By Gilbert Doctorow, Website, 6/23/24

A day ago, I wrote about the introductory remarks of presenter Vyacheslav Nikonov on his Thursday night edition of The Great Game when he reminded his audience that 22 June is Russia’s Memorial Day and connected the price in lives paid in 1941-1945 for national survival with the price now being paid on the front lines in Ukraine to ensure the survival of Russian statehood in the face of direct and growing threats from NATO countries. I might add that yesterday’s Russian news coverage of the Memorial Day events across the country was fulsome and moving.

But that was not the only segment of Nikonov’s Thursday show worthy of comment here. Another was the testimony of a Russian war correspondent on the meaning of the remarkable proliferation these past few days of Ukrainian drones reaching a thousand kilometers or more into the Russian heartland. What we hear in the daily news is that all sixty or seventy of them were shot down by Russian air defenses. What this expert contributed was an interpretation of this news that a global, and in particular an American audience should hear.

The Great Game panelist explained that this is clearly part of a ‘softening up operation’ launched by the Americans, and by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, if we may be more precise, intended to deplete the Russian air defenses in advance of the serious attacks to be made in the months ahead using the F-16s that are about to be delivered to Ukraine and the longer range American missiles that Sullivan in the past week allowed Kiev to direct as it sees fit deep into Russia.

Indeed, the response of the Biden White House to the Russian-North Korean mutual defense pact concluded during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang was precisely to double-down on its plans to precipitate World War III or, at least, a European wide nuclear war that would leave the United States unscathed and at the top of the heap.

The Russians know a thing or two about ‘softening up operations.’ They have themselves practiced exactly that against the Patriot air defense installations in Ukraine, forcing the defenders to expend interception missiles costing tens of millions of dollars and available in strictly limited quantities to bring down drones costing tens of thousands of dollars and clearing the way for serious missile attacks on the Ukrainian electricity generating stations and other critical infrastructure that have been performed with devastating effect, taking down 60% of the country’s generating capacity.

And the Russians have their own back-up solutions to deal with the problem that may otherwise arise when those F-16s appear in the war zone. They are now installing their latest, world beating defense complex, the S500, in Crimea and close to the Ukrainian borders. Such a unit is now standing guard over the Crimean bridge. As more come on line, the S500s will enable the Russian forces to detect missile launches and jet take-offs from as far away as Lvov, near the Polish border, and to dispatch interceptor missiles appropriate to those threatening aircraft.

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In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger justified his rightful place at the head of the national security apparatus and then of the State Department, saying that these branches of the federal government were overpopulated by lawyers who had no area knowledge and whose modus operandi was based on in-basket, out-basket mentality.

In some countries, the in-basket, out-basket approach to governance does no harm and may even be good for all. I think of Germany under Mutti Merkel. Only in her case the practice was in effect one basket for problems that time had not yet resolved and the other was the basket for problems that had been solved by time.

In the administration of Mr. Biden, his assistants are far more active, and in the case of Jake Sullivan are doing their best to bring about Armageddon thanks to their insouciance, certainty of their superiority as evidenced by their Yale degrees and by their willful ignorance of those they are playing on the big chessboard, to use Zbigniew Brzezinski’s metaphor.

Superior intellect and even a prized law degree are not a vaccine against stupidity, as we see in the daily actions of Mr. Sullivan. Another proof of the same point is his colleague over at the State Department, Tony Blinken.

Involuntarily, every time I see Blinken in the news I think back over the comment by the owner-manager of The Nation who publicly expressed her delight when he was nominated by Biden for the position of Secretary of State. Finally, she opined, we would have a sophisticate, a bilingual Secretary who grew up in a family of privilege in France, as our chief diplomat, replacing the ill-educated and bullying Mike Pompeo, who so resembled his crass boss, The Donald.

I earnestly wish for Sullivan’s retirement from government after Biden loses the election. I am confident he will be placed in one or another of America’s prestige universities to work on his memoirs and lecture students on how national security and diplomacy should not be run.

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 6/19/24

Russia and North Korea just clinched a mutual defense pact during President Putin’s trip to Pyongyang, which followed his counterpart Kim Jong Un’s visit to Vladivostok last September that was analyzed here. This agreement is a geopolitical game-changer for three fundamental reasons: it raises the stakes in the US’ dangerous game of nuclear chicken with Russia in Ukraine; accelerates the US’ “Pivot (back) to Asia”; and could thus trap China and the US in an escalation spiral that moves the New Cold War out of Europe.

