By Fred Weir, Christian Science Monitor, 8/23/24

Russian foreign policy experts express zero enthusiasm for another Donald Trump presidency, should he win the upcoming election. There’s a simple reason why.

They’ve already experienced one term of Mr. Trump in the White House, and it was the worst four years of their lives.

“Even if we assume that Trump genuinely wanted to improve relations with Moscow when he came in the first time, what he achieved was the exact opposite,” says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a Moscow-based foreign policy journal. “There was chaos in Washington. There was a storm around Trump that affected anything to do with Russia, and it destroyed even the most modest efforts to start a dialogue.”

Russians remain fascinated with U.S. politics. The official media has covered each dramatic turn of the 2024 presidential race over the past couple of months with a mixture of excitement, bafflement, and dark schadenfreude. But gone is any expectation that the winner is likely even to slow the relentless downward spiral of U.S.-Russia relations, much less find the new level of mutual understanding, perhaps a U.S.-Russia compact, that they once hoped for.

Most Russian analysts seem to view Kamala Harris as a continuation of the Joe Biden administration, which has solidly backed Ukraine and hit Russia with the most intense blizzard of sanctions in history. As for Mr. Trump, even his pledge to end the Ukraine war “in 24 hours” is seen as empty verbiage at best or, more likely, a cynical effort to tap into the war-weariness of the U.S. electorate.

“The Russian media coverage of the upcoming U.S. elections seems rather objective to me,” says Lev Lurye, a St. Petersburg-based historian. “The general idea is that either Trump or any candidate from the Democratic Party will be equally bad for Russia.”

Frustration with Trump’s leadership

When it was announced that Mr. Trump had defeated Hillary Clinton back in November 2016 to become president, the entire State Duma – Russia’s lower house of parliament – rose to their feet and delivered a noisy, sustained standing ovation.

Such were the hopes aroused, not only among officials but ordinary Russians as well, by Mr. Trump’s expressions of admiration for Russian President Vladimir Putin and promises during his first presidential campaign that he would find ways to “get along with Russia.”

But they quickly were dashed once he entered office.

Many Russians were bemused by the #Russiagate scandal, which saw Mr. Trump mired in accusations that he had colluded with the Kremlin in unsavory ways for years, that he was profiting from lucrative business deals in Moscow, and that Russian internet trolls had helped to secure his election by manipulating social media in the U.S. Most of those accusations turned out to be false or greatly exaggerated, but at the time they dogged any conversation about Mr. Trump’s Russia policy and seemed to make any progress impossible.

It all came to a head at the July 2018 Helsinki summit, where Mr. Putin tried to press Russia’s agenda on issues like the war in Syria and nuclear arms control. But the summit was quickly overshadowed by Mr. Trump’s unusually deferential stance toward the Russian leader, which triggered a strong critical response among U.S. media and officials.

“The main thing that struck me, watching that show in Helsinki, was the total mismatch between the substantive issues that two leaders were supposed to be discussing, and the utter lack of interest in any of those things that was displayed at the press conference,” says Mr. Lukyanov. “Nobody wanted to hear anything about the actual agenda. They were only interested in some supposed secret relationship between Trump and Putin.”

“We thought that Trump was different”

The widespread view in Moscow now seems to be that U.S. hostility to Russia is hardwired, and unlikely to change regardless of whoever becomes president.

“Much of the Russian political elite thinks that the U.S. deep state is in charge, directing events, and no political actors can change anything,” says Alexei Mukhin, director of the independent Center for Political Information, a Moscow think tank. “We thought that Trump was different, but now it looks like he’s just another agent of the deep state.”

But some watch the electoral turbulence, the deep polarization, and the somewhat disorderly changes at the top with a bit of satisfaction. The way the former Soviet Union tried to reform itself with a younger leader, and then collapsed, is a staple analogy in Russian news commentaries.

Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin adviser, says Russia is less interested in U.S. political developments and more concerned about the shifting global order, in which Russians perceive the U.S. steadily losing ground. New faces such as Ms. Harris aren’t likely to reverse the underlying dynamics of decay, he argues.

