RT, 10/29/23

There has been a string of anti-Jewish incidents in Russia’s southern Muslim-majority regions, since the war between Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas began, earlier this month.

Media sources in Moscow believe the unrest has been encouraged by Ukraine-based Telegram channels running information-war operations. 

The latest major flashpoint took place on Sunday, when hundreds of anti-Jewish protesters breached the international airport of Makhachkala, the capital of the Republic of Dagestan.

What happened?

Hundreds of angry protesters, some of whom were carrying Palestinian flags and anti-Jewish placards, massed outside the Makhachkala airport late on Sunday. The unauthorized gathering was prompted by online rumors of a flight, allegedly inbound from Tel Aviv and carrying “Jewish refugees” purportedly fleeing the conflict in the Middle East.

The mob scuffled with airport police, breaking doors of the terminal and forcing its way into the facility. Rioters streamed into the terminal, found their way onto the runway and blocked incoming flights as they searched for Israeli passengers.

Response from the authorities

The unrest at the airport prompted a massive police response, and dozens of law enforcement vehicles were spotted at the scene. Riot police entered the airport, detaining multiple protesters, footage circulating online suggests. Some 20 people, including at least six police officers, were injured in clashes, according to local health authorities.

The local directorate of the Russian Interior Ministry said a criminal probe into mass rioting has been launched. The charge incurs heavy penalties and can land offenders behind bars for up to 15 years. Apart from that, individuals making hateful racially- and religiously-charged public remarks may face criminal probes as well, the directorate has warned.

Other anti-Jewish incidents

A day earlier, an angry crowd searched a hotel in the Dagestani city of Khasavyurt for “Jewish refugees,” rumored to be living there. The crowd found none, and the incident was resolved peacefully.

Separately, a Jewish cultural center under construction in the city of Nalchik, the capital of Russia’s Kabardino-Balkaria Republic, was targeted by unknown assailants. The attackers set the building ablaze and tagged it with anti-Semitic graffiti.

Ukrainian intelligence behind the unrest?

The online rumors that prompted the unrest in Dagestan appeared to have originated from the Utro Dagestan (‘Dagestan Morning’) Telegram channel. Despite portraying itself as a local outlet, the channel had been exposed by both Russian officials and the Killnet hacker community as a Ukrainian intelligence service project, set up to stir unrest in Russia.

The channel began to rapidly grow shortly after the beginning of the conflict between Kiev and Moscow in February 2022, receiving lavish funding and becoming a major resource in the network of anti-Russian online outlets.

Fugitive former State Duma deputy Ilya Ponomarev, who had settled in Kiev in 2016 and was eventually granted Ukrainian citizenship, has openly and repeatedly admitted, most recently just a few months ago, that the Dagestan Morning was one of “their” resources.

Branded a “foreign agent” by Moscow, Ponomarev previously claimed to be the mouthpiece of the so-called Russian guerilla group NRA, even though there is no conclusive evidence that it actually exists. Through Ponomarev, the group claimed responsibility for the murders of Russian journalist Darya Dugina and military blogger Vladlen Tatarsky, taking the heat off Kiev, after Moscow blamed Ukrainian special services for orchestrating both terrorist attacks.

Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky immediately reacted to the unrest at the airport with a lengthy post on X on Sunday evening, in which he accused Russia of “deeply rooted” antisemitism and “hatred toward other nations.” Meanwhile, Ponomarev’s team distanced itself from the source of the rumors, claiming that the ex-MP had not been in contact with the Dagestan Morning for over a year.

**

Deciphering What Really Happened In Dagestan by Andrew Korybko, Substack, 10/30/23

Efforts have been underway since the start of the special operation to weaponize multiculturalism under a faux “decolonization” guise in order to “Balkanize” Russia. Of additional relevance, attempts have been made to ruin Russia’s careful balancing act between Israel and Hamas/Palestine. These two contextual factors combined in the latest incident, which saw the SBU exploit some local Muslims’ pro-Palestinian sentiment amidst the latest regional war for the purpose of manipulating them into rioting, storming the airport, and carrying out a pogrom in pursuit of their puppet master’s anti-Russian geopolitical agenda.

An Unexpected Security Incident

A riotous crowd stormed the Makhachkala Airport in Russia’s autonomous Republic of Dagestan on Sunday night and even reached the tarmac after falling under the influence of online rumors alleging that an inbound flight carrying Jewish refugees was expected to arrive from Tel Aviv. They acted as if they wanted to protest in support of Palestine amidst the latest Israeli-Hamas war, but anti-Semitic slogans were associated with the mob, which made some fear that it wanted to carry out a pogrom.

Subsequent Media Spin & A Background Briefing

The security services quickly restored order, though the optics of the incident were immediately exploited by the Western media to fearmonger that Russia is supposedly no longer safe for Jews. According to them and their supporters, the Kremlin’s bias towards Hamas in this conflict has stoked anti-Semitic sentiment in the country and directly contributed to what happened Sunday night. In reality, Russia is neutral as explained by Lavrov here, while Moscow blamed the rumors on the SBU.

Deciphering what really happened in Dagestan requires one to be aware of the larger context leading up to this event. Efforts have been underway since the start of the special operation to weaponize multiculturalism under a faux “decolonization” guise in order to “Balkanize” Russia, which is explained more at length in the preceding two analyses. Of additional relevance, attempts have been made to ruin Russia’s careful balancing act between Israel and Hamas/Palestine, which was explained here and here.

These two contextual factors combined in the latest incident, which saw the SBU exploit some local Muslims’ pro-Palestinian sentiment amidst the latest regional war for the purpose of manipulating them into rioting, storming the airport, and carrying out a pogrom. Under the pretext of holding an unauthorized/illegal protest in support of their co-religionists’ UNSC-endorsed independence cause, this foreign spy agency misled some young men into harming three of Russia’s state interests.

An Attempt To Kill Three Birds With One Stone

For starters, riots naturally pose a threat to any country, especially when they involve storming an airport. Second, it’s even worse when they take the form of a heavily implied pogrom like some extremists within their ranks arguably wanted to carry out as proven by their anti-Semitic slogans. And finally, this incident extended false credence to claims that Russia isn’t safe for Jews anymore, which in turn risks ruining its careful balancing act between Israel and Hamas/Palestine in the latest conflict.