To explain, the first outcome can be interpreted as one of Russia’s promised asymmetrical responses to the West arming Ukraine. If Russia achieves a military breakthrough across the front lines that’s exploited by some NATO members as the pretext for commencing a conventional intervention which provokes a Cuban-like brinkmanship crisis in Europe, then North Korea might provoke its own such crisis in Asia in order to remind the US about the principle of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD).  

Valdai Club expert Dmitry Suslov, who’s also a member of the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and Deputy Director of World Economy and International Politics at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, published a piece at RT where he observed that the US “lost its fear of the mushroom cloud”. He therefore suggested a “demonstrative” nuclear test in order to scare some sense back into Western warmongers, but Russia’s new mutual defense pact with North Korea could serve the same purpose.

In the Western mindset, North Korea is synonymous with nuclear scares and World War III, so knowing that it could symmetrically escalate in Asia out of solidarity with Russia in response to the US escalating in Europe might make American policymakers think twice about crossing Russia’s red lines there. After all, it would already be difficult enough managing the escalation ladder in one Cuban-like brinksmanship crisis, let alone two at the exact same time on opposite ends of Eurasia.

As regards the second point about accelerating the US’ “Pivot (back) to Asia”, this process is already unfolding as proven by the way in which the US is tightening its containment noose around China in the first island chain through its newly formed “Squad” with Australia, the Philippines, and Japan. Even so, the US is still clinging to its political fantasy of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, which is why its post-2022 ramped-up military presence in Europe hasn’t yet been scaled back and redirected towards Asia.

If Russia begins carrying out regular drills with North Korea and transfers high-tech military equipment to that country, then the US might feel coerced into speeding up its “Pivot (back) to Asia” at the possible expense of maintaining its pressure on Russia in Europe. The abrupt rebalancing of the US’ attention could make some of its NATO allies reconsider conventionally intervening in Ukraine since the US might no longer approve of this due to the difficulty of managing newfound North Korean-related tensions.

And finally, any tangible progress on hastening the US’ “Pivot (back) to Asia” would reduce the possibility of it and China normalizing their ties anytime soon since it could catalyze a self-sustaining escalation cycle as China responds to the US’ moves and then the US responds to China’s and so on and so forth. The US couldn’t agree to scale back its military presence in Northeast Asia as part of a speculative grand compromise with China due to the qualitatively enhanced threat posed by Russian-backed North Korea.

Since it’s unlikely that China would ever agree to a lopsided deal with the US in exchange for normalizing their ties or at least reducing American pressure on the People’s Republic, such as that which would retain any predictably bolstered US military presence in Northeast Asia, this scenario can be ruled out. In that event, Sino-US ties could easily become trapped in the self-sustaining cycle of mutual escalation, with the result being that Asia quickly replaces Europe as the top theater of the New Cold War.

To sum it all up, Russia’s mutual defense pact with North Korea is a geopolitical game-changer because of the way in which it’ll likely trap China and the US in an escalation spiral, which works to the Kremlin’s benefit by creating the conditions for relieving American pressure upon it in Europe. It’ll take time to manifest though so the US might escalate in Ukraine and/or open up another front in Eurasia (ex: Central Asia and/or the South Caucasus) before then so everything might still get worse before it gets better.

By Kyle Anzalone, Antiwar.com, 6/24/24

In response to a deadly strike on the Crimean Peninsula that killed four and wounded over 100, the Russian Foreign Ministry said that Washington had effectively become a party to the war, and Moscow would “certainly” retaliate. The Kremlin says American missiles were used in the attack.

On Monday, the Russian Foreign Ministry summoned the US ambassador to express outrage over Sunday’s attack on Crimea. The Kremlin claims that American ATACMS missiles were used, that Washington provided intelligence to Kiev to coordinate the attack, and that a US drone was operating near Sevastopol when the assault on civilian targets took place.

According to a statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry, the US “has effectively become a party” to the war on Ukraine’s side, adding, “Retaliatory measures will certainly follow.”

The Kremlin said the deadly assault involved five ATACMS. The defense ministry reported that four were shot down, and a fifth exploded over a civilian area. Russia labeled the missile barrage a “terrorist” attack on “one of the most important Orthodox holidays, the Day of the Holy Trinity.”

