Finally some good news! – Natylie

Hindustan Times, 6/24/24

Under the terms of the deal, Assange will plead guilty to one count of conspiring to obtain and disclose information related to national defense in a U.S. federal court in Saipan, located in the Northern Mariana Islands, a U.S. commonwealth in the Pacific. This plea is expected to occur this week, according to the court papers.

According to the Wikileaks Twitter account:

“JULIAN ASSANGE IS FREE Julian Assange is free. He left Belmarsh maximum security prison on the morning of 24 June, after having spent 1901 days there.

He was granted bail by the High Court in London and was released at Stansted airport during the afternoon, where he boarded a plane and departed the UK. This is the result of a global campaign that spanned grass-roots organisers, press freedom campaigners, legislators and leaders from across the political spectrum, all the way to the United Nations.

This created the space for a long period of negotiations with the US Department of Justice, leading to a deal that has not yet been formally finalised. We will provide more information as soon as possible.

After more than five years in a 2×3 metre cell, isolated 23 hours a day, he will soon reunite with his wife Stella Assange, and their children, who have only known their father from behind bars.

WikiLeaks published groundbreaking stories of government corruption and human rights abuses, holding the powerful accountable for their actions. As editor-in-chief, Julian paid severely for these principles, and for the people’s right to know. As he returns to Australia, we thank all who stood by us, fought for us, and remained utterly committed in the fight for his freedom. Julian’s freedom is our freedom. [More details to follow].”

You can see video of Assange boarding the plane to Australia on the Wikileaks Twitter account.

JULIAN ASSANGE IS FREE

Julian Assange is free. He left Belmarsh maximum security prison on the morning of 24 June, after having spent 1901 days there. He was granted bail by the High Court in London and was released at Stansted airport during the afternoon, where he boarded a…

— WikiLeaks (@wikileaks) June 24, 2024

By Geoffrey Roberts, Brave New Europe, 6/9/24

1. The Worsening Situation. The window to a compromise peace with Russia is fast closing. Western hardliners are urging Ukraine to expend its remaining military resources in the vain hope of stopping and reversing Russia’s most recent advances, supposedly to strengthen Kiev’s position in future negotiations with Moscow. But wishful thinking is not a strategy. There is no evidence Ukraine is capable of doing this. Ukraine’s attempted counter-offensive in summer 2023 – when both it and NATO were much stronger – was an unmitigated disaster. Ukraine’s remaining ability to inflict significant military costs on Russia is a negotiating card that Kiev needs to play now. The weaker Ukraine is militarily, the less incentive Russia will have to negotiate a peace settlement, as opposed to imposing one.

2. Averting Armageddon. Western hardliners have no compunction when it comes to fighting to the last Ukrainian and they are determined to escalate NATO’s support for Ukraine, even at the risk of nuclear war with Russia. But Western escalationism is a sign of weakness, not strength, a barometer of NATO’s persistent failure, and the inability of its guns, tanks, missiles, mercenaries, sanctions, sabotage, technicians, intelligence, targeting and terrorism to turn the tide of war in Ukraine’s favour. All-out nuclear war would be catastrophic, not least for Ukraine, which would be wiped out in the first wave of attacks.

3. Saving Odessa. The Donbass is lost, and Kharkov may be doomed, too. Control of Odessa might be maintained as part of a peace settlement, but only if Russia faces – as it does just now – a very hard fight to seize it. Should Ukraine collapse militarily and be unable to effectively defend Odessa, Putin will have no reason to concede to Kiev a city he considers historically Russian. Odessa’s retention as a result of a negotiated settlement would signal Ukraine’s survival as an independent, sovereign state – a country with a Black Sea port and a viable economic future that is not reliant on Western hand-outs.

4. De-Railing Demographic Decline. Ukraine is heading towards a demographic disaster that could see the country’s post-independence population halved from 40 to 20 million. It desperately needs to halt the slaughter of its young people. And only when the war ends will the millions of Ukrainian refugees living abroad even consider returning home.

5. Reclaiming Sovereignty. The war has turned Ukraine into a Western client state, whose future depends on the whims and electoral fortunes of American and European politicians. Ending the West’s proxy war with Russia would regain Ukraine’s sovereignty

6. Beating Trump. Come November, the chances are Ukraine will either have lost the war or will be losing even more badly than it is now. Democratic strategists calculate that even a severely stricken Ukraine will be better for Biden’s votes than a lost war. But much more helpful to Biden politically would be peace negotiations with Russia initiated and led by Ukraine. A Trump presidency would be a nightmare for Ukraine, threatening to undermine, and possibly end, US economic and military support for Kiev.

7. Regime-Changing. Elected President on a platform of peace with Russia, Zelensky is all-in on the continuation of the war, whatever the costs to the Ukrainian people. He remains popular among Ukrainians who want to fight on come what may, but the broader public is increasingly embracing the idea of ending the war by conceding territory to Russia in order to save lives and safeguard the country’s future existence. Zelensky’s regime will be ended by peace – and the sooner the better for the families of the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians who will die if the war continues for much longer.

8. Getting Russia to Pay. While Putin will concede little or nothing when it comes to the negotiation of vital territorial and security issues, economic and financial concessions are another matter. Aid to a recovering, postwar Ukraine could serve Russia’s trade and commercial interests. One possibility is that Moscow could guarantee the supply of cheap energy to Ukraine, something Russia did for decades before the breakdown of its relations with Kiev. Instead of attempting to steal Russia’s foreign assets, the West should unfreeze the funds so that Putin can invest money in the reconstruction of not just his newly acquired territories but, quite possibly, in Kiev-controlled Ukraine as well.

9. Joining NATO and the EU. While Ukraine’s membership of NATO is not on offer as part of any peace deal, Putin has already conceded Ukraine’s right to join the EU. The negotiation of Ukraine’s entry into the EU will take years and the talks will only make significant, practical progress when the war ends. Putin has also accepted the idea of some kind of international security guarantee for postwar Ukraine. Importantly, peace between Russia and Ukraine could kick-start discussions about the establishment of pan-European security structures that would obviate the need for NATO.

