Apparently Sergey Karaganov is doubling down on his crazy idea of Russia potentially using nuclear weapons to get the US to act more rationally. His latest article can be found here.

Emphasis via bolding is mine. – Natylie

Fyodor Lukyanov is the editor-in-chief of the journal “Russia in Global Affairs”, Chairman of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP)

By Fyodor Lukyanov, Profil, 6/21/23 (translation to English via Google Translate)

Sergey Karaganov’s article “The Use of Nuclear Weapons Can Save Humanity from a Global Catastrophe” caused a violent reaction, which was probably part of the author’s plans. Public discussion about the permissibility of the use of nuclear weapons has been taboo, in fact, since the moment when their sole use by the United States against Japan led to certain consequences.

The relations of the nuclear superpowers in the last century were based on the presumption that any use would lead to total atomic war and the destruction of civilization. Confidence in the inevitability of such a scenario, fear of its implementation, made the nuclear bomb not a battlefield weapon, but a deterrent – both the enemy and the “hotheads” at home. And when someone dares to raise the question of the need to return the nuclear component to the status of conventional weapons, albeit incredibly powerful, it causes shock and indignation.

Your humble servant is not an expert on nuclear weapons and the principles of deterrence and does not pretend to be. But the topic raised by a senior colleague affects everyone, so I will venture to speculate from the position of an informed layman.

Deterrence as a child of its time

Everyone is free to evaluate Sergey Karaganov’s arguments in their own way, especially since they range from applied to religious. You can’t argue with one thing – today the risk of nuclear war is higher than at any time since the early 1960s. The reasons for this are the general increase in aggressiveness in international politics, and strategic frivolity as a result of thirty years of peace under American hegemony, and disbelief that a full-fledged nuclear war can really happen, that is, the departure of existential fear . The latter serves as a starting point. Only the return of the real fear of a nuclear apocalypse can sober up Western elites, who are ready to impose supremacy on the rest of the world by force, no matter what.The goal stated in the article is to “break the will” of the collective West, forcing it to abandon the desire for superiority. The last resort is a nuclear strike on a “group of targets in a number of countries.”

Let’s leave aside the moral aspect, with which everything is clear, the author himself recognizes the enormity of the proposed action. Let’s focus on the conceptual scheme, how effective it could be for “sobering up”.

Nuclear deterrence and the principle of mutually assured destruction (HLG) is a product of the political and technological development of the second half of the twentieth century, the era after World War II. It was a unique period of relative orderliness of international relations, based on a system of institutions – organizations and norms of varying degrees of formalization. Thanks to this orderliness, it was possible to regulate the interaction of the main players, primarily the two superpowers.

The presence of an approximate military-political, economic and ideological balance was cemented by the nuclear factor – first the appearance of atomic weapons in the USSR, then the achievement of Soviet-American parity. The degree of orderliness should not be exaggerated, but it was greater than ever before, and probably ever in the future.

A crisis of the old order

The end of the Cold War meant the disappearance of balance in most respects, but the institutional framework remained unchanged. It was assumed that there was no need to rebuild it, because in the absence of confrontation, the institutions would finally work as they should. The nuclear factor also remained unchanged – the principle of the HLG was preserved even during the period of Russia’s maximum weakness in the first years after the collapse of the USSR.

In practice, the viability of the institutions created in the last century and working effectively then began to decline rapidly – their mechanism was intended for a different alignment of forces and interests. Theoretically, it would be necessary to discuss the other infrastructure of international organizations and agree on their structure. But the victorious West did not consider it necessary. After all, the very system of institutions, starting with the UN, initially embodied American ideas. The Soviet Union agreed to them after World War II, because it had no doubt that it would play a leading role in any design.In other words, the stability of the world order of the second half of the last century was determined by Western design and the presence of a balance of power within it, which was provided by the USSR.

Without balance, the structure staggered and began to crumble. Hence the dysfunction of structures, from the United Nations to many sectoral and regional institutions, including those that were purely Western, such as the WTO, which arose on the basis of the GATT. They cannot cope with the heterogeneity of the world. Against this background, other types of associations are beginning to take shape, less formalized, including a smaller number of participants, designed for a more flexible approach. A fixed world order is not expected in the foreseeable future – it will not be possible to regulate multi-level international strife without a qualitative simplification of the picture. And it is just not expected, if you do not consider catastrophic scenarios.

Deterrence as an institution

Nuclear deterrence is one of the fundamental institutions of the second half of the last century. It did not take shape immediately, for the first decade and a half of the existence of atomic weapons, America and the USSR probed possible boundaries by provoking exacerbations. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers faced that very fear. And they finally fixed the inadmissibility of direct conflict.

