By Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 10/17/24
A majority of Russians would support ending hostilities and launching peace negotiations, according to the results of a September 2024 poll by Russia’s Levada Center1 on Russians’ views on the war against Ukraine. However, when asked if Russia should make concessions in such negotiations, a vast majority answered in the negative. Moreover, when asked to evaluate the conditions of a hypothetical peace deal, vast majorities of respondents rejected returning territories to Kyiv, as well as Ukraine’s membership in NATO. In addition, when Levada divided its respondents into two groups, a majority in one of the groups said they would not support an end to the military conflict if it meant returning annexed territories, even if Vladimir Putin himself made such a decision. This obviously doesn’t bode well for those in the West seeking support for brokering a peace deal that would defer territorial issues in exchange for Kyiv’s membership in the Alliance.
Russians Not Ready for Meaningful Compromise
Like all but one of Levada’s previous polls on Ukraine since October 2022, the September 2024 poll shows that the percentage of respondents favoring an end to Russia’s so-called special military operation and launching peace negotiations (54%) is greater than that of those who support continuing the operation (38%). However, when asked whether Russia should make concessions to Ukraine to end the military operation and sign a peace agreement, the share of those who answered “definitely or probably yes” was 20% in September 2024. In contrast, 70% were opposed, after fluctuating in the range of 70%–73% last year.
Levada has also asked its respondents to weigh in on specific conditions that a peace accord would contain. It has found that 94% of respondents considered an exchange of POWs to be acceptable or preferable as of September 2024, and 78% of respondents considered immediate ceasefire to be acceptable or preferable. However, only 21% of these respondents found returning the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions to Ukraine to be acceptable or preferable, while 69% found such a return unacceptable. Additionally, 75% found returning the Luhansk and Donetsk regions to Ukraine unacceptable. Finally, the share of those who found Ukraine’s membership in NATO as acceptable or preferable was 15% in September 2024, while 73% found it unacceptable under any circumstances.
Russians Won’t Agree To Return Land Even if Putin Decides to Do So
As part of the September 2024 survey, the Levada Center once again repeated the following experiment. With the help of a random number generator, the respondents participating in the survey were divided into two equal groups, each of which was asked a question in one of two formulations. In Group 1, the respondents were asked if they would support or not support the president’s decision to immediately end the military conflict, without any conditions to support or not to support the president’s decision to immediately end the military conflict (without any conditions). In Group 2, the respondents were asked whether they would support Putin’s decision to end the conflict, but on the condition of returning territories to Ukraine. Some 73% in Group 1 in September 2024 said they would support Putin’s decision to end the conflict with Ukraine (in April 2024 it was 71%), while 19% said they would oppose it (20% in April 2024). In Group 2, 30% said in September they would support Putin’s decision to end the military conflict with Ukraine and return the annexed territories, while 60% said they would oppose such a combination.
Majority of Russians Believe Their Army is Succeeding in Ukraine
Perhaps, one reason why majorities of Russians reject concessions to Ukraine is that many of them believe the Russian armed forces are succeeding in Ukraine (60% in September 2024). In comparison, the share of those who believe that the campaign has been going somewhat unsuccessfully or extremely unsuccessfully totaled 23% in September 2024. This belief in the success of the Russian army may also explain why a significant majority of Russians continue to personally support its actions in Ukraine (76% in September 2024). As for what shaped that belief itself, one should keep in mind that, according to Levada, majority of Russians (60%) continue to learn ‘news’ from Russian TV channels, which are mostly owned by the authorities or their loyalists. These channels toe the Kremlin’s line in portraying Russia’s war against Ukraine as a success. For instance, they trumpet Russian advances while declining to mention how far away the troops are from fulfilling Putin’s orders on capturing the Donbas. That the Kremlin refuses to admit number of casualties on the Russian side (which Western and independent Russian sources estimate at 200,000–600,000) to the Russian public also influence the latter’s assessment of whether their army is successful in Ukraine.
Yet, Russians See More Harm Than Good in War
At the same time, even in spite of suppression of facts on the ground in Ukraine, Levada’s recent polls still show that the share of those who believe Russia’s war in Ukraine has generated more harm than good does not only exceed the share of those who believe the reverse, but their number has also increased. The share of those who believe the conflict has caused net damage went from 41% in May 2023 to 47% in Sept. 2024 (damage-seers). In the same period, the share of those who believe the conflict has generated a net benefit decreased from 38% to 28% (benefit-seers).
When asked an open question to specify what exactly they meant when they said that the special military operation has caused more harm than good, some 52% of damage-seers pointed to the death toll, victims and suffering caused by the operation. Military losses, specifically the deaths of soldiers, were highlighted by 21% of damage-seers. Economic concerns were also notable, with 18% citing the worsening economic situation and increased expenses as a significant harm. Some 13% of damage-seers viewed the operation as leading to widespread destruction, devastation and violence typically associated with war. Deterioration of international relations and isolation is a concern for 7% of the damage-seers. In contrast, when asked an open question to specify what exactly they meant when they said that the special military operation has generated more benefits than harm, 26% of the benefit-seers pointed to the “return of territories, new territories and larger population.” Closely following this were 24% of the benefit-seers who believe that the operation has succeeded in the “protection of the people of Donbass, Russians and Russian-speaking individuals.” Additionally, 16% of the benefit-seers feel that the operation has strengthened Russia’s global position. Some 11% of these respondents said that the operation “stopped NATO expansion, removed Western threats.” Some 10% of the benefit-seers highlighted that the operation “has strengthened the economy and production.”
It should also be noted that the share of Russians who follow the situation in Ukraine has not changed significantly this fall. The share of those who are following it very closely or fairly closely went from 53% in August 2024 to 54% in September 2024.
Conclusion
The latest polling by the Levada Center reveals a complex and somewhat contradictory stance among the Russian public regarding the war in Ukraine. While a majority favor ending hostilities and pursuing peace negotiations, this sentiment is undercut by a strong unwillingness to make concessions on key issues, such as returning annexed territories, or accepting Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Such a stand leaves little room for meaningful compromise in the near future, especially given that recent polls show that majority of Ukrainians are also unwilling to compromise on key issues (polls held this summer show that 55% of Ukrainians are opposed to making any territorial concessions while 59% reject the demand that Ukraine’s neutrality is codified). The Levada polling also highlights a lingering belief in the success of Russian military efforts, which also likely fuels resistance to compromise even though an increasing share of Russians believe the war has caused more harm than good. As noted above, a number of factors may be influencing this belief; including reliance of the public on pro-Kremlin TV channels for news and suppression of information on casualties. One also should not forget that Russia’s slide towards a hard authoritarianism has led to criminalization of freedom of speech on issues related to the war, among other things. This cannot help influencing what a Russian living in Russia says when a stranger introduces himself as a pollster and says she and her colleagues want to ask him or her such questions about the war, which has become one of the central organizing principles of Putin’s rule.
The author would like to thank RM editor Ivan Arreguín-Toft for reminding him of some of the significant constraints faced by pollsters and respondents in Russia. The author also thanks RM student associate Chris Conway and managing editor Angelina Flood for contributing to retrieving and structuring polling data for this blog post.
Footnotes:
The Levada Center remains the most respected of Russia’s independent pollsters in spite of increasing constraints on such activities in authoritarian Russia.