“All that’s happening in the U.S. is just what we’ve been saying for some time,” he says.

“Some Russians are enjoying the spectacle of chaos in American politics, because they think that the more disruption in the U.S., the better things will be for us,” says Mr. Markov. “I think we should be careful what we wish for. This is a very dangerous time, and there is a possibility that expanding crises can lead to a real world war. That would be catastrophic.”

Russia Matters, 8/30/24

Pavel Durov, the Russian-born entrepreneur who founded the online communications tool Telegram, has been charged in France with a wide range of crimes for failing to prevent illicit activity on the app, and barred from leaving the country, NYT reported. French law-enforcement procedures with regard to Durov sent alarms ringing in Russia’s pro-war establishment as Telegram is widely used by the Russian military for battlefield communication, according to Politico. “They practically detained the head of communication of the Russian army,” Politico quoted Russian military blogger channel Povernutie na Z Voine as writing about Durov’s 4-day detention in Paris. A number of top Russian officials have decried Durov’s detention, and Russia’s opposition outlet Important Stories reported that the Telegram founder has visited Russia more than 50 times since ‘expulsion’ from Russia in 2014. If accurately reported, Durov’s frequent visits to Russia could not have occurred without the tacit approval of the Russian authorities.*

***

Read Craig Murray’s article, Pavel Durov and the Abuse of Law, at Consortium News here.

Read Andrew Korybko’s article, Pavel Durov’s Naivete Was His Achilles’ Heel, here.

RT, 8/24/24

Nearly 73% of Russians agreed it is necessary to be cautious in interactions with fellow citizens, the latest survey conducted by the long-established Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) has found.

Only about a quarter of respondents (24%) are ready to trust most people, as the remaining 3% are undecided, the poll indicated.

People in Russia, however, seem no less confident in each other than they were six years ago, the researchers noted; in 2018, a similar poll suggested that 74% of respondents demonstrated caution when engaging with others.

Trust in others directly depends on financial stability; the latest poll indicates that confidence was lowest among people with lower incomes. Respondents who assess their family’s financial situation as “very good” and “good” demonstrated a tendency to trust people more often (30%) than those who think that their finances are “bad” or “very bad” (15%).

Men tend to exhibit less trusting behavior toward others than women in social exchanges. Some 40% of male respondents said that they expect other people to deceive them when the occasion arises, while only 30% of females shared their trepidation. Meanwhile, 51% of women and 45% of men expect honest behavior from other people in any situation; 21% and 15%, respectively, were undecided.

The researchers added that responses were different in various age groups, with younger people being more anxious about others’ reliability: 45% of those aged 18–24 fear other people may to let them down at some point, while the share of older age cohorts giving the same answer ranged from 28% to 35%.

Commenting on the results of the latest poll, Valery Fedorov, the head of VCIOM, stated that the level of interpersonal trust between Russians hit its nadir during the 1990s, when the nation underwent a severe crisis and shortages of basic goods due to the rapid transition from a state-planned to a market-based economy.

The official added that the tendency towards the normalization of public life had boosted trust, but was interrupted due to new “traumas” in society, including an extension of the retirement age in 2018, the coronavirus pandemic, and the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict, among other things.

“The younger generation, on which sociologists rest their hopes when it comes to the potential waning of distrustful trends, turned out to be victims of new, difficult times,” Fedorov said.

By Tataragami, Euromaidan Press, 8/28/24

As Russian forces continue their rapid advance toward Pokrovsk, now just over 10 kilometers from this critical logistical hub in Ukraine’s Donbas Oblast, concerns are growing over the town’s potential loss.

One issue for the public is the lack of clarity about why Pokrovsk is seen as different from any other lost settlement in the Donbas. To fully grasp the current situation, prognosis, and risks associated with the potential loss of Pokrovsk, we need to step back from the tactical level and shift our focus slightly eastward, starting with Avdiivka.