Documented Proof Of Putin’s Passionate Philo-Semitism

The last-mentioned points deserve a bit more elaboration since it was these two goals that the SBU and its CIA masters wanted to achieve most of all. Contrary to the Western public’s twisted perception, which is the result of incessantly being fed groundless propaganda over the past 20 months about President Putin purportedly being the “New Hitler”, the Russian leader is actually a passionate philo-Semite. This collection of quotes here from the Kremlin website between 2000-2018 proves it beyond any doubt.  

In fact, he praised Judaism as recently as last Wednesday when meeting with representatives of religious associations. For those who want to learn more about President Putin’s philo-Semitism, they should review his speech at the Keren Heyesod Foundation’s annual conference in Moscow in September 2019 here and the one that he gave at the Fighting Antisemitism forum in Jerusalem several months later in January 2020 here. This background places former Israeli Prime Minister Bennett’s praise in context.

He told President Putin during their meeting in October 2021 that “I want to tell you on behalf of our country, the whole of our people that we regard you as a very close and true friend of the State of Israel”, which he would never have said if there even a remote chance that he was an anti-Semite. Those Western media outlets and their supporters who try to defame the Russian leader in such a way are suggesting that Israel can’t properly assess friend from foe, which inadvertently offends its policymakers.

The Plot To Ruin Relations With Israel

Nevertheless, the artificially manufactured narrative that was just concocted following Sunday night’s incident at the Makhachkala Airport alleging that Russia is no longer safe for Jews puts pressure on Israel to reconsider their ties, especially after some counterfactually claimed that this is President Putin’s fault. It’s premature to predict whether or not that’ll happen in the long run, but the case can compellingly be made that the SBU’s provocation was timed for maximum effect considering the lead-up to it.

Russia’s unsuccessful UNSC draft resolution calling for a humanitarian ceasefire was vetoed by the US on the grounds that it didn’t explicitly condemn Hamas’ terrorist attack, which Moscow pragmatically eschewed doing in alignment with its neutral stance and desire to raise the odds of ending the violence. Washington’s objection intended to lend false credence to the claim that Russia is biased towards Hamas, all with the ultimate aim of pressuring Israel into reconsidering their ties.

Approximately one week later, Israel demanded that Russia expel Hamas’ political delegation that traveled there to discuss freeing those of its host’s dual citizens who it had earlier taken hostage. Around the exact same time, Israel’s Permanent UNSC Representative criticized Russia’s position at that global body, which prompted his counterpart to clarify the Kremlin’s neutral policy in remarks that were analyzed here.

The Plot To Drag Russia Into The War

Taken together, these three developments in the lead-up to Sunday night’s incident – the US’ innuendo at the UNSC that Russia is biased towards Hamas and Israel’s two subsequently implied claims to that effect – put further pressure on Israel to reconsider ties in the aftermath of that event. The SBU and its CIA masters hope to spark a self-sustaining cycle of political escalations through their latest meddling with the goal of dragging Russia into the Israeli-Hamas war by inertia against its will.

From their perspective, this would open up their long-planned “second front” after prior attempts in Moldova/Transnistria, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Karabakh were either called off in the first two cases (at least for now) or failed in the last three as explained in the associated hyperlinks. These three analyses here, here, and here explain why Russia doesn’t deter or respond to Israeli-US strikes in Syria, but the Kremlin’s calculations could change if Tel Aviv’s do and it begins threatening Russia’s bases there.

To be clear, there’s no credible indication at the time of writing to suggest that Israel has any such intentions, even after Sunday night’s incident. Even so, this doesn’t mean that the SBU-CIA alliance didn’t hope to make that more likely through their latest meddling in Makhachkala, the failure of which wouldn’t automatically amount to a failure of that operation. After all, it demonstrated that they can still manipulate some Daghestanis into doing their bidding, but this isn’t anything new though.

The Plot To Discredit Russia’s “Ummah Pivot”

RT wrote about this in October 2022 in their article here about how similar such information warfare methods as Sunday night’s were employed to incite unauthorized protests against Russia’s partial mobilization of experienced reservists back then. This time the weaponized narrative that they relied on was to take advantage of local Muslims’ pro-Palestinian sentiments amidst the latest Israeli-Hamas war for the purpose of manipulating them into rioting, storming the airport, and carrying out a pogrom.

The foreign conspirators responsible for this provocation wanted large-scale clashes to erupt between their “useful idiots” and the security forces in order to then spin the decontextualized footage with the aim of generating more unrest in the region on the false basis that “Russia is oppressing Muslims”. They haven’t succeeded in this supplementary objective thus far, but they hoped that it could lead to another wave of terrorism in the North Caucasus while also discrediting Russia’s “Ummah Pivot” in recent years.

That concept refers to Russia’s prioritization of ties with majority-Muslim countries, which is intended to optimize its Sino-Indo balancing act in Eurasia as well as serve as a supplementary valve from Western sanctions pressure since the start of the special operation. If Muslims were misled into thinking that “Russia is oppressing” their co-religionists in Dagestan, however, then its soft power would plummet and immense grassroots pressure could be placed on their governments to distance themselves from it.

The Plot To Discredit Spring’s Presidential Elections

Even if none of these objectives are achieved, then this still doesn’t mean that the latest meddling completely failed since it made some Westerners think that Russia is anti-Semitic, briefly revived ridiculous speculation about its “impending collapse”, and distracted from Kiev’s failed counteroffensive. Unless the targeted Dagestani population is inoculated from the effects of foreign influence campaigns, which can be achieved via the means detailed here, some elements might continue doing their bidding.

Other than lone wolf terrorist attacks, this could manifest itself through more such riots as Sunday night’s (whether at transport facilities, government buildings, or wherever else) aimed at either creating wider unrest or at least the perception thereof ahead of next spring’s scheduled presidential elections. The purpose is to encourage a Color Revolution that could then create the previously mentioned optics required for inciting further instability in order to discredit the vote and whatever its outcome may be.

Concluding Thoughts

Considering the wide range of objectives that the latest SBU-CIA latest meddling in Russia sought to achieve, it can be concluded that Dagestan is of disproportionate geostrategic importance, and events there can more easily have far-reaching consequences than if they happened elsewhere. The worst-case scenarios were averted by the security forces’ swift intervention, however, which suggests that they’ll also succeed in averting most (if not all) forthcoming ones and thus crush their foes’ Hybrid War plans.

