YouTube link here.

Transcript, Substack, 2/12/25

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Two years ago, when Michael and I first testified before your Weaponization of Government Subcommittee, Democratic members called us “so-called journalists,” suggested we were bought-off “scribes,” and questioned our ethics and loyalties. When we tried to answer, we were told to shut up, take off our tinfoil hats, and remember two things: one, there is no digital censorship, two, if there is digital censorship, it’s for our own good.

I was shocked. I thought the whole thing had to be a mistake. No way the party I gave votes to all my life was now pro-censorship. Then last year I listened to John Kerry, whom I voted for, talk to the World Economic Forum. Speaking about disinformation, he said “our First Amendment stands as a major block” to our ability to “hammer it out of existence.”

He complained that “it’s really hard to govern” because “people self-select where they go for their news,” which makes it “much harder to build consensus…”

I defended Kerry when people said he “looks French,” but Marie Antoinette would have been embarrassed by this speech. He was essentially complaining that the peasants are “self-selecting” their own media. What’s next, letting them make up their own minds?

“Building consensus” may be a politician’s job, but it’s not mine as a citizen or as a journalist. In fact, making it hard to govern is exactly the media’s job. The failure to understand this is why we have a censorship problem.

This is an Alamo moment for the First Amendment. Most of America’s closest allies have already adopted draconian speech laws. We’re surrounded. The EU’s new Digital Services Act is the most comprehensive censorship law ever instituted in a democratic society.

Ranking member Raskin, you don’t have to go as far as Russia or China to find people jailed for speech. Our allies in England now have an Online Safety Act that empowers the government to jail people for nebulous offenses like “false communication” or causing “psychological harm.” Germany, France, Australia, Canada, and other nations have implemented similar ideas.

These laws are totally incompatible with our system. Our own citizens have been arrested in some of these countries, but our government hasn’t stood up for them. Why? Because many of our bureaucrats believe in these laws.

Take USAID. Many Americans are in an uproar now because they learned about over $400 million going to an organization called Internews, whose chief Jeanne Bourgault boasted to Congress about training “hundreds of thousands of people” in journalism. Her views are almost identical to Kerry’s.

She gave a talk about “building trust and combatting misinformation” in India during the pandemic. She said that after months of a “really beautifully unified Covid-19 message,” vaccine enthusiasm rose to 87%, but when “mixed information on vaccine efficacy” got out, hesitancy ensued.

We’re paying this person to train journalists, and she doesn’t know the press doesn’t exist to promote “unity” or political goals like vaccine enthusiasm. That’s propaganda, not journalism.

Bourgault also once said that to fight “bad content,” we need to “work really hard on exclusion lists or inclusion lists” and “really try to focus our ad dollars” toward “the good news.”

Again, if you don’t know the fastest way to erode “trust” in media is by having government sponsor “exclusion lists,” you shouldn’t be getting a dollar in taxpayer money, let alone $476 million. And USAID is just a tiny piece of a censorship machine Michael and I saw across a long list of agencies. Collectively they’ve bought up every part of the news production line: sources, think-tanks, research, “fact-checking,” “anti-disinformation,” commercial media scoring, and when all else fails, censorship.

It’s a giant closed messaging loop, whose purpose is to transform the free press into a consensus machine. There’s no way to remove the rot surgically. The whole mechanism has to go.

Is there “right-wing misinformation”? Hell yes. It exists in every direction. But I grew up a Democrat and don’t remember being afraid of it. At the time, we didn’t need censorship because we figured we had the better argument.

Obviously, some of you lack that same confidence. You took billions from taxpayers and blew it on programs whose entire purpose was to tell them they’re wrong about things they can see with their own eyes.

You sold us out, and until these “rather tiresome” questions are answered, this problem is not fixed. Thank you.

Kremlin website, 2/24/25

Pavel Zarubin: Mr President, we have just watched your meeting on rare-earth metals. Forgive me, but I believe that right now, all journalists around the world are interested in rare-earth metals, although in a slightly different context. The United States, and I will put it mildly, is strongly urging Zelensky to sign an agreement with the US regarding these resources as payment for the aid Ukraine received from the former administration, the Biden administration. In your opinion, what are the prospects of such an agreement?