The Russian Defense Ministry reported that the ATACMS were cluster bombs. Such bombs contain submunitions and are designed as anti-personnel weapons meant to scatter small submunitions over a large area. The US has outlawed the export of most cluster weapons because of how deadly the submunitions are for civilians. President Joe Biden is likely in violation of this law by shipping the weapons to Ukraine.

Last year, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry posted a video threatening Russian civilians on vacation in Crimea. The video shows civilians fleeing explosions and tells the Russian audience, “‌We warned you last summer to stay away from Crimea.”

The peninsula was annexed by Moscow in 2014, but Kiev and Washington maintain that the Kremlin must hand control back to Ukraine to end the war. In Russian President Putin’s recent ceasefire offer to Kiev, he said Ukraine would have to recognize Russia’s claim over the territory.

Russia suffered a second major attack on Sunday. In Russia’s southern Dagestan Republic, at least 19 people were killed and 25 injured in a coordinated assault at various places of worship.  While no group immediately claimed responsibility, law enforcement agencies reported the attack was from “adherents of an international terrorist organization.”

Kyle Anzalone is the opinion editor of Antiwar.com, news editor of the Libertarian Institute, and co-host of Conflicts of Interest.

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Did someone in this administration finally decide that it’s time to pick up the darn phone and talk to the Russians? – Natylie

Pentagon head speaks with Russian counterpart for first time in a year

By Noah Robertson, Defense News, 6/25/24

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin spoke with Russia’s defense minister — the first such conversation in 15 months.

Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder announced the call in a briefing Tuesday, saying Austin initiated the discussion.

“The secretary emphasized the importance of maintaining lines of communication amid Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine,” Ryder said.

Russia has blamed the U.S. for an attack on Crimea — a Ukrainian peninsula Moscow seized in 2014 — in which Ukraine used ATACMS missiles supplied by America. Still considered Ukrainian territory under international law, Crimea is an exception to a U.S. policy that bans Ukraine from shooting long-range weapons into Russia.

This week the Russian Foreign Ministry summoned U.S. Ambassador Lynne Tracy for a scolding over the attack, which killed at least four and left more than 150 injured.

“Retaliatory measures are certain to follow,” the ministry said in a post on Telegram.

The last time Austin spoke with Russia’s defense minister — then Sergei Shoigu — was March 15, 2023. According to a Pentagon readout, the two discussed “unprofessional, dangerous, and reckless behavior by the Russian air force in international airspace over the Black Sea.”

A day before, a Russian jet had crashed into an American surveillance drone, forcing it down over international waters.

Andrei Belousov, the new defense minister, was appointed this May in a major shakeup within the Kremlin. Belousov is an economist by training, and his ascendance in part reflects Russia’s ability to manage its defense industry two years into the full-scale war in Ukraine.

This is the first time Belousov and Austin have spoken. The U.S. treats any conversations with Russia as extremely sensitive, and Ryder wouldn’t answer questions about how long the call lasted, why it occurred and the state of U.S.-Russia communication.

By Patrick Armstrong, Website, 6/18/24

On this day, 18 June, in 1935, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed. The two sides agreed that the German Navy’s total tonnage would be fixed at 35% of the Royal Navy’s tonnage. Not, when you think about it, a very intelligent agreement from London’s perspective. One of the causes of the First World War had been British concerns about the size of the German Navy and yet where did they think this one-third-as-big navy would be based? Obviously in the North Sea; the British, with their world-wide empire, would have most of their ships elsewhere, In short, London was agreeing that the Germans could have near-parity in the waters closest to it.

But worse. The agreement was the first violation by a great power of the Versailles conditions and had been done without consultation with any of Britain’s allies. It was the first, and therefore legitimating, agreement made by a great power with Hitler’s Germany.

(Unless you count Poland as a “great power” as the Polish government certainly did. It had signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler’s Germany eighteen months before. A French diplomat remarked that he saw a repetition of a pattern of Polish history: overestimate your power, step too far, be divided up by your neighbours.)

Soon after Hitler’s takeover in Germany, Moscow (which is to say Stalin) understood four things: 1) there was no possibility of returning to the previous good relations (Rapallo) 2) Hitler was a threat to all around him 3) Hitler would break any agreement as soon as he felt strong enough to 4) the only possible response was an alliance/coalition/agreement of Germany’s neighbours to block him. This became the Soviet Union’s principal foreign policy; as a Soviet diplomat put it to a French colleague, Soviet policy was very simple: “It is dictated by the fact that all that reinforces Germany we are against, and all that reinforces France, we are for”. Soviet diplomats were dismayed when they told their interlocutors that Hitler had plainly stated his intentions in Mein Kampf and received flippant answers like that’s just a ten-year old book and nobody ever does what he said he would when he gets in power. A ten-year old book given to every newlywed couple and soldier; definitely not something to ignore.

