Jack Rasmus: A Tale of Two Offensives: Endgames in the Ukraine War?

By Jack Rasmus, Website, 8/26/24

Dr. Jack Rasmus is author of The Scourge of Neoliberalism: US Economic Policy From Reagan to Trump, Clarity Press, 2020 and the forthcoming Twilight of American Imperialism, 2024, also Clarity Press. He blogs at http://jackrasmus.com, hosts the weekly radio show, Alternative Visions, and posts daily on ‘X’ at @drjackrasmus.

The Ukraine War is at a crossroads. It is entering a new phase. Military and political strategies on both sides are in flux. Both Ukraine and Russia have opened new fronts and offensives—Ukraine in the northern Kursk border region and Russia in the Kharkov and central Donbass area of Donetsk. Further new fronts are likely.

It is estimated that Russia’s total forces in Ukraine ranges today, late summer 2024, are between 600,000 (per Ukraine) and 700,000 (per Russia Ministry of Defense). Ukraine’s total available forces are around 350,000. Behind these numbers, however, both sides are mobilizing further additional forces not yet committed to the line of combat. Ukraine is hurriedly recruiting and training another 150,000 while Russia reportedly has another 400,000 in its total armed forces located elsewhere in Russia. Russia additionally plans to have an army of 1.4 million by year end which suggests additional combat reserves of perhaps 300,000 in addition to its 700,000 combat brigades now in Ukraine.

So Russia today has a roughly 2 to 1 numerical superiority in both combat troops in Ukraine as well as potential reserves. What a Russian force of 700,000 in Ukraine today—and even 1 million by year end—means is that Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO) is simply not a sufficient force to conquer all of Ukraine. Nor was it ever intended to be when Russia in February 2022 entered Ukraine with an SMO combat force of less than 100,000.

With combat forces even at 1m by year end, short of an unlikely total collapse of Ukraine’s army, the SMO is not sufficient to take Kiev or Odessa; and it’s certainly not sufficient to invade NATO as some war hawks in the west like to argue in order to justify more direct NATO involvement in the war.

By way of historical comparison, it took the Soviet Union a 13 million man army to push the Nazis out of its territory; at least a third or 4 million of which were engaged in its southern Ukrainian front alone.

While Russia has a clear, albeit not overwhelming edge, in combat forces in Ukraine today, military success is not just a function of absolute numbers but of how well forces can be concentrated at a given front to enable a numerical advantage for a time over one’s adversary. Other factors play a tactical role as well—like the element of surprise, the quantity and quality of reserves that can be marshalled at critical points and times in the conflict, the mobility of one’s forces to be quickly deployed, and the ability to deceive one’s opponent as to where, when and how much force will be concentrated.

While important, and even at times decisive, these latter factors (reserves, surprise, mobility, etc.) are nonetheless secondary; concentration of force is always the primary military tactic. And so far we have seen both Ukraine and Russia concentrate their respective forces, albeit in different fronts separated by hundreds of kilometers. The question is which front is strategically the more important.

The Key Strategic Event of 2024

The key event of the war this summer 2024 is Russia’s concentration of numerically and qualitatively superior forces in the central Donbass area. Russia has enjoyed a numerical advantage in combat forces in the Donbass as well as in air superiority and missile-artillery forces for at least the past year since the collapse of Ukraine’s summer 2023 offensive. This Russian advantage and superiority in Donbass has been further increased this summer 2024 as result of Ukraine’s withdrawal from Donbass this summer of some of its own best brigades. Ukraine sent these best brigades from the Donbass to the north Kursk border region to participate on August 6 in Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s Kursk territory. That shift of Ukraine forces left its Donbass front weakly defended. In contrast, Russia has not shifted any of its forces from Donbass to the Kursk front but has increased its forces in Donbass. This event is perhaps the single most important strategic shift in the war this summer 2024.

Which front and offensive—Ukraine’s Kursk or Russia’s Donbass—is more important for the eventual outcome of the war will likely be decided in the coming months, and definitely before year end 2024.

In the battles now underway in these two fronts—Kursk and Donbass— we may in effect be witnessing the beginning of the endgame of the war in Ukraine.

As result of Ukraine’s withdrawals of some of its best brigades from the Donbass, Russian forces are now having increasing success on that front taking village after village and driving west toward the key Ukraine strongholds of Pokrovsk in central Donbass, as well as toward Slavyansk in northern Donbass. Should Russia take Pokrovsk and Slavyansk, the war in eastern Ukraine will be effectively over—at least in those former provinces Lughansk, Donetsk, Zaporozhie and Kherson in eastern Ukraine. The line of combat will almost certainly then move quickly far to the west to the Dnipr river.

In contrast, it’s difficult to see what strategically Ukraine hopes to achieve by its penetration into Russia’s Kursk province. Will it turn the tide of the war in favor of Ukraine? That is highly unlikely given Russia’s continuing advantage in combat forces, weapons and air superiority. Which raises the question: what were Ukraine’s motives and objectives for its Kursk offensive and can it attain them?