Before falling to Russian forces in February 2024, the Avdiivka area played a key role for Ukrainian troops for nearly a decade, serving as a fortress that secured vital logistical routes in the Donetsk oblast. It was also seen as a potential foothold for future Ukrainian efforts to deoccupy Donetsk.

Unsurprisingly, since 2022, Russia has committed substantial resources to capture Avdiivka, raising questions about whether the heavy losses incurred were justified even among Russians.

The goal of the operation was not merely to capture Avdiivka itself, but to gain access to the operational space behind it. Once Avdiivka was secured, it provided the Russians with multiple options and maneuverability.

This is a key aspect because, if we examine the war theater solely from a tactical standpoint – focusing on individual tree lines or single settlements – we may miss the broader operational objectives of the enemy and the potential consequences for Ukraine if these objectives are achieved.

The backbone of Ukraine’s logistics in Donetsk Oblast is under threat

Pokrovsk, a town with a pre-war population of 60,000, is situated west of Avdiivka at a crucial crossroads of multiple railroad lines. It has become a key delivery and railroad distribution hub, facilitating the supply of Ukrainian forces across a broad frontline, from Vuhledar to the north of Donetsk and beyond.

Currently, only two places in the Donbas serve this vital function – Pokrovsk and Kramatorsk. The significance of the location and length of the supply line becomes clear when viewed on a map:

When assessing the situation, we should remember that Russia doesn’t need to capture Pokrovsk to gain control over the railroad. Mere proximity to the town enables Russian forces to target trains and vehicles with artillery, mortars, and drones, effectively rendering the railroad hub unusable. It’s highly likely that train operations in the town have already been suspended due to these risks.

The significance of Pokrovsk extends beyond its rail connections; the town is also situated at an important road juncture, playing a similar role to the railroads in the transportation and distribution of supplies across the entire frontline.

The road linking Pokrovsk to Kostyantynivka has long been a target of Russian offensive efforts. Cutting off this road would complicate the resupply of troops engaged in the Bakhmut-Horlivka sector.

The potential loss of Pokrovsk poses a serious operational threat to the logistics of the entire region, disrupting supply lines from Vuhledar in the south to Horlivka in the north. The loss of both the road and railroad would exacerbate the situation for Ukrainian forces in the Donbas, leading to the potential loss of Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and areas both south and north of Toretsk.

Another significant concern is the political aspect: Pokrovsk is located just over 20 kilometers from the administrative border of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Given that Russian forces re-entered Kharkiv Oblast from the north in May 2024, there is little reason to believe that Putin plans to halt at the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts.

If Pokrovsk falls, Russian forces would face minimal obstacles in advancing toward Dnipro, potentially extending their control into another administrative region of Ukraine and broadening the list of occupied oblasts.

Russia’s rapid advance in Donbas undeterred by Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk Oblast

Since the fall of Avdiivka, Russian forces have advanced more than 25 kilometers westward into Ukrainian territory. The concern is not about the territorial losses, but the pace at which Russian forces are moving through fortified areas.

Starting from July, the rate of Russian advancement in this region has accelerated, allowing them to bypass multiple defensive lines that Ukraine hastily constructed after the fall of Avdiivka.

The Finnish OSINT group Black Bird has mapped Ukrainian defenses visible through satellite imagery, helping to visualize the situation. As seen on their map, Russian forces have moved beyond several defensive positions, and with the full control of Novohrodivka, only one defensive line remains before reaching the outskirts of Pokrovsk itself.

Satellite imagery analysis of the seized positions shows evidence of artillery shelling and bombing, though not as extensive as in other frontline areas. This likely suggests that Ukrainian troops in the Pokrovsk direction were forced to retreat multiple times, lacking sufficient forces and resources to mount an organized defense.

While there have been many discussions and concerns about the lack of fortifications behind Avdiivka, which are entirely valid, the major issue remains the shortage of available manpower and units to defend those positions. No matter how well-constructed or numerous the defenses are, if they are only staffed at 10-20% of the required capacity, it’s unsurprising that Russian forces are able to overrun them so quickly.