10. “Ukrainianisation”. Not the ultra-nationalist wet dream of an ethnically cleansed Ukraine, but a form of ‘Finlandisation’. Finland was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1939-1940 and then fought on Hitler’s side during World War II, but it survived to prosper during the cold war by balancing between the Soviet and Western blocs. In return for a friendly foreign policy Moscow allowed the Finns freedom of action in their domestic affairs. It was a formula that enabled Finland to become one of the most successful post-WW2 states. Finland aspired to bridge East and West, and had many successes in that regard, notably during détente in the 1960s and 1970s. Ukraine could play the same role in ameliorating the highly dangerous new cold war that is developing between Russia and the West. Like Finland, Ukraine can recover from the dire consequences of siding with Russia’s enemies and benefit from good relations with both Washington and Moscow.

By Tarik Cyril Amar, Website, 6/16/24

On 16 June, Russian President Vladimir Putin has laid out his country’s conditions for ending the fighting in Ukraine and, after that, a comprehensive peace settlement (hereafter, the Moscow Conditions). Unsurprisingly, this was clearly a thoroughly prepared statement, and it was delivered in a setting obviously carefully chosen to signal its importance: As Russian TV news have emphasized, this was not just any meeting of the president with the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Instead, it was a rare occasion when representatives of that ministry, including its highest ranks, members of the Presidential Administration, the Federal Assembly, and various other executive agencies were gathered for a major meeting with the president. The last time this format was used was November 2021, that is before the large-scale war in Ukraine.

Putin stressed that he was speaking not about a “freezing of the conflict, but its conclusive ending” and that if Kiev were to agree to the conditions he was enumerating – beginning with a full military retreat from the areas of the oblast regions of Donetsk, Lugansk/Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia/Zaporozhe, which Moscow has annexed – Russia would proceed to negotiations (clearly implying, of a full peace settlement) without delay. 

The conditions listed by the Russian president were: the recognition as parts of Russia of the four regions listed above as well as all of Crimea; a “neutral, non-affiliated, non-nuclear status” for Ukraine; its “de-Nazification and de-militarization” – “all the more so,” he stated, “because everyone already agreed with these parameters” during the Istanbul negotiations of spring 2022. He also demanded guarantees for the “rights and interests of the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine.” 

“Naturally,” he added, the “fundamental international agreements” required to tie down all of the above would also presuppose the end of sanctions against Russia.

In sum, Putin reiterated Russia’s declared initial war aims (neutrality, “de-Nazification,” and de-militarization) and added the territories it has formally annexed (and, to a significant extent, occupied) since, while also, unsurprisingly, confirming that Moscow intends to keep Crimea. The reference to a non-affiliated status was, of course, most of all about NATO (which neutrality, too, would rule out) as well as, not to be overlooked, the EU.

Many Western observers and politicians have been content with dwelling on the obvious: This is a set of uncompromising or “maximalist” cease-fire and peace conditions (“a dictatorial peace” in German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s historically clumsy and factually wrong terms: Putin was not “dictating” anything), directly derived from what Russia wants and what it has already got on the battlefield. It is still a genuine offer, but it is true, entirely on Russian terms. It is not polemical or any exaggeration to observe that if the West and its Ukrainian proxy regime were to accept these terms, it would amount to a de facto recognition that they have lost the war.

Expectably, this offer has been rejected comprehensively, from Washington, via Brussels, to Kiev. The interesting question about this exchange is not if it could have had a different outcome; unfortunately, it could not. Equally unsurprising is the fact that Putin himself knew as much in advance. We can take him by his word – conveyed through his speaker Dmitry Peskov – that he did not expect a positive response.

Hence, the real question we should ask is why and for what purpose these conditions were stated at this point. The New York Times has pointed out that they represent “Mr. Putin’s most concrete set of territorial conditions to stop the war to date.” One can quibble, but there is little doubt that, in this form, this is a milestone statement one way or the other.

But then, a milestone on the road to what? First of all, let’s not get distracted: The timing of spelling out the Moscow Conditions in one handy package probably had something but not all too much to do with the so-called “peace summit” at Bürgenstock, initiated originally by Ukraine and obligingly hosted by Switzerland in a Qatari-owned luxury hotel. While not a real peace meeting by any stretch of the imagination (that would presuppose the presence of Russia which was not invited and may well have declined anyhow), Bürgenstock was meant to once again try against all odds to rally the Global South for Kiev and as a public relations boost for Ukraine’s Zelensky regime, President Zelensky personally, and their Western backers. By now, it has ended with a declaration long on rhetoric, short on everything else.

So, yes, Moscow may have enjoyed disrupting the Bürgenstock news cycle a little by its announcements. But as the meeting in Switzerland was a predictable dud anyhow – as even the staunchly russophobic and bellicist Economist acknowledged, if very gently – at the latest since both China and US President Biden decided to stay away, this is not a sufficient explanation of Putin’s actions. Mostly, over-reacting is not his style.

No, the relevant context for the Moscow Conditions is not Bürgenstock. Instead, think Savelletri, that is, where, in another luxury resort, the G7 has just met. You could add Washington in April of this year, for instance. Both places stand for Western announcement to pump more funding into Ukraine and the proxy war the West is waging through it: 50 billion dollars in the case of the G7 meeting, officially 61 – though, in effect, rather around 32 – billion dollars in the case of America’s legislation passed in April. The manner in which these funds are generated may differ, but the overall Western message to Russia is clear and has been sent explicitly time and again recently: The West, as of now, refuses to quit and signals its readiness to continue the war.   

In this respect, the real message of the Moscow Conditions was that Moscow as well is ready for an even longer war. For Putin did not merely lay out how Russia would be willing to make peace now; he also added on the same occasion, two points about the alternative, namely, continuing the war:

First, that this is an offer that will get worse as Russia’s military situation will get even better. Take this now or get an even less attractive deal later, was his message; and he confirmed it again after the meeting. As Peskov has put it, in principle, the conditions named by Putin have no deadline, but “the situation on the frontline is changing dynamically” and “there will be a moment, when it will change again in such a manner that the Kiev regime will face another worsening of its position.” 

