Stephen Bryen is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute.
It is still too early to say whether the direction of the Ukraine war has changed, but there is increasing evidence that Ukraine’s inability to penetrate Russian defenses along the southern line, and challenges in the directions of Kupyansk, Lyman and Bakhmut suggests the entire war could be reaching a decisive conclusion.
It is, for that reason, that the Biden administration is asking Congress for $20 billion for Ukraine. The idea seems to be to provide psychological support to both President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian army.
This time, however, Congress may not rubber stamp this outlandish money request. It is not clear why US$20 billion is needed, and sentiment in the US and Europe is starting to shift toward finding a solution to this costly and difficult war.
Concerns range from depleting US strategic reserves to prolonging a conflict that increasingly looks like it will end up badly in a Ukrainian defeat. While opposition is well short of a majority, further battlefield setbacks could lead Congress to change its mind on financial requests that break the bank.
One thing is certain: It is unlikely that any Washington politician can mobilize public support for the war.
Information about Russian operations, particularly in the Kupyansk direction, is hard to find. The Russians are not calling their operations an offensive, although unconfirmed reports say that Russia has mustered 100,000 or more troops for their operation in this area, and have moved in a lot of heavy equipment.
Most revealing was a convoy of BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, seen heading to the area. There also have been reports of Ukrainian units refusing to fight, and while information on such mutinies has been suppressed, it seems to have happened in the past few days.
Zelensky is hoping to retake Bakhmut, his key objective before he lost the city to Wagner forces. At the moment Bakhmut city is not threatened. Instead, the Ukrainians have been trying to take back settlements to the north and south of the city.
The latest information is that early Ukrainian advances in both directions have been repulsed, and that any hope Zelensky may have of creating a victory on the ashes of Bakhmut seems to have failed to materialize.
The Bakhmut venture, once it is finally sorted out, could create a huge internal problem for Zelensky. He is about to fire his defense minister, the man who fronted for him in getting arms from Europe and the United States. Anticipated replacement candidates are, for the most part, inexperienced and unconnected to the war.
Oleksiy Reznikov, the sitting defense minister, may be tipped to be sent to the UK as the Ukrainian ambassador. No one can say for sure whether Ukraine’s military still supports Zelensky, but as more and more cracks appear in Kiev, it is a good bet that they may take matters into their own hands. Should that happen, Zelensky will likely be deposed.
Ukraine has brought up reserve units, many NATO-trained, to try and head off any big Russian advance.
But committing these reserves leaves Ukraine with less trained brigades for the future, since Russia’s primary strategy has been to let them come in fairly close and then pound them with artillery, air strikes and aerial mines. It is now reported that Ukraine has ordered a mass evacuation, while at the same time mining bridges and roads to slow a Russian advance.
The Russians have been fairly clever in managing their war front. Few attacks have been made on Kiev, except one more than a month ago on Ukraine’s intelligence center in the city.
Little is said in the Russian press about the top Ukrainian commanders, Valerii Zaluzhny and Oleksandr Syrskyi, other than to note that the Ukrainian army operates professionally. This may suggest the Russian door is open to dialogue with Ukraine’s military.
Meanwhile, reports indicate that the Wagner troops in Belarus are starting to return to Russia. The immediate cause is that Belarus has refused to pay them, leaving them without salaries for their troops or money to purchase equipment.
It is possible that some of them will be shipped off to Africa. While Russia has not supported the coup in Niger, that disclaimer does not necessarily apply to Wagner. The recent decision of ECOWAS to agree to putting together a military operation to “restore democracy in Niger,” offers Russia and Wagner a significant opportunity.
ECOWAS troops are nearly as bad as Niger’s. They lack transport, communications and supplies. Any war there, without an outside stabilizing force, is likely to become a war of atrocities. No one knows whether Putin will tip his hat to Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and fly them into Niamey.
Niger, of course, is a sideshow and Ukraine is the main event, with significant geopolitical implications. The Russians have been holding out instead of starting a big push to finish the war, trying to wear down the Ukrainians and split support for the war in Kiev.
But war planners in Moscow know how to count, and it could be they now see opportunities for a big offensive. If it materializes, keep an eye on Kupyansk.
