Speakers include Scott Ritter, Col. Richard Black (ret.), Col. Lawrence Wilkerson (ret.)

YouTube link here.

YouTube link here.

By Hugh Cameron, Newsweek, 6/21/24

Vladimir Putin has announced that Russia will ramp up its nuclear arsenal, the latest of several such warnings his administration has issued since the beginning of the war with Ukraine.

The Russian president met with graduates of the country’s military universities in the Kremlin on Thursday. His address to the students covered matters relating to the country’s military capabilities, potential cooperation with NATO, and was characteristic of the angle Russia has taken toward the West for the past two years.

The news was first reported by Ria Novosti, a Russian state-owned news agency.

Putin’s speech began by congratulating the attendees on completing their studies, who Defense Minister Andrey Belousov hailed as ready to “serve the fatherland faithfully and truly.”

The Russian president also used the opportunity to make a statement on Russian national security. Standing before the lectern, Putin said: “We plan to further develop the nuclear triad as a guarantee of strategic deterrence and maintaining the balance of power in the world.”

A nuclear triad refers to a three-part military capability consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistics missiles, and bomber aircraft capable of carrying nuclear bombs and missiles.

Russia is one of four nations confirmed to be in possession of a nuclear triad, alongside the U.S., China, and India. Israel is generally thought to be in possession of a triad, though its taciturn nuclear program makes this hard for experts to verify.

In May, the U.S. announced an upgrade to its own nuclear triad, with the Air Force releasing photos of the B-21 stealth bomber undergoing test flights.

Finally some good news! – Natylie

Hindustan Times, 6/24/24

Under the terms of the deal, Assange will plead guilty to one count of conspiring to obtain and disclose information related to national defense in a U.S. federal court in Saipan, located in the Northern Mariana Islands, a U.S. commonwealth in the Pacific. This plea is expected to occur this week, according to the court papers.

According to the Wikileaks Twitter account:

“JULIAN ASSANGE IS FREE Julian Assange is free. He left Belmarsh maximum security prison on the morning of 24 June, after having spent 1901 days there.

He was granted bail by the High Court in London and was released at Stansted airport during the afternoon, where he boarded a plane and departed the UK. This is the result of a global campaign that spanned grass-roots organisers, press freedom campaigners, legislators and leaders from across the political spectrum, all the way to the United Nations.

This created the space for a long period of negotiations with the US Department of Justice, leading to a deal that has not yet been formally finalised. We will provide more information as soon as possible.

After more than five years in a 2×3 metre cell, isolated 23 hours a day, he will soon reunite with his wife Stella Assange, and their children, who have only known their father from behind bars.

WikiLeaks published groundbreaking stories of government corruption and human rights abuses, holding the powerful accountable for their actions. As editor-in-chief, Julian paid severely for these principles, and for the people’s right to know. As he returns to Australia, we thank all who stood by us, fought for us, and remained utterly committed in the fight for his freedom. Julian’s freedom is our freedom. [More details to follow].”

You can see video of Assange boarding the plane to Australia on the Wikileaks Twitter account.

JULIAN ASSANGE IS FREE

Julian Assange is free. He left Belmarsh maximum security prison on the morning of 24 June, after having spent 1901 days there. He was granted bail by the High Court in London and was released at Stansted airport during the afternoon, where he boarded a…

— WikiLeaks (@wikileaks) June 24, 2024

By Geoffrey Roberts, Brave New Europe, 6/9/24

1. The Worsening Situation. The window to a compromise peace with Russia is fast closing. Western hardliners are urging Ukraine to expend its remaining military resources in the vain hope of stopping and reversing Russia’s most recent advances, supposedly to strengthen Kiev’s position in future negotiations with Moscow. But wishful thinking is not a strategy. There is no evidence Ukraine is capable of doing this. Ukraine’s attempted counter-offensive in summer 2023 – when both it and NATO were much stronger – was an unmitigated disaster. Ukraine’s remaining ability to inflict significant military costs on Russia is a negotiating card that Kiev needs to play now. The weaker Ukraine is militarily, the less incentive Russia will have to negotiate a peace settlement, as opposed to imposing one.

2. Averting Armageddon. Western hardliners have no compunction when it comes to fighting to the last Ukrainian and they are determined to escalate NATO’s support for Ukraine, even at the risk of nuclear war with Russia. But Western escalationism is a sign of weakness, not strength, a barometer of NATO’s persistent failure, and the inability of its guns, tanks, missiles, mercenaries, sanctions, sabotage, technicians, intelligence, targeting and terrorism to turn the tide of war in Ukraine’s favour. All-out nuclear war would be catastrophic, not least for Ukraine, which would be wiped out in the first wave of attacks.

3. Saving Odessa. The Donbass is lost, and Kharkov may be doomed, too. Control of Odessa might be maintained as part of a peace settlement, but only if Russia faces – as it does just now – a very hard fight to seize it. Should Ukraine collapse militarily and be unable to effectively defend Odessa, Putin will have no reason to concede to Kiev a city he considers historically Russian. Odessa’s retention as a result of a negotiated settlement would signal Ukraine’s survival as an independent, sovereign state – a country with a Black Sea port and a viable economic future that is not reliant on Western hand-outs.