Second, Putin also, once again, underlined that he sees the root cause of this war in the West’s unwillingness to relinquish its delusions of unipolarity and the policy of limitless expansion they have produced. In that context, he warned, also not for the first time, of “tragic” consequences if this Western approach does not change. What exactly “tragic” means is, in reality, not hard to guess: an escalation of the current large but localized war between Russia and Ukraine as well as the West, if mostly still indirectly, into an at least European or probably global open war between, at least, Russia and NATO, which would be devastating even without the use of nuclear weapons and a possible extermination event if they come into play.

What does all of this mean? We cannot know yet because Putin’s message was really about the future. But we can speculate: It is not, as some shortsighted or dishonest Western politicians, such as Mark Rutte, have tried to pretend, a sign of Russian weakness. Instead, it is a warning of what Moscow may do with its highly mobilized capacities: In the short-term, the real message of the Moscow Conditions may be that a major Russian offensive is coming. In that case, they will have served as a last warning to Ukraine and the West before Russia will strike even harder. If that is the case, Putin’s speech will end up being seen as an analogue to Moscow’s last offer to negotiate in earnest before its February 2022 invasion.

In the long term, with or without such a major offensive this year, the warning says that Russia is prepared to fight a long war and win, and, perhaps more importantly, that if the West should manage to prolong the war (despite the success of the European far right and the likelihood of Trump returning to the US presidency) and choose to escalate this long war in such a manner that Russia would feel under serious pressure, attacks on the West itself, at least in Europe, and the use of nuclear weapons will not be excluded.

Perhaps, for once, we should listen.

Kremlin website (machine translation), 6/7/24

The discussion was moderated by political scientist, historian, and academic supervisor of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs of the Higher School of Economics Sergey Karaganov….

S. Karaganov: Let’s move on to more political issues. You always talk about your desire to negotiate an end to the conflict with the West in Ukraine. This, of course, is a commendable and positive desire to negotiate.

But with whom to negotiate? Our Western partners have cheated us many times and are violating all the agreements that we reach with them. The Kiev regime is morally illegitimate, politically illegitimate and even legally illegitimate from the point of view of even the already failed state that exists there.

How is it even possible to conduct any kind of negotiations with them without first defeating them, without achieving complete surrender and without, so to speak, pointing a nuclear pistol at our Western opponents so that they don’t twitch anymore? Because, in principle, any agreements now will not be implemented until there is a defeat. Illegitimate and unreliable partners.

How to deal with this?

V. Putin: Well, yes, but, as Joseph Vissarionovich said, “I have no other writers” – he spoke in relation to the Union of Writers of the USSR at one time, when Beria came to snitch on them once again. He said: “I have no other writers.” Well, these are the partners – what should we do now, fight with everyone, or what?

We must, of course, seek agreements and conditions that would correspond to our interests and be as reliable as possible. You are right that it is very difficult to negotiate with such a public; they deceive at every step. They say one thing and do another. It’s sad, but all armed conflicts end in some kind of peace agreement. True, as one of the former leaders of a fairly significant European country told me, all these agreements can be based either on the basis of military defeat or on the basis of victory. We, of course, strive and will achieve victory.

The question of the legitimacy of those with whom we negotiate. Yes, there are problems there, of course. Because a preliminary, even cursory analysis of the legislation of Ukraine shows that the current executive authorities have lost their legitimacy.

There is the 103rd article of the Constitution [of Ukraine], which says that the President is elected for only five years, there is the 83rd article of the Constitution of Ukraine, which states that in conditions of martial law the powers of the Verkhovna Rada can be extended. Nothing has been said about extending the president’s powers.

There is a law on the essence of the martial law regime, and it says that under martial law, presidential elections are not held, but it does not say that they are prolonged – after all, I am a graduate of St. Petersburg University, Faculty of Law – and this is very important, this an essential thing: if it is not said, then it does not exist.

The Criminal Code has relevant articles that talk about usurpation of power. It looks like we are dealing with a usurpation of power. But negotiations can still be conducted, because, in my opinion, in accordance with Articles 109, 110, 111 of the Constitution, powers are transferred to the Speaker of the Rada. So if you want to negotiate, you can find someone to negotiate with.

We are ready for these negotiations, but only, I repeat, on the terms that we agreed on when we started these negotiations in Minsk and then in Istanbul, and not on some conjectures. Even if we take the agreements in Istanbul as a basis, we must still proceed from the realities of today. This is in general terms.

S. Karaganov: Vladimir Vladimirovich, naturally, the maxim that all wars end in negotiations is a false maxim, of course, it is being imposed on us. Most wars end in defeat and surrender of the enemy. This is the only way to end this war.

I move on to the next question, which is that the defeat and surrender of the enemy in the current circumstances, when America benefits from this war, and they will continue it, driving Ukrainians to slaughter and finishing them off, and now they will also drive Europeans to slaughter – This war will not be able to be stopped in the near future without rapid movement along the ladder of nuclear escalation. This is the first.

Second. The plates under the world system have moved apart. There will be a lot of conflicts that will arise objectively. There used to be a nuclear fuse, but now it has seriously weakened – fear of nuclear weapons. Do we understand that we have a huge responsibility not only to win this war – and for this we need to go much tougher on the ladder of escalation and be ready to use it – but also to return this nuclear fuse to the international system in order to prevent movement towards a huge wave of conflicts. After all, who, besides us, will do this? Who, besides you, will do this?

You have a huge responsibility. And if we crawl so slowly up this ladder, although there is, of course, movement, then I am afraid that we will seem to be shirking this responsibility. Although I understand the gravity of the moral choice.

Vladimir Putin: Regarding nuclear escalation: we never started this rhetoric. I don’t remember the name of this lady, the former Prime Minister of Great Britain, who, when asked when she became Prime Minister, said that she was ready to press the nuclear button.

We never said that. This is where it all started. We simply responded that we needed to take this more seriously; we immediately started saying that we were rattling nuclear weapons. We don’t rattle. First.

Secondly, what is use, non-use, in what case to use. We have a nuclear doctrine, and everything is written there. Yesterday I just spoke with the heads of news agencies and said this. We have everything written there: use is possible in exceptional cases – in the event of a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, in exceptional cases.

I don’t think that such a case has arisen – there is no such need. But this doctrine is a living instrument, and we carefully monitor what is happening in the world, around us, and do not rule out making some changes to this doctrine.