Very disturbing that the most gung-ho are Millenials and Gen Zer’s. These are presumably the demographics more inclined to look at alternative media, yet they seem to have imbibed the establishment narrative on Ukraine the most. On the other hand, boomers appear to be the most opposed while Generation X (my generation – apparently the invisible generation) is not mentioned at all. – Natylie
Almost a third of Americans support U.S. troops being sent to war-torn Ukraine, according to a new poll.
A total of 31 percent of eligible voters in the U.S. support or strongly support American military forces heading to the battlefields of Ukraine, polling conducted exclusively for Newsweek by Redfield & Wilton Strategies has revealed.
A quarter of respondents neither supported nor opposed the idea of sending U.S. soldiers to Ukraine, with 34 percent against the suggestion. Just under one in ten respondents did not know.
The Pentagon said it had no comment to make when contacted by Newsweek about the results of the poll.
The U.S. is by far Ukraine’s biggest backer in terms of military aid. Since the start of the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, Washington has pledged more than $43 billion in security assistance to Kyiv. But the Biden administration has said since the early days of the conflict that U.S. soldiers will not be heading to the front lines in Ukraine.
A total of 1,500 people participated in the online poll, carried out between July 25 and July 26.
In the poll, those identified as “Millennial,” between 27 and 42 years old, were most likely to “strongly support” committing U.S. troops to Ukraine. However, more respondents born between 1997 and 2012 said they would support the measure overall, 47 percent saying they supported or strongly supported sending U.S. troops.
Nearly a third of respondents aged over 59 said they opposed pledging U.S. troops to Ukraine, with a further 25 percent “strongly” opposing the suggestion.
Just four percent of “Gen Z” respondents, aged between 18 and 26, said they felt strongly against sending U.S. troops.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden said U.S. military forces “are not and will not be engaged in a conflict with Russia in Ukraine.”
Biden said U.S. forces would be transferred to Europe, but they were not heading to the continent “to fight in Ukraine, but to defend our NATO allies and reassure those allies in the east.”
“As I made crystal clear, the United States will defend every inch of NATO territory with a full force of American power,” Biden said at the time.
However, Ukraine is not part of the alliance, despite loud calls from Kyiv to be allowed to join and promises from NATO that Kyiv could become a member state further down the line.
Under Article 5, NATO members are obligated to treat an attack on one state as an attack on all, and this is one of the reasons for the hesitancy about allowing Ukraine to become part of NATO while it is still at war with Russia.
In the polling for Newsweek, 47 percent of respondents said they either supported or strongly supported Ukraine being admitted into NATO, with just 15 percent saying they opposed Kyiv’s membership. A further 29 percent expressed neither support nor opposition, and 10 percent did not know.
Just over a quarter said NATO should admit Ukraine immediately, whereas 37 percent believed Ukraine should become a NATO state after the war with Russia has finished.
On July 13, Biden said he had authorized an additional 3,000 reserve troops to be sent to Europe.
“This reaffirms the unwavering support and commitment to the defense of NATO’s eastern flank in wake of Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war on Ukraine,” U.S. Lt. Gen. Douglas Sims told a Pentagon media briefing.
These soldiers “are not additional forces” but will “augment what we already have there,” he said, adding their activities will be decided by the U.S. European Command.
In mid-April, ABC News reported that a “small U.S. military special operations team” had been operating from the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv since the early days of the war, but that they did not approach the front lines, citing a former and a current U.S. official.
On November 1, 2022, Pentagon Press Secretary, Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder told media that U.S. forces were at the embassy, but Washington had “been very clear there are no combat forces in Ukraine, no U.S. forces conducting combat operations in Ukraine.”
“We have U.S. Marines at the embassy doing normal U.S. Marine-type guard duties,” Ryder said. “These are not combat squads that are going out.”
In an unprecedented move, more than 100 leading medical journals from around the world called for the abolition of all nuclear weapons in an op-ed published Tuesday.
“The prevention of any use of nuclear weapons is […] an urgent public health priority and fundamental steps must also be taken to address the root cause of the problem — by abolishing nuclear weapons,” the editorial argues, adding that current non-proliferation efforts are “inadequate to protect the world’s population against the threat of nuclear war.”