4. De-Railing Demographic Decline. Ukraine is heading towards a demographic disaster that could see the country’s post-independence population halved from 40 to 20 million. It desperately needs to halt the slaughter of its young people. And only when the war ends will the millions of Ukrainian refugees living abroad even consider returning home.

5. Reclaiming Sovereignty. The war has turned Ukraine into a Western client state, whose future depends on the whims and electoral fortunes of American and European politicians. Ending the West’s proxy war with Russia would regain Ukraine’s sovereignty

6. Beating Trump. Come November, the chances are Ukraine will either have lost the war or will be losing even more badly than it is now. Democratic strategists calculate that even a severely stricken Ukraine will be better for Biden’s votes than a lost war. But much more helpful to Biden politically would be peace negotiations with Russia initiated and led by Ukraine. A Trump presidency would be a nightmare for Ukraine, threatening to undermine, and possibly end, US economic and military support for Kiev.

7. Regime-Changing. Elected President on a platform of peace with Russia, Zelensky is all-in on the continuation of the war, whatever the costs to the Ukrainian people. He remains popular among Ukrainians who want to fight on come what may, but the broader public is increasingly embracing the idea of ending the war by conceding territory to Russia in order to save lives and safeguard the country’s future existence. Zelensky’s regime will be ended by peace – and the sooner the better for the families of the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians who will die if the war continues for much longer.

8. Getting Russia to Pay. While Putin will concede little or nothing when it comes to the negotiation of vital territorial and security issues, economic and financial concessions are another matter. Aid to a recovering, postwar Ukraine could serve Russia’s trade and commercial interests. One possibility is that Moscow could guarantee the supply of cheap energy to Ukraine, something Russia did for decades before the breakdown of its relations with Kiev. Instead of attempting to steal Russia’s foreign assets, the West should unfreeze the funds so that Putin can invest money in the reconstruction of not just his newly acquired territories but, quite possibly, in Kiev-controlled Ukraine as well.

9. Joining NATO and the EU. While Ukraine’s membership of NATO is not on offer as part of any peace deal, Putin has already conceded Ukraine’s right to join the EU. The negotiation of Ukraine’s entry into the EU will take years and the talks will only make significant, practical progress when the war ends. Putin has also accepted the idea of some kind of international security guarantee for postwar Ukraine. Importantly, peace between Russia and Ukraine could kick-start discussions about the establishment of pan-European security structures that would obviate the need for NATO.

10. “Ukrainianisation”. Not the ultra-nationalist wet dream of an ethnically cleansed Ukraine, but a form of ‘Finlandisation’. Finland was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1939-1940 and then fought on Hitler’s side during World War II, but it survived to prosper during the cold war by balancing between the Soviet and Western blocs. In return for a friendly foreign policy Moscow allowed the Finns freedom of action in their domestic affairs. It was a formula that enabled Finland to become one of the most successful post-WW2 states. Finland aspired to bridge East and West, and had many successes in that regard, notably during détente in the 1960s and 1970s. Ukraine could play the same role in ameliorating the highly dangerous new cold war that is developing between Russia and the West. Like Finland, Ukraine can recover from the dire consequences of siding with Russia’s enemies and benefit from good relations with both Washington and Moscow.

By Tarik Cyril Amar, Website, 6/16/24

On 16 June, Russian President Vladimir Putin has laid out his country’s conditions for ending the fighting in Ukraine and, after that, a comprehensive peace settlement (hereafter, the Moscow Conditions). Unsurprisingly, this was clearly a thoroughly prepared statement, and it was delivered in a setting obviously carefully chosen to signal its importance: As Russian TV news have emphasized, this was not just any meeting of the president with the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Instead, it was a rare occasion when representatives of that ministry, including its highest ranks, members of the Presidential Administration, the Federal Assembly, and various other executive agencies were gathered for a major meeting with the president. The last time this format was used was November 2021, that is before the large-scale war in Ukraine.

Putin stressed that he was speaking not about a “freezing of the conflict, but its conclusive ending” and that if Kiev were to agree to the conditions he was enumerating – beginning with a full military retreat from the areas of the oblast regions of Donetsk, Lugansk/Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia/Zaporozhe, which Moscow has annexed – Russia would proceed to negotiations (clearly implying, of a full peace settlement) without delay. 

The conditions listed by the Russian president were: the recognition as parts of Russia of the four regions listed above as well as all of Crimea; a “neutral, non-affiliated, non-nuclear status” for Ukraine; its “de-Nazification and de-militarization” – “all the more so,” he stated, “because everyone already agreed with these parameters” during the Istanbul negotiations of spring 2022. He also demanded guarantees for the “rights and interests of the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine.” 

“Naturally,” he added, the “fundamental international agreements” required to tie down all of the above would also presuppose the end of sanctions against Russia.

In sum, Putin reiterated Russia’s declared initial war aims (neutrality, “de-Nazification,” and de-militarization) and added the territories it has formally annexed (and, to a significant extent, occupied) since, while also, unsurprisingly, confirming that Moscow intends to keep Crimea. The reference to a non-affiliated status was, of course, most of all about NATO (which neutrality, too, would rule out) as well as, not to be overlooked, the EU.