Now this is also connected with the testing of nuclear weapons. We once not only signed it, but also ratified it, the Americans signed it, but did not ratify it, so in today’s conditions we have withdrawn our ratification. But, if necessary, we will conduct tests. So far there is no such need either, since our information capabilities, computer ones, allow us to produce everything in its current form.

Now regarding speed, regarding results. You said that I have a great responsibility. Yes indeed. Is it possible to increase the speed of solving the problems we face? It is possible, but it is directly proportional to the losses. And, understanding my responsibility, I still proceed from what the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense propose. Speed ​​is important, but even more important is caring for the lives and health of our guys who are fighting at the front.

Combat work is underway. Just since the beginning of this year, 47 settlements, in my opinion, have been liberated – 880 square kilometers. We are gradually pushing the enemy out of the territory of Donbass and other adjacent territories. The General Staff and the Ministry of Defense have plans for the implementation and achievement of all our goals – we are acting according to this plan. I am confident that all these plans will be implemented.

S. Karaganov: Nevertheless, we understand perfectly well that accelerating movement along the nuclear escalation ladder can save a large number of lives, because it can bring some sense to our opponents, who took advantage of the fact that we, among other things, had such an easy doctrine.

I have no doubt that it will be changed, I hope that it will be changed soon, and you will now have the formal right to respond, if you so decide, with a nuclear strike to any attacks on our territory. This absolutely must be the sovereign right of our leader. I hope that such a statement will appear in our doctrine, and it will cool our opponents a little, and will also save our soldiers sooner or later.

Of course, now it’s probably too early to go for nuclear escalation, but we need to move towards this in order to cool down our opponents. They went crazy, especially the Europeans. They are going to war for the third time in almost a hundred years. The Americans are much more careful, they fed the Ukrainians, they push them, and they themselves are much more careful. But the Europeans are going to war.

I am a hunter, I know how animals behave. If you are attacked by a pack of wild dogs or hyenas and you have a stick, then you can hit them, drive them away, and there is a chance that you will drive them away. But most likely they will tear your trousers, and then, if you get tired, they will chew you off. If you have the opportunity to nail a couple, they will run away – I guarantee it.

President Mnangagwa knows the habits of hyenas. Do you agree with me, Mr. President, that this is how they disperse hyenas?

E. Mnangagwa (as translated) : Yes, you know, there are a lot of hyenas in Zimbabwe. But they are all kept in national parks so that they do not bother us. We don’t have any problems with them, and they multiply quickly. If someone wants a hyena, we can give it to you.

Vladimir Putin: We have enough of our own.

S. Karaganov: In Europe.

Again, I repeat this question – I bring it to the end. If we do not move more decisively along the ladder of escalation, will we not anger the gifts of the Almighty? After all, the Almighty once showed us the way, when he destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah with fiery rain for dissipation and debauchery. And after this, humanity remembered this for many years and behaved carefully, but now it has forgotten about Sodom and Gomorrah.

So, maybe let’s remember this rain and try again to bring some sense into humanity or that part of humanity that has lost faith in God and has lost its mind?

Vladimir Putin: Without me, maybe not? You will set the heat there! They were already scared.

Although, of course, one might think: You are now talking about Europeans – any logic is possible. If, God forbid, it comes to some kind of strike, then everyone should understand that Russia has an early warning system – a missile attack warning system. The USA has it. There is no such developed system anywhere else in the world. We have. In Europe there is no developed system; in this sense, they are more or less defenseless. This is the first.

The second is the power of the blows. Our tactical nuclear weapons are four times more powerful than the bombs the Americans used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, three to four times. We have many times more of them – both on the European continent, and even if the Americans bring theirs from the USA – we still have many times more.

If it comes [to this], God forbid, which we really don’t want, then – you said “let’s reduce the sacrifices” – they can increase indefinitely. This is the first.

And second. Of course, these same Europeans will have to think: if those with whom we exchange such blows do not exist, will the Americans get involved in this exchange of blows at the level of strategic weapons or not? I very much doubt it, and Europeans should also think about it, that’s for sure.

But still, I proceed from the fact that it will never come to this and we do not have such a need, because our Armed Forces are not just gaining experience, increasing their efficiency – our defense-industrial complex is demonstrating its effective work. I have said it many times, I can repeat it: we have increased the production of ammunition by more than 20 times, we are many times greater than the enemy’s capabilities in aviation technology, we are significantly superior in armored vehicles, and so on, and so on. We don’t even need to think about this topic.

Please, and I would also ask everyone not to mention such things in vain once again.

S. Karaganov: You behave so responsibly and speak so responsibly, but we are dealing with partners who are absolutely irresponsible and have lost their minds.

V. Putin: A terrible person.

S. Karaganov: No, you know… You looked at these partners from the outside, like most of us, but I grew up in that system, this happened in my life. I have known them from a young age and I assure you that I have reason to say what I say.

Although I understand perfectly well and support your hesitation, because this is a terrible choice, and the choice should be made only as a last resort. But if they know that you are not ready to make this choice, they will endlessly try to fight and bleed us.

And at the same time, they are fighting not only against us – they are also fighting against our friends in the world majority, because we are the military-strategic root, the core of this world majority. If they turn us back, they will begin to suppress them again. I don’t know whether the gentlemen presidents agree with this.

Vladimir Putin: Allow me to make one remark.

The decisions of both mine and my colleagues with whom I work in this area are not associated with any hesitation – there is no hesitation and cannot be. All our decisions must be based on analysis – a real, objective analysis of the current situation. That’s what we do.

S. Karaganov: The day before yesterday you spoke to the heads of agencies and said something extremely interesting about the fact that we are ready and can supply our long-range weapons to countries that are enemies of our enemies. This made me very happy because it was long overdue. What, will we supply both high-precision and hypersound? Naturally, with your technical specialists? This could really seriously improve the situation in the world. For example, aircraft carriers, which are generally a meaningless tool now, in the current circumstances, will leave the world stage, and people will stop spending huge amounts of money on them.

So what will we supply? When and how? Of course, at the same time, I understand that under no circumstances should we do this ourselves, or at least we should say that we are not doing it.

Vladimir Putin: Regarding aircraft carriers. You said they were meaningless. No. They are meaningless only in some kind of global conflict in a strategic sense. And from the point of view of solving geopolitical problems, as an instrument of geopolitics, in order to move them towards those territories against which the same Americans, French or British want to fight and force them to do something, they make sense. True, taking into account the presence of modern hypersonic weapons in Russia and China, to a certain extent, of course, they lose their meaning. You urge us not to spend money on this. Let them spend it. Why did you say this out loud? Let them spend it….

Helmer’s reporting below offers a different explanation for why the Istanbul agreement was not actually finalized and signed. I have bolded the portion of the article accordingly. – Natylie

By John Helmer, Website, 6/16/24

The Russian military bloggers haven’t been as quick as the Kiev regime and NATO allies to dismiss President Vladimir Putin’s peace terms speech to the Foreign Ministry as propaganda. But they did.

According to Boris Rozhin, the editor-in-chief of the Colonel Cassad military blog, Putin’s speech on Friday morning, June 14 [3], “was not announced in advance”. The Foreign Ministry audience who assembled “learned about it half an hour in advance, no more.” There is telltale vagueness in the Kremlin communiqué introducing “a meeting with the senior officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry.” 

In practical terms, Moscow’s leading independent military analyst concluded, the speech was a tactical feint and a strategic deception.

“[Putin’s terms] will obviously not be accepted by the West and their Ukrainian puppets,” wrote Rozhin. “Against the background of the ‘world summit’ [the Burgenstock, Switzerland, meeting on June 15-16] this will indicate that in fact the West is prolonging the war, so these statements [of Putin] are another torpedo in the summit. Russia is thus showing the countries of the Global South that it has offered a world that will be rejected by those who are broadcasting about ‘peaceful summits’…The war will continue. The goals of the SVO [Special Military Operation] will be achieved by military means.”

The distinction in the last line is between Kremlin political strategy and General Staff military strategy – this is a distinction which published Russian analyses of the president’s speech and the state propaganda organs avoid identifying. The semi-official Vzglyad [4]quoted Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, as characterizing the reaction from the West as “of an unconstructive nature”. No Russian official will say as little as this for the record.

Instead, Vzglyad [4]has mobilized its official sources to patch over the differences between Kremlin strategy and General Staff strategy by emphasizing that Putin is following the latter. “According to [Putin], the West has received a specific condition – either Ukraine will be outside the NATO bloc, or there will be a bold and sharp onslaught that will leave no chance for the enemies. Putin is confident of victory not only over Ukraine, but also over the entire collective West. The proposal was made in order to recall this initiative after the defeat of Ukraine. But Western leaders did not understand Putin, and then they themselves will say that they want peace… But there will be no mercy, tougher conditions will be put forward.” 

In a second report from academics on the Kremlin-financed Valdai Club roster, Vzglyad claims [5]“the essence of the Russian president’s speech is that the European security system no longer exists and will not be based on the same principles.” “In addition, the Russian president managed to change the agenda of the Swiss summit…the president’s initiative is capable of transforming the security structures not only of Eurasia, but also in the perspective of the entire planet. In addition, Russia already has really working international institutions in this space: the CIS, SCO, EAEU, CSTO, BRICS, the Union State of Russia and Belarus. All these tools have proven their reliability and suitability in modern conditions.”

The Kremlin’s American camp followers have repeated the semi-official line by scratching the difference between tactics and strategy, between feint and purpose. “Notice he’s [Putin] not making a demand about Odessa,” said [6]one. “So Odessa is still off the table…So this is a prelude to the next ramp-up in Russian military operations.” 

Russian skeptics, as well as non-Russian military analysts, point out that Putin has repeatedly refused to follow the General Staff’s advice, restricting their proposed military operations to an extent that there is open questioning about his reasons. One source says Putin’s June 14 exposition is “only half-right in blaming the Western ‘globalist liberal elites’ [Putin’s speech] for the current ‘extremely dangerous state of affairs’ [Putin’s speech]. Ultimately, the ideology of liberalism, inferiority complex, and corruption which dominate the oligarch-backed elite in Moscow has played a major role.”

This is a reference to the role Putin invited the oil and minerals oligarch Roman Abramovich to play in the negotiations of March-April 2022 in Istanbul; in the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation, Abramovich was Putin’s personal delegate and he outranked the official Russian negotiators [7].   There was strong domestic military and political opposition to this at the time in Moscow; there remains suspicion of an attempt to repeat by Putin’s Kremlin staff, represented by Peskov, even now.

“He [Putin] cannot be so influenced still as to think the war against Russia via the Kiev regime will stop under the conditions he laid out, nor can he think there are any terms which the US and NATO can be trusted by the Russians to sign. That’s why the Russian Foreign Ministry tabled the terms of a non-aggression and security in Europe requiring the roll-back of NATO’s borders to 1997. That was in December 2021. To think anyone on the other side is trustworthy, or capable of agreement, after all Putin recounted of US aggression, lying, double-dealing, and Ukrainian Nazism, is impossible.”

In Putin’s June 14 retelling of the Istanbul agreement, “everything” — he said [3]of the documents initialed by Russian and Ukrainian negotiators — “was written on paper.”  Then on March 30 [2022], Putin went on, after “the Russian troops were withdrawn from Kiev, the Ukrainian leadership suspended its participation in the negotiations staging the infamous provocation in Bucha, and rejected the prepared version of the agreements. I think today it is clear why that ugly provocation was necessary: to explain why the results that had been achieved during the negotiations were rejected. The path to peace was rejected again. As we know now, it was done on orders from Western curators, including the former UK Prime Minister who said directly during his visit to Kiev – no agreements; Russia must be defeated on the battlefield to achieve its strategic defeat.”

Note that the US newspaper report is based on terms drafted between March 16 and 17, 2022, two weeks before the draft documents were initialed in Turkey. Subsequent reporting by the newspaper of the negotiations, which continued after the Istanbul meetings, concluded [10]: “On April 15, five days after Mr. Abramovich told the Ukrainians about his meeting with Mr. Putin, the Russian negotiators sent a 17-page draft treaty to their president’s desk. Similar to the month-earlier version, the April 15 draft includes text in red highlighting issues in dispute. But such markings are almost entirely absent from the treaty’s first pages, where points of agreement emerged.” 

