By Gordon Hahn, Russian and Eurasian Politics, 4/2/24

Despite Western media reports over recent months and weeks regarding supposed secret talks between Westerners and Russians to settle or at least stop the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War, there are no such talks ongoing. But this does not mean that they cannot emerge.

First we heard of supposedly secret talks between Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhniy and Russian General Staff Chief Gen. Valerii Gerasimov. Then there were Russian President Vladimir Putin’s alleged ‘signals’ indicating that he seeks negotiations. In reality, there are no peace talks underway between Russia, on the one hand, and the West and/or Ukraine, on the other hand. There are no signals that Putin is seeking negotiations. Although he is willing to hold talks, he expects that any negotiations be requested first by the West and/or Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskiy. The New York Times piece about ‘Putin’s signals’ published just before Christmas was nothing more than another attempt to portray Russia and Putin as ‘losing the war’ and desperate for an exit ramp, and it was nothing less than a contribution in support of US President Joseph Biden’s desperate re-election prospects as the American presidential campaign is about to kickoff.

Nothing could be further from the truth than the tale of Russian desperation told since the war began. This is most evident now for anyone following the recent course of events on the front; a front that is collapsing on the Ukrainian side. In Zelenskiy’s eternal PR mode, the Ukrainian front’s collapse will be framed as an orderly retreat to new defense lines and part of a new defensive strategy replacing the offensive one that so ignominiously failed with this summer’s predictably disastrous counteroffensive. Nevertheless, the hard, cold realities of the summer campaign’s defeat following the fall of the strategic hub of Bakhmut (Artyomevsk) and preceding the fall of the heavily fortified town of Avdiivka (Avdeevka) are trumping Zelenskiy’s simulated reality productions both in the West and Ukraine ever so gradually. 

As Russian forces slowly but but surely advance westward across the entire front ranging from Zaporozhe (and perhaps soon Kherson) to Kharkov — an advance that is likely to accelerate in spring and summer, the Kremlin has no burning need to negotiate. To be sure, Moscow would prefer ending the war, but on its own terms. The longer Washington, Brussels, and Kiev refuse negotiations, the more fluid the situation becomes and the less likely Moscow will be easy to negotiate with before its forces reach the Dnieper River. Some Russian officials are trumpeting a hard line. For example, a month ago Russian ambassador to the UN Dmitri Polyanskiy said that Kiev’s chance for talks had passed and now only capitulation talks are possible (https://t.me/RusskajaIdea/5265 and https://t.me/Slavyangrad/79622).

But Putin appears open to talks. However, he certainly is not desperate for them and may prefer holding off until more Ukrainian military force and territory is attritted. He has indicated numerous times since the war began that he is open to talks. In a speech to the Defense Ministry Collegium last December, Putin summed up the course of the war in 2023 by saying: “This is what everyone should understand: in Ukraine, those in Europe and the USA who are aggressive towards Russia in Ukraine, if they want to negotiate, let them negotiate. But we will do this based only on our interests” (http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73035). He repeated this for Americans in his interview with Tucker Carlson and for Russians in his most recent interview with Dmitrii Kisilev.

The lack of talks is best explained by the West’s and Ukraine’s unwillingness to negotiate. In fact, since December 2022 Ukrainian law forbids Ukrainians from conducting peace talks with Putin’s Russia. The U.S. has apparently held to its proclaimed policy of ‘no talks about Ukraine without Ukraine’ at least in terms of any peace negotiations, though the US’s CIA chief, William Burns, and his Russian counterpart, SVR chief Sergei Narynskii met a few months back for discussions on undisclosed issues. Therefore, Zelenskiy consistently rejects talks until such time as Russia has withdrawn all of its troops beyond Ukraine’s 1991 borders—the core of his supposed ‘peace plan.’ Obviously, without defeat on the battlefield Russia will not give up Crimea and the four oblasts it now considers to be its sovereign territory. Recently, Zelenskiy rejected negotiations out of hand. Several weeks ago, visiting Turkey, Zelenskiy spurned Turkish President Tayyip Recep Erdogan’s entreaties to start talks with Moscow under Ankara’s mediation. Earlier, Zelenskiy made an unclear statement that talks with Russia were not urgent at this time. He also noted that Ukraine and the West still are working of a “peace formula” that will be handed to Russia as soon as it is ready. If Russia accepts it, then “the issue of negotiations will be relevant,” but the fact that Putin states his goals — neutralization (no NATO membership), demilitarization, and denazification of Ukraine – still hold means he is against talks, stated Zelenskiy (https://strana.news/news/453348-perehovory-ukrainy-s-rossiej-sejchas-ne-aktualny-zelenskij.html and https://t.me/stranaua/133310).

But the above does not necessarily mean that talks may not be in the offing this year or early next year. By then Russian troops will likely have attained the Dnieper River at several points and may even be storming eastern Kiev on the Left Bank. That would be a good time, a logical time for Putin to offer what would then be outright desperate Western capitols and Kiev to begin talks. For Moscow, this stage would also be pivotal. The arrival of Russian troops at, even all along the entire Dnieper, would pose the question of advancing farther in order to force the West and Kiev to negotiate. Russian forces would face the logistical challenge of crossing the Dnieper, which could be mitigated by 1-200,000 Russian and Belarusian troops invading western Ukraine through its northern border with Belarus, and then waging a costly and more escalation-threatening next phase of the ground-air war by moving into more hostile western Ukrainian territory and towards the border with NATO. Russia would be taking on greater costs and risks, while at the same time eliminating the very buffer zone it has been pursuing before and after the February 2022 invasion by way of establishing a neutral Ukraine.