Typically, in situations like this, both Ukraine and Russia deploy additional forces to stabilize the problematic part of the frontline. This often involves pulling one or more battalions from quieter sectors and redirecting them to more critical areas. However, after Ukraine was compelled to redeploy its resources to the Kharkiv Oblast and then to Sumy for the Kursk operation, the number of available units for such stabilization efforts was significantly reduced.

As a result, Ukraine was unable to stabilize this section of the frontline, just like in other areas such as Toretsk and New York, where Ukrainian forces also faced significant challenges and were forced to retreat.

Is the fall of Pokrovsk imminent?

Does this mean that Pokrovsk is definitely lost? No, it does not, but the likelihood of such an outcome continues to grow, given the balance of forces on the ground and the concentrated Russian firepower in the Pokrovsk area. Despite Ukrainian attempts to divert Russian forces from Pokrovsk with the Kursk incursion, Russian leadership remains reluctant to redeploy a significant number of forces from this front, even at the expense of reputational and political costs.

It is imperative for Ukrainian forces to prevent a swift and easy takeover of Pokrovsk, as this could buy Ukraine the necessary time to organize a defense beyond the Pokrovsk area—an opportunity missed in a similar situation in Avdiivka. If Russia exhausts its forces to capture Pokrovsk, it may lack the resources or morale to advance further.

Furthermore, Ukraine has demonstrated a capacity for sudden and effective counterattacks against overextended enemies, an approach that has proven effective given the Ukrainian forces’ greater mobility and more decentralized approach compared to Russian forces.

The Ukrainian leadership has several options to stabilize the line, including deploying newly formed brigades, repositioning forces from the Kursk and Kharkiv areas, or pulling battalions from more stable fronts. Whether the Ukrainian command will take these steps remains to be seen, but such a scenario cannot be ruled out.

As of today, the situation around Pokrovsk is dire and dangerous, with the potential to create a serious operational catastrophe if the town is lost.

by Ben Aris, Intellinews, 9/1/24

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) hit 15 regions of Russia with a barrage of homemade drones on the night of September 1 in retaliation for a massive Russia barrage a week earlier.

Russia launched over 200 missiles and drones on August 26 that mainly targeted what remains of Ukraine’s non-nuclear energy infrastructure as its own retaliation for the Kursk incursion that began on August 4.

Russia claims it shot down 158 inbound Ukrainian drones in a mass attack launched at the weekend targeting refineries and power plants in a total of 15 Russian regions, including Moscow.

Fires and explosions were reported throughout the targeted regions, but no reliable information has emerged of the extent of the damage caused. Russia has extensive air defences, but as the country is so large it remains vulnerable to attacks by single long-range low-flying Ukrainian drones. Ukraine has been targeting Russia’s energy infrastructure since the start of the drone war this January.

The first Ukraine drone strikes on Russia launched in March struggled to reach Moscow only 850km from Ukraine’s borders, but in the last week of July, a Ukrainian drone hit a Russian refinery inside the Arctic Circle over 2,000km from Ukraine.

Russian regions hit

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed that at least nine drones were downed in Russia’s capital region, but Ukrainian drones struck the Moscow Oil Refinery, in the southeast of the capital just 15 km from the Kremlin. One of the refinery’s buildings was damaged and a fire was reported following the attack, Russia’s state-owned Ria Novosti outlet reported. The sprawling refinery is owned by Gazprom Neft and one of Russia’s biggest. It has a refining capacity of over 12mn tonnes per year or more than 240,000 barrels of oil per day.

The attack on the Moscow refinery follows on from a drone strike of the Omsk refinery on August 26, Russia’s biggest, accounting for 8% of Russia’s total oil product production, which also caught fire and temporarily lost half its production capacity as a result of the fire. Repairs are already underway.

Amongst other facilities targeted on September 1 were the

Konakovo Power Station in the Tver region, one of the largest energy producers in central Russia, and three drones reportedly targeted the Kashira Power Plant in the Moscow region, Kyiv Independent reports.