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: That has nothing to do with us. I do not have an opinion, nor do I even want to think about it. Of course, these resources should be evaluated – whether they exist, what is their amount, how much are they worth, and so on. But, again, that is not our concern.

Our concern is what we have just discussed during the meeting. Rare and rare-earth metals are crucial resources for modern industries. So far, we have not done enough in this area, and we need to do more. The purpose of the meeting today was to direct administrative resources to developing this sector in the initial phase.

By the way, we would be open to cooperation with our American partners – and when I say “partners” I mean not only administrative and government agencies but also private companies – as long as they show interest in working together.

It is important to emphasise that Russia possesses significantly – I want to stress this – significantly larger resources of this kind than Ukraine. Russia is one of the uncontested leaders when it comes to rare and rare-earth metal reserves. We have deposits in the north, in Murmansk, and in the Caucasus, in Kabardino-Balkaria, as well as in the Far East, in the Irkutsk Region, in Yakutia and Tuva. Developing these resources requires substantial capital investment. We would be happy to cooperate with any foreign partners, including American companies.

The same is true for the new territories: we are open to foreign partnerships. Our historical territories that have become part of the Russian Federation again also hold certain reserves. We are ready to work there with international partners, including Americans.

Pavel Zarubin: In the new regions too?

Vladimir Putin: Yes, of course.

Pavel Zarubin: We are seeing an avalanche of statements and debates these days, with everyone discussing Trump and why he is so adamant that Zelensky must hold elections and that his approval rating is just at four percent. There has been a lot of criticism among the Europeans regarding Trump’s statements. Some even believe that the current stance of the US President is actually playing into Russia’s hands. Do you believe this is actually the case?

Vladimir Putin: I think this is absolutely not the case. I have my own point of view on that and it runs counter to what you have just said.

In fact, the person who currently stands at the helm of the Kiev regime is becoming a toxic figure for the Ukrainian armed forces. He issues clumsy, poorly thought-out orders guided by a political agenda instead of military imperatives, and it is unclear where they are coming from. This results in huge losses for the Ukrainian army that cannot be justified, or should I say, to major or catastrophic losses. He is also becoming increasingly toxic for society in general. Today’s vote in the Rada on extending his powers proves this point, as far as I can judge.

Finally, he has boxed himself into a corner by signing an order banning peace treaty talks with the Russian Federation. He was the one who stopped these talks. What is this all about? What this means is that he evades talks. Why? Because once the talks begin, sooner or later, and probably quite quickly, they will bring about an end to martial law. Once this happens, he will have to hold an election. In that case, there will be no grounds for not holding an election anymore, since martial law currently serves as a pretext for not holding an election. But if you initiate the talks and they quickly bring about an end to martial law, this means that you need to hold an election right away. The current head of the regime has a problem with that.

Why? His approval rating, be it four percent or any other number, does not matter all that much. What matters is that his approval ratings – and according to the information at our disposal this is objective data – is exactly half that of his closest potential political rival. I am referring to Mr Zaluzhny, the former commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces who was sent, or should I say exiled, to London. His approval rating is twice as high as that of the current regime leader.

Once we consider the possibility that other political leaders, including former prime ministers and presidents, may support Zaluzhny’s possible candidacy, it becomes clear that the current regime leader will stand absolutely no chance of winning an election. His chances are zero – unless, of course, he blatantly rigs the election in one way or another, which would also be detrimental for him since everyone would be able to see through these attempts.

This is why he has become a destabilising factor for the army, society and the state. I am certain that the current US President, Mr Trump, understands this, which explains why he has been pushing the head of the Kiev regime to hold elections. As I see it, Trump’s goal is to restore political stability in Ukraine, consolidate society and enable the Ukrainian state to survive. Overall, this benefits Ukraine more than Russia, since our conflict is with the current regime, not the country itself.

All other things aside, the current [US] President has openly stated that he wants to achieve peace. By the way, this is something we want too, and the quicker this happens, the better. But the current [Ukrainian] regime leader stands in the way of achieving this goal. That, in my view, is the reasoning behind Trump’s position. It is not about advancing Russia’s interests. But it probably serves the interests of Ukraine, Ukrainian statehood and could help preserve it. We have no objection to that, even if we do not want this territory to be used as a launchpad for aggression against the Russian Federation, or as a hostile outpost targeting us. At the end of the day, we want it to evolve into a friendly neighbourly state.

