Strana, 3/11/25, Translated by Geoffrey Roberts

Ukraine has agreed to the US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire.

Vladimir Putin and other representatives of the Russian government have repeatedly stated they are against a ceasefire and favour a “long-term peace agreement”, conditional upon the transfer of the entire territory of four regions of Ukraine, recognition of them as Russian territory, neutral status, etc.

The prevailing opinion among commentators is the Kremlin will reject the ceasefire proposal (as we have already written, this is exactly what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is counting on, who initially did not want to talk about any ceasefire).

However, there are signals in the media that Putin may agree to a ceasefire. They have not been officially confirmed by the Kremlin, but this option cannot be 100% ruled out.

The key question is what will US President Donald Trump offer Russia in exchange for this?

If he lifts sanctions along with a ceasefire plus something else, that could be a strong argument.

In addition, there are other arguments:

1. The Russian Federation has the initiative at the front, and is achieving success, but this comes at a high price. To continue the war and achieve the goals declared by Moscow, even greater sacrifices and efforts will be needed. It will be necessary to declare mobilisation and completely transfer the economy to a war footing, cutting social and other items in favour of military spending (and the budget is already overstrained). In place of mobilised citizens, Russia will import migrants in ever greater numbers. All this could have grave consequences for the internal stability of the Russian Federation. Besides, according to all polls, a majority of Russians are for a ceasefire, provided that Russia retains the territories it has already captured.

2. Refusal to agree a truce could have negative foreign policy consequences for Russia. The United States will increase sanctions pressure, increase arms supplies to Ukraine, and a split in the West along US-Europe lines will become less likely due to the return of the “common enemy” in the person of Putin. In addition, the reaction of the global South could also be negative. Above all, China, which has long been calling for a speedy ceasefire. On the other hand, the end of hostilities will create an opportunity for Russia to begin normalising relations with both the United States and Europe. Moscow would be able to play a strong game in relation to growing contradictions between the United States, Europe and China.

3. Importantly, Russian troops have almost completely regained control over the Kursk region and the withdrawal of the UAF from there is only a matter of time. This removes one of the main arguments for the Kremlin against ending the war along the front line – the presence of the UAF on the internationally recognised territory of the Russian Federation.

4. The end of the war along the front line (if Ukraine’s armed forces are completely driven out of the Kursk region) will be a military victory for Russia, since it was able to capture part of the territory of a neighbouring state without losing its own.

5. The achievement of the political goals of the Russian Federation (both in domestic policy in Ukraine and in relations with NATO) can be achieved without military action. Trump already has a clear position on Ukraine’s non-accession to the Alliance. And other countries do not want to take it, so as not to run into the threat of war with the Russian Federation. As for internal processes in Ukraine, any prospects for normalising relations between Kyiv and Moscow are tied to one key point – ending the war.

We will find out about Putin’s decision out in the coming days. Perhaps he will refuse. Perhaps he will support a truce. Or perhaps he will set conditions for a ceasefire. But that will be a matter for negotiation. The main thing is a real readiness on both sides for a truce – which is still in question for Zelensky as well as Putin. Moreover, the “war party” in the West and in the Russian Federation will probably try to do everything possible to disrupt attempts to agree a truce.

As for the fact that the truce is not permanent, but temporary, the likelihood of a new war starting in 30 days is actually not very high. The balance of power between the parties is such that if hostilities resume, they will again turn into a war for one or two settlements without much meaning or prospects for a successful breakthrough – as is now obvious to everyone.