Another 34 drones were shot down over the Bryansk region on Ukraine’s border. More than 28 drones were destroyed over the Voronezh region, which also shares a short border with Ukraine. In Belgorod Oblast, the border region above Kursk, 34 drones were shot down, reports Reuters, but others caused damage to houses, cars, and commercial properties, according to local reports. 14 drones targeted the Belgorod region. More drones were downed over the southwest regions of Lipetsk, Kaluga, Ryazan and Tula regions, Kyiv Independent added.

Two drones also targeted the Kursk region, which remains partially under the control of Ukraine, according to the region’s acting governor, Aleksei Smirnov.

Despite the wide-ranging drone attack, Russian authorities report there have been no casualties caused by the barrage, which underscores the relatively small amount of explosives Ukraine’s drones can carry – typically up to 50kg vs the Russian glide bombs that can carry up to 1,400kg of high explosives. While Ukraine’s attacks exclusively use home made drones, Russia has an extensive arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles; it fired more than 236 missiles and drones at Ukraine on August 26, and Syrskyi admitted recently that Ukraine can only bring down at most 10% of the most powerful.

In what may be an unrelated incident, a large fire broke out in Moscow of government buildings on the banks of the river Moskva on August 31. A three-storey administrative building caught fire covering thousands of square metres in the heart of Moscow that burnt for several hours, Russia’s Emergencies Ministry reported. Helicopters, drones and fire-fighting ship “Colonel Chernyshev” were involved in bringing the blaze under control. There have been several reported incidents of suspected arson deep inside Russia since the war started.

Kursk inclusion slowing down

After almost a month, the AFU’s Kursk incursion is slowing down and under growing pressure. Military commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi reported last week that Russia has brought up some 30,000 fresh troops to face the estimated 7,000-20,000 crack AFU troops in Kursk. Increasingly boxed in, the AFU expeditionary force has started to take up defence positions and is increasingly coming under intense attack from Russia devastating FAB glide bombs against which they have little defence.

Separately, Ukraine’s Ground Forces report that the Russians are wiping the town of Sudzha in Russia’s Kursk Oblast “off the face of the earth” with a barrage of glide bombs. Sudzha is home to the gas pipeline metering stations that carries the Russian gas that transits Ukraine on its way to European markets and was seized by the AFU in the first days of the incursion. Approximately 200 civilians remain in the city out of a population of around 5,000.

“They are killing their own people. Even though Sudzha is located in the rear, the Russians are wiping it off the face of the earth: they are bombarding it with guided aerial bombs (GABs), artillery and kamikaze drones,” Ukraine’s Defence Ministry said in a statement, cited by Ukrainska Pravda. “On Friday, 30 August, a Russian UAV hit a local kindergarten, and enemy aircraft struck houses in a residential area in Sudzha.”

Analysts are starting to questions the assault and ask if it has been a strategic blunder by Bankova (Ukraine’s equivalent of the Kremlin) as, while a huge PR success that has lifted the morale of both the long suffering population and embattled AFU, the move has also weakened Ukraine’s defence of the frontline in the Donbas.

One of the mooted goals of the offence was to give Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy a territorial card to trade in a second peace summit that Zelenskiy has been hoping to organise in November. However, Russia’s veteran Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed that idea as “simple-minded and naïve” on August 31.

“It is very hard to tell what goal and intent they were pursuing. But political analysts are discussing it now. And even [Ukrainian President Vladimir] Zelensky said, he sometimes makes Freudian slips, that they will need this for future exchanges. That’s why they are taking prisoners and want to seize square kilometres. It’s so simple-minded and naive. We do not discuss our territory with anyone. We do not negotiate about our territory,” the minister said in an interview with RT.

Lavrov said that Russian President Vladimir Putin said a year and a half ago that Russia “is not against talks, but those who are against them should realise that the longer they procrastinate, the harder it will be to reach an agreement.”

“In Istanbul, less than a month after the start of our special military operation, compared to what we see now, it was very easy to reach an agreement. They did not want that,” the minister said, referring to the failed Istanbul peace deal agreed in April 2022 and repeating that the Kremlin will talk, but only on the “basis of the reality.”