“As editors of health and medical journals worldwide, we call on health professionals to alert the public and our leaders to this major danger to public health and the essential life support systems of the planet — and urge action to prevent it,” they write. The co-authors include the editors-in-chief of the Lancet and the New England Journal of Medicine.
The piece, which was sponsored by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, notes that the risk of nuclear war has gone up in recent years due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The authors slammed nuclear states for failing to pursue total denuclearization in good faith, a key provision of the Cold War-era Non-Proliferation Treaty, an agreement that limits which states have access to nuclear weapons.
The article’s release is set to coincide with the 78th anniversary of the American nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Those strikes killed as many as 200,000 Japanese civilians, not including those who may have died from cancer and other radiation-related illnesses in later years.
As the editorial notes, the impact of nuclear war today would likely be far worse. Researchers have found that a war involving roughly two percent of the world’s nukes could kill 120 million people directly. And a full-scale nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia could lead to “nuclear winter,” in which the vast majority of humans would perish and civilization as we know it would cease to exist.
The call also comes as millions of people are flocking to theaters to watch ‘Oppenheimer,’ the new Christopher Nolan film about the scientist who led the program that created the atomic bomb. Notably, the movie has faced criticism for not portraying the aftermath of American attacks on Japan and the long-term health consequences of nuclear testing.
The editorial is unlikely to get a warm reception from U.S. officials, who have long argued that security considerations make denuclearization impossible in the near term. And some experts argue that full denuclearization would actually raise the risk of cataclysmic war between the world’s military powers, which have assiduously avoided direct clashes since acquiring the ultimate weapon.
“Nuclear weapons took great power war off the agenda of international politics,” Michael Desch of Notre Dame University told RS earlier this year. And, as Desch noted, the total number of nuclear weapons has dropped dramatically from its high of 65,000 warheads in the mid-1980s.
The Biden administration has so far paid little attention to nuclear negotiations of any sort, though it recently offered to restart nuclear talks with Russia and China “without preconditions.”
The op-ed, for its part, offers three concrete steps that could reduce nuclear risks short of full abolition. One suggestion is for states to adopt a “no first use” policy, meaning that they would only use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack on their territory. Another is to take nukes off “hair-trigger alert,” which would lengthen decision-making windows in case of an apparent attack. Finally, the physicians call on states at war to “pledge publicly and unequivocally that they will not use nuclear weapons in these conflicts.”
But, as the authors note, none of these steps would eliminate the risk of nuclear apocalypse.
“The danger is great and growing,” the medical experts argue. “The nuclear armed states must eliminate their nuclear arsenals before they eliminate us.”
Presidents typically announce controversial personnel and policy decisions on a Friday to ensure that the Saturday papers, which are not widely read, are charged with informing the general public. This was the case this past Friday, when President Joe Biden appointed CIA director William Burns to the Cabinet. President Harry S. Truman, who created the CIA in 1947, favored the depoliticization of the agency and its directors, which is why he initially chose professional military officers to be the director of central intelligence. No CIA director was appointed to the cabinet until the Reagan administration several decades later.
It is ironic that Biden chose Burns for the cabinet because I believe Burns was appointed to CIA in part to depoliticize the role of the director in the wake of the failed stewardship of CIA directors Mike Pompeo and Gina Haspel in the Trump administration. Too many CIA directors in the past were particularly bad choices because they were too close to partisan politics. Such directors as George H.W. Bush (the Ford administration); William Casey (the Reagan administration); and Mike Pompeo (the Trump administration) were bad choices because of their partisan views. As president, George H.W. Bush appointed Robert Gates to lead the CIA because Gates’ loyalty to the president (and the entire Bush family) could be assumed. Barack Obama’s appointment of John Brennan was similarly flawed, and Brennan—like Gates—was more concerned with serving the White House than telling truth to power.
When George H.W. Bush was named director of the CIA in 1976, he asked President Gerald Ford to place him in the cabinet. Ford rejected that request and, upon reflection, Bush agreed that it would have been an inappropriate move. When Bush became president in 1989, he refused to give cabinet status to either William Webster or Bob Gates.