Ukraine’s Kursk Summer Offensive

Launched on August 6, 2024 Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has had some initial success. Ukraine initially concentrated numerically superior forces at the Kursk border (as it had earlier in the summer at the Kharkov border southeast of Kursk).

In the run up to its August Kursk offensive, Ukraine publicly announced its troop concentrations opposite Kursk and north of Kharkov city were strictly defensive moves to prepare for expected Russia invasions from the north which were being rumored to be imminent throughout the spring 2024. In hindsight, however, Ukraine’s announcement that its forces at the Kharkov and Kursk borders were strictly defensive appears to have been a military deception. Ukraine’s military recently revealed that Ukraine had been preparing back in June for an offensive into Russia at Kursk.

The question then arises: what were Ukraine’s motives and objectives moving troops from the Donbass and other areas of Ukraine (also from the Belarus-Ukraine border) and concentrating them on its northern Kharkov and Kursk border? If it was not for defense against a new Russian offensive in the north but to launch an offensive of its own, what were (and are) Ukraine’s objectives?

In preparation for it Kursk offensive this August, Ukraine transferred combat brigades from all over Ukraine and concentrated them at the Kursk border in July—including many of its best brigades in Donbass as well as some of its 95,000 in defensive positions at the Kharkov border. Ukraine reportedly even moved troops from its Belarus border to Kursk, enabled apparently by an agreement with Belarus to reduce their respective forces from the Belarus-Ukraine border (an agreement that reportedly has been recently rescinded). Finally, Ukraine also rushed some of its new drafted recruits with minimal training to its Kursk region in preparation for the Kursk offensive as well.

In short, Ukraine moved up to a third of its total brigades to the Kursk region. That is probably around 150,000, perhaps half of which are actual combat brigades. A reduced force was left at Vovchansk and a seriously depleted force in the Donbass. In addition, some Ukraine brigades reportedly have returned to the Belarus border since the August offensive.

With an amassed combat force of around 70,000 Ukraine easily overwhelmed Russia’s thinly guarded Kursk border which was manned with border guards and other untested units—even though Ukraine invaded Kursk initially with 12,000 or so. Since August 6 it has brought up and concentrated at least another 60,000 or so.

This perhaps suggests Ukraine is not finished with crossing the border into Russia elsewhere along the northern border. Some analysts suggest Ukraine plans to open another offensive further northwest of Kursk in what’s called the Bryansk border region. Or alternatively just southwest of Kursk in the Belgorod border.

There is even some rumor of another offensive in the far southwest of Zaporozhie province by Ukraine, targeting the taking of the Zaporozhie nuclear power plant currently under Russian control. Where Ukraine might marshall such additional combat forces is debatable, however.

In response, Russia initially brought in special forces and marines to check Ukraine’s advance which has slowed significantly. And reportedly mechanized forces are en route to the Kursk front from other locations in Russia. The Kursk pocket has now become perhaps the most intense killing field of the war to date.
What the Kursk and other possible Ukraine offensives and fronts suggests is that Ukraine is desperate to get Russia to shift its superior and increasingly effective forces from the Donbass in order to slow Russia’s accelerating advances there. But so far it appears Russia has not done so.

Russia’s Kharkov-Vovchansk Offensive

There’s another parallel story here: Before Ukraine’s August offensive into Kursk, Russian forces in early May had entered Ukraine’s Kharkov province near the Ukrainian border city of Vovchansk located just 25miles north of Ukraine’s second largest city of Kharkov. That Russian offensive was launched with a small force of only 15-20,000 even though Russia knew Ukraine had concentrated 95,000 troops in a defensive line just south of the border. The result was predictable: the Russian offensive into Kharkov became quickly bogged down and a stalemate resulted there around the city of Vovchansk, at least until very recently.
A second parallel question therefore arises: why did Russia cross the border near Kharkov-Vovchansk with such an insufficient concentration of forces, facing off against what it knew were reportedly 95,000 Ukrainian troops dug in defensive positions? Clearly the objective could not have been to take Kharkov city. So then what was it?

Russia’s Donbass Offensive

The most important strategic military development this summer 2024 in the war is not Ukraine’s invasion at Kursk. It is that to enable its Kursk offensive Ukraine has left its Donbass front seriously weakened. So weak in fact that Russia’s offensive in the Donbass is intensifying almost daily with growing success.

There are three directions in which Russia is driving west in the Donbass. The most important is the central Donbass where Russia is virtually at the gates of the strategic hub Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk. Pokrovsk is a railway and road intersection that feeds Ukraine forces most of its weapons and supplies to central and southern Donbass. If it falls to Russia, supplies to most of its forces in central Donbass are at great risk. Equally important, west of Pokrovsk there are few lines and fortifications for Ukraine defense operations. The road is open to the Dnipr river to the far west, the next natural line of defense by Ukraine. But the Dnipr represents the loss of all of Donetsk province and its complete liberation by Russia.