Nuclear weapons are indeed capable of destroying humanity, and the institution of deterrence was considered almost unshakable. You can play different games, but you can’t put the existence of the planet on the line. Yes, no one will. The same Sergei Karaganov wrote a few years ago: the depth and scale of international contradictions are such that in former times they would have led to a world war long ago, only the presence of nuclear stops weapons. Now he comes to a different conclusion. The United States is not afraid to unleash a full-fledged war against a nuclear superpower, albeit by proxy.There is only one step before a world war, it will be universal thermonuclear, it may turn out that the only way to avoid it is to arrange a preventive nuclear war, but a local one.

Here it is reasonable to ask the question: why a nuclear attack against another state / bloc possessing nuclear weapons will not lead to a rapid escalation to the very thermonuclear universal, that is, an exchange of strikes between Russia and the United States? The entire system of relations in the nuclear sphere, as noted by theorists of deterrence, is built primarily not on strategy and technology, but on psychology. And this psychological game should discourage the enemy from even the thought of a possible nuclear attack.

The use of nuclear weapons means the end of the game and, in fact, nullifies its special role, turning it into a very powerful means of destruction. And competition in the means of destruction is a “normal” war, only in this case of a cyclopean scale. Mutually assured destruction may not happen, but the all-encompassing damage will be such that the participating countries and the world as a whole will change dramatically in horrific ways.

Is it possible to go back to basics?

Sergey Karaganov emphasizes that nuclear strikes are a last resort, and expects that the movement along the “ladder of escalation” itself will force the opposite side to realize the level of threat and move on to a conversation on the merits – how to start getting out of the clinch and remove contradictions. That is, he believes it is possible to return to the original institutional meaning of nuclear weapons – the production of absolute fear that limits the behavior of participants.

But, as mentioned above, at that time it was part of the overall system of balanced management of international processes. Yes, we can say that the existence of that system was largely determined by the presence of nuclear weapons, but it was not limited to this factor. And when other elements of the structure began to fall off after the Cold War, it turned out that nuclear deterrence as such was not enough to provide the previous behavioral limitations.

It is assumed that with the help of fear, on the escalation of the terminal threat, it is possible to recreate a system of mutually acceptable rules. This logic was applied at a lower level in December 2021, when Russia put forward ultimatums on long-term security guarantees, threatening “military-technical measures” in case of refusal. The nature of the measures manifested itself with the start of a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine and shocked the Western elites, who treated the ultimatum with disdain. This, however, did not lead to a willingness to enter into a discussion with Russia about its concerns, the effect was the opposite.

It can be argued: the comparison is incorrect, since the NWO does not pose a direct threat to the United States and its NATO allies, and nuclear escalation does. But this is where the very elites whose irresponsibility Sergei Karaganov complains about come into play. No matter how you treat them, but so far they demonstrate skill in managing public opinion and mobilizing in support of their policies. Even though objectively this policy is to the detriment of the welfare and security of their citizens.

It turns out that the plan is to return nuclear deterrence to the status it had in the second half of the twentieth century by inflating the level of threat. And to return the elites of the type that were in power at that time. Something romantic-nostalgic. It is not clear where such personnel could be obtained today – just look at alternative forces in the leading Western countries. Moreover, apart from everything else, legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons in someone’s eyes outside the obvious situation described in doctrinal documents (a threat to the existence of the state) looks like an impossible task.

Are we going to bang?

Immediately after the Americans detonated the atomic bomb in 1945, George Orwell wrote a short essay, “You and the Atomic Bomb.” He had no doubt that some others (at least the Russians and the Chinese) would acquire these weapons, and if they remained at the level of not only super-destructive, but also difficult to obtain and very expensive, then they could be useful: “For an indefinite period, it will put an end to large-scale wars at the cost of establishing” a world that will not be peace. That is, Orwell understood from the very beginning that the meaning of this invention is not in application, but in availability. According to Orwell, turning it into another “mere weapon”

Now nuclear weapons are becoming more and more accessible both technologically and materially. Are reflections on the likelihood of using the prerogative of only Russian minds looking for a way out of a difficult military-strategic situation? Of course not. Arguments on this subject are gradually filling the world public space. This confirms what has been said above – the institution of deterrence, like other institutions of the last century, is in crisis. A sharp increase in the degree of discussion does not lead to the strengthening of the institution, but to its final collapse. And the application will not be a way to make you come to your senses, but a formal removal of the general taboo with unpredictable consequences.Further actions will no longer be dictated by calculations of one kind or another, but by reactions to each next step of the other side. Playing nuclear peers is a gambling activity. But in the event of a breakdown, the net damage will multiply any hypothetical benefits for everyone.

The taboo on the use of nuclear weapons is undoubtedly weakening. You need to prepare for everything. And rational behavior here is not to break the taboo completely, preventively, but to try to preserve it as at least some kind of limiter. This does not mean that the topic itself cannot be touched, quite the opposite. It is sanctimonious to shy away from the very thought of application – an ostrich approach. In this sense, Sergey Karaganov should be thanked for such a direct statement of position. Its discussion should become part of the development of a new understanding of strategic stability to replace the one that can no longer be restored.