By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 3/26/25 (Excerpt)

The principal outcomes of the negotiation process so far (which is primarily taking the form of extensive talks between US and Russian teams and then providing a Ukrainian team some opportunity for comment) are still shaky. They mainly have to do with a partial and very temporary ceasefire that covers attacks on energy installations and energy infrastructures of either side, and an extension of this ceasefire to the Black Sea in a measure that is routinely described as the reinstatment of the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

If successful, then this measure should work in the interests of all parties:

• providing security for commercial shipping in the Black Sea,
• providing additional revenue to Ukraine for its Black Sea exports;
• providing additional revenue to Russia for grain and fertilizer exports; reducing the weight of Western sanctions on Russia;
• improving Russian access to Western agricultural hardware;
• reopening Russian markets to US agricultural corporations; increasing supplies of Russian grains at lower prices to China – which accounts for half of all Russian export sales of grains;
• lowering food prices worldwide and reducing inflationary pressures.

At this stage there are significant disagreements as to when the ceasfire begins, with Russia saying it began on March 18 (in which case Ukraine has violated the ceasefire in multiple instances) and Ukraine saying it begins whenever the White House formalizes the date (which I believe the White House now has done, for March 25). This disagreement would open up the possibility that Russia would renew attacks on Ukrainian energy facilities after March 18, attacks that Ukraine would then denounce as violations.

The Black Sea grain initiative refers back to a deal that was brokered by Turkey in 2022 whereby Russia undertook to allow safe passage to ships from Ukrainian ports for the export of grains to what at the time were believed to be very needy Global South destinations. Turkey was supposed to have inspected ships to ensure that the free passage was not being abused to cover for the flow of Western weapons into Ukraine. Turkey failed to live up to this important obligation.

Further, the majority of grain deliveries went not to the Global South, but to developed countries in the West. In addition, and most importantly, European countries did not live up to their undertaking to lift all measures in place to restrict the flow of Russian exports of grain and fertilizer. This last could have had the effect of limiting the overall volume of global trade in grain and, because of constrained supply of fertilizer and higher prices, the productivity of crops worldwide. It probably did have these effects even though Russia’s grain export earnings have continued to climb (see below).

The Black Sea grain initiative still needs to be thought through before it can be said to have taken effect, even though both sides have apparently agreed to it in principle. One major issue is who will do the inspecting. Turkey is clearly not a candidate. It is unlikely that relations between Russia and Turkey are as robust today as they were in 2022 (and they were always fragile, contingent on Erdogan’s notorious slipperiness in his balancing of Turkey’s interests between the US, Europe, Russia and the Arab World pressures).

Gilbert Doctorow has helpfully itemized some of the other measures that need to be resolved or executed. The initiative will take place only after:

(1) the US ends sanctions on Russian banks engaged in export of agricultural products, fish products and fertilizers;

(2) Rosselkhozbank is reconnected to SWIFT and correspondent accounts are opened with U.S. and other banks to handle the respective transactions;

(3) limitations on insurers for Russian flag vessels, restrictions on port services to these vessels are lifted;

(4) sanctions are lifted on producer and exporter companies in the sectors of agricultural, fish and fertilizer products. Russia will have to be allowed sanction-free access to purchase abroad agricultural machinery and equipment needed for its fish and fertilizer production.

Doctorow cites figures supplied by the The Financial Times showing that the sanctions have not actually prevented Russia from establishing alternative export routes and other work-arounds, and that Russian fertiliser exports hit a record 40mn tonnes last year and are expected to increase by up to 5 per cent in 2025.

TASS Summary of the Black Sea Initiative

1. In accordance with the agreement between the Presidents of Russia and the United States, the Russian and American sides agreed to ensure the implementation of the “Black Sea Initiative,” which includes ensuring the safety of navigation in the Black Sea, non-use of force, and prevention of the use of commercial vessels for military purposes while organizing appropriate control measures through inspection of such vessels.

2. The United States will help restore access for Russian agricultural and fertilizer exports to the world market, reduce the cost of shipping insurance, and expand access to ports and payment systems to conduct such transactions.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall come into force after:

Lifting sanctions restrictions from Rosselkhozbank and other financial organizations involved in ensuring operations on international trade in food products (including fish products) and fertilizers, connecting them to SWIFT, opening the necessary correspondent accounts;

Lifting restrictions on trade finance transactions;

Lifting sanctions restrictions on companies producing and exporting food (including fish products) and fertilizers, as well as lifting restrictions on the work of insurance companies with cargoes of food (including fish products) and fertilizers;

Lifting restrictions on servicing ships in ports and sanctions against ships under the Russian flag involved in the trade of food products (including fish products) and fertilizers;

Lifting restrictions on the supply of agricultural machinery to the Russian Federation, as well as other goods used in the production of food (including fish products) and fertilizers.

3. Russia and the United States agreed to develop measures to implement the agreements between the presidents of the two countries on a ban on strikes on energy facilities in Russia and Ukraine for a period of 30 days, starting on March 18, 2025, with the possibility of extension and withdrawal from the agreement in the event of non-compliance by one of the parties.

4. Russia and the United States welcome good offices from third countries aimed at supporting the implementation of agreements in the energy and maritime sectors.

5. Russia and the United States will continue to work to achieve a strong and lasting peace.