Pavel Zarubin: Every day we hear many different statements from Trump. You have met with him more than once and you had a telephone conversation with him just recently. Do you think he is driven by his emotions?

Vladimir Putin: Of course not. Naturally, the current leader of the Kiev regime gives him plenty of reasons to express emotions. But based on what I have just said, a different picture emerges: his actions are not driven by emotions but rather by cold calculation and a rational assessment of the situation.

It may sound strange but frankly, in this situation, we would be interested in him staying in power and continuing to weaken the regime with which we are involved in an armed conflict. However, if the goal is to strengthen Ukrainian statehood, then a different approach is needed – bringing to power those who have the trust of the Ukrainian people.

Pavel Zarubin: In your opinion, do European leaders realise the current dynamics around Ukraine?

Vladimir Putin: You would have to ask them. But judging by their actions, I do not believe they fully grasp the situation. More importantly, unlike the US President, European political leaders are deeply entangled with the Kiev regime. They have made too many statements and promises and now, frankly speaking, it is very difficult or almost impossible for them to backtrack without losing face. Given that they are also facing internal political challenges, including elections, re-elections, parliamentary struggles, and so on, changing their stance is practically unthinkable in these circumstances.

In contrast, the newly-elected President of the United States, has far more freedom of action. He is not bound by past commitments that would prevent him from moving forward and working towards a resolution of this conflict. His direct and unrestrained approach reflects his character. He is in a unique position: not only does he say what he thinks but he says whatever he wants. And that, after all, is a privilege of a leader of a major global power.

Pavel Zarubin: Several days ago in St Petersburg, I asked you a question about everyone’s desire these days to have some kind of say in Russia-US talks, with Europeans insisting and demanding to be able to weigh in on the Ukraine talks.

What do you think about it?

Vladimir Putin: I do not think there is anything wrong with that. But no one can make demands in this situation – certainly not of Russia. Let them submit their demands and requests to someone else. In fact, they have been making demands from their vassals for thousands of years, but now they are the ones facing demands. So let them stay home and keep their demands to themselves so that they can think it over and understand how they got where they are today.

However, it is important that they take part in the negotiating process, of course. As for us, we have never turned down anyone’s requests. In fact, we kept the conversation going with them at all times. But then came a point when they came up with this far-fetched and illusionary idea of defeating Russia on the battlefield. So they were the ones who rejected all contacts with us. Should they wish to come back, we would only welcome it.

I observed the response to my telephone conversation with the US President, and I saw the response to the high-level meeting in Riyadh. It was emotional and devoid of any common sense. Why? Because in order to resolve challenging and urgent matters, including on the Ukrainian track, Russia and the United States must make the first step.

What will it be about? This first step must consist of increasing the level of trust between our two nations. This is what we focused on in Riyadh, and this will be the focus for the possible upcoming high-level contacts. Otherwise, it would be impossible to address any issues, including the Ukraine crisis with all its challenges and urgency.

But what do Europeans have to do with this? This is a matter of bilateral Russia-US relations. What role do Europeans see for themselves here? What can they contribute? Yes, the Ukraine crisis was mentioned in both the telephone conversation and at the Riyadh meeting, but without discussing its substance. All we did was agree to move in this direction. In this sense, of course, we do not deny European countries the right to be part of this process.

Let me emphasise that we also respect the position of our BRICS friends, who have established the Friends of Peace group. I talked to the President of the People’s Republic of China today, and we discussed this too. He informed me that the Friends of Peace group will hold another meeting in New York soon to discuss this agenda.

Not only do we welcome these efforts, but we are also grateful to all our partners who have been raising these issues and want to bring about a peace deal. Why am I saying this? This is not just about the Europeans – other countries also have the right to and can participate in this process, and we respect that.

Pavel Zarubin: May I ask you to comment on a few more statements made by President Trump, which, as I mentioned earlier, are many.

Vladimir Putin: Not all of them, alright?

Pavel Zarubin: Not all. For example, he said he wanted to propose to you and the head of China to cut the defence budgets in half. What do you think about this idea?

