“Neocons are about the most dangerous species in international relations today. They are the kind of people who would rather see a million dead than chose a cooperative framework to resolve a (perceived) problem. Let’s remember the memorable words of Ultra-Neocon Madeleine Albright: When asked in 1992 at an interview if half a million dead Iraqi Children which the US sanctions on the country had caused was worth it, Albright replied: “I think that is a very hard choice, but the price, we think, the price is worth it.” (https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/20…. If Hitler came back, he’d be a neocon. In this talk, professor emeritus Michael Brenner gives a comprehensive overview of the genesis and development of US neocons and the damage they are causing in international relations.”

YouTube link here.

By Isabel Van Brugen, Newsweek, 5/30/24

Russia has issued a warning to the West over the planned delivery of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine from Belgium this year.

Moscow will perceive the delivery of the aircraft as a “signal action” by NATO “in the nuclear sphere,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in an interview with state-run news agency RIA Novosti published on Wednesday.

His remarks come after Belgium pledged on Tuesday to deliver a first batch of F-16s to Ukraine this year. The two nations signed a security agreement this week that includes supplying a total of 30 of the U.S.-built fighter jets to Ukraine to ramp up its defenses amid the ongoing war launched by Russia.

“They are trying to tell us that the United States and NATO would stop at nothing in Ukraine,” Lavrov said. “Nevertheless, we hope that the Russian-Belarusian drills on the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons that are underway now will knock some sense into our opponents by reminding them about the catastrophic consequences of further nuclear escalation.”

Lavrov added: “These aircraft will be destroyed, like other types of weapons supplied by NATO countries to Ukraine.”

Newsweek has contacted Russia’s Defense Ministry for comment by email.

Belgium vowed to supply Ukraine with all 30 F-16s before 2028. Last year, Belgium, alongside Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, announced that it would be sending Ukraine an unspecified number of the aircraft.

Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo said at a press briefing with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on Tuesday that his country would provide Ukraine with the F-16 jets “as soon as possible.”

“Our aim is to be able to provide first aircraft before the end of this year, 2024,” he said. “We will do everything in our capacity to deliver some planes already this year.”

However, De Croo said the U.S.-made jets are only to be used within Ukrainian territory.

“Everything which is covered by this agreement is very clear: it is for utilization by the Ukrainian defense forces on Ukraine territory,” he said.

There has been a growing chorus of calls for Ukraine to be authorized to use Western weapons to attack targets inside Russia, more than two years into the war launched by Moscow in February 2022.

“Putin has only one influence mechanism, that is the destruction of life. He is not capable of anything else,” Zelensky said Tuesday. “A sufficient power of weaponry is crucial so that we can physically defend [ourselves] against Russia’s terror.”

“They are shooting at you, and you cannot shoot back at them because you do not have the permission [from Western allies],” he added.

By Peter Rutland, Responsible Statecraft, 4/30/24

Peter Rutland is a Professor of Government at Wesleyan University and associate of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University. Before that he taught at the University of Texas at Austin, and at the University of York and London University in the UK.

The Carnegie Center’s Maksim Samorukov recently published an article in Foreign Affairs entitled “Putin’s brittle regime. Like the Soviet one that preceded it, his system is always on the brink of collapse.”

The argument is driven by a straightforward historical analogy. The Soviet system appeared strong and immutable, and virtually no one predicted its collapse. But collapse it did. Likewise, the Putin system appears strong and resilient, and few people can imagine its collapse. But collapse it will.

One can understand why this argument would be attractive to Foreign Affairs. Wishful thinking always gets an audience: people like to be told what they want to hear. Absent any prospects of a successful counter-offensive in Ukraine, the most likely scenario for Ukrainian victory is regime collapse in Russia.

Historical analogies can be attractive but misleading in that they may focus our attention on superficial similarities, while ignoring structural differences. And there are several important respects in which Putin’s regime is in a very different place from the Soviet Union of the perestroika era.

First, Mikhail Gorbachev was only in power for six years and he was never able to establish effective control over the inner circle of Soviet leaders, nor the bureaucracy at large. As a result, his policy initiatives were blocked from effective implementation, forcing him to adopt more radical measures which destabilized the entire system.

In contrast, Putin very quickly established strong control over rival elites after he came to power in 2000, restoring the “power vertical.” He has been in charge for 24 years, and most analysts agree that the institutional foundations of the Putin regime are robust and it will likely survive the death of its founder.

Second, a critical factor in the unraveling of the USSR was the fact that it was fighting an unwinnable war in Afghanistan, which forced it to enter negotiations with the West. Russia is fighting a war in Ukraine which it is still confident it can win.

Third, the Soviet Union was bankrupt, running trade deficits and borrowing money abroad. In contrast, despite the pressure of Western sanctions, Russia ran a $50 billion trade surplus last year. The Soviet planned economy was rigid and value-destroying, a sinkhole of state subsidies. Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia has a dynamic capitalist economy, well integrated into the global economy, and one whose entrepreneurs have been adept at evading Western sanctions.

Fourth, the USSR was a federation where ethnic Russians made up 52% of the population. Putin’s Russia is a more centralized state where Russians are 82% of the population.

