Excerpt from Moon of Alabama website, 11/28/24

*Prof. Geoffrey Roberts brought this to my attention – Natylie

Ukraine is losing its children. Demographers are sounding the alarm because of the mass departure of schoolchildren abroad

Experts began to talk about the second wave of emigration of Ukrainians to European countries. Now we are talking about traveling abroad for high school students, who go there not by themselves, but mainly with their parents. RegioNews found out what this threatens Ukraine in the future, given whether our country will have enough labor to restore the state after the end of the war.

Director of the distance school Vladimir Strashko published his observations on the mass departure of schoolchildren to other countries. According to him, over the past few months, he has been receiving an abnormal number of applications for completing Ukrainian schools remotely, saying that students are leaving Ukraine. Uladzimir Strashka also says that there are more and more students in the 11th grade who will not write the National Multi-Subject Test (replacing the EIT during martial law). In other words, this means that all these children do not plan to enter Ukrainian universities. Moreover, according to the director of the distance school, in some classes of Ukrainian schools, about 90% already refuse NMT.

What makes you want to leave Ukraine

Leading researcher at the Institute of Demography and Quality of Life Problems of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine Lydia Tkachenko in a comment to RegioNews noted that parents decide to take their children out due to the terrible forecasts of some experts that there will be no heating or light in Ukraine.

“Therefore, parents, if they have the opportunity, try to take their children abroad, so that they, as they say, have a normal childhood at least for the period of this winter. In addition to everyday issues, there are also quite a lot of statements that almost children should already fight in the future. The general information tone greatly influences the decisions of parents, ” says Lydia Tkachenko.

At the same time, in a comment to RegioNews, Boris Krimer, a senior researcher at the Institute of Demography and Social Research, said that today it is actually very difficult to say how many people are leaving. They say that information from different sources is very different: the data from the European Union may be the same, and the data provided by the UN is also different, and from the Ukrainian border guards are completely different.

“In general, Ukrainians who take older children abroad consider it more profitable in the future, justified than staying in Ukraine. This may be related to the issue of safety, as well as forecasts for the coming winter, ” says Boris Krimer.

Will emigrants return

In general, if we take into account the mass departure of women with children after February 24, 2022, then the current outflow of Ukrainian schoolchildren abroad can already be safely called the second wave of emigration of Ukrainians. Of course, the Ukrainian state hopes that all Ukrainians will return home sooner or later, but whether this will happen en masse is a big question.

Boris Krimer, a senior researcher at the Institute of Demography and Social Research, says that whenever there is a migration flow, some people still come back.

“It all depends on how long the migration of the population will be and how much Ukrainians will take root abroad. If the fighting ends in Ukraine and it becomes safe, economic development begins, then at least some of the emigrants can be expected to return. I hope that Ukraine will still join the European Union and then it will be so that we will have one free space for the movement of people, ” says Creamer.

In turn, Lidia Tkachenko, a leading researcher at the Institute of Demography and Quality of Life Problems of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, notes that if there are many jobs in Ukraine with normal pay and working conditions, then of course Ukrainians who have left abroad will have more incentives to return to Ukraine.

“But many Ukrainians abroad now choose not even large fortunes and opportunities, but simply the opportunity to live in peace without explosions of all sorts and the like. For many, the sense of security may even outweigh the opportunity to get a position in Ukraine or a lot of money, ” says Lydia Tkachenko.

There is also a lot of discussion about how long it takes for Ukrainians to take root in the same Europe, after which they will not return to Ukraine. According to Borys Krimer, on the one hand, this is very individual, because even a year is enough for someone to take root, but of course, the longer a person stays abroad, the less desire they have to return to Ukraine later.

“For example, in the first year of a full-scale war, we estimated that 50% of those who went abroad would remain there, and 50% would still return. Then we focused on a variety of surveys. Today, the share of those who will not return is more than 50%, but this is again a situational thought. If, for example, the economic situation in the country where a particular Ukrainian is located worsens, he will be ready to return home. But the vector is really such that the longer people live in another country, the more they will have new connections, the more children will get used to kindergarten or school. As a result, they are less likely to return to Ukraine, ” Borys Krimer sums up.

What can be the consequences of population outflow

Experts say that in any case, the consequences of the war for Ukraine will be terrible, because in some places the impact of military operations in countries can last even 50 years after their completion.

According to Lydia Tkachenko, it is now very difficult to make any demographic forecasts for Ukraine.

“Previously, everything was calculated based on the birth rate and mortality, and migration did not significantly affect this. For example, since the beginning of the zero years, the migration growth was already small, but with the beginning of a full — scale war, migration flows, of course, have increased very much,” the expert says.

She confirms that there will still be a large percentage of those Ukrainians who do not want to return to Ukraine, and there may also be such a problem that as soon as the borders are opened, many men may still leave, not only those who already have a wife and children abroad, but also men who have survived the war. war is very stressful. Lydia Tkachenko emphasizes that this will be the loss of the young population, which can still work for the development of Ukraine for a long time. That is, the state will gradually lose the necessary amount of labor, and there will be no one to replace it. Relatively speaking, today high school students in 5-7 years should replace in the labor market those Ukrainians who are now of pre-retirement age. If students continue to leave the country en masse and do not return, then those who retire will have no one to replace them in the labor market.