By Michael Brenner, SheerPost, 9/21/23

The United States is being defeated in Ukraine. One could say that it is facing defeat – or, more starkly, that it is staring defeat in the face. Neither formulation is appropriate, though. The U.S. doesn’t look reality squarely in the eye. We prefer to look at the world through the distorted lenses of our fantasies. We plunge forward on whatever path we’ve chosen while averting our eyes from the topography that we are trying to traverse.  Our sole guiding light is the glow of a distant mirage. That is our lodestone.

It is not that America is a stranger to defeat. We are very well acquainted with it: Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria – in strategic terms if not always military terms. To this broad category, we might add Venezuela, Cuba, and Niger. That rich experience in frustrated ambition has failed to liberate us from the deeply rooted habit of eliding defeat. Indeed, we have acquired a large inventory of methods for doing so.

DEFINING & DETERMINING DEFEAT

Before examining them, let us specify what we mean by ‘defeat.’ Simply put, defeat is a failure to meet objectives – at tolerable cost. The term also encompasses unintended, adverse second-order consequences.

1. What were Washington’s objectives in sabotaging the Minsk peace plan and cold-shouldering subsequent Russian proposals, in provoking Russia by crossing clearly demarcated red lines, in pressing for Ukraine’s membership in NATO; in installing missile batteries in Poland and Rumania; in transforming the Ukrainian army into a potent military force deployed on the line-of-contact in the Donbas ready to invade or goad Moscow into preemptive action? The aim was to either pin a humiliating defeat on the Russian army or, at least, to inflict such heavy costs as to cut the ground from under the Putin government. The crucial, complementary dimension of the strategy was the imposition of economic sanctions so onerous as to implode a vulnerable Russian economy. Together, they would generate acute distress leading to the deposing of Putin – whether by a cabal of opponents (disgruntled oligarchs as the spearhead) or by mass protest. It was predicated on the fatally ill-informed supposition that he was an absolute dictator running a one-man show, The U.S. foresaw his replacement by a more pliable government ready to become a willing but marginal presence on the European stage and a non-player elsewhere. In the crude words of one Moscow official, “a tenant-farmer on Uncle Sam’s global plantation.”
2. The taming and domestication of Russia was conceived as a vital step in the impending great confrontation with China – designated the systemic rival to American hegemony. Theoretically, that objective could be achieved either by enticing Russia away from China (divide and subordinate) or totally neutralizing Russia as a world power by bringing down its stiff-backed leadership. The former approach never went beyond a few desultory, feeble gestures. All the chips were placed on the latter.
3. Ancillary benefits for the United States from a war over Ukraine that would bring Russia low were a) to consolidate the Atlantic alliance under Washington’s control, expand NATO and open an unbridgeable abyss between Russia and the rest of Europe that would endure for the foreseeable future; b) to that end, the termination of the latter’s heavy reliance on energy resources from Russia; and c) thereby, substituting higher-priced LNG and petroleum from the United States that would seal the European partners’ status as dependent economic vassals. If the last were a drag on their industry, so be it.

The grandiose goals stated in (1) and (2) manifestly have proven unreachable -indeed, fanciful – a blunt truth not as yet absorbed by American elites. Those in (3) are consolation prizes of diminished value. This outcome was determined in good part, albeit not at all entirely, by the military failure in Ukraine. We now are about to enter the final act. Kiev’s vaunted counter-offense has gone nowhere – at an enormous cost to the Ukrainian military. It has been bled white by massive losses of manpower, by the destruction of the greater part of its armor, by the ruin of vital infrastructure. The Western-trained elite brigades have been mauled, and there no longer are any reserves to throw into the battle. Moreover, the flow of weapons and ammunition from the West has slowed as American and European stocks are running low (e.g. 155mm artillery shells).  The shortage is being aggravated by newfound inhibitions about sending Ukraine advanced weapons which have proven highly vulnerable to Russian firepower. That holds especially for armor: German Leopards, British Challengers, French AMX-10-RC tanks as well as Combat Fighting Vehicles (CFV) like the American Bradleys and Strykers. Graphic images of burnt-out hulks littering the Ukrainian steppe are not advertisements for either Western military technology or foreign sales. Hence, too, the slow-walking of deliveries to Kiev of the promised Abrams and F-16s lest they suffer the same fate.

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The illusion of eventual success on the battlefield (with its envisaged wearing down of Russia’s will and capacity) is founded on a mistaken idea of how to measure winning and losing. American leaders, military as well as civilian, are stuck to a model that emphasizes control of territory. Russian military thinking is different. Its emphasis is on the destruction of the enemy’s forces, by whatever strategy is suited to the prevailing conditions. Then, in command of the battlefield, they can work their will. The aggressive tactics of the Ukrainians entails the throwing of its resources into combat in relentless campaigns to evict the Russians from the Donbas and Crimea. Unable to achieve any breakthrough, they invited themselves to a war of attrition much to their disadvantage. It has been succeeded by this summer’s all-out last fling which has proven suicidal.  They thereby played into the Russians’ hands.  Hence, while attention is fixed on who occupies this village or that on the Zaporizhhia front or around Bakhmut, the real story is that Russia has been dismantling the reconstituted Ukrainian army piece by piece.

In historical perspective, there are two instructive analogies. In the last year of WW I, the German high command launched an audacious campaign (Operation Michael) on the Western Front in March 1918 using a number of innovative tactics (featuring commando squads, stormtroopers, equipped with flame-throwers) to punch holes in allied lines. After initial gains that brought them across the Marne, attended by very heavy casualties, the offensive petered out and allowed the allies to roll over their gravely depleted forces – leading to the final collapse in November. More pertinent is the battle of Kursk in July 1943 wherein the Nazis made a massive attempt to regain the initiative after the disaster at Stalingrad.  Again, after some noteworthy success in breaching two Soviet defense lines they exhausted themselves short of their objective. That battle opened the long, bloody road to Berlin. Ukraine, today, has suffered huge losses of even greater (proportional) magnitude, without achieving any significant territorial gains, unable even to reach the first layer of the Surovikin Line. That will clear the road to the Dnieper and beyond for the 600,000 strong Russian army equipped with weaponry the equal of what we have given Ukraine. Hence, Moscow is poised to exploit its decisive advantage to the point where it can dictate terms to Kiev, Washington, Brussels et al.