Admittedly, the possibility of an Islamist insurrection in the North Caucasus is a potential security challenge. But the logic that turned Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov into a loyal vassal of Moscow would apply to any successor. It is better to enjoy a flow of subsidies from Moscow and buy Lamborghinis, than to have Grozny turned back into a sea of rubble. The Chechens have learned their lesson from the first and second wars: that pursuit of independence is not worth the effort. None of the other ethnic republics in the Russian Federation are remotely interested in starting a war with Moscow.

The Crocus City Hall attack of April 22 was not only a reminder that Islamist terrorism remains a security threat for Russia, but it represented a massive intelligence failure by the Russian security services. They were warned in advance by the U.S. that such an attack was coming: they should have placed armed guards at all concert halls in Moscow. However, attacks like Crocus are not going to cause regime change in Russia.

The terrorists did not come from North Caucasus, but from Tajikistan. That indicates that the 8 million migrant workers from Central Asia are a potential security risk. But their value in Russia’s labor-short economy still outweighs the security challenge, at least for now.

The Wagner insurrection in June 2023 was an extraordinary development, the most serious threat to the stability of the Putin regime since its foundation in 2000. We’ll never know what would have happened if the dog had caught up with the car: if Yevgeny Prigozhin had not turned back, but had ordered his troops to advance into Moscow. What we do know is that the insurrection failed. Prigozhin is dead and buried, and regime stability was quickly restored.

Allowing the Wagner group to develop to a point where it could launch that mutiny was a serious error by Putin — second only to his decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. But it remains an outlier, and cannot serve as a foundation for U.S.policy.

To prevail in diplomacy and war one needs a realistic assessment of the adversary’s strengths and weaknesses. The abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union reminds us to expect the unexpected. But Putin (and China’s President Xi Jinping) have learned from Gorbachev’s mistakes. Washington should not build its Russia policy on the assumption that lightning will strike twice in the same place.

YouTube link here.

By ERIN BANCO, ALEXANDER WARD and LARA SELIGMAN, Politico, 5/30/24

The Biden administration has quietly given Ukraine permission to strike inside Russia — solely near the area of Kharkiv — using U.S.-provided weapons, three U.S. officials and two other people familiar with the move said Thursday, a major reversal that will help Ukraine to better defend its second-largest city.

“The president recently directed his team to ensure that Ukraine is able to use U.S. weapons for counter-fire purposes in Kharkiv so Ukraine can hit back at Russian forces hitting them or preparing to hit them,” one of the U.S. officials said, adding that the policy of not allowing long-range strikes inside Russia “has not changed.”

Ukraine asked the U.S. to make this policy change only after Russia’s offensive on Kharkiv began this month, the official added. All the people were granted anonymity to discuss internal decisions that haven’t been announced.

In the last few days, the U.S. made the decision to allow Ukraine “flexibility” to defend itself from attacks on the border near Kharkiv, the second U.S. official said.

In effect, Ukraine can now use American-provided weapons, such as rockets and rocket launchers, to shoot down launched Russian missiles heading toward Kharkiv, at troops massing just over the Russian border near the city, or Russian bombers launching bombs toward Ukrainian territory. But the official said Ukraine cannot use those weapons to hit civilian infrastructure or launch long-range missiles, such as the Army Tactical Missile System, to hit military targets deep inside Russia.

It’s a stunning shift the administration initially said would escalate the war by more directly involving the U.S. in the fight. But worsening conditions for Ukraine on the battlefield –– namely Russia’s advances and improved position in Kharkiv –– led the president to change his mind.

The National Security Council did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The Biden administration hinted that a decision had either been secretly made or forthcoming in recent days. On Wednesday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who supports a restriction lift, became the first U.S. official to publicly hint that Biden may shift course and allow such strikes, telling reporters that U.S. policy toward Ukraine would evolve as needed. White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby later did not rule out a potential change.

Those messages came after top U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom and France, said Ukraine should have the right to attack inside Russia using Western weapons. Lawmakers from both parties also supported the move publicly and privately, while top U.S. military officials briefed Congress behind closed doors that relaxing the restriction had “military value,” POLITICO first reported.

The Russian embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment.

Some officials are concerned that Ukraine, when it attacks inside Russia using its own drones, has hit military targets unrelated to Russia’s invasion. The U.S. has strongly delivered the message that Kyiv must use American weapons only to directly hit Russian military sites used for its invasion of Ukraine, but not civilian infrastructure.

Ukrainian officials, from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on down, have pushed for the Biden administration to change its policy ever since Russia launched a large assault on Kharkiv. For weeks they’ve said an inability to attack Russian troop positions over the border complicated Ukraine’s defense of Kharkiv and the country writ large.

In a discussion with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Wednesday, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov made a “hard push” to use U.S. weapons in Russia, according to a person with knowledge of the call.