As a result, Ukraine risks facing another problem — there will be fewer working citizens than the same pensioners. For example, even before the full-scale war in Ukraine, there was about one working citizen per pensioner. That is, in fact, we can say that one employee withheld one pensioner at the expense of his taxes. Lydia Tkachenko says that while this ratio still remains, if Ukrainians continue to go abroad en masse, in particular, high school students who will later be able to work, the situation will worsen. If this trend continues, then sooner or later, relatively speaking, there will already be two or three pensioners per person working in Ukraine. But according to experts, no pension system can withstand such a load, and therefore we will have to resort to drastic measures. For example, raise the retirement age.

https://regionews.ua/ukr/articles/1730982278-ukrayina-vtrachae-ditey-demografi-b-yut-trivogu-cherez-masoviy-viyizd-shkolyariv-za-kordon (via translation add-on.)

Posted by: Jeremy Rhymings-Lang | Nov 28 2024 20:32 utc | 85

By John Helmer, Website, 11/16/24

Yulia Skripal communicated from her bedside at Salisbury District Hospital on March 8, 2018, four days after she and her father Sergei Skripal collapsed from a poison attack, that the attacker used a spray; and that the attack took place when she and her father were eating at a restaurant just minutes before their collapse on a bench outside.

The implication of the Skripal evidence, revealed for the first time on Thursday, is that the attack on the Skripals was not perpetrated by Russian military agents who were photographed elsewhere in Salisbury town at the time; that the attacker or attackers were British agents; and that if their weapon was a nerve agent called Novichok, it came, not from Moscow, but from the UK Ministry of Defence chemical warfare laboratory at Porton Down.

Porton Down’s subsequent evidence [3] of Novichok contamination in blood samples, clothing, car, and home of the Skripals may therefore be interpreted as British in source, not Russian. 

This evidence was revealed by a police witness testifying at the Dawn Sturgess Inquiry in London on November 14. The police officer, retired Detective Inspector Keith Asman was in 2018, and he remains today the chief of forensics for the Counter Terrorism Policing (CTPSE) group which combines the Metropolitan and regional police forces with the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the Security Service (MI5).

According to Asman’s new disclosure, Yulia Skripal had woken from a coma and confirmed to the doctor at her bedside that she remembered the circumstances of the attack on March 4. What she remembered, she signalled, was not (repeat not) the official British Government narrative that Russian agents had tried to kill them by poisoning the front door-handle of the family home.

The new evidence was immediately dismissed by the Sturgess Inquiry lawyer assisting Anthony Hughes (titled Lord Hughes of Ombersley), the judge directing the Inquiry. “We see there,” the lawyer put to Asman as a leading question, “the suggestion, which we now know not to be right, of course”.  — page 72. [4]

Hughes then interrupted to tell the witness to disregard what Skripal had communicated. “If the record that you were given there is right, someone suggested to her ‘Had you been sprayed’. She didn’t come up with it herself.”   — page 73 [4]. Hughes continued to direct the forensics chief to disregard the hearsay of Skripal. “Anyway the suggestion that she had been sprayed in the restaurant didn’t fit with your investigations? A. [Asman] No, sir. LORD HUGHES: Thank you.”

So far in in the Inquiry which began public sessions on October 14, this is the first direct sign of suppression of evidence by Hughes.

Hearsay, he indicates, should be disregarded if it comes from the target of attack, Yulia Skripal. However, hearsay from British Government officials, policemen, and chemical warfare agents at Porton Down must be accepted instead. Hughes has also banned Yulia and Sergei Skripal from testifying at the Inquiry [5]. 

The lawyer appointed and paid by the Government to represent the Skripals in the inquiry hearings said nothing to acknowledge the new disclosure nor to challenge Hughes’s efforts to suppress it.

Asman described his career and credentials in his witness statement to the Inquiry, dated October 23, 2024. His rank when he retired from the regular police forces in 2009 was detective inspector. He was then promoted to higher ranking posts at the operations coordinating group known as Counter Terrorism Policing for the Southeast Region (CTPSE). By 2018 Asman says [6] he was “head of the National Counter Terrorism Forensics Working Group since 2012, and was the UK Counter Terrorism Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) forensic lead.”  In June 2015 Asman was awarded the Order of the British Empire (MBE) “for services to Policing.”  

At page 19 of his recent witness statement, this is what Asman has recorded for the evening of March 8, 2018:

Source: https://dsiweb-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/uploads/INQ006140_strong-compression.pdf [8] — page 19.

Asman’s went on to claim in this statement: “At this point Yulia Skripal was described as being emotional and fell unconscious. I made notes of my conversation with DI [Detective Inspector] VN104 in one of my notebooks, and in addition this information was confirmed to me in writing the next morning. The information she provided about being sprayed at the restaurant [Zizzi] was seemingly inconsistent with the presence of novichok at the Mill public house and 47 Christie Miller Road. On hearing this, I personally wondered whether Yulia Skripal knew more about it than she had alluded to and therefore whilst being fully cognisant of the SIO’s [Senior Investigative Officer] hypothesis and the need to be open-minded continued to prioritise her property.”