Vladimir Putin: I am aware, or I think I know where it comes from. It is likely based on the calculations by a British think tank, which calculated our respective spending in terms of purchasing power parity. Last year, the United States had, I think, US$968 billion, and if you put Russia and China’s spending together, it will roughly add up to the same amount. Russia’s and China’s spending combined add up to what the United States is spending.

First, we need to run the numbers. The British calculations may be correct, or may be not too correct, or not correct at all. They need to be looked at closely. This is my first point.

Second, I am not in a position to comment on how the People’s Republic of China would feel about this. The US side tried different approaches regarding strategic offensive weapons and other critical matters. So, this is a matter for the People’s Republic of China to decide on. However, we could come to an agreement with the United States, we are not against it. I think this is a good idea: the United States would cut their spending by 50 percent, and we would cut ours by 50 percent. The People’s Republic of China could then join in if it wants to. We think this is a good proposal, and we are open to discussing it.

Pavel Zarubin: President Trump also imposed 25-percent tariffs on aluminium and steel imports from all countries without exception. Our aluminium business with the United States used to be quite extensive. What do you think of this trade policy?

Vladimir Putin: I am not going to comment on the US trade policy, since it has been driven by sanctions for many years now. We believe sanctions are illegal and harm global trade and economy. I believe sanctions are bad for us and those who impose them.

With regard to trade policy, higher rates, tariffs and so on, each country decides for itself what is good for it and what is not. I can understand the logic behind it. They want to bring the manufacturers into the country, to create new jobs, and to have them pay taxes to all levels of the taxation system, and so on. Without a doubt, at some point, these actions will run into certain difficulties caused by inflationary pressure, higher costs of goods, and so on. Experts are well aware of this, and they can provide every detail of how it works.

As regards aluminium, in 2017, I think, about 15 percent of US [aluminium] imports came from Russia. If memory serves, the United States produces about 60 percent of the aluminium it needs, and imports the remaining 40 percent, of which 15 percent used to come from the Russian Federation. The main importer today is Canada.

If a decision is made to open the US market to our producers, we could sell about two million tonnes on the US market, which would not drastically affect prices, but, I think, would still have a restraining influence on prices.

In addition, and what is most importantly, in my opinion, we could think about working together with US companies in this area. For example, back in Soviet times, there were plans to build a new hydroelectric power plant and to create additional aluminium production facilities in the Krasnoyarsk Territory. After all, aluminium is, first of all, about energy, preferably cheap energy. Hydropower is cheap and environmentally friendly.

To reiterate, such plans have been in place since the Soviet times. However, these are capital- and investment-intensive projects. In today’s money, according to preliminary estimates, they will cost around 15 billion. We can think about it.

Indeed, the US President’s policy is to deploy production facilities in the United States. But if the US companies come to work in Russia, it will also benefit them greatly, because the companies will turn decent profit, and the corresponding amounts of aluminium will be supplied to their domestic market at absolutely acceptable market prices. There are things to ponder in this area, as well as in our potential joint work on rare and rare-earth metals and other areas, including, for example, energy.

Pavel Zarubin: I just read the latest news coming from the United States: President Trump said the United States and Russia were discussing major economic projects as part of Ukraine talks.

Vladimir Putin: Yes, some of our respective companies are in contact and are discussing such projects.

Pavel Zarubin: Thank you very much.

Vladimir Putin: Thank you.

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 2/7/25

Sanctions were supposed to hurt Russia’s economy and impoverish the people, right? Do you remember when early in the war there was the hope that the quality of life would sink so far that the population would rise up and oust Russian President Vladimir Putin?

Well, not only has that not happened, but for regular Russians life hasn’t been this good for years. The Central Bank of Russia (CBR)’s sky high interest rates are a major problem and hurting companies who are now laying off staff to cut costs – especially their IT departments. But for the man on the street they are a boon and people are cashing in on them.

In around 2019 Russia was booming again and the CBR cut the overnight rate to below 4% for the first time since 1991. Russia has always suffered from high inflation for most of the last three decades, but that fell to record lows too. Good news at a macroeconomic level. Bad news for the population as the interest rates on bank deposits tumbled to next to nothing.