Just further north of Pokrovsk lies a similarly strategic city of Slavyansk and its neighboring largest city of Kramatorsk. Slavyansk is the analog in terms of Ukraine logistical support for the northern Donbass. If it too falls so too does all of the remainder of northern Donetsk and Lughansk province. Russian advances have also begun in this region, through Siversk and Izyum.

In short, if Pokrovsk and Slavyansk fall to Russia it’s game over in the Donbass front to Ukraine. Russia advances suggest this is likely before the US November elections or soon after. The point is Ukraine’s withdrawal of some of its best forces from Donbass, to its Kursk front, as no doubt accelerated Russia’s gains now underway in the Donbass. And if Donbass falls, Ukraine has no choice but to exit its positions further south at the Zaporozhie border as well, or else be encircled there.

The events in recent months in Donbass thus raises yet a third strategic question: Has Ukraine effectively decided to sacrifice the Donbass in order to launch its Kursk offensive?

Military analysts on both sides seem uncertain as to why Ukraine and Russia have made the decisions they have at this critical juncture of the war in summer 2024—Russia last May in Kharkov, Ukraine this summer in Donbass and today Kursk, and Russia’s decision to hold firm to its offensive in Donbass.

So what are some of the possible explanations being bandied about by analysts trying to explain these objectives of these two offensives—Ukraine in Kursk and Russia in Kharkov-Donbass?

Some Unanswered Strategic Questions:

Let’s summarize these strategic questions and offer some possible answers.

Question 1. Why Did Ukraine Invade Kursk, what are its possible objectives, and can it attain those objectives:

Military analysts are all over the map with speculation as to why Ukraine invaded Kursk. Some say the objective was seize the Russian nuclear power plant located just south of the city of Kursk and less than 100 miles from the border. By seizing the plant Ukraine would then use it as a blackmail piece in negotiations with Russia.

Another objective raised is that Ukraine intends to use the territory captured as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Russia, which it appears several third party countries have been trying to arrange—albeit thus far without success.

In terms of military tactics, still another speculation goes, the Ukrainian invasion was intended to force Russia to transfer brigades from its Donbass front to Kursk, and thereby slow down Russia’s advances in the Donbass that appear to be accelerating.

Yet another speculation is Ukraine intended to create a buffer zone along the border before Russia launched its own offensive into Ukraine in the region. That suggests the Ukrainian invasion was to pre-empt Russia opening an offensive front of its own along the northern border.

Another view is that the true objective of Ukraine’s offensive has been to make Putin appear weak to Russian elites and public who are now demanding a more aggressive Russian response to the invasion. The Kursk offensive, according to this view, is to provoke Russia to a more extreme aggressive response that would enable Zelensky to receive more lethal military aid from NATO—like UK Storm Shadow and US ATACMS missiles and missile carrying F-16s—and NATO permission to use them to attack deep inside Russia.

It is possible that a little of all the above are motivations for Ukraine’s offensive: So far as seizing the Kursk nuclear plant is concerned, if that were the objective it has been neutralized and Ukraine has virtually no chance of reaching the Kursk plant any longer now that massive Russian defenses now block its path.

The explanation that the Kursk offensive’s objective is to force Russia to move military units from Donbass to Kursk has also apparently failed to date. Russia has sufficient reserves elsewhere in Russia proper and is moving those to the Kursk front.

The speculation that Zelensky authorized the Kursk offensive as a ‘land for land’ bargaining chip in future negotiations is also negated by recent events since August 6: Putin has publicly stated there will be no negotiations with Ukraine so long as its forces remain on Russian territory, whether in Kursk or Donbass.

The idea of Ukraine obtaining a buffer has never been convincing. Why would Ukraine deplete its military resources elsewhere and risk losing more territory (Donbass) in order to protect territory (North Border) it hadn’t even lost yet?

It seems therefore that the most likely objective of the Ukraine Kursk offensive was, and remains, political: to provoke Russia into an extreme response in order for Ukraine to restore fading western support for Ukraine to continue the war. Zelensky needs Russia to escalate to remain in power in Ukraine. Throughout NATO, support is waning for providing military arms and ammunition. The west further believes that funding Ukraine’s war and economy is settled, provided by the seized $300 billion of Russian assets. However, Western Media almost daily has become increasingly critical of the war, recognizing it cannot be won. Zelensky thus needs to show Ukraine still has the ability to fight and NATO needs to provide even more weaponry because Russia is escalating the war!

Zelensky realizes he needs more direct NATO troop involvement—not just weaponry. Currently NATO is participating in ground operations with technicians operating advanced NATO weapons, mercenaries, as well as senior NATO officers and war planners on the ground. It will need even more. It can’t impress NATO to provide more by losses in the Donbass. But it might convince NATO war hawks to do so by offensives into Russia like Kursk.