THE SCENE OF THE NOVICHOK CRIME

The Skripals reportedly spent 45 minutes at lunch in Zizzi’s restaurant. Witnesses described Sergei Skripal as upset when he left with Yulia to walk to the bench. Source: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/ [10]

THE EVIDENCE THE CRIME WAS BRITISH

Left: Yulia Skripal in May 2018, the scar of forced intubation still visible; read more here [12].  Centre; Dr Stephen Cockroft who recorded the exchange with Skripal at her bedside on March 8, 2018; that was followed, Cockroft has also testified, by forced sedation and tracheostomy – read more [13]. Right: read the only book on the case evidence. [14] 

Open-minded was not what the judge and his lawyers wanted from Asman when he appeared in public for the first time on Thursday, November 14. Referring precisely to the excerpt of Skripal’s hospital evidence, Francesca Whitelaw KC for the Inquiry asked Asman: “ We can take that [witness statement excerpt] down, but this information as well, was it consistent or inconsistent with what you had found out in terms of forensic about the presence of Novichok at The Mill and 47 Christie Miller Road? A. [Asman] It, I would say, was inconsistent on the basis that she said she was sprayed in the restaurant.”  — page 73. [4]

Asman was then asked by Whitelaw to comment on Yulia Skripal’s exchange with Cockroft. “My question for you is: how, if at all, this impacted on your investigations? A. It only very slightly impacted on it…It was information to have but not necessarily going to change my approach on anything.”  — page 73 [4].

Left, Francesca Whitelaw KC, counsel assisting Hughes, asked Asman about Yulia Skripal’s hospital evidence – click to watch from Minute 2:01:27. Right: Hughes interrupting the witness to dismiss Skripal’s evidence from Min 2:03:23 [16].   On Hughes’s order, Asman’s face was not transmitted during his testimony, and the audio record was delayed by ten minutes before broadcast.

In the Inquiry record [17] of hearings and exhibits since the commencement of the open sessions on October 14, there have been eleven separate exhibits of documents purporting to record what Yulia and Sergei Skripal have said; they include interviews with police and witness statements for the Inquiry; they are dated from April 2018 through October 2024. Most of them have been heavily redacted. None of them is signed by either Skripal.   

Neither Yulia nor Sergei Skripal has been asked by the police, by the Inquiry lawyers, or by Hughes to confirm or deny whether Yulia’s recollection of March 8, 2018, of the spray attack in Zizzi’s Restaurant is still their evidence of what happened to them.

***

BRITISH OPERATION KISS – “KILL INSTANTLY SKRIPALS” – HAS FAILED TO KILL BUT SUCCEEDED AT COVERING UP, ALMOST

By John Helmer, Website, 11/22/24

This is the comic book version of what really happened, as revealed by the clumsiest judge in England – Anthony Hughes (titled Lord Hughes of Ombersley, lead image, right).

Even if all the evidence presented to Hughes and already endorsed by him is true – on the record of six and half years of British Government investigations and twenty-one days of hearings with concealed witness faces, censored documents, missing CCTV — there remains no direct evidence that the Russians attacked the Skripals by poisoning their front-door handle when they were inside their home, four hours before their collapse.

Instead, Hughes and his lawyers have directed the police and other witnesses to stretch their circumstantial evidence and dictated their inferences of Russian guilt. In New York, the legal textbook difference between direct and circumstantial evidence is this [3]. 

To stretch the circumstantial evidence and inferences beyond the criminal standard of reasonable doubt, Hughes has prevented direct evidence from being presented, stopping the Skripals from testifying themselves. Their Home Office lawyer purportedly representing the Skripals in the hearings has said nothing at all; Hughes’s lawyers have manipulated witnesses with leading questions; alternative explanations for the circumstantial evidence have been blocked by Hughes from the hospital doctors and independent experts. The way in which this has been done is comic book jurisprudence. The judges of the former British empire aren’t laughing; this is how they say the means and opportunity of a capital crime must be prosecuted, then judged [4]. 

The CCTV and other evidence presented at the Hughes hearings shows the Russians knew they had been marked by MI6 from the minute they booked their flights and landed at Gatwick Airport; and they then encouraged the video recording which took place, often mugging in front of the CCTV cameras for that purpose. There is no evidence of their coming close enough to the Skripal house, or to Sergei and Yulia Skripal (lead image, left) in person, in order to attack them.

Ergo, the evidence of the murder act is missing; the evidence of the murder weapon is missing; the evidence of the murder attempt at the bench is missing. Means, opportunity, motive are all missing from the British prosecution of the Russians for the crime.

Yulia Skripal has testified that the poison attack took place when she and her father were sprayed as they were eating lunch inside Zizzi’s Restaurant. They then walked outside, felt ill, sat down on a city bench, and collapsed.

Yulia Skripal’s evidence indicates the attackers were British.

The refusal of the British chemical warfare laboratory to name the weapon by its organophosphate name, and reveal its molecular composition and mass conceals the origin of the weapon. In police, forensic or courtroom practice, this is the equivalent of concealing ballistic evidence determining whether a fatal bullet was fired from the gun in the alleged shooter’s hand. 

The evidence, collected by the police and Porton Down agents, then analysed by Porton Down, then announced publicly by then-Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson days before he told Prime Minister May’s meeting of Cabinet, is as likely to be of a British-made organophosphate nerve agent subsequently called Novichok as of a Russian-made nerve agent.