In fact, Putin had been unable to convince Russian military and intelligence chiefs that the terms he had authorized for initialing would be enforceable and would not betray countrywide public support of the announced goals of the Special Military Operation.

Confirmation that Putin had been “micro-managing” the negotiations in Istanbul through Abramovich appears in the New York Times report of the process from Ukrainian and other sources. “ ‘Colleagues, I spoke to RA,’ Ukraine’s lead negotiator, Davyd Arakhamia, wrote on April 10 [2022] in a WhatsApp message to the Ukrainian team. ‘He spoke yesterday for an hour and a half with his boss.’ RA was Roman Abramovich, the Russian billionaire who played a behind-the-scenes role in the talks. His ‘boss,’ Mr. Putin, was urging the negotiators to concentrate on the key issues and work through them quickly, Mr. Arakhamia wrote [10]. (A member of the WhatsApp group showed that message and others to reporters for The Times.).” 

In the New York Times version, based on a March 17 draft of terms, no Russian source acknowledges the backlash Putin faced from the General Staff and the Security Council after the full extent of Abramovich’s role became clear from the terms Putin had told his negotiators to sign in Istanbul. After two weeks of internal debate, Putin was forced to back down, and the terms he and Abramovich had conceded on March 31 were revised. The Ukrainian sources feeding the New York Times reporters told [10] them “we had no interest in continuing the talks.” 

What is missing from this Ukrainian and American narrative, as well as from the public Russian versions, is that Putin retreated from the terms he had agreed with Abramovich. The role played by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson in the published narrative, repeated to the press by Israelis and others, had been a minor one.

Last Friday, Putin hinted that the General Staff has opposed his concession terms. “I haven’t spoken about this publicly either but some of those present here know about it. After the Russian army seized part of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions, many Western politicians offered their mediation in a peaceful settlement of the conflict. One of them was on a working visit to Moscow on March 5, 2022. We accepted his mediation efforts, especially since he said during the conversation that he had secured the support of the leaders of Germany and France, as well as high-ranking US representatives.”

“In course of our conversation our foreign guest wondered – an interesting moment – saying if you are assisting Donbass, then why Russian troops are in the south of Ukraine, including in the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions? We responded to the effect that it was our General Staff ‘s decision [sic] on planning the operation. And I will add today that the idea was to bypass some fortified areas built in Donbass over the eight years by Ukrainian authorities, primarily for liberating Mariupol.”

“Then our foreign colleague specified – a professional man, to be fair to him: are Russian troops going to stay in the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions? And what will happen to these regions after the Special Military Operation has attained its goals? I answered to this that in general I do not rule out preservation of the Ukrainian sovereignty over these territories, provided Russia has a stable land bridge to Crimea [3].” 

It had been clear to the president then, and it is clearer now, that Putin’s “stable land bridge to Crimea” was politically incompatible with “Ukrainian sovereignty” because, as the General Staff kept repeating to Putin, it was militarily impossible.

On Friday Putin kept the identity of the mediator secret. But it is already well known from the mediator himself. It was the Israeli, former prime minister Naftali Bennett [12] (right). He has confirmed his meeting in Moscow with Putin on March 5, 2022 [13].  For Putin to authorize Abramovich and Bennett, two Jewish Israelis, to negotiate Russia’s end-of-war terms with the Kiev regime remains a highly sensitive issue in Moscow [14].   

Russian public opinion has been clearer on the end-of-war objectives and on terms of negotiations than Putin has admitted himself to have been. For the poll evidence, click to read [15]. 

What now, what next?

According to the President on Friday, “a verbatim return to the security proposals that we put forward twenty-five, fifteen, or even two years ago is impossible, as too much has happened and the conditions have changed. However, the basic principles and, most importantly, the very subject of dialogue remain unchanged.” From Putin’s new statement of end-of-war terms, he says the “parameters were broadly agreed upon during the Istanbul negotiations in 2022, including specific details on demilitarisation such as the agreed numbers of tanks and other military equipment. We reached consensus on all points.”

Now, however, with the new long-range artillery, drones, missiles, and F-16s supplied by NATO to the Kiev regime, the depth of “demilitarisation” is more than ten times beyond the “25 mile” (40 kiliometre) range which was one of the Russian parameters in the Istanbul agreement drafts of March 2022 [10]. Read the backfile on what Putin has been calling this “sanitary zone [17]”. 

Denazification, the second strategic goal of the Special Military Operation, means regime change in Kiev, but Putin implied last Friday that he means no more than the replacement of Vladimir Zelensky because “the presidential term of the previously elected head of Ukraine has expired along with his legitimacy, which cannot be reinstated by any tricks”. That, he added, leaves only one constitutional authority in the country: “unlike the executive branch, the Verkhovnaya Rada is a legitimate body now. Ukraine is not a presidential republic, but a parliamentary and presidential republic. This is the point.”

Russian sources believe this is beside the point. As Rozhin has written, “the goals of the SVO will be achieved by military means.”

Asked to list what they believe will now be the military targets in the General Staff’s strategy, the emphasis, the sources say, will continue to be energy generation plants and distribution hubs and networks, especially those through which the replacement electricity is entering the Ukraine from its neighbours – the Chervonograd substation (from Poland); the Mukacheve substation (Slovakia, Hungary, Romania); the Usatove and Primorska substations (Moldova, Romania); and the Khmelnitsky, Dobrotvirka and Pivendennoukrainska generating hubs.

GERMAN MAP OF THE UKRAINE’S ELECTRICITY IMPORT LINES AS OF OCTOBER 2021

Source: https://www.swp-berlin.org/ [19]

UKRAINIAN MAP OF THE IMPORT LINE CAPACITIES AS OF OCTOBER 2023

Source: https://kyivindependent.com/ [21]

The total capacity of these electricity lines is shown as just under 3,890 kV. On June 10, the Ukrainian state utility Ukrenergo reported [22] that “almost 25,000 MWh of electricity were imported into the country from Romania, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Moldova during the day”. A NATO military engineer estimates that although Russian raids have forced some of the lines into what is reported publicly as maintenance, the import volume is still running “at or near capacity. But they are struggling. Watch for renewed attacks on the substations connecting the Ukrainian grid to Poland and Romania.” For more technical details on the situation from US engineers, read the comments here [23]. 