2. Has Ukraine effectively decided to sacrifice Donbass?

Evidence on the ground strongly suggests Ukraine may have decided to sacrifice territory in the Donbass and perhaps the entire region altogether. Its Donbass defense was beginning to crack well before the Kursk offensive, ever since loss of the strategic Donbass city of Avdeyevka earlier this year. Now losses there are accelerating after Ukraine pulled some of its best brigades from Donbass and moved them to Kursk.

For Ukraine, the northern Kursk front is strategically more important than Donbass. Its bargaining position in eventual future negotiations with Russia and western support in general was weakening so long as it was losing Donbass. Seizing Russian territory in the north might shore up that loss of support and strengthen its position. In short, protecting Kharkov city and Ukraine territory outside Russia’s four provinces in the east is strategically more important to Ukraine than holding on to the Donbass. Ukraine can’t hold onto the Donbass in the end and NATO and Ukraine both know it. Opinion in the west increasingly suggests Ukraine should agree to give up Donbass and the four provinces. But Ukraine cannot simply retreat in the Donbass and give it up without appearing weak or is about to lose the war. That would accelerate NATO withdrawal of support. Zelensky therefore needed another success elsewhere if Ukraine was inevitably about to lose Donbass. Thus the Kursk offensive.

3. Why did Russia invade Kharkov region with an insufficient force?

Russia crossed over the border early last May in the Kharkov region but not to capture the large Ukraine city of Kharkov. That would take perhaps a Russian offensive force of at least half a million. Russia obviously knew, moreover, that a large Ukrainian force of up to 95,000 per reports was concentrated between the border and Kharkov city itself barely 50 miles away to the south.

So why then did Russian open that front with only 15-20,000 troops? The only possible explanation is Russia entered Kharkov with an insufficient force to get Ukraine to withdraw forces from the Donbass to protect Kharkov, which it did. Otherwise the explanation for throwing a force of 15,000 at 90,000 was military folly. And there’s no evidence throughout the war Russia has been militarily foolish in its offensive force deployments.

4. Did Russia get caught by surprise by the Kursk invasion?

It has to be admitted Russia was clearly caught off guard by Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. It might have been misled by Ukraine’s deception that its amassing of forces on the Ukraine side of the Kursk border in the summer was strictly defensive, designed to confront Russia should it have itself invaded at that location. It is also possible Russia may have viewed US/NATO limitations to date on Ukraine’s use of ATACMS and cruise missiles to attack deep inside Russia as evidence Ukraine was not allowed by NATO/US to escalate attacks directly into Russia. Before August 6 Ukraine’s attacking inside Russia was limited to Ukrainian drones.

Russia may have interpreted these NATO limits meant Ukraine would not be given the ‘green light’ to cross the Russian border with large ground forces. This—combined with Russia misreading Ukraine’s concentration of forces on its side of the border as only defensive—may have led Russia to erroneously assume Ukraine would not mount an offensive into Kursk.

5. Are we witnessing the growing importance of reserves in the war?

As the war now has passed its two and a half year mark, it is clearly beginning to wear on both sides in terms of men and materiel. The availability of sufficient reserves is therefore beginning to play a relatively more important role as the war has continued. Not just reserves in the sense of the number of available combat troops but their combat experience, training, and availability of weapons and ammunition are becoming an increasingly critical factor in the conduct of the war. This is often the case in war as the conflict becomes protracted, except when one side has an overwhelming force advantage of the other. That may have been the case in US wars in Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia, Panama, and elsewhere. But it wasn’t in Viet Nam and it isn’t in Ukraine. Here Russia’s longer term advantage in reserves has begun to show.

It is true Russia in refusing to move reserves from Donbass has had to commit reserves from elsewhere in Russia but it has such reserves. Ukraine does not. The Kursk offensive shows Ukraine has probably committed most of its remaining reserves to that front. And it had to move brigades from Belarus, Kharkov and Donbass for the Kursk offensive—and to cut short training of new drafted recruits. Ukraine is approaching the end of its human reserves and cannot get an increase in weapons and ammunition from NATO that it requires if the war intensifies, as it is now, in both Kursk and Donbass. NATO has arrange continued funding for Ukraine throughout 2025 by seizing Russia’s $300B assets in G7 banks that were frozen at the outset of the war.

NATO’s provision of weapons is slowing, moreover, as NATO inventories are drying up; it can no longer accelerate the delivery of weapons to Ukraine as it did in 2022-23. Nor politically does NATO have the will to provide soldiers on the ground directly into Ukraine, although it is building the largest military and air base in NATO now in eastern Romania within tens of miles from Odessa where it already has stationed thousands of French and US airborne troops. If NATO does intervene ever on the ground it will mostly like be to prevent Russia seizure of the critical Ukraine seaport of Odessa, without which even a rump state of Ukraine in the west cannot be sustained.

6. What are Russia’s strategic options with regard to the Kursk invasion? Its Donbass Offensive?

Russian strategy will not change much in the Donbass. It will continue to advance, likely even more rapidly. Ukraine’s forces in Donbass may even collapse there before year end, with Ukraine retreating west to the Dnipr river and thus abandoning any hold on territory that comprises Russia’s four provinces. As for the Kursk front, Russia will most likely seal off the currently occupying Ukrainian force, bring up new Russian armored division, artillery and air forces and continue to batter those Ukrainian forces in the pocket until they weaken and retreat of their own accord. That will likely happen soon after the US November elections. Ukraine will try to hold on to Kursk to try to ensure further US support before Biden leaves office next January. The odds are significant, however, it will not be able to succeed in that.

Political Consequences of the Kursk-Donbass Offensives

Public opinion in Russia has strengthened Putin’s hand in the war as a consequence of the two offensives. His problem now is not ensuring Russian public opinion continues to support his government and the SMO but that growing segments of Russian opinion and Russian media are now demanding he take even more aggressive military action in response to the Kursk invasion.

Putin’s challenge now is to not fall for Ukraine’s Kursk provocation, abandon the SMO and escalate the conflict to an even more intensive and wider war that would require a much larger military force than the SMO and falling into the NATO war hawks trap to use a Russian escalation as an excuse to get NATO even more directly involved on the ground in the war than it already is.

Zelensky clearly wants to maneuver events into that direction—i.e. a more direct Russia-NATO conflict. That’s perhaps the major rationale behind the Kursk offensive. But Putin ultimately wants some kind of negotiated settlement, albeit on Russia’s two terms announced earlier this summer. He will therefore likely wait until the outcome of US elections to determine whether abandoning the SMO for a larger conflict is necessary. Zelensky and Ukraine leadership is desperate and reckless; Putin is calculating and typically factors in the bigger political picture.

For the moment, however, Putin’s conditions for beginning negotiations announced a couple months ago—i.e. Ukraine leave the four provinces and agree to neutrality—is off the table.

Scuttling the possibility of negotiations (that China was trying to arrange last July) may have also been part of the objective of Ukraine’s Kursk offensive. Ukraine and Zelensky have a long track record of feigning interest in negotiations as a cover for an escalation planned. Ukraine diplomatic maneuvers in Beijing in July and in Qatar in August are evidence Ukraine has no intention of seriously negotiating anything. Quite the contrary. Although nothing is imminent, US and Russia may continue exploring the possibility of negotiations through back channels, as they have in recent months, but it’s clear there will be no negotiations of any kind until after the US elections at earliest and more likely not until the Biden administration ends next January 20, 2025.

Throughout the summer opinion has been growing among NATO elites and western media that Ukraine cannot hold onto the Donbass or even the four provinces annexed in 2022 by Russia. Russia’s continuing successes in the Donbass offensive further confirm that view, and solidify it should Russia take Pokrovsk next month. Conversely, NATO elite opinion may shift further toward allowing Ukraine to attack inside Russia using ATACMS, cruise missiles, and even F-16s to enable Ukraine to hold onto the Kursk territory as Ukraine losses the Donbass. The test of this NATO elites’ shift will be evident should US allow in coming weeks further shipments of UK storm shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine. Losing the Donbass logically means rolling the military dice even further in Kursk and the northern border.

US neocons and war hawks will attempt to create further escalation in the Ukraine war between now and January 2025 in order to make it extremely difficult for any new US president elected in November to reduce US/NATO commitments to Ukraine, let alone withdraw.

Should Harris win in November, the Biden administration policies toward the war will almost certainly continue. Harris will be malleable to the foreign policy/neocon establishment who have been running US foreign policy and wars since at least 2001 and perhaps even earlier since the late 1990s. Should Trump win—and the Deep State allow him to actually take office in January without a major US constitutional crisis (which is more likely than not)—it is unlikely that Trump will be able to end the Ukraine war in the short run after taking office January 20. Even with Trump in office, the war will therefore continue well into 2025. The only factor that may expedite an earlier end to the war is if Russia debilitates Ukraine military resources to such an extent that those forces effectively collapse in both the Donbass and Kursk fronts.

Russia has never intended to ‘conquer’ all of Ukraine, including Kiev. Putin’s SMO has always been to drive Ukrainian forces out of the Russian speaking provinces and then ensure some kind of neutrality by what’s left of a Ukrainian state.

But before that can happen Russia will need to conclusively drive Ukraine back across the border from Kursk and take the strategic Donbass cities of Pokrovsk and Slavyansk. Only then is Endgame apparent. Only then will Ukraine forces retreat back to whatever remains of Ukraine. Only then will US/NATO decide to cut losses and abandon the ‘Ukraine Project’ altogether.

Ken Klippenstein: Pentagon’s “sensitive activities” detachment revealed

By Ken Klippenstein, Website, 8/19/24

As the Ukraine war enters its most perilous phase, with Kiev’s forces fighting inside Russia, the United States is operating a formal “sensitive activities” detachment that is active in providing direct military support to the beleaguered country. The detachment, never before disclosed, is run by U.S. special operations forces, and with its Ukrainian counterparts, provides on-the-battlefield support, including near-real time targeting intelligence, operators say.

Since Russia’s invasion in February 2022, the Biden administration has issued firm reassurances that there are no U.S. boots on the ground in Ukraine. The statement has always been misleading because “boots” only refers to conventional forces and excludes CIA and military special operations personnel, which are considered unconventional and even covert.

The U.S. military defines1 sensitive activities as:

“Operations, actions, activities, or programs that are generally handled through special access, compartmented, or other sensitive control mechanisms because of the nature of the target, the area of operation, or other designated aspects. Sensitive activities also include operations, actions, activities, or programs conducted by any DOD Component that, if compromised, could have enduring adverse effects on U.S. foreign policy, DOD activities, or military operations; or cause significant embarrassment to the United States, its allies, or the DoD.”

Something that is “sensitive” is defined2 as:

“Requiring special protection from disclosure that could cause embarrassment, compromise, or threat to the security of the sponsoring power. May be applied to an agency, installation, person, position, document, material, or activity.”

The Government Accountability Office further clarifies that sensitive activities demand extraordinary secrecy and are “excluded from normal staff review and oversight because of restrictions on access to information.”

Given the Biden administration’s pledges not to be involved in the fighting against Russia, it’s not hard to see why public knowledge of special operators directly supporting the war might be embarrassing. Also, U.S. military aid packages for Ukraine have become an increasingly contentious issue, particularly among Republicans in Congress who have sought to block such aid. But is this a legitimate reason for secrecy? To prevent the American public from knowing something, especially at such a time when the war could even further escalate? 

An operator formerly deployed to the Army’s 10th Special Forces Group assigned to a sensitive activities detachment told me their work included the creation of clandestine human networks for intelligence gathering, as well as identifying Russian military weaknesses for targeting. Part of the sensitive activities detachment, the operator was tasked with providing near-real time intelligence in support of Task Force Raven, which trains Ukrainian military personnel, predominantly in Poland.

A second operator also described having been tasked with providing near up-to-the-minute intelligence support to Ukrainian forces. Formerly deployed to a coalition planning cell in Germany, the operator worked with 20 partner nations, generating intelligence on vulnerabilities in Russian electronic warfare systems and air defenses.

To what extent is the “sensitive activities” detachment working on the ground in Ukraine? And how are U.S. green berets and other special operators providing support for Ukraine’s foray into Russia? These are questions that demand answers. Those answers would enhance U.S. foreign policy rather than undermine it, by better informing debate on the matter. At a time when the Pentagon is decrying adversary operations in the so-called “gray zone” — the murky continuum between peace and all-out war — shrouding their own such activities in unnecessary secrecy destabilizes more than stabilizes a very shaky world.

— Edited by William M. Arkin

Gilbert Doctorow: Pressure from Russians on Vladimir Putin to escalate?

By Gilbert Doctorow, Website, 8/24/24

In my latest chat with Judge Andrew Napolitano on his program Judging Freedom this past Thursday, I made an off-the-cuff answer to his question about whether Russian society is pressuring Vladimir Putin to be more cruel, more dramatic, more effective in responding to provocations engineered by the West, the most recent example of which is the invasion of the RF province of Kursk by Ukrainian forces.

The show has come and gone but while I was perusing the last, 18 August show of Sunday evening with Vladimir Solovyov before the host went off on summer vacation, I heard a very authoritative answer to Judge Napolitano’s question from, shall we say, “the horse’s mouth.”

https://smotrim.ru/video/2851978

Solovyov is at the apex of Russian journalism and has close ties to the Kremlin. Over time, he has conducted several lengthy interviews with President Putin. Therefore what he said on air in his characterization of Putin’s decision making processes in times of crisis, like in the aftermath of the Ukrainian incursion/invasion of the Kursk province, may be taken to be very well informed.

Said Solovyov: “Our Commander in Chief does not submit to either outside pressure or to his own emotions.” Solovyov insists that Putin’s decisions are made in an absolutely rational way. One might say in an autocratic manner, if we use the original meaning of that word to be self-reliant and independent.

Political talk shows generally do not age well, given that the assumptions of the day rest on ever changing circumstances. However, to my surprise, I found the 18 August edition of Sunday Evening with Vladimir Solovyov to be very useful for coming to terms with a number of other issues surrounding the invasion of Kursk and the Russian response that have developed in the six days since it was aired..

I will set these observations out first and then move on to discuss briefly how and why the Solovyov show differs from the other authoritative state television talk show, The Great Game, which I have used these past several weeks as my principal source of information about Russia’s chattering classes, who are concentrated in the capital and form whatever forces of domestic political pressure may be said to exist with respect to Kremlin policy.

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One of the most valuable insights that I found in the typically long introductory remarks of host Vladimir Solovyov before he turned the microphone over to his guests was a direct answer to the question that several interviewers have posed to me in the past week: namely what were the objectives of the Ukrainian raid into, later invasion of the Kursk province.

I have answered this question by saying that the accounts of Kiev’s objectives have been constantly changing if you take President Zelensky’s words as having any substance to them. We have heard most recently that they wanted to capture some RF territory that might be used to compel the Russians to give back some of the Ukrainian land they have occupied since the start of the Special Military Operation. Thus, the aim is said to have been to prepare for peace talks on a ‘fair basis.’

However, Solovyov presented a different story, one which he surely received from senior officials in the Russian military with whom he is in close contact. He said that the main objective of the invaders had been to capture the nuclear power plant in Kursk, situated perhaps 70 km in from the border.

If the Ukrainians had succeeded on that mission, they would indeed have improved their overall chances of bringing the Russians to the peace table on more favorable terms to themselves. And this logic of their mission is confirmed by the large concentration of the most modern NATO tanks (British Challenger 2) and other heavy equipment appropriate to an irresistible cut through Russian defenses to their target. That equipment was certainly not brought together for the sake of taking and holding the thinly populated farm country which is the predominant character of the 1,000 square kilometers along the Kursk-Ukraine border that the Kiev forces have occupied since the first days of the incursion.

Indeed, the Russians, who were taken by surprise, did scramble to bring to bear their overwhelming air domination and artillery plus drone forces to stop the Ukrainians in their tracks before they got more than 15 km or so inland in Kursk from the international border. They have, by all accounts, utterly destroyed all of the NATO equipment used by the invaders, so that the survivors, i.e., the 7,000 from the initial 12,000 who are still breathing, are scattered in small groups operating on foot and awaiting their extermination or opportunity to surrender, which are sure to come in the days ahead. Their escape routes west, across the border, have been sealed by the Russians.

 By evacuating all the civilian population, Russia made the entire territory of the Ukrainian occupation a free fire zone, thus depriving Kiev’s forces of shelter in residential houses that they enjoy in the territory upon which the Russians are advancing along the main line of confrontation in Donetsk.

Like Napoleon’s forces which took Moscow in 1812, the Ukrainians in Kursk have degenerated from elite brigades into armed marauders breaking into houses to steal and machine-gunning any civilians who were foolish enough not to heed Moscow’s evacuation orders. We know that from the testimony of some evacuees before Russian television war reporters. Of course, not everyone got out in time, and we heard today about a heavily pregnant Russian woman who was wantonly murdered in the hospital where she lived by the invaders.

We are told by Russian military spokesmen that the toll on the Ukrainian forces in Kursk this past week has been around 2,000. That is a high proportion of the contingent fighting in Kursk. But it is a small part of overall Ukrainian losses on the battlefield in the past 7 days, which these same Russian spokesmen put at 16,000.  Sixteen thousand! This very high number results directly from losses on the main line of confrontation, in Donetsk, and particularly around the city of Pokrovsk, losses which rose precisely because the most capable Ukrainian defenders there were shipped out to Kursk and their places were taken by new conscripts, many of whom were dragooned off the streets of Kiev and elsewhere and given very little training before they were handed their rifles and delivered to the front.

Finally, a word must be addressed to the fate of the surviving foreign troops now engaged in Kursk should they be taken alive by the Russians. As some of my colleagues have said on air in latest interviews, these ‘mercenaries’ will not be dealt with in the same manner as any Ukrainian POWs. They will not be exchanged for Russian soldiers held by the Ukrainians. By international law they do not enjoy the same protection as regular troops. Some of my peers have said these mercenaries will be executed by the Russians. At this moment, that is not true. Russia still has an official moratorium on the death penalty. However, there is currently discussion in the Duma of a bill which would remove the protection of this moratorium from captured foreign fighters.

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There are important differences between the talk shows hosted by Russia’s top journalist Vladimir Solovyov and the talk show hosted by Duma member Vyacheslav Nikonov (The Great Game).

I have not listened to Solovyov for a while because he is an aggressive nationalist, because he takes too much pleasure speaking ersatz German as if every German politician is a practitioner of Hitler’s histrionics, because he is often a bully with his panelists, using some as punching bags, and because he interrupts them, takes them off subject all too often.

However, in his favor, some of his guests are to be seen only on his show. I have in mind chairmen and deputy chairs of key Duma committees such as Finance, Taxation and Defense. He also presents Duma members from the Communist Party, from the Liberal Democrats, and independents, which is a great service to those of us who are interested in the role given to the Duma ‘fractions’ outside of the governing United Russia party. And he has very highly regarded military men, retired colonels who are also prominent in the Duma. In this last category, I would name Andrei Gurulyov, whose views I have occasionally quoted on these pages.