What motive: why would the British attack the Skripals?

Their reason was that they believed Sergei Skripal was planning to return home to Russia, and that the GRU was planning an exfiltration operation on March 4, 2018. The Russians knew that MI6 would be suspicious, so they prepared decoys. These are the two men, Alexander Petrov (Alexander Mishkin) and Ruslan Boshirov (Anatoly Chepiga), now accused of the Novichok attack.

The British planned to kill the Skripals but camouflage the operation, as they have done. Motive was pressing for the British if Sergei Skripal had returned to Russia, revealing himself in Moscow to be one of the first successful triple agents in modern espionage history.

The Russian exfiltration failed; the British failed to execute the Skripals on the spot; for a few minutes from her hospital bed on March 8, Yulia Skripal revealed what had happened before she was put into an artificial coma, then silenced with a tracheostomy on March 21, and kept incommunicado ever since.

The British camouflage for their operation – Operation KISS, “Kill Instantly the Skripals” — relied on the door-handle as “ground zero” – the original source of the Novichok – and on Porton Down to replace the inconclusive or negative tests conducted by doctors treating the Skripals at Salisbury District Hospital.

A corpse had to be found, dead enough not to be able to testify otherwise as Yulia Skripal had done.

That turned out to be Dawn Sturgess, who died at her home on June 30, 2018, of cardiac arrest and brain hypoxia after consuming a combination of sleeping and anti-anxiety medications, cocaine, and fentanyl. The Novichok weapon, fabricated in a perfume atomiser by MI6 and Porton Down, was then placed on Sturgess’s kitchen table for the police to discover eleven days after her drug binge and collapse; and after medics and police had failed to find it through multiple and repeated searches.

For the evidence and the law, and to understand who laughs last in this comic book of British public inquiry, follow frame by frame, tweet by tweet, here [5].

By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 12/1/24

The Economy

Russia’s new military budget for 2025-2027 commits 13.5 trillion rubles (32.5 of the total budget; equivalent to $145 billion) per year to the war.

This will doubtless run the risk of overheating the economy, especially given manpower shortages for the defense industries, and adding further pressure on interest rates that now exceed 21%, and on inflation which is around 8%. This is in the context of a troubling fall in the international value of the ruble (7% depreciation in the past seven days, now on a par with its value in the opening phase of the SMO in 2022), in part connected to a fall in the price of Russian oil and gas. This is likely the result of a recent US imposition of sanctions on Gazprom Bank. That the US delayed so long targeting the Gazprom Bank is indicative of the importance to the West of continuing Russian trade in oil and gas. But at this time, it would appear, the US needs more than anything else to inflict pain on Russia, regardless of the accompanying pain to the West.

All this, it should be emphasized, is occurring in a context of (1) a healthy GNP that until the Central Bank’s recent measures to apply the brakes, was increasing at an annual rate of almost 4%; (2) generously increasing wages and benefits to military personnel and their families; (3) a doubling over the past year in the rate of increase of the real value of household wealth; (4) a reinvestment into the Russian economy of flows of money that had previously been exported and of the profits of former Western corporations that were formerly siphoned off to the West; (5) rapidly expanding markets for Russian energy and other goods in China, India and other countries of the Global South.

Further, none of the problems outlined above should be regarded as insuperable. Many are natural to the ebb and flow of all economic cycles. Russian industry and agriculture overall are very strong. Many if not most of the weaknesses that resulted from Western sanctions and the departure of Western corporations have been overcome in whole or in part, as just mentioned, by the enhancement of Russian trade with China and India and other countries of the Global South and by sophisticated work-arounds to avoid Western sanctions.

Further still, the West is divided by an economically crippled Europe, ever more impoverished by the transfer of its wealth in weapons, money and, soon, human lives, to Ukraine, and ever more economically dependent on the US for markets and supplies and for its fanatical continuation of the war. The US grows stronger as a result of this imbalance but not so much that the upward trajectory of its approximately $35.5 trillion debt load is significantly off-set any time in the forseeable future, helping to explain why, somewhat pathetically, Trump now threatens the BRICS (representing the Global South or, better still, the Global Majority) with sanctions if they try to topple the dollar as hegemonic currency.

Extending but Not Breaking Russia

Russia’s increased military budget will be sufficient, in conditions in which it has proven superiority over the West in both nuclear and non-nuclear (but nuclear-comparable, as in the case of the Oreshnik) weapons, to (1) continue its advances on Ukrainian territory (even as Ukraine prepares a new offensive in Zapporizhzhia, and possibly on Belgorod and Bryansk); (2) head off Western attempts to stage a “Maidan” style coup d’etat (or the “Ukrainization of a Causcasian State”) against the recently elected government of pro-Russian prime minister Irakli Kobakhidze in Georgia, where street protests in Tbilisi constitute the latest Western-financed splurge of “pro-democratic” violence and coercion); (3) halt the progress of a Turkish-Israeli-Western backed jihadist offensive from Idlib on Aleppo and Hama in Syria; (4) head off anticipated Western provocations against the government of Belarus in Minsk during the lead-up to presidential elections that are scheduled for 26 January 2025; and (5) counter Ukrainian designs on pro-Russian Transnistria in an attempt to seize its Russian military assets and to support Moldavan aspirations to EU and NATO membership.

