toward the end of the book bothered me. After detailing how the anti-Trump establishment Democrats and their allies in the media tended to push and believe every nefarious allegation about Putin and Russia to the point of absurdity, Short writes:
“The handful of diplomats and scholars who argued otherwise, most of them old Russia hands like Jack Matlock and Stephen Cohen, often went overboard trying to explain Putin’s actions and ended up discrediting themselves.” (p. 603)
I was left scratching my head at this. Matlock and Cohen have/had a tremendous amount of knowledge and experience of Russia. Wouldn’t it be their job to use that expertise to try to explain why Putin – the head of the world’s other nuclear superpower – was doing what he was doing, especially at a time of heightened tensions or even crisis? Isn’t that the whole point of being an expert on Russia? And the fact that a Putin biographer of all people would make such a comment is especially mystifying. Why exactly does Short think he’s writing a biography of Putin if not to explain the man to his audience? Perhaps almost 700 pages is going “overboard” in explaining Putin, eh, Phil? You’re discrediting yourself.
My guess is that Short already knows that even attempting to provide a modestly balanced account of Putin and Russia is going to get him no love from the establishment institutions whose approval one needs at least somewhat to be a writer or analyst who wants to make an actual living. He needs to throw a few bones to the important people who will be close to popping a blood vessel because he’s daring to acknowledge NATO expansion as a contributor to the current mess and that Putin wasn’t actually responsible for the Moscow apartment bombings and likely doesn’t have a trillion dollars stuffed into giant coffee cans in a cave somewhere. In the almost 600-plus pages of the book, I don’t recall Short ever using the term “thug” to describe Putin, which even RFK Jr. and Seymour Hersh feel the obligation to use in reference to the Russian president in recent interviews.
In conclusion, Short’s biography is worth reading if you’re interested in gaining insight into Putin. But it shouldn’t be the only thing you read on that journey. I also recommend the following books which are as good or better:
WASHINGTON, DC – There was a time when everyone was talking about a group of fast-growing emerging economies with huge potential. But the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – struggled to transform themselves from a promising asset class into a unified real-world diplomatic and financial player. Is this finally changing?
The story of the BRICS begins with a November 2001 paper by Jim O’Neill, then the head of global economic research at Goldman Sachs Asset Management, called “The World Needs Better Economic BRICs” (the original grouping did not include South Africa). At a time when the world was dealing with the fallout of the dot-com bust and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, O’Neill highlighted the BRICs’ vast potential, noting that their GDP growth was likely to accelerate considerably in the ensuing decades.
At the time, China and India were experiencing rapid economic growth, and Russia, aided by booming commodity prices, was recovering from the post-Soviet meltdown of the 1990s. Growth in the BRICs was outpacing that of the advanced economies so significantly that O’Neill predicted in 2003 that their collective GDP could overtake the then-Group of 6 largest developed economies by 2040.
While the world expected the BRICs to thrive economically, few expected them to form a united grouping. After all, they represent a mix of unsteady democracies and outright autocracies, each with its own distinctive economic structure. And two of them – China and India – have long been locked in a border dispute, with no sign of resolution.
But the BRICS saw their economic alignment as an opportunity to expand their global influence by creating an alternative to West-led international institutions. And, for a while, they seemed to be making progress.
The addition of South Africa – then Africa’s largest economy – in 2010 lent the grouping greater heft. By 2014, the BRICS Development Bank – now the New Development Bank – was formed as an alternative to the World Bank. The next year, the BRICS created the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, in order to support members experiencing short-term balance-of-payments pressures.
Economically, the BRICS continued to thrive, at least in the aggregate. Though China is the only BRICS economy that has sustained solid growth, the group has surpassed the G7 in terms of relative contribution to global GDP (based on purchasing power parity). Moreover, bilateral trade among its members is rising rapidly. But progress toward the BRICS’ broader ambitions seemed to stall.
Recent developments suggest renewed momentum. Lately, members have been talking of “de-dollarizing” trade, with some raising the prospect of a new shared BRICS currency. While calls for de-dollarization are nothing new, some experts believe that a BRICS currency “has the potential to usurp” the US dollar, or at least “shake [its] place on the throne.”
Moreover, the BRICS seem to be making a comeback as a platform for cooperation on a range of issues, including climate change, global governance, and development. In fact, 19 countries, including Argentina, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, have expressed interest in joining the BRICS – bids that will be discussed at the group’s August summit in South Africa.
Though the group’s institutional framework remains underdeveloped, the motivations that led to its creation have not diminished – and are unlikely to any time soon. In fact, the BRICS and their supplicants appear to be both united and driven by one thing: grievance.