One of regular Russian’s obsessions is how to protect your life savings against the ravages of inflation. And this is a very serious problem. In 1993 I fell into conversation with a babushka selling knitted socks on the street. It turned out that she had a PhD and had formerly been the chief engineer at a factory. But during the collapse of the Soviet Union her factory stopped working and her life savings – some $5000 worth of rubles, which was a lot in Soviet times – got hyperinflated away to less than $1 in a matter of months.

Russian banks have long relied on deposits as their main source of funding and offer decent rates. So when the prime rate fell to next to nothing in 2020 Russian punters started casting about for something else to invest into and for the third time started buying stocks.

It was a real boom market, as we reported at the time, and after two previous failed attempts to get regular Russians to buy stocks, it looked like this time it was really working and that Russia’s capital markers had finally come of age.

Of course, it all blew up again in 2022 after the invasion of Ukraine and the markets tanked yet again. Every time there has been a wave of retail investment into stocks the market has always blown up about a year later.

Now the setup has been turned on its head. The banks are paying at least 21% on term deposits. Inflation is high at around 10%, but that still leaves an 11% real interest rate spread on money in the bank – a very nice return indeed.

And it’s safe as houses. It’s tempting to assume that putting money in the crisis-prone Russia is very risky, but actually the opposite is true. Yes, the banking sector has blown up a few times, but the CBR’s deposit insurance scheme works extremely well and if your bank goes bust, punters will get their money back within a few weeks – provided you have less than about $30,000 in your account. (The EU equivalent is €100,000 – on a par with the Russian limits in price adjusted terms.)

And people have cash to save as currently after being stagnant for much of the last decade, Russian real disposable incomes were up to a record 9.6% in July. So for regular Russians, there are plenty of jobs, nominal wages are rising by about 12% a year, again ahead of inflation, banks are paying a healthy profit on deposits and on top of that Moscow just had a very warm winter so even the weather is nice.

That may change later this year when the economic problems are expected to get worse, but for now, for most people, life is good.

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 2/28/25

Some of Russia’s supporters at home and abroad have been skeptical of Trump’s commitment to peace talks with Putin, but the latter just praised his counterpart’s approach and thus sent a message to them. He was speaking at a meeting of the board of the Federal Security Service (FSB) when said that his first contacts with Trump and his team “inspire certain hopes”. He elaborated that the US now shares Russia’s desire to repair their relations and work on addressing larger strategic problems in the world.

Putin continued by saying that “our partners demonstrate pragmatism and a realistic vision of things, and have abandoned numerous stereotypes, the so-called rules, and messianic, ideological clichés of their predecessors.” He then warned the FSB about how “A portion of Western elites are still committed to maintaining instability in the world, and these forces will try to disrupt or to compromise the newly resumed dialogue.”

This was followed by him tasking them with “leveraging every possibility offered by diplomacy and special services to thwart such attempts.” Their latest mission deserves more attention due to what it signifies. For starters, it suggests that Putin and Trump are truly approaching a game-changing deal that can be described as a “New Détente” between their countries, the potential details of which were shared in the following five analyses:

* 3 January: “Creative Energy Diplomacy Can Lay The Basis For A Grand Russian-American Deal”

* 13 February: “Here’s What Comes Next After Putin & Trump Just Agreed To Start Peace Talks”

* 14 February: “Why Might Russia Repair Its Ties With The West & How Could This Reshape Its Foreign Policy?”

* 15 February: “Vance’s Munich Speech Vindicated Putin’s Summer 2022 Prediction About Political Change In Europe”

* 25 February: “Russia & The US’ Diplomatic Choreography At The UN Shows Their Commitment To A ‘New Détente’”

Moving along, the next point is that some Western elite might try to stop this “New Détente” since it goes against their interests. Nobody knows which forms this might take, but Putin’s warning about how they could try to disrupt this process hints at provocations against Russia and/or Belarus, while his words about compromising their dialogue could refer to leaks or lies. The FSB must in any case either preemptively avert these scenarios or have plans in place for what Russia should do if they materialize.