Fog Lifts in Syria

The situation in Syria as of the afternoon of December 1st, California time, offers greater clarity as to purpose as well as stabilization of the jihadi threat. The overall purpose and the reason why this offensive shows signs of careful, secret planning and organization, is that Western and Israeli sponsors of violent jihadism see in Syria a strategic weapon with which to hold down Russia and Iran.

Turkiye’s principal interest, however, is somewhat different. I would suggest that it is to use jihadi forces for which it has long been responsible for containing in the northwest of Syria (centered in Idlib province, whose goverance has now been taken over by the former Qaeda affiliated HTS in conjunction with the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army [SNA]) to (1) force a reluctant Syrian President Assad into settling the conflict between Turkey and Syria in such a way that both parties can undermine the establishment of a US-protected Kurdish enclave; (2) update and preserve on a more permanent basis the buffer zone along Turkey’s long border with Syria; and (3) re-settle Syrian refugees in southern Turkiye back to Syria.

The overall size of the SNA-HTS army has been estimated at 15,000. Modest. Yet it was strong enough to take the Syrian army completely by surprise in and around Aleppo, the second largest Syrian city and its most important industrial base. This represents a very major, an unspeakable, fiasco for the Syrian army and for the Damascus government.

Fortunately, it does not, however, represent a collapse of the Syrian army as was at first feared. With the help of Russian aerial bombing, the supply of Russian drones, and the deployment, it is reported, of up to 5,000 Russian Wagner soldiers, the Syrian army forces appear to have halted the SNA-HTS advance in Hama. Earlier reports suggest that an uprising in Daraa has been suppressed and that an attempted coup d’etat in Damascus has come to nothing. The whereabouts of Assad are something of a mystery and some reports have suggested that he is in Russia. There were consultations with Moscow and Assad before the most recent events.

Russian Interests

Russia, therefore, has clearly demonstrated its determination to support Damascus. It has many incentives to do so (1) it has naval, air force and army facilities in Syria; (2) it is a very long-standing ally of Syria; (3) it needs good relations with Syria in order to prepare for a likely upcoming regional, conceivably even a world war, starting with a conflagration between Russian ally Iran, and Israel, a conflict that Israel seems to lust for even as pro-Western elements in Tehran pathetically cling to fantasies about a sanctions-busting deal with Trump.

At home, the Kremlin faces considerable skeptcism among civilians as to the benefits of yet another foreign military adventure. In short, I would conclude that Russian support for Syria is dependable; its support for Assad – and not for the first time – hangs in the balance.

While Turkiye is assumed by most commentators to have played a major part in the invasion, this has not prevented Moscow from proposing a resuscitation of the Astana accord of 2017 whereby Russia, Turkiye and Iran consult together on policy with respect to Syria. Given that Russia is not, therefore, breaking off relations with Turkiye, – no matter how mecurial, even treacherous and unpredictable is the behavior of Erdogan – suggests that it is interpreting Erdogan’s motivation along the lines suggested above namely, that he wants to resolve the conflict between Turkiye and Syria, and to clean up the mess for which Ergodan himself carries major responsibility from the time when he broke off relations with his quondam friend, Assad, in 2011, and committed Turkiye to a regime-change war fought alongside the CIA, using arms released from NATO’s murder of Ghadaffi in Libya, and assuaged with protected jihadi R&R centers in Diyabakur.

Erdogan’s allies included the Arab theorocracies of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, UAE and the Muslim Brotherhood, amidst the skilful meddling of Britain, the Netherlands and France through chemical weapons hoaxes, sinister false flags perpetrated by the White Helmets, and a multitude of other innovative misinformation and disinformation strategies.

Ankara, by the way, denies responsibility. But more plausible reports speak of a war-room in Turkey that have brought together Western military and Turkish operatives.

Assad, his failure to negotiate with Erdogan notwithstanding, has been successful in repairing relations with many of his former adversaries (including Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the Arab League as a whole), some of whom are joining Syria’s friends such as Iraq, Iran and even the Lebanese-based Hezbollah in rushing support to Syrian troops.

SNA and HTS remain in control of Aleppo; the SNA have control over the Kuweices base, and HTS controls the airport. The Syrian army and the Kurdish SDF are defending the Tell Rifaat district. But there will almost certainly be a Syrian Army counter-offensive in the next few days.

None of this takes away the grave indications of something seriously wrong in Damascus. Of course, the major reasons that have allowed such a lightening invasion by the rebel Sunni forces of Idlib on Aleppo, include (1) the deep impoverishment of the Syrian economy, and (2) of 90% or more of the Syrian people as a result (3) of a Western-instigated jihadist “civil war” from 2011, involving (4) the usual Western incitement of extremist Sunni, Muslim Brotherhood-style ideological violence, building (5) upon the first Muslim Brotherhood uprising against Bashar Assad’s father in 1980, and (6) not forgetting the US-Kurdish purloining of Syrian oil and agricultural wealth in the northeast over the past five to ten years, nor (7) the cruelty and cynicism of the US Caesar Act sanctions that have prevented the most basic of post-conflict rebuilding.

The Syrian army during the civil war survived in large measure by its ability to decentralize and to localize but at the expense of a certain tendency to warlordism that others might simply label corruption. This too would surely have been a factor.