Developing economies are angry about the burdensome conditionality that has been imposed on them by Western-dominated institutions. They are sick of what they perceive as double standards on vital policy matters, such as the green transition. They are unwilling to tolerate efforts to “constrain” their economies through conservation demands or limits on technology sharing. Perhaps most important, they regard Western norms and values with suspicion as a fig leaf for Western countries’ self-interested behavior.
The West’s inability – or unwillingness – to reform global governance so that emerging economies like China and India have greater influence has compounded these grievances. Calls for reform have, after all, been growing louder for decades – since around 1999, when the G20 was formed. In the aftermath of the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, finance ministers and central-bank governors began holding regular high-level meetings, and non-Western representatives wanted to be heard.
With the West’s pledges to pursue reform having come to nothing, potential alternatives – from development banks to currencies – look increasingly attractive to those who feel left out. The BRICS are attempting to build a new world order, “bric by bric,” and the appeal of their cause among other disgruntled countries is growing.
One must wonder what would happen if countries like Argentina or Saudi Arabia joined this project. Even the “BRICS-Plus” embraced by China could go a long way toward advancing an alternative worldview and institutional system – goals that China is also pursuing with its massive transnational Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
To be sure, the BRICS’ ability to realize its ambitions remains far from certain. None of its members is going to stop putting national interests first, though that is precisely what has long held the BRICS back. Even China’s BRI has been likened to a “new form of imperialism” – hardly the best way to win long-term friends.
But the resurgence of the BRICS is disquieting, not least because the grouping has not demonstrated a capacity for genuine global leadership. Shared grievances about the West – legitimate or not – cannot support a rules-based world order. A coherent narrative for global governance, underpinned by clearly articulated values, is essential. And the BRICS have offered no such thing.
For the West, the BRICS’ growing influence holds an important lesson. If the current international order is to remain relevant, the institutions that comprise it will have to change.
By Susan Schmidt, Andrew Lowenthal, Tom Wyatt, Techno Fog, et al., Racket News, 5/10/23
Introduction by Matt Taibbi
On January 17, 1961, outgoing President and former Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower gave one of the most consequential speeches in American history. Eisenhower for eight years had been a popular president, whose appeal drew upon a reputation as a person of great personal fortitude, who’d guided the United States to victory in an existential fight for survival in World War II. Nonetheless, as he prepared to vacate the Oval Office for handsome young John F. Kennedy, he warned the country it was now at the mercy of a power even he could not overcome.
Until World War II, America had no permanent arms manufacturing industry. Now it did, and this new sector, Eisenhower said, was building up around itself a cultural, financial, and political support system accruing enormous power. This “conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience,” he said, adding:
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes… Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.
This was the direst of warnings, but the address has tended in the popular press to be ignored. After sixty-plus years, most of America – including most of the American left, which traditionally focused the most on this issue – has lost its fear that our arms industry might conquer democracy from within.
Now, however, we’ve unfortunately found cause to reconsider Eisenhower’s warning.
While the civilian population only in recent years began haggling over “de-platforming” incidents involving figures like Alex Jones and Milo Yiannopoulos, government agencies had already long been advancing a new theory of international conflict, in which the informational landscape is more importantly understood as a battlefield than a forum for exchanging ideas. In this view, “spammy” ads, “junk” news, and the sharing of work from “disinformation agents” like Jones aren’t inevitable features of a free Internet, but sorties in a new form of conflict called “hybrid warfare.”
In 1996, just as the Internet was becoming part of daily life in America, the U.S. Army published “Field Manual 100-6,” which spoke of “an expanding information domain termed the Global Information Environment” that contains “information processes and systems that are beyond the direct influence of the military.” Military commanders needed to understand that “information dominance” in the “GIE” would henceforth be a crucial element for “operating effectively.”
You’ll often see it implied that “information operations” are only practiced by America’s enemies, because only America’s enemies are low enough, and deprived enough of real firepower, to require the use of such tactics, needing as they do to “overcome military limitations.” We rarely hear about America’s own lengthy history with “active measures” and “information operations,” but popular media gives us space to read about the desperate tactics of the Asiatic enemy, perennially described as something like an incurable trans-continental golf cheat.
Indeed, part of the new mania surrounding “hybrid warfare” is the idea that while the American human being is accustomed to living in clear states of “war” or “peace,” the Russian, Chinese, or Iranian citizen is born into a state of constant conflict, where war is always ongoing, whether declared or not. In the face of such adversaries, America’s “open” information landscape is little more than military weakness.