Third, the preceding two points imply Putin’s preference for his supporters to publicly back what he’s trying to achieve in the face of resistance from some Western elite or at least not discredit him by questioning his or Trump’s intentions. In other words, the “politically correct” interpretation of recent events is that Russia and the US are sincerely working to comprehensively patch up their problems for the world’s benefit, and anything that challenges this view will be frowned upon by the Kremlin.

The fourth point builds upon the last one by raising the possibility that those supporters who defy the new “politically correct” interpretation of recent events might even be suspected of operating under the influence of the dissident Western elite. This could lead to foreign ones being “canceled” and domestic ones investigated depending upon the way in which their own dissident views are expressed. And finally, the last point is that Putin wants everyone to trust him as he tries to clinch the real “deal of the century”.

These two articles were brought to my attention by Prof. Geoffrey Roberts:

A correspondent has pointed out to me that while there was no general election in Britain between 1935-1945, there were 200 parliamentary by-elections, including many during the war which featured candidates highly critical of the government. There was very lively political discussion in Britain throughout the war, not least at the height of the German Blitz. Pro-Fascist organisation were banned and their leaders interned but the British communist party remained legal and waged a massive anti-war campaign before the Soviet Union entered the conflict in June 1941 (though the party’s newspaper was temporarily prohibited). Members of leftist organisations that continued to resist war were imprisoned (including my late father-in-law), but for refusing to serve in the armed forces even in auxiliary capacities (which is what the Quakers and other pacifists did). – Prof. Geoffrey Roberts

Why shouldn’t Ukraine hold elections?

By Branko Marcetic, Responsible Statecraft, 2/24/25

For three years now, the U.S.-NATO policy of eschewing peace talks in Ukraine and pursuing a hypothetical and increasingly unlikely military victory has been predicated on defending democracy.

Ukraine, we were told, has a vibrant, flourishing democracy, and preserving its survival is worth any cost — including the tremendous loss of life, physical destruction, and economic devastation borne by the country as a result of this policy.

Yet now, Western media and commentators are in a state of panic at simply the idea that Ukraine might have to do what they’ve been saying is the entire mission of the war effort: act like a democracy.

A little background: Ukraine should have held a presidential election last year, but with the government having declared martial law shortly after the Russian invasion in February 2022, that election has been indefinitely delayed until it is lifted. That move has been controversial, including in Ukraine, where critics have complained that Zelensky — whose popularity has dropped significantly since the start of the war, and who has suspended opposition political parties, arrested, intimidated, and sanctioned potential rivals, consolidated media under his control, and generally centralized power — is using it to avoid being removed from office.

Peace negotiations have thrown a further wrinkle into this, as Fox News reported, one of the possible stages of a three-stage peace plan discussed in U.S.-Russia talks to end the war would be for Ukraine to hold elections after a ceasefire, and before the settlement is signed. It is still far from clear whether holding an election would actually be in the mix, however, as a U.S. source later walked it back, Russia’s foreign minister denied the report, and the idea hasn’t popped up in other reporting on the discussions.

In any case, one would think that, given the overwhelming concern for Ukrainian democracy among war hawks, an election in the near future would be enthusiastically welcomed. After all, it would not only give Ukraine the chance to demonstrate its democratic bona fides, but it would also prove wrong Trump’s claim that Zelensky is a “dictator,” undermine a key part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s propaganda, and give the Ukrainian president a renewed popular mandate.

Instead, as a host of Western commentators and news outlets now charge, a democratic election in Ukraine is not only impossible, but would be dangerous, wrong, and even part of a sinister Kremlin plot.

British journalist and media personality Piers Morgan called the idea “ridiculous,” pointing to the UK’s suspension of elections during World War II. Popular Twitter commentator Aaron Rupar likewise declared it “beyond ludicrous” for Ukraine “to hold an election when the country is an active war zone and 20 percent of it is under foreign occupation.” CNN anchor Jim Sciutto suggested the Kremlin would rig any election and possibly try and assassinate Zelensky.

***

Wartime Elections as Democratic Backsliding

By Oleksandr Vodiannikov, Website, 9/27/23

Oleksandr Vodiannikov, PhD, LLM, is a member of Ukraine’s Law Reform Commission and previously served as a member of Ukraine’s Judicial Reform Council and of the Constitutional Commission.