The Biden administration has made no plans for such an eventuality, nor have its obedient European governments. Their divorce from reality will make this state of affairs all the more stunning – and galling. Bereft of ideas, they will flounder. How they will react in unknowable. We can say with certainty one thing: the collective West, and especially the U.S., will have suffered a grave defeat. Coping with that truth will become the main order of business.

Here is a menu of options for handling it.

1.    Redefine what is meant by defeat/ victory, failure/success, lose/gain. There is a new narrative that is scripted to stress these talking points:

·       It is Russia that has lost the contest because heroic Ukraine and a steadfast West have prevented it from conquering, occupying and reincorporating all of the country

·       By contrast, Sweden and Finland formally have joined the American camp by entering NATO. That complicates Moscow’s strategic plans by forcing a dispersion of its forces across a wider front

·       Russia has been politically isolated on the world scene (MB: that is because North America, EU/NATO EUROPE, Japan, South Korea, Australia & New Zealand have backed the Ukrainian cause. Not a single other country has agreed to apply economic sanctions; the “world” does not include China, India, Brazil, Argentina, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa et al).

·       The Western democracies have displayed unprecedented solidarity in responding as one to the Russian threat

    This narrative already has been given an airing in speeches by Blinken, Sullivan. Austin and Nuland. Its target audience is the American public; nobody outside the Collective West buys it, though – whether Washington has registered that fact of diplomatic life or not.

2.    Retroactively scale back your goals and stakes.

·       Make no further reference to regime change in Moscow, to toppling Putin, to crashing the Russian economy, to breaking the Sino-Russian partnership or to fatally weaken it.

·       Speak of safeguarding the integrity of the Ukrainian state by denying that the Donbas and Crimea have been permanently severed from the ‘mother country.’ Emphasize that your friends in Kiev are still titular, legitimate leaders of Ukraine.

·       Aim for a permanent ceasefire that would freeze the two sides in existing positions, i.e. a de facto division a la Korea. The Western portion then would be admitted to NATO and the EU, and rearmed. Ignore the inconvenient truth that Russia would never accept a ceasefire on those terms

·       Maintain the economic sanctions on Russia but look the other way when needy European partners make under-the-table deals for Russian oil and LNG (mostly through intermediaries like India, Turkey and Kazakhstan) as they have been doing throughout the conflict

·       Put the spotlight on China as the mortal threat to America and the West while disparaging Russia as just its auxiliary.

·       Highlight symbolic gestures like the strikes by top-of-the-line supersonic and hypersonic cruise missiles transferred from the U.S., Britain and France that can inflict damage on prominent targets in Russia itself and Crimea (with crucial technical support from American and other NATO personnel). MB: this act is akin to rabid fans of a football team that just lost to a hated rival who puncture the tires on the bus scheduled to take them to the airport

·       Pull out all stops to keep Anna Netrebko – a citizen of Austria – from singing in major capitals. Threaten with heavy sanctions those concert halls which break the boycott – e.g. the Staatsoper in Berlin (ban from visiting Disneyland General Director Herr Matthias Schulz and his progeny unto the fourth generation?)

3.    Cultivate AMNESIA

 Americans have become masters in the art of memory management.

Think about the tragic shock of Vietnam.  The country made a systematic effort to forget – to forget everything about Vietnam. Understandably; it was ugly – on every count. Textbooks in American history gave it little space; teachers downplayed it; television soon disregarded it as retro. We sought closure – we got it.

In a sense, the most noteworthy inheritance from the post-Vietnam experience is the honing of methods to photoshop history.  Vietnam was a warm-up for dealing with the many unsavory episodes in the post-9/11 era. That thorough, comprehensive cleansing has made palatable Presidential mendacity, sustained deceit, mind-numbing incompetence, systemic torture, censorship, the shredding of the Bill of Rights and the perverting of national public discourse  – as it degenerated into a mix of propaganda and vulgar trash-talking. The “War on Terror” in all its atrocious aspects

Cultivated amnesia is a craft enormously facilitated by two broader trends in American culture: the cult of ignorance whereby a knowledge-free mind is esteemed as the ultimate freedom; and a public ethic whereby the nation’s highest officials are given license to treat the truth as a potter treats clay so long as they say and do things that make us feel good. So, our strongest collective memory of America’s wars of choice is the desirability – and ease – of forgetting them. “The show must go on” is taken as our imperative. So it will be when we look at a ruined Ukraine in the rear-view mirror.

The cultivation of amnesia as a method for dealing with painful national experiences has serious drawbacks. First, it severely restricts the opportunity to learn the lessons it offers. In the wake of the inconclusive Korean War where the United States suffered 49,000 killed in action, the mantra in Washington was: no war on the mainland of Asia ever again. Yet, less than a decade later we were knee-deep in the rice paddies of Vietnam where we lost 59,000 people. After the tragic fiasco in Iraq, Washington nonetheless was gung-ho about occupying Afghanistan in a 20-year enterprise to construct a similar Western-leaning democracy out of the barrel of a gun. Those frustrated projects did not dissuade us from intervening in Syria where we failed once again to turn an intractable, alien society into something to our liking – even though we went to such an extreme as a tacit partnership with the local al-Qaeda subsidiary. As Kabul showed, we didn’t even take away from the Saigon denouement the lesson in how to organize an orderly evacuation.

At the very least, one might have expected that a reasonable person would have come away with an acute awareness of how crucial is a fine-grain understanding of the culture, social organization, mores and philosophical outlook of the country we were committed to reconstituting. Still, we manifestly have not assimilated that elementary truth. Witness our abysmal ignorance of all things Russian that has led us to a fatal miscalculation of every aspect of the Ukraine affair.

NEXT: CHINA

Ukraine, in turn, is not cooling the ardor for confrontation with China. An audacious, and by no means a compelling, enterprise that is ensconced as the centerpiece of our official national security strategy. Senior Washington officials openly predict the inevitability of all-out war before the end of the decade – nuclear weapons notwithstanding. Moreover, Taiwan is cast in the same role as that played by Ukraine in the American scheme of things. So, having provoked a multi-dimensional conflict with Russia which has failed on all counts, we hastily commit ourselves to the nearly exact same strategy in taking on an even more formidable foe. This could be classified as what the French call a fuite en avant – an escape forward. In other words: Bring it on! We’re geared up for it.