“If these are knocked out,” a NATO military engineer says, “it’s all over.”

In the meantime, according to this Spanish newspaper report [24], the billed charge for electricity is rising so fast and so high, at least a quarter of the Ukrainian population cannot afford it. “The electricity tariff from June has increased by 64%, from 2.64 hryvnas per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to 4.32 hryvnas (between $0.064 and $0.11). Days before the Ukrainian Cabinet met on May 30, it was leaked that the increase would be 80%. But the reaction in the media and on social networks made it clear that the measure was highly unpopular at a time when the authorities must also deal with enormous unease over the compulsory conscription process to incorporate hundreds of thousands of civilians into the army.” 

“Dixi informs this newspaper that its estimates in 2023 indicated the average monthly consumption per household in Ukraine was 155Kwh. In this average scenario, the monthly household bill would rise from $10 to $16.6. The Ukrainian Statistics Service indicates that the average monthly salary in Ukraine was equivalent to $471 at the end of last year. The World Bank estimated that in 2022 alone, the year in which Russia launched its invasion, the poverty rate in Ukraine rose from 5.5% to 24% of the population. There is no alternative to raising tariffs, say the government and companies in the sector.”

This means that the multi-billion dollar cash transfers to the Kiev regime from the US and European Union for non-military budget support are being diverted, and failing to reach the population.

To run emergency generating sets powered by diesel and to fuel the Ukrainian military movements require fuel storages. The Russian Defense Ministry’s daily operations bulletin is reporting daily strikes at these throughout the country.

On the border there are a series of targets which Russian sources expect to be hit in the coming days. The lead image map shows their locations and functions (red for rail, orange for road,  blue for bridge and ferry). Rozhin has reprinted this analysis of these targets [25]. “Since sending military aid by air is not available, most of the cargo is delivered by rail, heavy trucks, or, much more risky, by sea. Either way, all cargoes go through customs and checkpoints. In the west and south-west of Ukraine there are about 87 sea, pedestrian, rail, and road border crossings…Taking into account the checkpoints that Ukraine received from the USSR, this number can be increased by almost half, but a significant part of such crossings is either destroyed, looted in previous decades, or abandoned under the USSR. However, most of the border crossings are on the border with Moldova. There are 34 of them, but they are not used as intensively as the checkpoints for transit to and from the territory of NATO countries. The state of some of them is far from ideal.”

Rozhin’s purpose in mapping the targets is to ask the question publicly: “If all border crossings are known, why not intercept military cargo there?”

“In the west and south-west, Ukraine borders Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Moldova. The total length of the border in these areas is 777 km. The long-range weapons of the Russian Federation — for example, X-101 missiles with cluster and high-explosive warheads —  are sufficient to destroy military cargo directly on the border. All the coordinates of the border crossings are almost certainly known to the Russian military. But the main problem in the matter of the destruction of military cargo at these points is reconnaissance and obtaining reliable data on the time of shipments of cargo columns. The determining parameter in this case is the precise time for the crossing of the cargo on to the territory of Ukraine.” The original military blog source can be followed here [26]. 

In similar fashion, Rozhin and other military bloggers are asking publicly why there are Kremlin restrictions on targets which the US, NATO and the Ukrainians are using for drone and missile attacks on Crimea, as well as deeper into the Russian heartland. Putin addressed this question in his press conference with international reporters on June 5 [27]. 

“What can the Ukrainian military – not the ones who are just sitting there and pressing buttons – but the higher-ranking ones do when it comes to target assignment? They can identify a target that is a priority for them. But they are not the ones who decide whether a particular target should be hit, because, to reiterate, a WTA (weapon target assignment) is formed and effectively entered only by those who supply the weapons. If we are talking about ATACMS, then the Pentagon is doing it. If it is Storm Shadow, then the British are. It is even more straightforward in the case of Storm Shadow, because the target assignment is entered automatically, without the involvement of the military personnel on the ground. The British do it, that is all there is to it.”

“And when the Bundeswehr military were pondering an attack on the Crimean Bridge or other targets, they were thinking for themselves [28]. No one was doing it for them, right? They were going to do it. The same goes for the French specialists. Western specialists do it. We have no illusions about this. How are we supposed to respond?”

“First, we will, of course, improve our air defence systems. We will be destroying their missiles. Second, we believe that if someone is thinking that it is possible to supply such weapons to a war zone in order to deliver strikes at our territory and to create problems for us, why can we not supply our weapons of the same class to those regions around the world where they will target sensitive facilities of the countries that are doing this to Russia? The response could be symmetrical. We will give it a thought.”

“Third, sure enough, such actions will wreck international relations, which have already hit rock bottom, and undermine international security. Ultimately, if we see that these countries are being embroiled into a war against us, and this constitutes their direct involvement in the war against the Russian Federation, we reserve the right to respond in kind. Generally speaking, this path may lead to serious problems. I think that covers it all. If you have any leading questions, please go ahead. But I do not think I can add anything to what I just said [28].” 

Several days later, after a fresh series of missile attacks on Crimea was launched, the Russian military bloggers responded with this leading question – why are the US, French and British systems operating in the Black Sea not targeted when their role in the Russian attacks is certain?

Mikhail Zvinchuk, principal of the Rybar military blog, has reported that on the eve of the June 10-11 missile attacks on the Peninsula, “it is worth noting that… NATO satellites were again active. The target reconnaissance alternately depended on which areas were planned [for missile attack] — on June 8-9, the northwestern part of the Crimea was filmed, and on June 10 and 11, Sevastopol and the centre of the Peninsula. In addition, yesterday and the day before yesterday, special attention of the satellites was paid to the eastern part of the Crimea. Filming was conducted of Theodossia, Kirovsky, Kerch, and of course, the Crimean Bridge… Also, during today’s attack [June 12] in the western part of the Black Sea, the American RQ-4B drone was operating…After the strikes, it moved to the eastern part of the sea area closer to the Crimean Bridge, where, unhindered, it was operating until the morning. This fact, together with the active work of the satellites, as well as consecutive strikes on the air defence positions, first in the northwest, then in the south, allow us to conclude that the next goal may be the east of the Peninsula.”