The topic of the next elections to the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine unexpectedly surfaced in public discourse towards the end of spring this year. In May 2023, PACE President Tiny Kox called for free and fair elections, despite the ongoing war. In July 2023, the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, Ruslan Stefanchuk, cautiously noted that there is no constitutional ban on holding elections during martial law, suggesting that the issue can be open for discussion. In September 2023, when questioned on the matter at the annual Yalta European Strategy conference in Kyiv, the President of Ukraine did not rule out such a possibility, but highlighted several practicalities that made elections unfeasible. “It is not a question of democracy. It is a question of security,” he stressed.

According to various press reports (see e.g. here, here, and here) Ukraine’s Western allies are urging the Ukrainian Government to organize elections despite the hostilities, often citing Israel as an example.

Indeed, if it were not for the war, Ukraine would already be in the midst of  the election process, as the next parliamentary ballot was supposed to be held on the last Sunday of October this year. However, on February 24, 2022, the world changed. The constitutional order of Ukraine also changed with various extraordinary mechanisms designed for extraordinary situations put in motion. This raises a logical question: can the next parliamentary elections be held under these conditions?

Julia Kyrychenko and Olha Ivasiuk’s recent article on Verfassungsblog outlines major legal and practical obstacles to holding wartime elections in Ukraine. In their illuminating analysis, the authors make a strong case against wartime elections, a viewpoint largely shared by civil society.

My argument is a bit different. I will argue that (1) wartime parliamentary elections are expressis verbis inconsistent with the Ukrainian Constitution, and (2) wartime elections would undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions and potentially lead to democratic backsliding.

Elections under extreme conditions: what does Ukraine’s Constitution say?

The prohibition of wartime elections is established in statutory law.  Article 19(1) of the Law of Ukraine “On the Legal Regime of Martial Law” prohibits the holding of elections for the President of Ukraine, as well as elections to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and local self-government, under martial law. The Electoral Code of Ukraine also provides for the suspension of any electoral process from the moment martial law is introduced (Article 20).

The constitutional text is no less straightforward: In the case of martial law or a state of emergency, Article 83(4) of the Constitution provides for the extension of the Parliament’s powers until the day of the first meeting of the first session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, elected after the termination of martial law or state of emergency. The wording of this provision leaves no room for ambiguity– Parliament shall be elected after martial law is lifted. Thus, there are grounds to argue that no parliamentary elections can be constitutionally held during martial law.

While the Constitution cannot be amended during martial law (Art. 157(2)), statutory law can. If the electoral legislation is amended to allow wartime elections, it would be a valid law of the land until the Constitutional Court of Ukraine declares it unconstitutional (presumption of constitutionality). Therefore I would not rule out such a scenario with legislative enactment if international pressure increases.  However, under extreme conditions of war, can free and fair elections be held and can the expression of will be free as required by Art. 71 of the Constitution?

Julia Kyrychenko and Olha Ivasiuk have already discussed the practical, security, and human rights implications of the wartime electoral process. In the realm of constitutional law, they supplement a key argument – wartime elections infringe the democratic principles of the Constitution (Article 1 “democratic state” and Article 71 “free elections”).

The Constitution of Ukraine establishes the principle of a democratic state (Art. 1), whereby all public authority emanates from the people. This principle extends beyond elections and directly influences the principle of free elections under Article 71. Elections provide  democratic legitimation, but only if they are free and fair. This means not only must the actual act of voting remain free of coercion and undue pressure, and the right to vote of eligible voters not be removed or impaired, but the entire electoral process be fair from start to finish. This is accomplished through numerous constitutional guarantees of freedom and equality as well as through institutional and procedural mechanisms.

The dilemma of wartime elections means the choice between two options: (1) holding elections that fall short of constitutional standards, or (2) suspending the electoral process until the end of the war. Here we need to look at another facet of the democratic state principle: democracy means self-determination of the people. Self-determination is based on the idea of free, rational, and informed choice. If democratic self-determination is to be meaningful, it necessitates certain pre-legal conditions, such as continuous free debate between opposing social forces, interests, and ideas.