A strong and independent CIA director is essential to deal with White House pressures to ensure that intelligence assessments support policy. The Carter administration scrutinized CIA director Stansfield Turner’s testimony on arms control because it wanted to make sure that Turner would tell the Congress that CIA’s monitoring of any strategic arms control agreement would be foolproof. Vice President Dick Cheney made numerous trips to the CIA in the run-up to the Iraq War to make sure that CIA intelligence supported White House claims regarding Iraqi weapons of mass production. Donald Trump relied on CIA director Pompeo to put pressure on the intelligence directorate to justify withdrawal from the Iran nuclear accord.
These are important considerations regarding the policy role of CIA directors, which is why it was disconcerting to observe the mishandling and misunderstanding of the issue by the mainstream media, particularly by the New York Times. On Saturday, Michael Shear’s article in the Times was headlined ”Biden Makes CIA Director Member of the Cabinet Again,” which incorrectly assumed that the CIA director was traditionally a member of the cabinet. But the CIA is not a policy making institution, and presidents initially did not appoint intelligence directors to their cabinets.
President Ronald Reagan broke this important tradition in 1981, when he made CIA director William Casey a cabinet member. Casey believed that cabinet status gave him a platform for shaping national security policy. He took advantage of this appointment to shape or politicize the intelligence of the CIA and to manage the Iran-Contra operation. In his important memoir, Secretary of State George Shultz stressed that he was aware that Casey and his deputy, Bob Gates, were shaping intelligence on the Soviet Union, so he discounted it.
President Donald Trump placed CIA directors Pompeo and Haspel in his cabinet, and Pompeo reliably tried to politicize intelligence on such sensitive policy issues as Iran. In view of Haspel’s role in the sadistic CIA program of torture and abuse, it was particularly inexorable to place her in such an important institution.
William Burns is far and away the best CIA director in recent memory, perhaps in the 75 years of its history, and clearly the national security heavyweight in the Biden administration. Burns repeatedly denies that he is engaged in the diplomacy of the Biden administration, but he has taken on a substantive and significant policy role. His numerous trips to key capitals belie his denials regarding diplomatic activism. It is difficult to believe that he has not taken part in policy discussions, particularly in view of the limited experience and knowledge of the Biden national security team (Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who is traveling to Tonga this week to open the U.S. embassy there).
In view of Burns’ extensive experience in sensitive diplomatic matters, it is reasonable to assume that he will be asked to contribute to discussions on sensitive policy issues. Burns repeatedly states that he is not engaged in diplomacy, but he traveled to Kyiv and Moscow with warnings of last year’s Russian invasion. And Burns, who conducted secret diplomacy with Iran on behalf of the Obama administration, traveled to Beijing for Biden to open lines of communication. It is up to Burns to ensure that he isn’t tempted to somehow shape intelligence analysis to a particular policy.
This should have been one of the major lessons of the CIA’s intelligence failures in the run-up to the Iraq War, when the British intelligence chief wrote a secret memorandum for the British Prime Minister, charging that the White House and CIA director George Tenet were shaping U.S. intelligence to U.S. policy regarding weapons of mass destruction. When the Soviet Union was heading toward dissolution in the 1980s, CIA director Casey and his deputy, Gates, “shaped” U.S. intelligence to paint a picture of a threatening Soviet Union in order to justify increased defense spending. Gates, who was a weather vane for all of Casey’s hard-line views, finally acknowledged in his memoir that he watched Casey “on issue after issue, sit in meetings and present intelligence framed in terms of the policy he wanted pursued.”
Burns has a well-deserved reputation for integrity, but he could be tested by the Biden administration, particularly in an election year.
Those of us who are attentive to the lessons of the past will remember that the architects of the second Gulf War, the two-part crusade to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s nefarious despotism and bring the blessings of democracy to the Arab Islamic Middle East, only belatedly discovered the fact that the divide between Sunnis and Shiites and the persistence of deep tribal cleavages were the fundamental realities we inherited in a newly “liberated” Iraq. Armchair theorists had spoken of an Iraqi middle class yearning for civic freedom, and of a reformed Islam waiting to find expression in “Islamic democracy,” something spiritually akin to the Christian Democratic parties that were so influential in Western Europe in the two-and-a-half decades after World War II. One read article after article of this type in Bill Kristol’s Weekly Standard. Even Stanley Kurtz, who was very cognizant of the tribal character of Iraqi society, did not think it would prove to be an insurmountable obstacle. But these visionary hopes, marked by ignorance of the facts on the ground and the democratic triumphalism—the “End of History”—that dominated Western thought after the collapse of Communism, proved to be catastrophic illusions.