But such a monumental failure of intelligence and, consequently, such a horrendous failure of preparation as has been demonstrated over the past few days must also be attributed to Damascus and to Assad who has had, since his coming to power well over twenty years ago, a reputation for the appearance of progressive intent coupled with an inability or unwillingness to follow through.

The Turkish-controlled northwest of Syria extends as far west as Yayladagi, next to Turkey’s Hatay province deep inside Syria, to Oabasin in the east and from Rajo and Elbeyli in the north to Kafr Uweid in the south. The recent invasion by SNA and HTS forces has reached through Aleppo as far south as As-Smeiriye, Ras-al-Ain and Saraqib.

Russian Advances in Ukraine

In Ukraine, Russia’s current advances are freshest:

(1) In the Vremivka/Velyka Novosilka area in Donetsk, where Russian forces have moved westwards from Novodonetske and north from Staromaiorske and Urozhaine, up through Makarivka in the direction of Storozheve, Vremivka, and Velyka Novosilka. Only one supply road now connects Velyka Novosilka to Ukrainian sources in Uspenivka to the west, a road that is vulnerable to being cut off by Russian forces moving north from Rivnopil to Novosilka;

(2) To the southeast of the Ukrainian stronghold of Uspenivka, Russian forces have established control over Illynka, and are advancing towards the adjacent settlements of Velyzavetivka and Romanivka in the direction of Vesely Hai;

(3) Around the Kurakhove reservoir, Russian forces now control some 50% of the town of Kurakhove on the southern bank, and are advancing in the direction of Dachne to the west while, north of the reservoir, Russian forces control Berestky and much of the territory to its north, and Stan Terny at the western end;

(4) Russian maneuvers are forcing the flight of Ukrainian forces westwards towards Shevchneko, very close to the major city of Pokrovsk. West of Sedove, Russian forces have taken or are moving on Pushkine, Petrivka, Zhovte, Novotroitske and Novopustaynka. They will aim to divide the city of Pokrovsk itself from adjoining Myronhohad. Elsewhere,

(5) Russian forces continue to bomb settlements north of Russian-held Mykoaivka towards Siversk, or westwards from Vyimka; establish footholds west of Oskil river in northern Kupyansk with a view to outflanking the city of Kupyansk from behind and, possibly, moving north to bring reinforcements to the city of Vovchansk, whose northern territory Russia now controls. Meanwhile the area controlled by Ukrainian forces on the Russian territory of Kursk continues to contract, its area of control (north of Ukrainian-held Suzhda), centers on Kryglenkoye, between Novoivanovka to the west and Malaya Loknye to the east.

Intellinews, 11/18/24

Perceptions of the quality of life and confidence in the future have reached new all-time highs, according to a poll by the independent pollster, the Levada Centre.

Public sentiment in Russia regarding quality of life has rebounded to near-record levels after a slight decline last year, with over half of respondents expressing satisfaction with their lives, according to a recent survey by Levada-Center, a Russian research organisation designated as a “foreign agent.”

Quality of life

As of November, 54% of respondents reported being satisfied with their lives – a figure approaching the peak of 55% recorded in April 2023. Meanwhile, dissatisfaction has reached a historic low, with only 12% indicating discontent, a stark contrast to June 1992, when two-thirds of Russians reported dissatisfaction.

The survey highlights a demographic split. Younger respondents under 24 years old reported the highest levels of satisfaction (75%), followed by those who can afford durable goods (63%) and those supportive of President Vladimir Putin’s administration (59%). Conversely, satisfaction levels were lower among those aged 55 and above (48%), individuals struggling to afford food (34%), and those critical of the country’s direction (27%) or opposed to Putin (21%).

Confidence in the future

Confidence in the future also surged, with 66% of Russians expressing optimism, a return to the near-maximum levels observed in May 2022 (67%). However, 31% remain uncertain about the future, a figure consistent with spring 2022 lows.

Young people were the most confident, with 87% expressing optimism. Other confident groups included those with disposable income (75%) and Putin supporters (72%). In contrast, uncertainty was most pronounced among those over 55 (34%), those struggling financially (52%), and Putin’s critics (78%).

Adapting to change

A growing proportion of Russians (38%) reported that their lives have remained stable over the past seven years, an 18 percentage-point increase. Meanwhile, 16% of respondents stated they had capitalised on new opportunities to improve their lives, an increase of eight points.

Fewer respondents reported struggling to maintain their previous lifestyle (15%, down 13 points) or resorting to any available means to earn money (23%, down six points). However, 6% of respondents still report being unable to adapt, a figure unchanged over the last six years.

The findings underline the significant influence of socio-economic and political factors on public sentiment. Those in financial stability or alignment with the government are more likely to express satisfaction and confidence, while older and economically disadvantaged groups, along with opposition supporters, report greater dissatisfaction and uncertainty, Levada concluded.

By Kit Klarenberg, Substack, 12/1/24

Apparently, Kit Klarenberg never sleeps. He just keeps posting top quality journalism on several topics on a regular basis. – Natylie

All my investigations are free to access, thanks to the generosity of my readers. Independent journalism nonetheless requires investment, so if you took value from this article or any others, please consider sharing, or even becoming a paid subscriber. Your support is always gratefully received, and will never be forgotten. To buy me a coffee or two, please click this link.