Many agreed with Stalin – President Roosevelt for example, in conversations with Litvinov, even proposed a US-Soviet non-aggression pact. In the UK in particular, the affable Soviet Ambassador, Ivan Mayskiy had found agreement on these four points with Robert Vansittart, the senior civil servant in the Foreign office, with Lord Beaverbrook, the powerful press baron, and even with the arch anti-Bolshevik Winston Churchill. Mayskiy discussed the world situation with the three many times, agreeing that the biggest threats to peace were Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia and that the coalition proposed by Moscow was the only hope of avoiding another great war. But Vansittart did not make policy, Beaverbrook could only push the line in his newspapers and Churchill was very far from power. Similar attempts in France failed, despite the support of General Weygand and other important officials, because of the instability of French politics and the effective opposition of Pierre Laval. And Poland was a constant worry: how close to Hitler was it getting? The smaller countries weren’t going to move without France or Britain. But many people in many countries agreed with Stalin and were working towards an anti-Hitler coalition.

The Anglo-German agreement was a shock to these hopes. London had given recognition to Hitler’s coup d’etat, made a bad agreement with him, ignored its allies and tossed Versailles overboard. Encouraging to Hitler and dismaying to his opponents.

Following his policy of pushing another step while professing eternal peace, Hitler re-occupied the Rhineland, demilitarised by Versailles, in March 1936. London and Paris did nothing and, once again, Hitler’s assessment proved out. How much did the naval agreement make him think he had the measure of London’s firmness of purpose? Do you think he would have done it had there been a USSR-France-UK plus Romania and Czechoslovakia alliance?

And, just as Stalin predicted, Hitler repudiated the naval agreement in spring 1939 along with the 1938 Munich agreement on Czechoslovakia and the 1934 pact with Poland. Moscow continued with its efforts to create an anti-Hitler force but with less and less hope. The final flicker was the abortive Anglo-French-Soviet military talks in late 1939. Giving up, Stalin accepted Hitler’s offer, signed a pact with him and the overconfident Poland was again eaten by its neighbours. (“‘We do not fear, [Józef Beck, Polish Foreign Minister] was reported to have said, [in 1934] ‘attacks on the part of Germany’.”)

The stock Western story remembers to forget this. Instead the story is 1) Munich (and for the neocons the time is always September 1938 and the place is always Munich) and 2) Hitler and his soulmate Stalin allying. Even so, every now and again the corporate media forgets to forget it: “Stalin ‘planned to send a million troops to stop Hitler if Britain and France agreed pact’”. And here we have a perfect example of the customary “forgetfulness”: for this historian the Soviet-German clock stopped in early 1933 and started up again in late 1939 :

The Rapallo Era ended nine months after Hitler assumed power in 1933 and, at his orders, the secret facilities closed one by one. While mistrust pervaded Soviet-German relations over the next six years, ties were never completely severed, Johnson writes. In spring 1939, both Stalin and Hitler proved open to renewing cooperation and in August, the country’s two foreign ministers signed a treaty of nonaggression, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

Evidently we’re supposed to believe that absolutely nothing (well, a teensy-tiny bit of “mistrust” if you insist) happened in Soviet-German relations over nearly seven years. (But to fill in the gap would spoil the simple story of Hitler, Munich, Stalin-Hitler wouldn’t it?)

“History is indeed little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind.” Hitler could have been stopped.

Once again I am indebted to Michael Jabara Carley’s work. I have just read his Stalin’s Gamble. This, the first in a trilogy, details the dismal story from Hitler’s coup until early 1936. Because of his three decades of labours in the archives of the principal countries, he has seen the notes taken by everyone of every meeting and diplomatic event; he can therefore tell us all sides of the issue It’s a dismal story because, hard as it may be for many in the West to accept, Stalin’s take was completely accurate. All his four points, which he had formulated by the end of 1933, came true. And the tragedy is that the foreign officials who agreed with him could never quite push their countries over the finish line. And so the alliance that could have deterred him never happened and only in the disaster of a great war did it eventually form.

YouTube link here.