Turning to the Russo-Ukrainian War that has raged since February 23, 2022, the same mix of historical ignorance and utopian expectations has clouded the Western response to the Russian invasion of the Ukraine. But this time, there has yet to be an acknowledgement of the most relevant fact on the ground, namely the deep divide in Ukraine between the Galician Party, rooted in the west of the country and now dominant in Kiev, which is committed to expunging any Russian cultural and spiritual presence in Ukraine, and the Muscovite Party, which sees Russia and Ukraine not as enemies but as spiritual, if not exactly political, brothers.
Since the Maidan Revolution of 2014, secretly encouraged and strongly supported by the United States, the Galician Party has been triumphant, encouraging the comprehensive de-Russification of Ukraine, even if Ukrainians are Orthodox Christians and the majority of them speak Russian at home. Fourteen thousand Russophone Ukrainians were killed in “anti-terrorist” campaigns in the east of the country after the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014 (which had been arbitrarily zoned to Ukraine by then-Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1954 at a time when intra-Soviet Union “borders” did not really matter). There was brutality on the “separatist” side, too. Compounding matters, the new Ukrainian government made no serious effort to implement the Minsk II agreements of 2015. These would have given language rights and some cultural autonomy to the Donbas (and other Russian-oriented regions in the east of the country) and might have helped defuse the situation.
The mainstream narrative passes over all of this in silence, or near silence, when its purveyors talk about the sources of the present conflict. The truth, however, is much more complicated. As Nicolai Petro lays out with impressive equanimity in his recent book The Tragedy of Ukraine, the Galician Party has its roots in the nationalist ideology of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). This underground organization formed the basis of Stepan Bandera’s anti-Soviet resistance movement during and after World War II. One is obliged to have some sympathy for the Banderites, who were caught between the conflicting evils of Nazi and Communist totalitarianism. However, as Petro demonstrates, that movement advocated what its chief ideologue called “Ukrainian spiritual totalitarianism.” It hated Russia far more passionately than it opposed Communism. The Russian government’s constant claim about Ukraine being a nation of Nazis is crude and hyperbolic. But important currents of Ukrainian nationalism then and now continue to have unsavory political views and connections. Groups such as the Svoboda Party and the Azov Battalion (major actors behind the 2014 Maidan rebellion) are hardly fighting for “liberal,” “democratic,” and “European” values as our political and media elites endlessly repeat. While a liberal, or at least a moderate, current is present among Ukrainian nationalists, it is far from dominant. To say that “Ukraine is fighting for democracy” is far from the truth on the ground.
As for Russia, to draw on a famous remark by Talleyrand, its invasion of Ukraine was “worse than a crime, it’s a mistake.” This point has been made brilliantly in a series of essays by the foreign policy analyst Srdja Trifkovic in ChroniclesMagazine. Trifkovic is not insensitive to Moscow’s legitimate grievances, including reckless efforts to expand NATO to include Ukraine, which run counter to the deep historical and cultural connections between Russia and Ukraine, not to mention Russia’a legitimate security interests in that part of the world. But as Trifkovic points out, if Russia’s goal remains the “demilitarization” of Ukraine, the invasion has hardly served that purpose. Quite the contrary. Indeed, as Christopher Caldwell has pointed out in the pages of the Claremont Review of Books, Ukraine, with massive NATO support, is the most militarized society on earth. That process had already begun after the Maidan Revolution and the Russian seizure of Crimea. The United States was the principal architect of this policy of massive militarization in response to the allegedly global threat of Russian “imperialism.” Here was what could call a “self-fulfilling analysis.”
Richard Pipes, the famed historian of Russia, was hardly reticent about his disdain for Russian political culture, which he associated quite one-sidedly with antisemitism and “patrimonial despotism.” But in a conversation with me at a conference on the Cold War at Hillsdale College in the fall of 2009, he proclaimed his vehement opposition to NATO expansion to include Ukraine and Georgia. Even the most liberal-minded and pro-Western Russians, he suggested, would find such a move threatening and destabilizing, an “existential threat” to the Russian nation, just as Americans would be alarmed by Russian troops in Canada or Mexico. But in the 14 years since Pipes made those remarks, the ability of the Western political class to look at things even provisionally from the Russian perspective—a sine qua non of geostrategic thinking—has nearly disappeared.