On November 27th, ultra-extremist militants Hayat Tahrir al-Sham launched a vast offensive in Syria. Within days, the Turkey-backed faction seized significant swaths of Aleppo, the country’s second-largest city, and advances elsewhere continue. While disinformation on the scale and success of HTS’ incursions abounds on social media, establishment news outlets remain the primary source of manipulation and deceit. No context to the current upsurge of violence is provided, although reference has been widely made to supposedly “peaceful” protests in 2011 that produced the decade-long Syrian civil war.

According to this narrative, pro-democracy demonstrators were brutally attacked by Syrian authorities for taking a righteous, public stand. Yet, the reality of what happened during that fateful time is amply documented in the Syrian government’s own internal documents. Namely, records of the Central Crisis Management Cell, created in March 2011 by Damascus to manage official responses to mass rioting that began weeks earlier.

Mainstream outlets have previously reported on this trove, dubbing them The Assad Files. However, reporters and rights groups have universally misrepresented, distorted or simply falsified their contents, in order to wrongfully convict Syrian officials of horrific crimes. In some instances, quite literally. In reality, the documents show Assad and his ministers struggled valiantly to prevent the upheaval from escalating into violence on either side, protect demonstrators, and keep the situation under control.

Meanwhile, sinister, unseen forces systematically murdered security service officials, pro-government figures, and protesters to foment catastrophe in a manner similar to many CIA regime change operations old and new. This shocking story has never before been told. Now, with dark insurrectionary clouds again pullulating over Damascus, it must be.

‘Brutal Violence’

Over the first months of 2011, the Arab Spring spread revolutionary fervor throughout North Africa and West Asia. Mass protests dislodged long-reigning dictators Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Libya was plunged into civil war, and even hyper-repressive, British-created Gulf monarchies appeared threatened. There was one exception, however. For the most part, the streets of Syria remained stubbornly calm.

This was despite relentless calls for upheaval by local opposition elements. Repeated demands for a “day of rage” against Assad’s government were widely publicized in the Western media but locally unheeded. As Al Jazeera explained in February of that year, Syrians had no appetite for regime change. For one, the country’s ethnically and religiously diverse population cherished their state’s secularism and feared unrest would create potentially violent tensions between them all.

Inconveniently, too, Assad was extremely popular, particularly with younger Syrians. He was widely perceived as a reformer who encouraged and protected diversity and inclusion, while overseeing a system that, while far from perfect, delivered comparatively high standards of education, healthcare, and much else for average citizens. Moreover, his refusal to accommodate Israel, unlike many other leaders in the region, was also greatly respected.

Peace in Damascus finally shattered in mid-March 2011, when massive demonstrations broke out in several major cities, following weeks of sporadic, small-scale bursts of public disobedience across the country. Reports of thousands arrested and an uncertain number of protesters killed spread widely. This was the spark that ignited the West’s secret dirty war in Syria. Ominously, mere days earlier, a truck carrying vast quantities of grenades and guns was intercepted at Syria’s border with Iraq.

Pater Frans was a Jesuit priest from the Netherlands who, in 1980, established a community center and farm near Homs. Ever after, he preached harmony between faiths and cared for people with disabilities. When the Syrian crisis erupted, he began publishing regular observations of events, deeply critical of both the government and the opposition. It is unknown whether such problematic insights motivated Frans’ murder by armed militants in April 2014. This was not long after he refused an offer of UN evacuation.

Before his death, Frans repeatedly noted that “from the start,” he witnessed armed demonstrators fire on police. “Very often,” he once recorded, “the violence of the security forces has been a reaction to the brutal violence of the armed rebels.” In September 2011, he wrote:

“From the start there has been the problem of the armed groups, which are also part of the opposition…The opposition of the street is much stronger than any other opposition. And this opposition is armed and frequently employs brutality and violence, only in order then to blame the government.”

‘Unidentified Bodies’

If peaceful protesters were killed in the initial stages of the Syrian “revolution”, the question of who was responsible remains unanswered today. The Central Crisis Management Cell records indicate in the days leading up to the mid-March protests, government officials issued explicit instructions to security forces that citizens “should not be provoked”:

“In order to avoid the consequences of continued incitement…and foil the attempts of inciters to exploit any pretext, civil police and security agents are requested not to provoke citizens.”

Similarly, on April 18th that year, the Cell ordered the military to only “counter with weapons those who carry weapons against the state, while ensuring that civilians are not harmed.” Four days later though, “at least” 72 protesters were allegedly shot dead by authorities in Daraa and Douma, the highest reported daily death toll since the demonstrations began. Condemnation from rights groups and Western leaders was instantaneous, and fiery.

Three months later, a number of Syrian Arab Army officers defected, forming the Free Syrian Army. They claimed to have become disaffected and thrown their weight behind the opposition due to the April 18th slaughter, alleging the mass shooting was expressly ordered by their superiors, which they refused to fulfill. However, if orders to execute protesters were given, they evidently weren’t approved by Assad or his ministers.

Cell records show the highest echelons of the Syrian government were extremely unhappy about the killings in Daraa and Douma, with one official cautioning this “difficult day” had “created a new situation…pushing us into circumstances we are better off without.” They further lamented, “if the directives previously issued had been adhered to, we would have prevented bloodshed, and matters would not have come to this culmination.”

