By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 9/22/24

I havent seen anything very substantial since my morning post on “Ukrainian” attacks on Russian ammunition depots, other than Dima’s midday report (California time of Sunday, September 22). There may now have been four such attacks in recent days. While the sites were big, and the damage apparently extensive, there are thousands of ammunition depots throughout Russia.

Dima continues to confirm that these attacks have involved cruise missiles which, if true, of course implicates NATO, providing evidence of direct NATO involvement. Since there has been no official Washington permission for this, it is hardly surprising that Washington is not saying anything, and I suspect that Russia at this time is too embarrassed or uncertain as to how it wants to proceed to make any formal pronouncement either. Dima implies that Russia is waiting for Washington to “officially” give the green light for the use of such weapons before Russia responds, but I think this is absurd unless Russia simply wants an excuse not to have to respond to this escalation right away.

Of course it is still theoretically possible that Ukraine has all of a sudden come up with some miracle drone that does as much damage as a cruise missile, just at the very same moment as Washington has appeared to go quiet on the subject of allowing the use of Western long-range missiles on targets deep in Russia.

Perhaps things will be clearer once Zelenskiy arrives in New York, which I believe he will have done by tomorrow, September 23.

Of course, attacks on Russian ammo depots is not a new phenemonon in this war. They have been ongoing. What is surprising right now is the size of the depots involved, their long distance from the front lines, and the scale of the damage that they have inflicted. Up until now attacks on ammo depots have seemed of relatively slighmt significance, and it was not unreasonable to attribute the damage that was caused to drones, except for some attacks by cruise missiles on depots in Crimea. Up until now use of Western long-range missiles on targets in Crimea has been considered “permissible,” given that for the West and for Ukraine, Crimea has been considered Ukrainian territory illegally seized by Russia in 2014 but which Russia says asked to join the Russian Federation for protection against the illegal, anti-Russian Kiev regime that came to power following the US-instigated, violent and unrepresentative coup that year in Kiev.

Dima also appears to be the only source I have seen today who is reporting the failure of a Russian test of its R5-28 “Sarmat” nuclear-capable missile, following the recent Russian confirmation that it was re-initiating such tests. The rocket exploded in or before take-off from a mine, destroying the test site, leaving a huge crater. The most recent comparable test took place on April 20, 2022. There have been four failed tests of the Sarmat to date, at least, according to Dima, and one success.

The Sarmat is nuclear capable, but can also carry Avantgard warheads. These are not nuclear but their explosive force is equivalent to 18 tons of TNT. By comparison, the hypersonic Kinzhal missile, when it is not fitted with a nuclear warhead, can carry a non-nuclear warhead with the impact equivalent to just one ton of TNT. That, at least, is as much as I could understand of Dima’s report today.

Dima suggests that Russia’s response to Western use of long-range missiles on Russian targets will take the form of the use of Avantgards but he does not explain how Russia intends to do this if Avantgards can only be deployed from Sarmat launchers that have only a one in five success rate. Once again, I shall be looking out for more reliable data on this matter.

In Kursk, which is of considerable importance to Western and Ukrainian narratives of the war’s progress, Russia continues to push back on previous Ukrainian successes south east of Snagost, and some of the fiercest clashes are in the forested areas close to Lyubimovka (recently recovered by Russia, according to some reports) and Tolstyi Lug. Further to the east, there are still fierce clashes in the highly contested area of Martynovka. Ukraine’s cross-border raid on Veseloye, well to the west, appears to have been repelled, but there are continuing clashes to the north near Glushkovo.

Otherwise, Dima’s most recent reports are of Russian advances in Zapporizhzhia in the territory north of the Russian-held settlements of Preschystivka and Pavlivka, from which Russian forces have been establishing a semi-encirclement of Vuhledar, while to the east Russian forces are moving from their recent acquisition of Vodiane towards Bohoiavlenka to the northwest, completing another part of the circle around Vuhledar. Bohoiavlenka would be the natural destination, otherwise, of Ukrainian forces abandoning Vuhledar.

Further north, west of Marinka and Krasnohorivka – both now under Russian control – Russian forces are moving from Hostre towards Ostrivske and the Kurakhove reservoir. They will soon likely take Maksymilianivka on this route. Moving up towards Pokrovsk, Russia is recovering positions in the south and southeast of Selydove, and appear to have taken the coalmine and Ukrainian stronghold in that area. Russia has control over most of Novohrodivka, as well as over Mykolaivka and Krasnyi Yar to the north. Further north still, Russian forces are moving from Niu-York, which they have recently taken, towards Leonidivka, and they control 70% of the Toretsk agglomeration.

Russia continues to consolidate control over all territory east of the Kanal, north and south of Chasiv Yar. Otherwise, the main recent developments have been in Kupyansk where Russian forces gradually edge towards to the Oskil river in a number of different locations, with a view to dividing up the oblast into three sections.