The Bell, 1/28/25

Putin-Trump talks: What to expect

Following Donald Trump’s inauguration as U.S. President, the prospect of Washington brokering a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine has shot up the global agenda. A source with contacts inside the Kremlin told The Bell that a deal is possible — but with many caveats.

Trump’s signals

In his election campaign, Trump promised to stop the war in 24 hours. He missed that deadline, but has made public overtures to Vladimir Putin in which he urged a quick resolution to the conflict, while threatening sanctions if Moscow does not comply. Trump has also been keen to talk up his good relationship with Putin and repeatedly said that he wants to meet as soon as possible.

The new US president has so far issued two key statements. First, Trump called on Putin to end his war in Ukraine, threatening to impose harsh “taxes, duties and sanctions” on everything that Russia sells to the US and “other countries involved.” This threat is hard to take seriously — tariffs on imported goods would not impact Russia in any way due to the microscopic size of its sales to the United States ($2.9 billion in the first 11 months of 2024), while sanctions against third countries were mentioned too briefly to constitute a meaningful warning to China or India to stop buying Russian oil.

Second, following a phone call with Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, Trump said that he would ask Saudi Arabia and OPEC to reduce oil prices. In Trump’s mind, that should stop the war by “cutting off” Russia’s vital export revenues. However, it is likely Trump has different motives. He would probably be demanding lower oil prices regardless of the war, just as he did in his first term. The Saudis are already planning to boost supplies to the global market, which would push down prices, but have yet to follow through.

The Kremlin reaction

Putin has twice responded publicly to Trump’s signals and his call to stop the war. First, the Russian president deliberately postponed a Security Council meeting to coincide with the inauguration in Washington when the president used the occasion to formally congratulate Trump on taking office (we discussed it here). Then, late last week, in a more substantial intervention, the Russian president told a state TV reporter that he was ready to meet his American counterpart, whom he called “pragmatic”, to “talk calmly.”

Once a meeting gets arranged, the question is what position the Kremlin will adopt — both in Putin’s first meeting with Trump and in any further wider talks on a ceasefire. Putin stated his current official position in June 2024, which has been dismissed by Volodymyr Zelensky as an ultimatum. Putin demanded the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from four regions that Russia has claimed to have annexed, despite holding only partial control of them (and, in the cases of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, without having seized the regional capitals). He also insisted that Ukraine renounce its desire to join NATO (enshrined in Kyiv’s constitution since 2019), demanded recognition that Crimea and the territories occupied since 2022 are Russian, and called for the lifting of Western sanctions.

These demands are clearly unfeasible and cannot be accepted by any Ukrainian government. The Kremlin’s real negotiating position will likely be more modest, albeit still unacceptable to Ukraine. A source close to the Kremlin told The Bell which issues are most crucial to Putin, and how an acceptable solution could be found:

• A ceasefire could be established along the current front line. As for the territories that Russia has annexed but does not control, neither side would recognize an official border, but they could agree to resolve this through diplomatic means. Putin may not be against exchanging small areas occupied by Russian troops, such as in the Kharkiv region, in return for something else.
• Ukraine will be expected to announce a status of permanent neutrality (as  proposed in the failed Istanbul peace talks in 2022). Putin is absolutely opposed to Ukraine joining NATO and any deployment of a NATO military base there would also be a red line, the source told The Bell. In mid-January a source told Bloomberg that Russia would insist on a sharp reduction in Ukraine’s ties with NATO. At the same time, NATO countries can continue to supply Ukraine with weapons, but these must not be used against Russia or in any attempt to regain control over the “disputed territories.”
• Security guarantees for Ukraine, which should form part of any deal, remain a  difficult area. The Bell’s source does not believe the strong peacekeeping force described by Trump and Zelensky will come about: no country is willing to face down a nuclear power over the fate of Ukraine, they said. “This means that Ukraine will have to accept there can be no meaningful guarantees. The negotiations would have to come up with some kind of formula that at least resembles a guarantee.”
• Russia may also pursue some of the demands from its full “wish list”, particularly in respect of limiting the size of Ukraine’s army, lifting some sanctions and restoring the Central Bank’s frozen assets in the west.

In general, according to The Bell’s source, Putin is prepared for any eventuality. If he needs to fight another year, or five, he is ready. If he sees a chance to reach a favorable settlement, he will take it. In this sense, the success of any negotiations will depend on the Americans, and how far they will push Ukraine to agree to terms acceptable to Putin, The Bell’s source summarized.

Why the world should care:

Trump’s inauguration has brought a radical turn in Washington’s attitude to the war. The United States is now seeking a swift resolution, and endless prolongation via ongoing military aid to Kyiv is off the agenda. There is a good chance that Russia will be able to keep, de facto if not de jure, a large part of occupied Ukrainian territory, if not all of what it has seized. If that is the general shape of the deal, then Putin and Russia’s propaganda machine will be able to hail a glorious victory not just over Ukraine, but over the “collective west.”