By contrast, Nikonov is very much the gentlemen. He never interrupts his guests. He never puts forward extravagant views or reads lectures to his audience. This is not to say that he does not deliver to his audience clearly articulated views on key subjects of the day, often in a drole manner. I think, for example, of his remarks following presentation on screen of the latest antics at the Democratic National Convention. He pointed out at some length the procedures by which Kamela Harris was anointed as the party’s candidate without ever having won a primary or won a single delegate for that matter. He did not shrink from saying this was a flagrant violation of all principles of democracy. He put up on screen some of the points in her radical economic program such as measures against price gouging. And he concluded that the Kremlin definitely favors Kamala Harris in the election because she and her policies will continue and accelerate America’s precipitate decline as a world economic and military power.

The panelists on The Great Game tend to be think tank senior personnel, pundits and representatives of civil society NGOs, not politicians. That being said, many of the think tank spokesmen and academics are exactly the same people who appear regularly on Vladimir Solovyov’s shows. That conforms to the tradition of Russian political talk shows that I witnessed back in 2016 when I was an invited guest on several of them. There were always these ‘experts’ who seemed to spend their entire days going from one television studio to another to take part in the discussions of current events.

Andy Corbley: Russia’s Parliamentary Left Calls for Assassination of Zelensky and His Cabinet

By Andy Corbey, Antiwar.com, 8/15/24

In a statement from Sergey Mironov, the leader of the Just Russia – For Truth Party, representing the socialist left in the Russian state Duma or parliament, the veteran politician said that in response to strikes on the Zaporozhskaya Nuclear Power Plant, “it is necessary to eliminate with pinpoint strikes the terrorist leaders in Kiev”.

“The attacks on the Zaporozhskaya NPP should be regarded as an attempt to use weapons of mass destruction against Russia,” Mironov said, arguing this gives the Federation every right to return fire with nuclear weapons. “If the Kiev regime and its masters continue nuclear escalation, then this can be regarded as the use or readiness to use weapons of mass destruction against Russia”.

He concluded his statement by noting it’s not necessary to use nuclear bombs, but rather simply to assassinate those responsible for escalating to the brink of their use.

The statement captures the pressure that Vladimir Putin is under from multiple sides of his government to “take the gloves off,” to use Western parlance, and move to total war.

Especially when considering the rhetoric surrounding it, the war in Ukraine even at this late stage has been remarkably limited in its scope. Historically speaking, this is indisputable.

Certain massacres, such as the case in the village of Bucha, the use of cluster munitions by both sides, and a steady stream of errant bombs and missile strikes all over urban Ukraine, certainly have occurred, and often constitute war crimes according to the Geneva Conventions.

Yet compared to nearly all other armed conflicts across the 21st century, in terms of various markers such as the destruction on a societal level, the number of civilian casualties, and the frequency with which civilian infrastructure like water treatment facilities and hospitals are struck, the conflict has gone on as close to the letter of international law as has happened practically since the creation of the concept.

Russian forces have refrained from strategic bombing of the large Ukrainian cities of Kyiv, L’viv, Kharkiv, and Kherson, such as what was carried out against the Germans, British, and Japanese in the Second World War. Missile strikes targeting communications or power infrastructure are common, but indiscriminate bombing, such as what was seen in Iraq when the US launched over 100,000 piloted airstrikes on Baghdad, has not occurred.

For example, rail transport has been vital not only to allow refugees to flee embattled cities in eastern Ukraine, but to transport Western military equipment into the country, yet there have been less than ten instances of major attacks on railway infrastructure since the conflict began, and less than ten targeting trains carrying civilians; one was located in Russia.

Furthermore, certain areas of the Ukrainian economy, even excluding military-related sectors, are growing, such as the publishing industry. Ukraine’s largest bookstore chains have opened up dozens of new locations, with plans to open over dozens more by the end of 2024.

In the Historic Center of Lviv, a UNESCO World Heritage Site that is considered in danger because of the conflict, bombing has caused the deaths of around 21 civilians in the entire county in which the city is located. Contrast that to US/Saudi bombing of the Historic Center of Sanaa, Yemen, another UNESCO World Heritage Site considered in danger, where 1,685 civilians were killed in the city itself, and dozens of buildings that make up the UNESCO designation were hit in the first five years of war.

Assassination or the organized hunting and killing of enemy political leaders during conflicts in the 21st century has occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and most recently over Gaza, but not Ukraine. The fact that the political opposition to Putin is calling for it suggests, at least partially, that as evil as Putin is portrayed in American media, his grip on Russia may be, at least in part, to suffocate much more reckless and dangerous forces.

Andrew Corbley is founder and editor of World at Large, an independent news outlet. He is a loyal listener of Antiwar radio and of the Scott Horton Show. Reprinted with permission from World at Large.