In March of 2017, in a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on hybrid war, chairman Mac Thornberry opened the session with ominous remarks, suggesting that in the wider context of history, an America built on constitutional principles of decentralized power might have been badly designed:
Americans are used to thinking of a binary state of either war or peace. That is the way our organizations, doctrine, and approaches are geared. Other countries, including Russia, China, and Iran, use a wider array of centrally controlled, or at least centrally directed, instruments of national power and influence to achieve their objectives…
Whether it is contributing to foreign political parties, targeted assassinations of opponents, infiltrating non-uniformed personnel such as the little green men, traditional media and social media, influence operations, or cyber-connected activity, all of these tactics and more are used to advance their national interests and most often to damage American national interests…
The historical records suggest that hybrid warfare in one form or another may well be the norm for human conflict, rather than the exception.
Around that same time, i.e. shortly after the election of Donald Trump, it was becoming gospel among the future leaders of the “Censorship-Industrial Complex” that interference by “malign foreign threat actors” and the vicissitudes of Western domestic politics must be linked. Everything, from John Podesta’s emails to Trump’s Rust Belt primary victories to Brexit, were to be understood first and foremost as hybrid war events.
This is why the Trump-Russia scandal in the United States will likely be remembered as a crucial moment in 21st-century history, even though the investigation superficially ended a non-story, fake news in itself. What the Mueller investigation didn’t accomplish in ousting Trump from office, it did accomplish in birthing a vast new public-private bureaucracy devoted to stopping “mis-, dis-, and malinformation,” while smoothing public acquiescence to the emergence of a spate of new government agencies with “information warfare” missions.
The “Censorship-Industrial Complex” is just the Military-Industrial Complex reborn for the “hybrid warfare” age.
Much like the war industry, pleased to call itself the “defense” sector, the “anti-disinformation” complex markets itself as merely defensive, designed to fend off the hostile attacks of foreign cyber-adversaries who unlike us have “military limitations.” The CIC, however, is neither wholly about defense, nor even mostly focused on foreign “disinformation.” It’s become instead a relentless, unified messaging system aimed primarily at domestic populations, who are told that political discord at home aids the enemy’s undeclared hybrid assault on democracy.
They suggest we must rethink old conceptions about rights, and give ourselves over to new surveillance techniques like “toxicity monitoring,” replace the musty old free press with editors claiming a “nose for news” with an updated model that uses automated assignment tools like “newsworthy claim extraction,” and submit to frank thought-policing mechanisms like the “redirect method,” which sends ads at online browsers of dangerous content, pushing them toward “constructive alternative messages.”
Binding all this is a commitment to a new homogeneous politics, which the complex of public and private agencies listed below seeks to capture in something like a Unified Field Theory of neoliberal narrative, which can be perpetually tweaked and amplified online via algorithm and machine learning. This is what some of the organizations on this list mean when they talk about coming up with a “shared vocabulary” of information disorder, or “credibility,” or “media literacy.”
Anti-disinformation groups talk endlessly about building “resilience” to disinformation (which in practice means making sure the public hears approved narratives so often that anything else seems frightening or repellent), and audiences are trained to question not only the need for checks and balances, but competition. Competition is increasingly frowned upon not just in the “marketplace of ideas” (an idea itself more and more often described as outdated), but in the traditional capitalist sense. In the Twitter Files we repeatedly find documents like this unsigned “Sphere of Influence” review circulated by the Carnegie Endowment that wonders aloud if tech companies really need to be competing to “get it right”:
In place of competition, the groups we’ve been tracking favor the concept of the “shared endeavor” (one British group has even started a “Shared Endeavour” program), in which key “stakeholders” hash out their disagreements in private, but present a unified front.
Who are the leaders of these messaging campaigns? If you care to ask, the groups below are a good place to start.
“The Top 50 List” is intended as a resource for reporters and researchers beginning their journey toward learning the scale and ambition of the “Censorship-Industrial Complex.” Written like a magazine feature, it tries to answer a few basic questions about funding, organization type, history, and especially, methodology. Many anti-disinformation groups adhere to the same formulaic approach to research, often using the same “hate-mapping,” guilt-by-association-type analysis to identify wrong-thinkers and suppressive persons. There is even a tendency to use what one Twitter Files source described as the same “hairball” graphs.
Where they compete, often, is in the area of gibberish verbiage describing their respective analytical methods. My favorite came from the Public Good Projects, which in a display of predictive skills reminiscent of the “unsinkable Titanic” described itself as the “Buzzfeed of public health.”
Together, these groups are fast achieving what Eisenhower feared: the elimination of “balance” between the democratic need for liberalizing laws and institutions, and the vigilance required for military preparation. Democratic society requires the nourishment of free debate, disagreement, and intellectual tension, but the groups below seek instead that “shared vocabulary” to deploy on the hybrid battlefield. They propose to serve as the guardians of that “vocabulary,” which sounds very like the scenario Ike outlined in 1961, in which “public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific and technological elite.”
Without further ado, an introduction to the main players in this “CIC”:
