By ERIN BANCO, ALEXANDER WARD and LARA SELIGMAN, Politico, 5/30/24
The Biden administration has quietly given Ukraine permission to strike inside Russia — solely near the area of Kharkiv — using U.S.-provided weapons, three U.S. officials and two other people familiar with the move said Thursday, a major reversal that will help Ukraine to better defend its second-largest city.
“The president recently directed his team to ensure that Ukraine is able to use U.S. weapons for counter-fire purposes in Kharkiv so Ukraine can hit back at Russian forces hitting them or preparing to hit them,” one of the U.S. officials said, adding that the policy of not allowing long-range strikes inside Russia “has not changed.”
Ukraine asked the U.S. to make this policy change only after Russia’s offensive on Kharkiv began this month, the official added. All the people were granted anonymity to discuss internal decisions that haven’t been announced.
In the last few days, the U.S. made the decision to allow Ukraine “flexibility” to defend itself from attacks on the border near Kharkiv, the second U.S. official said.
In effect, Ukraine can now use American-provided weapons, such as rockets and rocket launchers, to shoot down launched Russian missiles heading toward Kharkiv, at troops massing just over the Russian border near the city, or Russian bombers launching bombs toward Ukrainian territory. But the official said Ukraine cannot use those weapons to hit civilian infrastructure or launch long-range missiles, such as the Army Tactical Missile System, to hit military targets deep inside Russia.
It’s a stunning shift the administration initially said would escalate the war by more directly involving the U.S. in the fight. But worsening conditions for Ukraine on the battlefield –– namely Russia’s advances and improved position in Kharkiv –– led the president to change his mind.
The National Security Council did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
The Biden administration hinted that a decision had either been secretly made or forthcoming in recent days. On Wednesday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who supports a restriction lift, became the first U.S. official to publicly hint that Biden may shift course and allow such strikes, telling reporters that U.S. policy toward Ukraine would evolve as needed. White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby later did not rule out a potential change.
Those messages came after top U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom and France, said Ukraine should have the right to attack inside Russia using Western weapons. Lawmakers from both parties also supported the move publicly and privately, while top U.S. military officials briefed Congress behind closed doors that relaxing the restriction had “military value,” POLITICO first reported.
The Russian embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment.
Some officials are concerned that Ukraine, when it attacks inside Russia using its own drones, has hit military targets unrelated to Russia’s invasion. The U.S. has strongly delivered the message that Kyiv must use American weapons only to directly hit Russian military sites used for its invasion of Ukraine, but not civilian infrastructure.
Ukrainian officials, from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on down, have pushed for the Biden administration to change its policy ever since Russia launched a large assault on Kharkiv. For weeks they’ve said an inability to attack Russian troop positions over the border complicated Ukraine’s defense of Kharkiv and the country writ large.
In a discussion with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Wednesday, Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov made a “hard push” to use U.S. weapons in Russia, according to a person with knowledge of the call.
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Meduza asks military expert Yuri Fedorov to explain the consequences of NATO members permitting Ukraine to strike targets inside Russia using Western weapons
Meduza, 5/29/24
In his interview with Meduza, Fedorov argues that Kyiv could gain a serious advantage against Russia’s invasion if it can strike Russia’s reserve forces, logistics centers, and major weapons stocks near the border with Ukraine, which have been crucial in the latest offensive toward Kharkiv. Ukrainian attacks on these targets inside Russia would be possible using Western-supplied HIMARS and especially ATACMs long-range, guided missiles. In addition to damaging military facilities, sustained attacks on Russian territory would force the Kremlin to reallocate air defenses to border regions, pulling those systems away from frontline areas inside Ukraine.
Moscow has threatened to respond to this escalation by the West with its own escalation, but Fedorov says Russia is running out of non-nuclear options. He suggests that the Kremlin might resort to targeting government buildings in Kyiv, possibly even the embassies of NATO members. According to Fedorov, there are almost no Russian troops currently in Belarus, and concerns that Moscow might open a new front from this direction are unfounded. He also says the Belarusian military is not trained or equipped to join the war itself, despite two years of improvements. In the meantime, Russian troops hope to advance close enough to Kharkiv to be within barrel artillery range of the city. This assault, however, is intended largely to divert Ukrainian soldiers away from the Donetsk region, where Russia hopes to reach the region’s administrative boundary.
Asked about Ukraine’s recent drone attacks on two Russian early warning radar stations, Fedorov reasons that Kyiv was sending a “very serious warning” by signaling its capacity to damage extremely important facilities in Russia’s strategic defense network. He points out that Moscow hasn’t officially responded to the attacks on its strategic deterrence, even though they technically trigger Russia’s doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons. “This means that Russia currently lacks the political will or technical or material capabilities to implement these provisions of the nuclear doctrine,” says Fedorov, adding that he believes the United States might respond with its own nuclear attack or a “devastating non-nuclear response” against Russian military targets, possibly even on Russian soil, he claims. Fedorov acknowledges that Moscow views Western consent to the use of its weapons for attacks inside Russian territory as NATO’s direct involvement in the war, but he says his own opinion is that this new weapons policy will strengthen the Ukrainian military, thereby reducing the need for more direct Western intervention.
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Permission to use Western weapons to strike Russia:
what does it mean and what will happen as a result?
Strana, 5/31/24, Translation by Geoffrey Roberts
Statements by Western countries to allow strikes on Russia with their weapons are only partly the result of military necessity.
The use, for example, of HIMARS missiles – with a range of up to 80 kilometres- in the border areas of the Belgorod region, or of Western-supplied air defence systems to shoot down aircraft over Russia, could have a certain military significance, but it would not correspond to the hyped discussion of this topic. Nor will permission from the Czech Republic or Poland to strike with their weapons change much (Czech “Vampires” have been regularly fired at the Belgorod region).
A truly serious (though also not decisive) impact could be had by permission to strike with long-range missiles, but that does not exist yet.
At this stage, the spinning of this topic in the West solves not so much military as informational and political problems.
Namely:
1. Show the immutability of support for Ukraine – to maintain morale and faith in victory in Ukrainian society in the face of a difficult situation at the front.
2. Wind-up “angry patriots” in Russia because Putin does not react to the “crossing of red lines” – to roil the situation inside the Russian Federation.
3. Signal Russia not expand the front line by attacking the Sumy region or Kyiv (Western media write that permission to use their weapons may expand if the Russian Federation attacks in new directions).
4. Demonstrate to Western waverers there is no need to fear Russian threats, that you can move step by step: permission for strikes on Russian territory with long-range missiles; convince Scholz to provide the Taurus; increase and speed up the supply of aircraft; introduce a no-fly zone over Western Ukraine; and then send in NATO troops, etc.
The last goal is the main one of the so-called “war party”, which has been saying for a long time there is no need to be afraid of nuclear threats from the Russian Federation or of Moscow’s “red lines”, but that we need to be involved “to the maximum”, right up to sending troops. This “party” avers that Putin will not dare to launch a nuclear strike.
But Russia has its own “war party,” which calls for “moving from words to deeds”: present an ultimatum to the West with the threat of using nuclear weapons. Or demonstratively apply them to Ukraine (or even one of the European countries) in order to show “seriousness of intentions”, and then put terms to the West, believing the USA and the EU, fearing a nuclear war, will make an agreement with Russia (“Caribbean Crisis 2.0″).
This “party” has been demanding such for a long time, together with corresponding statements on the topic of where our “red lines” actually lie.
Authorising strikes on Russia with Western weapons, as well as other subsequent steps to increase NATO involvement in the war, gives supporters of the Russian “war party” new arguments. Maybe they will not immediately influence the Kremlin’s decision-making, but with each new step this probability increases. Moreover, Putin and Medvedev regularly make clear the “nuclear” option is possible.
The key problem is that the war party in Russia and the war party in the West are both based on premises that may turn out to be false.
The War Party in the West believes Putin will not dare use nuclear weapons in response to NATO’s increased involvement in the war.
The war party in Russia believes that the West will not go nuclear in the event of a threat (an ultimatum or a “demonstration” nuclear strike), but that it will make an agreement with Moscow.
Neither assumption may be warranted, and there could begin a real nuclear war with catastrophic consequences for humanity. Do the two sides have enough intelligence and political will to stop the war? That is the main question.