War, crises, and other extreme conditions are periods of “moral panic” when the world and the course of things we know crumble. A society in such periods may be willing to agree to extraordinary measures, proposals or appeals that promise a swift return to normalcy. The constitutional order, democracy, rule of law, constitutional rights and freedoms become vulnerable because during such times there is an increased risk of irrational decisions. People may panic and support policies that are unreasonable and excessive, especially when the nation’s very existence is at stake.

Therefore, between the two options, suspending the electoral process should be favored. Even if martial law is suspended for the sake of elections and the election process is put into motion, it will be constitutionally suspicious and will likely be held in contradiction to the Constitution’s fundamental principles of a democratic state and free elections. Wartime cannot guarantee an environment where electoral process participants can freely and fully express their views and wills. It also cannot ensure that all citizens serving in the armed forces, seeking refuge abroad or surviving under foreign occupation can meaningfully participate in a competitive and vibrant political life. Therefore, the unfeasibility of wartime elections is as much a question of democracy as it is of security.

Elections during the war: legality versus legitimacy

The motives behind foreign allies urging Ukraine to hold elections despite the ongoing extreme conditions are clear: they aim to  prevent Ukraine’s democratic backsliding. However, the risk of carrying ballot boxes through the trenches is similar: elections under extreme conditions would with high probability “cement” the current power constellations for the next 5-year term and at the same time undermine the public legitimacy of democratic institutions elected during wartime, thus creating a conducive environment for democratic backsliding.

Predicting the outcomes of potential elections during the war is speculative. There is no compelling precedent or case where a democracy in war, with a fifth of its territory occupied by an enemy or affected by active hostilities, has managed to conduct free and fair elections. Common wisdom tells not to change leaders in times of war. Wartime conditions have an impact on electoral choices, more so on electoral campaign dynamics and the fairness of elections. Therefore, even if the incumbent party majority in the Parliament lacks widespread popular support and would probably lose elections in peacetime, wartime conditions could provide it with a good opportunity to either consolidate its parliamentary representation or maintain the current status quo for the upcoming parliamentary term.

However, what is troubling is that wartime elections could merely pay lip service to democratic development.

The Verhovna Rada of Ukraine is the only directly democratically legitimized representative body that ensures state power is based on the people’s recognition and approval. This legitimation derives from Ukrainian citizens exercising their right to vote in parliamentary elections which, in turn, should comply with constitutional principles. If such a right is weakened due to the objective exigencies of wartime, Parliament would suffer an unsurmountable legitimacy deficit with all ensuing consequences.

First, elections that are constitutionally questionable can  undermine the legitimacy of both the process and the elected Parliament. Tens of thousands of men and women on the frontline, as well as those surviving under occupation or seeking refuge abroad, would feel deceived and treated unfairly if they were not able to vote or stand for elections. This perceived injustice would create a new divide in Ukrainian society, posing a threat to post-war reconstruction.

Suspending martial law for the sake of elections would also not be well received by the Ukrainian society. Public resentment would affect the legitimacy of the  newly elected Parliament, especially if upon reinstatement of martial law war casualties would increase. Discontent with politicians could inevitably lead to frustration with democratic institutions.

Secondly, war distorts rational choice and exacerbates societal divisions. While wartime sociological polls show a strong unity and cohesion among the Ukrainian people, underlying divisions remain, now intensified by subjective experiences and personal histories of war. These emotional aftershocks of personal experience, drama or, I would say, collective posttraumatic syndrome could transform into various scenarios of deterioration of the general psychological climate with corresponding consequences for democratic development.

Transitioning back to peacetime democracy would not be easy. The societal trauma of war will require a delicate treatment, including implementing transitional justice, promoting social cohesion, and ensuring effective and responsible functioning of democratic institutions. But what is more important, if a legislature is elected during wartime, post-war Ukrainian society would be deprived of the opportunity to resolve the country’s problems through dialogue and free debate inherent in the election process on competing visions of the nation’s future.

The story of Sir Winston Churchill is illuminating in this context. Britain suspended elections during World War II. At the end of the war, Churchill’s support in British society reached 83%. However, his party lost the post-war elections in 1945. The example of Winston Churchill shows that democratic elections are won not based on past achievements, but on visions for the future. When the basic instinct of a nation under extreme conditions threatening its very existence is survival and return to normality, the future does not exist in this sense.