The march to war with China defies all conventional wisdom. After all, it poses no military threat to our security or core interests. China has no history of empire-building or conquest. China has been the source of great economic benefit via dense exchanges that serve us as well as them. Therefore, what is the justification for the widespread judgment that a crossing-of-swords is inescapable?  Sensible nations do not commit themselves to a possibly cataclysmic war because China, the designated number one enemy, builds radar warning stations on sandy atolls in the South China Sea. Because it markets electric vehicles more cheaply than we can. Because its advances in developing semi-conductors may outclass ours. Because of its treatment of an ethnic minority in western China. Because it follows our example in funding NGOs that promote a positive view of their country. Because it engages in industrial espionage just the way the United States and everybody else does. Because it wafts balloons over North America (declared benign by General Milley last week).

None of these are compelling reasons to press hard for a confrontation. The truth is far simpler – and far more disquieting. We are obsessed with China because it exists. Like K-2, that itself is a challenge for we must prove our prowess (to others, but mainly to ourselves), that we can surmount it. That is the true meaning of a perceived existential threat.

The focal shift from Russia in Europe to China in Asia is less a mechanism for coping with defeat than the pathological reaction of a country that, feeling a gnawing sense of diminishing prowess, can manage to do nothing more than try one final fling at proving to itself that it still has the right stuff – since living without that exalted sense of self is intolerable. What is deemed heterodox, and daring, in Washington these days is to argue that we should wrap up the Ukraine affair one way or another so that we might gird our loins for the truly historic contest with Beijing. The disconcerting truth that nobody of consequence in the country’s foreign policy establishment has denounced this hazardous turn toward war supports the proposition that deep emotions rather than reasoned thought are propelling us toward an avoidable, potentially catastrophic conflict.

A society represented by an entire political class that is not sobered by that prospect rightly can be judged as providing prime facie evidence of being collectively unhinged.

Second, amnesia may serve the purpose of sparing our political elites, and the American populace at large, the acute discomfort of acknowledging mistakes and defeat. However, that success is not matched by an analogous process of memory erasure in other places. We were fortunate, in the case of Vietnam, that the United States’ dominant position in the world outside of the Soviet Bloc and the PRC allowed us to maintain respect, status and influence. Things have now changed, though. Our relative strength in all domains is weaker, there are strong centrifugal forces around the global that are producing a dispersion of power, will and outlook among other states. The BRICs phenomenon is the concrete embodiment of that reality.   Hence, the prerogatives of the United States are narrowing, our ability to shape the global system in conformity with our ideas and interests are under mounting challenge, and premiums are being placed on diplomacy of an order that seems beyond our present aptitudes.

 We are confounded.

Show starts about 8 minutes in. Link here.

Note: According to recent reports, internet service is gradually being restored to Gaza.

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 10/27/23

A lot of folks are concerned after the US struck two facilities in Eastern Syria on the pretext that they were being used by Iran to carry out at least 19 proxy attacks against American troops this month. Although Defense Secretary Austin said that this is “separate and distinct” from the latest Israeli-Hamas war, he also warned that more strikes might be forthcoming if Iran ramps up its attacks like some of its media surrogates suggested it might do if the aforementioned conflict continues escalating as expected.

As it presently stands, however, the US’ latest bombing of Syria isn’t all that big of a deal. Just two facilities that were allegedly storing arms and ammunition were struck in the border town of Boukamal according to the Associated Press’ unnamed military source. By contrast, Israel has bombed Syria’s two largest airports several times this month thus far, after which each were shortly placed out of service. Here are two analyses about those particular attacks that readers should review if they have the time [links available at original post on Substack]:

* 10 October: “Russia Is Unlikely To Let Syria Get Involved In The Latest Israeli-Hamas War”

* 22 October: “Russia Isn’t Expected To Stop Israel’s Strikes In Syria”

Of pertinence to this piece is that Russia never gets involved to deter or respond to any of Israel’s literally hundreds of strikes against the IRGC and its allies that it’s carried out since September 2015. That’s because President Putin agreed to a so-called “deconfliction mechanism” with Prime Minister Netanyahu in the immediate run-up to his country’s anti-terrorist intervention there. Israel was afforded complete freedom of action to respond to what it considers to be Iranian-linked threats to its security.

A similar such policy is in place when it comes to the US’ much rarer bombings of Syria on related pretexts. First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council’s Committee on International Affairs Vladimir Jabarov said in April 2017 that “Russia has no intentions to use its Aerospace Forces against US missiles if Washington decides to carry out new strikes in Syria as it could lead to a large-scale war.” In both cases, Russia occasionally objects to those two’s violations of international law, but it never militarily responds.

Over half a decade since Syria finally received the long-delayed S-300s from Russia in fall 2018, it still has yet to fire a single one at attacking American or Israeli aircraft, which is arguably attributable to Russia refusing to grant it this authorization in order to avoid any escalation that could lead to a larger conflict. This informal policy is veritably in place up to now as evidenced by President Putin telling representatives of religious associations on Wednesday that his country’s goal is to prevent the latest war’s expansion.

That being the case, what just took place actually isn’t anything new, but simply the latest manifestation of the same dynamics that have been in place for years. Russia prefers that America and Israel don’t bomb Syria, but it also understands that they’re threatened by Iran’s military presence there, which arms proxy groups to fight against their occupations. Russia agrees with Iran that the US is occupying Syria and Israel is occupying Palestine, but it disagrees with the unconventional methods employed to oust them.

The precedent established since the start of Russia’s anti-terrorist intervention in Syria in September 2015 shows that the Kremlin won’t intervene to deter or respond to American or Israeli attacks there. It also opposes Iran’s unconventional ones against their occupation forces that it plans via proxy in that country since its policymakers deem them to be a reckless escalation risk. If the latest war expands across the region, then Russia is expected to continue sitting aside as those two bomb Iran in Syria.

By Robert David English, National Interest, 10/5/23

The wages of hubris are dear. Four months into Ukraine’s vaunted counteroffensive—which, at a massive cost in men and materiel, has made minimal territorial gain—support for Kyiv is openly eroding. Frustration flows from the growing economic burden of war and continuing corruption scandals in Ukraine. But it is aggravated by the backlash against the overconfidence and arrogance of the Western, especially American, foreign-policy establishment. For months, skeptical voices were sidelined while the media contrasted Western military-technological prowess with Russian backwardness and disarray. NATO brains would defeat Russian brawn, experts confidently predicted in June, thus making the disillusion and distrust of October all the greater.