***

Meduza asks military expert Yuri Fedorov to explain the consequences of NATO members permitting Ukraine to strike targets inside Russia using Western weapons

Meduza, 5/29/24

In his interview with Meduza, Fedorov argues that Kyiv could gain a serious advantage against Russia’s invasion if it can strike Russia’s reserve forces, logistics centers, and major weapons stocks near the border with Ukraine, which have been crucial in the latest offensive toward Kharkiv. Ukrainian attacks on these targets inside Russia would be possible using Western-supplied HIMARS and especially ATACMs long-range, guided missiles. In addition to damaging military facilities, sustained attacks on Russian territory would force the Kremlin to reallocate air defenses to border regions, pulling those systems away from frontline areas inside Ukraine.

Moscow has threatened to respond to this escalation by the West with its own escalation, but Fedorov says Russia is running out of non-nuclear options. He suggests that the Kremlin might resort to targeting government buildings in Kyiv, possibly even the embassies of NATO members. According to Fedorov, there are almost no Russian troops currently in Belarus, and concerns that Moscow might open a new front from this direction are unfounded. He also says the Belarusian military is not trained or equipped to join the war itself, despite two years of improvements. In the meantime, Russian troops hope to advance close enough to Kharkiv to be within barrel artillery range of the city. This assault, however, is intended largely to divert Ukrainian soldiers away from the Donetsk region, where Russia hopes to reach the region’s administrative boundary.

Asked about Ukraine’s recent drone attacks on two Russian early warning radar stations, Fedorov reasons that Kyiv was sending a “very serious warning” by signaling its capacity to damage extremely important facilities in Russia’s strategic defense network. He points out that Moscow hasn’t officially responded to the attacks on its strategic deterrence, even though they technically trigger Russia’s doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons. “This means that Russia currently lacks the political will or technical or material capabilities to implement these provisions of the nuclear doctrine,” says Fedorov, adding that he believes the United States might respond with its own nuclear attack or a “devastating non-nuclear response” against Russian military targets, possibly even on Russian soil, he claims. Fedorov acknowledges that Moscow views Western consent to the use of its weapons for attacks inside Russian territory as NATO’s direct involvement in the war, but he says his own opinion is that this new weapons policy will strengthen the Ukrainian military, thereby reducing the need for more direct Western intervention.

***

Permission to use Western weapons to strike Russia:
what does it mean and what will happen as a result?

Strana, 5/31/24, Translation by Geoffrey Roberts

Statements by Western countries to allow strikes on Russia with their weapons are only partly the result of military necessity.

The use, for example, of HIMARS missiles – with a range of up to 80 kilometres- in the border areas of the Belgorod region, or of Western-supplied air defence systems to shoot down aircraft over Russia, could have a certain military significance, but it would not correspond to the hyped discussion of this topic. Nor will permission from the Czech Republic or Poland to strike with their weapons change much (Czech “Vampires” have been regularly fired at the Belgorod region).

A truly serious (though also not decisive) impact could be had by permission to strike with long-range missiles, but that does not exist yet.

At this stage, the spinning of this topic in the West solves not so much military as informational and political problems.

Namely:

1. Show the immutability of support for Ukraine – to maintain morale and faith in victory in Ukrainian society in the face of a difficult situation at the front.

2. Wind-up “angry patriots” in Russia because Putin does not react to the “crossing of red lines” – to roil the situation inside the Russian Federation.

3. Signal Russia not expand the front line by attacking the Sumy region or Kyiv (Western media write that permission to use their weapons may expand if the Russian Federation attacks in new directions).

4. Demonstrate to Western waverers there is no need to fear Russian threats, that you can move step by step: permission for strikes on Russian territory with long-range missiles; convince Scholz to provide the Taurus; increase and speed up the supply of aircraft; introduce a no-fly zone over Western Ukraine; and then send in NATO troops, etc.

The last goal is the main one of the so-called “war party”, which has been saying for a long time there is no need to be afraid of nuclear threats from the Russian Federation or of Moscow’s “red lines”, but that we need to be involved “to the maximum”, right up to sending troops. This “party” avers that Putin will not dare to launch a nuclear strike.

But Russia has its own “war party,” which calls for “moving from words to deeds”: present an ultimatum to the West with the threat of using nuclear weapons. Or demonstratively apply them to Ukraine (or even one of the European countries) in order to show “seriousness of intentions”, and then put terms to the West, believing the USA and the EU, fearing a nuclear war, will make an agreement with Russia (“Caribbean Crisis 2.0″).

This “party” has been demanding such for a long time, together with corresponding statements on the topic of where our “red lines” actually lie.

Authorising strikes on Russia with Western weapons, as well as other subsequent steps to increase NATO involvement in the war, gives supporters of the Russian “war party” new arguments. Maybe they will not immediately influence the Kremlin’s decision-making, but with each new step this probability increases. Moreover, Putin and Medvedev regularly make clear the “nuclear” option is possible.

The key problem is that the war party in Russia and the war party in the West are both based on premises that may turn out to be false.

The War Party in the West believes Putin will not dare use nuclear weapons in response to NATO’s increased involvement in the war.

The war party in Russia believes that the West will not go nuclear in the event of a threat (an ultimatum or a “demonstration” nuclear strike), but that it will make an agreement with Moscow.

Neither assumption may be warranted, and there could begin a real nuclear war with catastrophic consequences for humanity. Do the two sides have enough intelligence and political will to stop the war? That is the main question.