An obvious suspicion is the use of lethal force was directed by Army commanders planning to defect, who wanted to concoct a valiant pretext for their desertion, while creating significant problems for the government. This interpretation is amply reinforced by defectors claiming soldiers who refused the order to kill civilians were themselves executed.

That narrative was eagerly seized upon by mainstream media, rights groups, and the Syrian opposition as proof of Assad’s maniacal bloodlust. Yet, even the Western-funded Syrian Observatory of Human Rights has dismissed it as entirely false “propaganda”, intended to create divisions within government forces and encourage further defections. More sinisterly, this narrative also provided a convenient explanation for why Syrian security operatives began dying in large numbers immediately after the “peaceful” protests began.

From late March onwards, targeted killings of security operatives and soldiers by unknown assailants became routine, before the military was even formally deployed in Syria. By early May, the Cell requested daily updates on casualties among “our own forces.” Publicly though, the government initially remained silent on the slaughter. The Cell records suggest officials were afraid of showing weakness, inflaming tensions, and encouraging further violence.

It was not until June, with the slaughter of at least 120 security forces by armed militants who’d taken over the town of Jisr al-Shughour, that Damascus – and the Western media – acknowledged the killing spree. Cell records show that by this time, government supporters were routinely being abducted, tortured, and murdered by opposition actors by the dozen. One weekly incident report, for example, refers to how “a refrigerated vehicle was found on the Homs-Zaydal highway, containing 27 unidentified bodies displaying gunshot wounds and signs of torture.”

This bloodletting led to the Syrian military’s formal deployment, and eruption of all-out war against Damascus. Every step of the way, authorities were keen to identify individuals who “incited demonstrations and those who had contacts with foreign bodies, whether they are media bodies or plotters, or bodies which took part in funding and arming demonstrators [emphasis added].” Still, despite the carnage, the Cell’s instructions remained unambiguous.

“Ensure that no drop of blood is shed when confronting and dispersing peaceful demonstrations,” an August memo stated. The following month, an order to “prohibit harming any detainee” was issued. “If there is evidence” that any security official “fell short in carrying out any mission,” the Cell dictated, the “officer, head of branch or field commander” in question would have to explain themselves to the government personally, “to hold them accountable.”

‘Some Chaos’

Several striking passages in the Cell documents refer to unidentified snipers lurking on rooftops and buildings adjacent to protests from the upheaval’s beginning, firing on crowds below. One memo records that in late April 2011, a sniper near an Aleppo mosque “shot demonstrators, killing one and injuring 43,” and “the situation of some injured is still delicate.”

As such, “arresting inciters, especially those shooting at demonstrators,” was considered a core priority for the Assad government for much of that year. Around this time, the Cell also hit upon the idea of capturing “a sniper, inciter or infiltrator” and presenting them publicly in a “convincing” manner. One official suggested, “surrounding and catching a sniper alive or injured and exposing him in the media is not impossible,” which would “restore public trust in security agencies and the police.”

Yet, this never came to pass. Damascus also neglected to publicly present a bombshell document circulated among “the so-called Syrian opposition in Lebanon”, which its intelligence services intercepted in May 2011. The remarkable file, reproduced in full in the Cell records, lays bare the opposition’s insurrectionary plans, providing a clear blueprint for precisely what had happened since March, and what was to come.

The opposition proposed convening mass demonstrations, so security forces “will lose control of all regions,” be “taken unaware,” and become “exhausted and distracted.” This, along with “honest officers and soldiers” joining “the ranks of the revolution”, would make “toppling down the regime” straightforward, it was believed, particularly as any crackdown on these protests would encourage a Western “military strike,” ala Libya. The opposition foresaw mainstream news outlets playing a significant role in making this happen:

“Everyone should be confident that with the continuation of demonstrations today, media channels will have no choice but to cover the events…Al Jazeera will be late due to considerations of mutual interests. But we have Al Arabiya and Western media channels who will come forward, and we will all see the change of tone in covering the events and demonstrations will be aired on all channels and they will have wide coverage.”

The document is the most palpable evidence to date that the entire Syrian “revolution” unfolded over the next decade according to a pre-prepared, well-honed script. Whether this was drawn up in direct collusion with Western powers remains to be proven. Still, the presence of snipers picking off protesters is a strong indication among many that this was the case.

Unidentified snipers are a frequent fixture of US-orchestrated colour revolutions and CIA coups, such as the attempted overthrow of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez in 2002, and Ukraine’s 2014 Maidan “revolution”. In both cases, the shooting of unarmed protesters by snipers was pivotal to unseating the targeted government. In Kiev, demonstrations that began months earlier had started running out of steam, when scores of anti-government activists were abruptly slain by sniper fire.

This turned the entire crowd violent, while triggering an avalanche of international condemnation, making President Viktor Yanukovych’s downfall a fait accompli. In the years since, three Georgian mercenaries have claimed they were expressly ordered by nationalist opposition actors and a US military veteran embedded with them to carry out a massacre, and “sow some chaos.” That foreign actors are involved in sowing the current chaos in Syria couldn’t be more unambiguous, or writ larger. But there’s more.