Who isn’t aghast at over 20,000 casualties for a gain of 100 sq. miles, evoking the carnage of WWI? Since Russia occupies 40,000 sq. miles of Ukrainian land, the unsustainability of such a campaign is evident. Yet officials in Brussels and Washington insist that Kyiv’s counteroffensive is succeeding, cheering minor advances and illusory breakthroughs. At the same time, a chorus of retired military officers exaggerate Russian weakness and see victory as just one more “game-changing” weapons transfer away. Why haven’t NATO-supplied armaments, including hundreds of modern tanks, worked as expected? Because of minefields and trenches, they lament, neglecting to admit that Russia is fighting fiercely with both tactical and technological prowess—from devious electronic warfare to devastating anti-tank drones. But weren’t we told that Russian technology lagged far behind the West’s? And that Ukraine had an army of drones while Russia’s demoralized draftees were poorly armed, poorly led, and perpetually on the brink of desertion? 

The brutality of war sparks passions—admiration for Ukraine, hatred and derision of Russia—that inflame public debate and impede objective analysis. The latter, by definition, must be dispassionate. If think tanks become partisan and the media act as cheerleaders, then we see only what we want to see. With Ukraine, the cheerleading mirrors that of our Iraq and Afghanistan debacles. As a result, we underestimated the adversary, leading to flawed tactics, failed operations, and now flagging public support. What next? As always, the default choice is escalation—providing Kyiv with more armaments and munitions. But will a few squadrons of F-16s and a few hundred ATACMS be enough to defeat Russia? 

One morning in mid-June, Russian president Vladimir Putin awoke to bad news. In a pre-dawn raid, Ukraine struck the bridge linking Crimea and the Russian mainland. If he had followed U.S. media, Putin would have been truly distressed; experts described how the attack dealt a severe blow to Russia’s war because the bridge was the vital supply line for the front. But while pundits hailed this as a triumph for Kyiv, Putin merely shrugged while predicting Moscow’s victory. Was he in denial, or did he know something crucial about Russian resilience? In fact, notwithstanding initial hyperbole, only road traffic was disrupted while supply trains continued unimpeded. Moreover, Ukraine attacked the same bridge in 2022, and repairs quickly restored full operation despite similar predictions of doom. Indeed, the Crimean Bridge has symbolized Russian resourcefulness in the face of Western scorn for a decade; many initially sneered that Russia lacked the know-how to build Europe’s longest bridge, with some even predicting that it would collapse under its own weight. As such, this sturdy engineering marvel invites us to reconsider our stereotypes. 

“Russia is running out of ammunition.” A Google search of this phrase yields almost ten million hits, as versions of it appeared in Western headlines for a year. CNN, Newsweek, The Economist, Forbes, and Foreign Policy all joined the chorus, echoing assessments from U.S. and UK defense officials. In June 2022, the Washington Post predicted that Russian munitions would soon be depleted and Russia would “exhaust its combat capability” within months. Yet by June of 2023, all of these outlets reported that it was actually Ukraine that was critically low on missiles and artillery. How low? Russia now fires over 10,000 artillery rounds per day, while Ukraine manages just 5,000. It takes the United States weeks to produce what Ukraine expends in a few days, while NATO allies have reached “the bottom of the barrel” in donating their reserves to Kyiv. Meanwhile, Russia is still outproducing the West despite “crippling” sanctions that were supposed to strangle its war effort. Likewise, Russian missiles continued to strike Ukraine a year after reports that production would soon halt because arms manufacturers were reduced to cannibalizing computer chips from home appliances. And still, we scoff at Russia’s claim that it will increase tank production by 1,500 next year—three times the number of Western tanks provided to Ukraine. 

“So what if Russia makes more tanks? Ukraine will just destroy them with missiles and drones.” This follows the narrative of how Kyiv nullifies Russian quantity with superior quality, especially their hi-tech “army of drones.” Thus, we pay scant attention to news that belies this narrative, namely Russia’s adoption of new systems and tactics. Ukraine now loses up to 10,000 drones per month to Russian counter-drone weapons and electronic warfare. Russia also jams GPS signals to sabotage the guidance systems of U.S.-supplied armaments such as JDAM glide bombs and HIMARS artillery. And Russia is deploying a new line of unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the Lancent “kamikaze” drone, that have destroyed or disabled dozens of just-delivered Western tanks and armored vehicles—thereby thwarting the rapid breakthrough that was supposed to follow billions in NATO armor and months of NATO training. 

The Fog of War 

The Ukrainian battlefield is broad, flat farmland criss-crossed by strips of forest. It is covered by extensive air defenses, continually monitored by both Russian and Ukrainian ground and air-based systems, and blanketed by both sides’ surveillance drones. With night-vision capabilities as well, the “fog of war” has finally lifted—at least within a band of fifteen kilometers along the battlefront. Little can move far without being detected, and to be detected is to be targeted—by attack drones, by artillery, by rockets (such as the HIMARS), and by air-to-surface missiles (such as Russia’s LMUR). The Russians experienced this in the war’s first phase, suffering grievous losses as their drive on Kyiv was repulsed. Moscow’s last major advance, capturing the city of Bakhmut in May, came at the cost of tens of thousands of lives. But now Kyiv is suffering as its counteroffensive—meant as a blitzkrieg through Russian lines—instead advances at a bloody crawl. 

It’s true that the Ukrainians and their NATO advisers underestimated the density of Russian minefields. But while mines take a direct toll, they also work indirectly by restricting vehicles to secured routes and narrow paths where they are easier targets for Russian artillery and drones. In June, Russia decimated an entire column of Ukrainian armor—including just-acquired German Leopard tanks and American Bradley infantry fighting vehicles—in a clash on the Zaporizhzhia front. This morale-boosting victory for Moscow saw the site memorialized as “Bradley Square.” The lesson is that any large concentration of armor is quickly detected, and any major convoy of troops is similarly seen and targeted. 

With layers of surveillance, including swarms of drones providing real-time detection and targeting to Russian artillery, a grand Desert Storm-style offensive became impossible. Another problem is Ukraine’s inferiority to Russia in the air and its consequent inability to pave the way for its armor and infantry units by pounding Russian defenses from the skies. Even battalion-sized operations are problematic, much less the brigade-level blitzkriegs that many imagined. Ukrainian activity confines itself to company or platoon-level operations where a few dozen troops, supported by a handful of vehicles, advance stealthily under the cover of forest lines. Backed by drones—and supported by artillery fire—they seek to degrade the enemy enough to storm Russian trenches. 