Needless to say, obviously Putin will not accept any obstinacy from the West or Ukraine, as they are at present losing and appear condemned to lose the NATO-Russia Ukrainian War, unless NATO intervenes to prolong the war and/or Putin suffers health problems, sparking a political crisis or shift in Moscow perhaps. The Russians will make tough, perhaps near capitulationist terms but leave some room for actual horse-trading. There would be some limited magnanimity — as was demonstrated by Moscow in the March-April 2022 talks — as Russians do see Ukrainians as a ‘fraternal people’, given their overlapping history, languages, and cultures. But Russia will insist on and likely be able to dictate its core terms: Ukrainian neutrality, “demilitarization” (a small Ukrainian army restricted in its deployment to areas far from the new Russian border), and “denazification” (some limit or bans on political activity by ultranationalists and neofascists). Protections of ethnic Russians’ political, linguistic, and cultural rights or autonomy will also be required by Moscow. A starting position here may also include such protections for Ukraine’s beleaguered Hungarian and Romanian minorities. Ukraine’s political and economic autonomy will not be blocked by Moscow, including possible EU membership. NATO membership is red line for Putin, and any Western or Ukrainian insistence on preserving Kiev’s right to that will scuttle any and all talks with Moscow. Period.

Russia would likely agree to security guarantees for Ukraine as its central compromise with the defeated party. Details that would be acceptable would be those in discussion back in March 2022 under the Istanbul process before the West scuttled them by refusing to back guarantees, convincing Zelenskiy to continue the war. This included dual guarantees from Russia and Western parties and an unclear “international mechanism” perhaps beyond that of a mere treaty (https://strana.news/news/383394-vtorzhenie-rf-dmitrij-medvedev-vyskazalsja-o-harantijakh-bezopasnosti-ukrainy.html). Now, however, 71% percent of the European public wants an immediate end to the conflict (https://szazadveg.hu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Sovereignty-Conference-Presentation-Results-of-the-Project-Europe-Research-Aron-Hidvegi.pdf).

A key decision for Moscow in deciding whether or not to negotiate will be whether or not, by not crossing the Dniester, to forego seizing Odessa, western Kiev, and a ‘land bridge’ to the pro-Russian breakaway region of Moldova, Transnistria. Taking them would be costly and, again, risky but has its advantages, so any recalcitrance on the West’s and/or Kiev’s part to talk in good faith could lead Putin to opt to cross the Dniester. Regarding Odessa, the city is a Russian-made city, founded by Catherine the Great, and is a lucrative port. On the other hand, leaving the port as part of Ukraine would make the rump Ukrainian state more viable, and Moscow would prefer not having a dysfunctional state on its border. Such a state would be a shaky buffer. Kiev for centuries was part of Russia for centuries and so was called by Russians ‘the mother of all Russian cities.’ It was the seat of one of the first Russian kingdoms — Kievan Rus’ — and incorporated or had close ties with all the others. It was the birthplace of the Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Church. It was removed from Russian sovereignty by what most in the West and many in today’s Russia consider a illegal, criminal regime: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Incidentally, Ukraine’s 1991 territory is a conglomeration was cobbled together by Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin. Taking either Kiev or Odessa (as so Kharkov) would be more costly in Russian lives and equipment to take than Mariupol, Bakhmut (Artyomovsk), or Avdiivka (Avdeevka), and they are not majority pro-Russian regions, meaning they would be more difficult to control and integrate into Russia. Finally, in the event of any Western machinations, particularly if the Ukrainian peace treaty fails to hold, Transnistria would be a new focal point in Russo-Western conflict. Russia’s dearth of trust in the West makes being in a position to protect Moldova’s Russian- and Ukrainian-populated breakaway republic.

In sum, the prospects for negotiations occurring, no less bringing a lasting peace are on the decline as Russian forces continue moving west. The configuration of the conflict is becoming exceedingly complex across multiple levels. A watershed moment will be the Russian army’s arrival at the Dnieper in strength and breadth. Moscow will have a complex decision to make, and the willingness of the West and Kiev to propose talks will be weighty in determining that decision. A decision to cross the Dniester and move into western Ukraine is fraught with danger for all, but Moscow’s ‘partners’ may leave Putin with little to no choice. NATO and Kiev also will have their moment of decision: whether to propose negotiations or abandon ‘escalation management’ and send in NATO troops in collective or individual guise on the Macron model. Will it choose to In lieu of a peace agreement, Russian troops’ forcing the Dnieper will increase the likelihood of open NATO involvement in the war and present Moscow with the daunting task of having to put down a hostile population capable of forming a partisan insurgency; one that would certainly be funded, armed, and equipped by the West. The latter would keep the threat of an all-out, full-scale NATO-Russia war alive, threatening not just Ukraine’s future but that of the world.