Many Western observers and politicians have been content with dwelling on the obvious: This is a set of uncompromising or “maximalist” cease-fire and peace conditions (“a dictatorial peace” in German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s historically clumsy and factually wrong terms: Putin was not “dictating” anything), directly derived from what Russia wants and what it has already got on the battlefield. It is still a genuine offer, but it is true, entirely on Russian terms. It is not polemical or any exaggeration to observe that if the West and its Ukrainian proxy regime were to accept these terms, it would amount to a de facto recognition that they have lost the war.

Expectably, this offer has been rejected comprehensively, from Washington, via Brussels, to Kiev. The interesting question about this exchange is not if it could have had a different outcome; unfortunately, it could not. Equally unsurprising is the fact that Putin himself knew as much in advance. We can take him by his word – conveyed through his speaker Dmitry Peskov – that he did not expect a positive response.

Hence, the real question we should ask is why and for what purpose these conditions were stated at this point. The New York Times has pointed out that they represent “Mr. Putin’s most concrete set of territorial conditions to stop the war to date.” One can quibble, but there is little doubt that, in this form, this is a milestone statement one way or the other.

But then, a milestone on the road to what? First of all, let’s not get distracted: The timing of spelling out the Moscow Conditions in one handy package probably had something but not all too much to do with the so-called “peace summit” at Bürgenstock, initiated originally by Ukraine and obligingly hosted by Switzerland in a Qatari-owned luxury hotel. While not a real peace meeting by any stretch of the imagination (that would presuppose the presence of Russia which was not invited and may well have declined anyhow), Bürgenstock was meant to once again try against all odds to rally the Global South for Kiev and as a public relations boost for Ukraine’s Zelensky regime, President Zelensky personally, and their Western backers. By now, it has ended with a declaration long on rhetoric, short on everything else.

So, yes, Moscow may have enjoyed disrupting the Bürgenstock news cycle a little by its announcements. But as the meeting in Switzerland was a predictable dud anyhow – as even the staunchly russophobic and bellicist Economist acknowledged, if very gently – at the latest since both China and US President Biden decided to stay away, this is not a sufficient explanation of Putin’s actions. Mostly, over-reacting is not his style.

No, the relevant context for the Moscow Conditions is not Bürgenstock. Instead, think Savelletri, that is, where, in another luxury resort, the G7 has just met. You could add Washington in April of this year, for instance. Both places stand for Western announcement to pump more funding into Ukraine and the proxy war the West is waging through it: 50 billion dollars in the case of the G7 meeting, officially 61 – though, in effect, rather around 32 – billion dollars in the case of America’s legislation passed in April. The manner in which these funds are generated may differ, but the overall Western message to Russia is clear and has been sent explicitly time and again recently: The West, as of now, refuses to quit and signals its readiness to continue the war.   

In this respect, the real message of the Moscow Conditions was that Moscow as well is ready for an even longer war. For Putin did not merely lay out how Russia would be willing to make peace now; he also added on the same occasion, two points about the alternative, namely, continuing the war:

First, that this is an offer that will get worse as Russia’s military situation will get even better. Take this now or get an even less attractive deal later, was his message; and he confirmed it again after the meeting. As Peskov has put it, in principle, the conditions named by Putin have no deadline, but “the situation on the frontline is changing dynamically” and “there will be a moment, when it will change again in such a manner that the Kiev regime will face another worsening of its position.” 

Second, Putin also, once again, underlined that he sees the root cause of this war in the West’s unwillingness to relinquish its delusions of unipolarity and the policy of limitless expansion they have produced. In that context, he warned, also not for the first time, of “tragic” consequences if this Western approach does not change. What exactly “tragic” means is, in reality, not hard to guess: an escalation of the current large but localized war between Russia and Ukraine as well as the West, if mostly still indirectly, into an at least European or probably global open war between, at least, Russia and NATO, which would be devastating even without the use of nuclear weapons and a possible extermination event if they come into play.

What does all of this mean? We cannot know yet because Putin’s message was really about the future. But we can speculate: It is not, as some shortsighted or dishonest Western politicians, such as Mark Rutte, have tried to pretend, a sign of Russian weakness. Instead, it is a warning of what Moscow may do with its highly mobilized capacities: In the short-term, the real message of the Moscow Conditions may be that a major Russian offensive is coming. In that case, they will have served as a last warning to Ukraine and the West before Russia will strike even harder. If that is the case, Putin’s speech will end up being seen as an analogue to Moscow’s last offer to negotiate in earnest before its February 2022 invasion.

In the long term, with or without such a major offensive this year, the warning says that Russia is prepared to fight a long war and win, and, perhaps more importantly, that if the West should manage to prolong the war (despite the success of the European far right and the likelihood of Trump returning to the US presidency) and choose to escalate this long war in such a manner that Russia would feel under serious pressure, attacks on the West itself, at least in Europe, and the use of nuclear weapons will not be excluded.

Perhaps, for once, we should listen.