Clumsy, Cowardly Russians?

Sometimes, they succeed. Sometimes, the Ukrainians are detected early, and the Russians ambush them with artillery fire. Snipers and stormtroopers contest every trench, with deadly drones buzzing above. The Ukrainians press on, their courage under fire reverently detailed in the media. But that of the Russians—also fighting fiercely and taking heavy losses—is nowhere to be seen. After numerous stories about disarray in command and desertion in the ranks, the fact that the Russians are fighting with discipline and cohesion has left those who predicted otherwise silent. The first direct acknowledgment of dogged Russian resistance in major U.S. media came only recently from CNN. This admission did not come from Western experts but from Ukrainian soldiers themselves. Frustrated that their NATO backers had faulted their meager progress, they lamented, “We expected less resistance. They are holding. They have leadership. It is not often you say that about the enemy.” 

Such observations are notably absent in U.S. media. Yet, is the aim of war reporting to celebrate one’s allies? Or is it to present a balanced assessment, regardless of whether the good or bad guys have the upper hand? This partisanship over the prowess of soldiers is also seen in coverage of the weapons they wield. Following the narrative of “Ukrainian brains over Russian brawn,” a succession of upgrades to Kyiv’s arsenal have been touted as wonder weapons. These include HIMARS artillery, Leopard tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, Storm Shadow missiles, and DPICM cluster munitions—“game changers” all. But these high hopes have been frustrated, in large part because of the weapons the Russians use to counter them. Moscow’s arsenal includes electronic warfare (EW) systems that down Ukrainian drones by the dozens and GPS jamming of U.S.-made HIMARS artillery and JDAM glide bombs. Untested on such a vast scale, their effectiveness has been a nasty surprise. Also unexpected was Russia’s introduction of new systems, such as the Lancet drone, which wreaks havoc on Ukrainian armor thanks to its expanded range, payload, and anti-jamming features. Others include new FAB glide bombs and the improved LMUR missile, whose range puts the helicopters launching it beyond the reach of Ukrainian air defense. These Russian weapons are blunting Ukraine’s advance, yet mainstream analyses rarely mention them. After all, Russia was said to be running out of precision munitions, not developing and deploying new ones.

Instead of asking why they badly underestimated Russia’s resilience and innovation, the excuse for Kyiv’s failures is that “Moscow had months to prepare defensive lines.” Media experts—often the same ones who predicted rapid progress—now explain why progress could never have been rapid in any case. This is an incomplete and self-serving answer; the Russians clearly excel at building defenses more complex than just minefields and trenches, and proper appreciation of that is essential to analyzing Ukraine’s prospects and possible endpoints for this war.

The Ever-Imminent “Collapse” of Russia

Many analysts remain bullish on Ukraine’s eventual victory, yet now see it resulting from a Russian collapse—whether of the Russian army or the entire Putin regime. In other words, these military experts base their prognoses not on analysis of military operations per se but on hunches about the perseverance and patriotism of Russian soldiers and citizens. Some, like General Mark Milley, say that the Russians “…lack leadership, they lack will, their morale is poor, and their discipline is eroding.” Others, like ex-CIA Director General David Petraeus, believe that Russian resolve might “crumble” in response to Ukraine’s drone attacks on Moscow. Such strikes “bring the war to the Russian people” and may convince them that, like the USSR’s 1980s quagmire in Afghanistan, today’s war in Ukraine is “ultimately unsustainable.” Even a largely sober analysis by Warographics concludes with a scenario based on hope; a Ukrainian reconquest of Bakhmut could deliver “a devastating psychological blow” perhaps sufficient to cause a Russian collapse. 

Wishful thinking is no basis for policy, nor is there reason to hope that a Ukrainian reconquest of Bakhmut would deliver a “devastating psychological blow” sufficient to cause a Russian collapse.  In fact, such a blow was already absorbed by the Ukrainians, who lost the indispensable cream of their army (to hordes of dispensable Russian criminals-turned-stormtroopers) in the doomed defense of a city that President Zelensky had vowed would not fall.  As seen, Ukrainian soldiers themselves rebut Milley’s claim that Russian forces lack leadership, will, and discipline. Petraeus is correct that Kyiv’s drone strikes unnerve Muscovites, and evidence from Russian social media reveals distress over high casualties. But these have not translated into broad anti-Putin, anti-war attitudes. On the contrary, support for Putin remains strong, and an anti-Western, rally-round-the-flag effect intensifies as Russia finds itself in a proxy war with all of NATO, per Kremlin propaganda. 

Petraeus’ hope that Russia’s elite will reject the Ukraine war as “unsustainable”—as the Soviet elite supposedly did with the Afghan war in the 1980s—is based on a flawed analogy. The old Soviet ruling elite did not see the Afghan war as unsustainable or worry much about public opinion. It took a new leader who prioritized improving ties with the West, China, and the Muslim world—all of whom made leaving Afghanistan a precondition of detente—to start working toward an exit. The point is not that war isn’t costly; the Afghan war was, and the Ukraine war is even more so. Accepting defeat in a major war—especially one that is justified in terms of “vital national interests”—is unlikely until there is both a new leader and elite turnover. For Putin and his political-military elite, the geopolitical implosion that followed Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and other outposts—particularly Central Europe—is precisely why they believe that Russia must stand firm in Ukraine today. 

Putin is Now Weaker/Stronger than Ever

Yet, if the media and its commentators are correct, that leadership transition is coming soon. For months—especially since the abortive June mutiny led by Wagner Group boss Yevgeny Prigozhin—consensus has reigned on Putin’s weakness and potential ouster. Per one former KGB officer on CNN, Putin’s hold on power is now “almost nonexistent,” and state authority “is in free fall.” Another CNN guest—a top Ukrainian official—agreed about Putin’s waning authority and said, “The power he used to have is just crumbling down.” Further, this hastens Ukrainian victory because it has “greatly affected Russian power on the battlefield.” These predictions were wrong: Putin’s grip is stronger now than before; the mutiny failed to rally support; Wagner has been tamed, and its boss eliminated; and Putin has sidelined officials who echoed Prigozhin’s criticism of him or his top brass. As for the war in Ukraine, Russian resistance has actually stiffened since June. Who was this Ukrainian official who claimed that Putin’s army, like his authority, was “crumbling?” None other than Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. 