Russia annexed the Crimea in 2014 and four regions of Ukraine in September 2023 that are now considered to be sovereign territory. Putin has been signalling that the Kremlin was ready for peace talks in July as Ukraine inched towards a ceasefire deal, but Lavrov has become increasingly adamant that that card has been taken off the table since Ukraine invaded Russia last month.

In his first comments on the Kursk incursion, Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the AFU’s incursion is in line with Ukraine’s right to self-defence in an interview with Welt am Sonntag.

“The Russian soldiers, tanks and bases there [Kursk] are legitimate targets under international law…. According to international law, this right does not stop at the border [with Russia],” he said as cited by Ukrainska Pravda.

Tit-for-tat targets

Notably Ukraine exclusively used its own increasingly powerful drones to hit the 15 regions in Russia. Zelenskiy has been calling, almost on a daily basis, for permission to hit targets deeper inside Russia with the more powerful Nato-supplied missiles, but the White House has repeatedly refused. US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan repeated again last week that “our policy has not changed,” afraid of an escalation in the war ending a direct clash between Nato and Russia.

Zelenskiy has hinted that amongst the priority targets, should Ukraine be given that permission, would be Russian airfields from which it is launching its glide bombs that must be dropped from Russian fighter jets. Ukraine’s drones continue to mainly target Russian oil refineries and depots, but they are not powerful enough to make runways unusable.

The no-fly zone de facto imposed over Russia for the best missiles by the White House has been the subject of increasing scorn in Ukraine, where the skies remain entirely open to inbound Russian missiles, as highlighted by the August 26 barrage.

Amongst the missiles Ukraine would like to use is the Franco-British made Storm Shadow, but the US has openly refused to grant either Paris or London permission to drop the ban on their use on Russian targets.

Specifically, Zelenskiy has been asking the US for permission to use the US-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and in preparation, last week Russia reportedly moved all its aircraft back 90km from their current position in case this permission is granted. However, not only is this permission unlikely to be granted, but unconfirmed reports also surfaced over the weekend that the US have decreased the shipment of ATACMS to Ukraine as well as the size of its military aid packages. The US in the past year sent Ukraine around 200 ATACMS or about 1.4% of all US long-range missiles.

Last week, Zelenskiy announced that Ukraine has developed its own long-range ballistic missile that has a similar range and power as the US ATACMS missiles, but it is unclear if these are already in production and none were used in the September 1 attack.

Zelenskiy has also complained in the last week that despite the new $61bn aid package granted on April 20, promised supplies to Ukraine are coming too slowly and reports from the frontline in Donbas say that the AFU is again running very short of ammunition and men. As bne IntelliNews reported, the US continues to follow its “some, but not enough” weapons supply policy that is part of its “escalation management” policy, designed to prevent Ukraine from not losing the war, but not supplying it with enough to win.

Donbas front collapsing

The pace of the collapse of Ukraine’s position on the frontline in Donbas appears to be accelerating. Intermittent battlefield reports by military bloggers (milbloggers) say the situation is becoming increasingly desperate as the Armed Forces of Russia (AFR) presses ahead with its assault especially for the key town of Pokrovsk and is making increasingly rapid progress. As bne IntelliNews reported, Zelenskiy’s Kursk incursion gamble appears to be unravelling.

“‘I’ve never seen such speed [in a Russian advance],” the commander of a Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance unit fighting in the area told The Telegraph’s correspondent Roland Oliphant in an interview last week.

‘It is very rapid. And our problem is the same: we don’t have infantry, we don’t have enough artillery or shells. We don’t have enough drones… The situation is very complicated, and not in our favour. The most critical thing for us now is the large number of soldiers of the Russian Federation. They outnumber us I reckon by at least five to one”.”

Zelenskiy has faced mounting criticism from his own officers and soldiers in the last few days as if the goal of the Kursk incursion was to relieve the pressure on the Donbas frontline by drawing off forces to retake Kursk, then Syrskyi admitted last week that has not worked and ironically Bankova has weakened its own defences by withdrawing crack troops from the defence to man the incursion at a critical juncture in the war.