In fact, our response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been accompanied by little or no soul-searching about our own significant role in the unfolding of the tragedy. Instead, we are subjected to endless moralistic effusions about Russian perfidy and the purity of the Ukrainian cause. In his fine recent book, The Roadto Ukraine: How the West Lost Its Way (please note the subtitle), the eminent sociologist Frank Furedi suggests that Western elites were so committed to “endism” (the “End of History,” facile humanitarianism, the end of war especially for the European avant-garde of humanity) that they could only see this essentially regional conflict, borne of conflicting interests and borders, as a massive assault on the post-political ethos of Western elites. Add to this dogmatic identification of Russia with the Soviet Union in many establishment conservative circles, and the Left’s disdain for the social conservatism of the Russian people, and the ground is set for angry moralism as a substitute for principled but realistic judgment in approaching relations with post-Communist Russia.
There are consequences for these precipitous moralistic judgments. The indefinite continuation of the conflict in Ukraine risks leaving that country as a charnel house, a victim of Western moralism as much as Russian aggression. In Russia itself, the regime has hardened with draconian (and ultimately counterproductive) punishments for open opposition to the war, and a growing fixation with “Nazi” efforts to surround and subvert historic Russia. The rhetoric of Russia’s ruling political class has grown more brutal and crass.
Contrary to legend, Putin has never been particularly nostalgic for Bolshevism. He strongly supported the teaching of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in Russian high schools. But in February, a leader of Putin’s United Russia Party in the Duma called for eliminating “garbage” such as The Gulag Archipelago from the school curriculum, surely an ominous sign. Thankfully, other members of the ruling party strongly responded to this crude assault on Russian national memory and the greatest anti-totalitarian masterpiece of our time. For the time being, Solzhenitsyn remains in the school curriculum. But there is no doubt that Russia is moving in the wrong direction, in part because of Western imprudence and also because of the ossification of a political order that lacks sufficient civic openness and vitality.
In truth, Solzhenitsyn represents a fundamental example for the future of a decent Russia: an unwavering defense of conscience and human dignity, an adamant refusal to conflate the best of historic Russia with crude authoritarianism or soul-destroying totalitarianism, a humane, moderate, and self-limiting nationalism or patriotism, and a desire for equitable dealings between Russia and Ukraine. Extreme Ukrainian nationalists hated him and all things Russian. But he never reciprocated such hatred.
In the third volume of The Gulag Archipelago, the great Russian writer lambasted his fellow Russians for turning a blind eye to legitimate Ukrainian grievances over the centuries. He believed Ukraine should be free to go its own way but not with unjust “Leninist” borders left over from the Soviet period. In Rebuilding Russia, Solzhenitsyn eloquently reminded his Ukrainian interlocutors that both the Ukrainian and Russian peoples were victims of an inhuman ideology built on the twin foundation of violence and mendacity. Famine, terror, and collectivization afflicted both great peoples, even if Ukrainians suffered particularly cruelly in 1932 and 1933. Shared opposition to totalitarianism ought to shape and deepen common bonds built in suffering and a shared defense of human dignity. Like most Russians, Solzhenitsyn opposed indefinite NATO expansion (he died in 2008). But half-Russian and half-Ukrainian himself, he once wrote that “If, God forbid, there is war between Russia and Ukraine, I will have nothing to do with it, nor will I permit my sons to join.” Solzhenitsyn is a living reproach to the extreme nationalists on both sides: his repeated calls for “repentance and self-limitation” can perhaps challenge and modify the thinking of frenzied partisans.
We in the United States (and the West more broadly) must not associate legitimate opposition to the Russian invasion of Ukraine with enduring animosity to all things Russian or support for the exclusion of Russia from the community of nations. That is neither just nor in our national interest. Moreover, serious investigation and reflection upon our own culpability in the tragedy is necessary if we are not to give rise to a dangerous and eventually tragic escalation of enmity and conflict between East and West. That is a much-needed first step in avoiding a fatal fall into the abyss.