With all due respect to Zelensky and his office, a journalist’s duty is to push back against spin and insist on evidence for extravagant claims. Instead, the media meekly accepts arguments from officials—then repeated by commentators and pundits—because they fit our narratives of Putin the loser, of a collapsing Russia, or of Western superiority. In other words, because they feed our hubris. Consider the claim by UK intelligence chief Richard Moore that Putin was compelled to “cut a deal to save his skin.” In fact, it was the opposite. Prigozhin—to temporarily save his own skin since he faced summary execution for treason—was forced to accept Putin’s terms. Ridiculing Putin as the one who backed down in fear for his life has little to do with intelligence. It plays well in the moment, but people eventually notice the accumulation of flawed assessments and failed predictions. 

When the Going Gets Tough…Spin? 

This helps explain a recent poll showing that a majority of Americans now oppose more military aid to Ukraine. Here, they join EU countries where majorities already believed—even before Ukraine’s recent failures—that sending more weapons only prolongs an unwinnable war and delays negotiations for peace. The polls cannot tell exactly what measure of concerns lie behind such opinions—be it general “Ukraine fatigue,” loss of faith in Kyiv’s chances of victory, concern at the heavy burden borne by taxpayers, distress at the news of Ukrainian corruption, or alarm at the cost of assimilating millions of Ukrainian refugees. Yet underlying all is a broader loss of faith in their leaders and the NATO-EU elite still promising to fight for “as long as it takes” to achieve “decisive victory.” 

U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken recently defended Ukraine’s counteroffensive by arguing that, thanks to last year’s campaign, “They (Russia) have already lost,” and “(Ukraine) has already taken back about 50 percent of what was initially seized.” Yet the entire point of this year’s campaign is to retake the other 50 percent. Similar spin comes from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), a highly regarded think tank but one whose pro-Ukrainian partisanship complicates its objectivity. ISW claimed that Ukraine regained more territory in under six weeks than Russia in the previous six months. Instead of assessing Kyiv’s campaign by its stated objective—a rapid thrust to sever Russia’s land bridge with Crimea—ISW relativizes its failures by comparing them with Russia’s. But even this doesn’t convince because Russia’s recent gains refer to the conquest of Bakhmut, a large and heavily fortified city (prewar population 73,000). By contrast, Ukraine’s recent gains consist of open fields and small villages like Robotnye (prewar population: 500). 

Maintaining public support for the war is tougher than in the early 2000s following the 9/11 attacks. The sense of outrage and the White House’s pledges of quick and remorseless victory convinced many to back ill-fated ventures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not only is the “hubris and mendacity” of those recent debacles still fresh in the public mind, but today, we have many more sources of critical information—from expert journals and websites to specialized analysts offering detailed, current information and independent critiques on the conflict. They subject the claims of our political-military leaders to close scrutiny, and unless there is a sharp reversal of fortunes in Ukraine, that scrutiny will be harsh.

Preparing for the Horrors Ahead

But is a sharp reversal of fortunes likely? After so many failed forecasts, many now doubt the assurances of Washington, Brussels, and Kyiv. And it’s not just the quantity of failed predictions that diminish faith in a Russian collapse. It’s also their quality, or the way those predictions have failed, that raises doubt about their authors’ insights into the system about which they prognosticate. Analysts who foresaw that economic sanctions would cripple Russia’s war effort have had to admit that they misunderstood key aspects of Russia’s economic resourcefulness. Others underestimated Russia’s military resilience—as detailed above—due to flawed assumptions about Russian ineptitude or Western military-technological superiority. 

Some fall victim to confirmation bias—finding evidence of Russian weakness because their assumptions told them to seek it. When attention focuses on disorganization and dissent in the Russian army—trumpeting incidents of soldiers’ and officers’ complaints, even desertion—it suggests imminent collapse. But how many Russian soldiers and officers are not complaining, and how common is disorganization or dissent in the Ukrainian military? And where is the analysis of why regular soldiers spurned the Wagner mutiny? A related problem is that of selective coverage. Among many examples was recent media coverage of Moscow’s “desperation” in seeking an arms deal with North Korea. Yet they simultaneously ignored signs of “desperation” in Kyiv, such as lowering fitness standards for military service or seeking to deport back to Ukraine men who are ducking conscription in countries of the EU. 

Ukraine could be closer to collapse than Russia. There may indeed be an “asymmetrical attrition gradient”—another way of saying that Russia is taking more casualties than Ukraine—but even some Kyiv officials admit that Russia can sustain them better than Ukraine. By late autumn, when weather slows the fighting and campaigns usually end, Ukraine may have clawed back another 100 sq. miles—but at what cost? Looking to 2024, Russia will draw on a manpower base far larger than Ukraine’s. Ukraine will receive more NATO missiles, but they are unlikely to “change the game” any more than HIMARS and Storm Shadows did before them. Kyiv will also receive a few dozen F-16 fighters, but their hastily trained pilots—confronting a dense and sophisticated belt of air defenses—may suffer severe losses with no major impact on the war.

Faced with an asymmetrical armamentsgradient—the inability or unwillingness of NATO states to continue providing Ukraine with sufficient munitions to keep pace with Russia—Ukraine will seek to change the equation. This means more drone strikes on Moscow and other Russian cities, raids on Russian border towns, and a ferocious battle over Crimea. Ukraine will expand attacks on Russia’s Black Sea ships and ports, perhaps finally destroying the Crimean Bridge. And Russia will do likewise, improving its drone and missile force (including reverse engineering of captured NATO weapons) to hit airfields, railroads, ports, and other infrastructure harder than ever. Civilian casualties will soar, as will the danger of chemical or nuclear “accidents.” 

Cheerleading that “Ukraine must win decisively, and with superior NATO armaments, it surely will” supports neither sensible military strategy nor responsible policy debate. Those who argue thus recall Britain’s WWII leader, Winston Churchill, who stiffened a nation’s resolve through its darkest hour and led it to triumph. Rarely do they recall Britain’s WWI commander Douglas Haig, whose insistence that Germany would collapse if only the Allies mounted just one more offensive ultimately prolonged a grueling war of attrition at the cost of a million lives. Hubris is not only our enemy but Ukraine’s too.

Robert English, a former Pentagon policy analyst, is the Director of Central European Studies at the University of Southern California. He is the author of various works on the Cold War’s end and aftermath, including Russia and the Idea of the West.