ITALIAN MAP OF US AIR FORCE DRONE OPERATIONS AGAINST CRIMEAN TARGETS

Source: https://www.itamilradar.com/ [30]– the map indicates the tracking paths of the RQ-4B on May 29. This Italian source regularly maps and reports on US and NATO operations in the Black Sea region, usually with a time lag of several days.

In parallel, according to the Rybar report, there appeared “for the first time in a month and a half, south of Feodosia, the French long-range radar detection aircraft, the E-3F, and the French Navy aircraft [Bréguet] Atlantique 2 [based at Souday Bay, Crete]. In the west of the sea also flew the RC-135V of the British Air Force. That is a lot for one day, isn’t it? As noted repeatedly, the main goal of the West is the Crimean Bridge, and for this it is necessary to reduce the combat potential of the air defence in the Crimea.”

The Russian Air Force has downed a USAF drone operating against the Crimea in March 2023 [31]. Since last October the Houthis, assisted by Iran and possibly by Russia, have downed several USAF drones operating in the Red Sea to assist Anglo-American attacks on targets in Yemen.

What the military bloggers like Rozhin and Zvinchuk are saying is why not strike at these targets now?

“What we have in the end,” Zvinchuk has written on June 12 [32], is that “the air defence strikes are aimed at weakening the protection near the Crimean Bridge, which must be taken into account and measures taken to modify the available means of missile defence – the missiles are shot down, but not all of them. The enemy is clearly preparing for a new attack. We’ve already identified two false starts – they can be called the harbinger of massive strikes; it is possible they will be aimed at the bridge. In the future, the lack of opposition, the reluctance to accept reality and learn from mistakes can affect the potential of the air defence of the Crimea. Already this will play a key role when the F-16 fighters will make their appearance.”

“Reluctance to accept reality and learn from mistakes” – this criticism is aimed, not at the General Staff, but at the Kremlin. 

MAP OF UKRAINE MISSILE STRIKES AT CRIMEA, JUNE 10-12

Map of Ukrainian missile strikes on Crimea, June 10-12 – posted by Rybar [32], June 12 at 20:29h.

On June 14 Zvinchuk returned [32] to the targeting of the USAF drones. “For the first time, the American Triton [MQ-4C [34]] appeared on the Crimean shores right before a massed blow on the Crimea. The question of what you can expect from its presence in the Black Sea region begs itself. Especially when the curators of the Ukrainian military will not miss such an opportunity to attack. And if this happens, it will again be possible to raise the question of the advisability of a more radical counteraction to American aviation near the Russian borders. Someday, maybe, we will come to the same measures as the Houthis.”

***

Link to the NYT article can be found here that is not behind a paywall.

Documents: Putin Was Willing To Compromise To End War in 2022

Antiwar.com, 6/16/24

In April 2022, Ukraine and Russia were on the brink of signing a deal to end the war just weeks after it began. The New York Times published documents showing President Vladimir Putin was willing to make concessions to get an agreement signed.

According to the documents, Putin initially sought to have Kiev recognize Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. However, a draft agreement from April 15, 2022, suggests both parties were prepared to set aside the issue to end the conflict. “Paragraph 1 of Article 2 and Articles 4, 5, and 11 of this Treaty shall not apply to Crimea and Sevastopol,” the document says.

In December, Ukrainian negotiator Oleksandr Chalyi explained that an agreement was reached in the spring of 2022, stating the two sides “managed to find a very real compromise. We were very close in the middle of April, in the end of April, to finalize our war with some peaceful settlement.”

Kiev was also willing to accept neutrality with regards to NATO, according to the NYT. Ukraine’s negotiation team proposed a peace deal that would say the country “does not join any military alliances” and “does not deploy foreign military bases and contingents.”

The draft deal would have allowed Kiev to sign bilateral agreements with NATO states, as well as become a member of the European Union, but would have required Ukraine’s security partners to lift sanctions on Russia.

The Kremlin also sought to protect the rights of millions of Russian speakers living in Ukraine by forcing Kiev to repeal restrictions on the Russian language, and to bar the state from erecting monuments glorifying neo-Nazis and WWII-era Nazi collaborators.

As the talks were ongoing, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was pushed by his Western backers to forgo diplomacy and attempt to forcibly expel Russian troops from his country. Then-UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson made an infamous trip to Kiev to pressure Zelensky to abandon any peace negotiations, while Washington repeatedly vowed to supply unlimited military aid.

The NYT report added details about US pressure on Ukraine to ditch the talks. According to a senior American official familiar with the negotiations, Washington “quietly said, ‘You understand this is unilateral disarmament, right?’”

Additionally, the NYT noted that Polish leaders believed the French and German governments might have endorsed the peace agreement and pushed Ukraine to accept it. During a meeting in late March 2022, Poland’s President Andrzej Duda pressured other NATO leaders not to allow Ukraine to sign the Russian proposal.

Some US officials cautioned Ukraine not to trust Russia and warned the talks were merely a military ploy. However, two out of three Ukrainian negotiators who spoke with the NYT believed the Russian proposal was genuine, and one explained Putin had “reduced his demands” over the course of the discussions.

Ultimately, decision-makers in Kiev listened to their supporters in Warsaw, London, and Washington and elected to break off the negotiations. More than two years later, the conflict drags on, with Russian forces steadily advancing on major Ukrainian cities despite renewed Western military aid.

On Friday, the Russian president extended a public peace offer to Ukraine that is similar to the one nearly agreed to in 2022. However, along with Kiev agreeing never to join NATO and the West lifting sanctions on Russia, the Kremlin is now demanding that Ukraine recognize Moscow’s sovereignty over Crimea and four other Ukrainian oblasts that have been annexed by Russia throughout the two-and-a-half-year-long war.

Kyle Anzalone is the opinion editor of Antiwar.com, news editor of the Libertarian Institute, and co-host of Conflicts of Interest.