By Tarik Cyril Amar, Website, 3/9/25

This is a text from my informal series trying to convey better information about Russian politics than can be found in Western mainstream media. I pay particular attention to statements, policies, or events that the latter either distort, neglect, or entirely ignore – that is, a lot. While I cannot possibly fill that gap, I hope my efforts help Western readers in search of better and more serious coverage.

Here, I address a recent meeting (on 6 March) between the president of Russia Vladimir Putin and about twenty representatives of the Defenders of the Fatherland Fund, all of them women. The Russian presidency’s website has posted a long (over two hours) recording and a full transcript of the meeting, which are the basis for this text. [http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76418]

The fund is an important institution that emerged from the war between Russia, on one side, and Ukraine and the West, on the other. It was founded by presidential degree in 2023 and has branches in all of Russia’s 89 regions. Its “principle task,” to quote the website of the Russian government, “is individual social assistance and support [сопровождение] of veterans of the Special Military Operation [that is, the war in Ukraine] and of the families of fallen soldiers.”

I had to select aspects that appeared most interesting to me. But those who know Russian will see that it is very well worth listening to the whole meeting.

Some of the meeting consisted of questions, requests, and answers that concerned the details of the assistance and services offered by the fund and Russian public authorities, at the general, that is, federal as well as the regional level, to veterans of the war in Ukraine – or, in the official parlance that was used here, the “special military operation” – and their families. Such issues included, for instance, the standardization of these measures, requests to routinely extend them to further categories of family members, and the status of former prisoners who have volunteered for military service.

Here, incidentally, Putin made clear that this policy – often distorted in the West – makes distinctions: Certain categories of crime, such as treason and terrorism, disqualify prisoners. In essence, only those who have committed more or less ordinary crimes can volunteer.

Another thread running through the meeting may surprise those in the West who rely on Western mainstream media for their (dis)information about Russia: With many of the women present either the widows or mothers of fallen soldiers, the losses and sacrifices of war were by no means avoided in this recorded discussion with the president that is now posted on the presidency’s website. That is a notable fact worth paying attention to.

If anything, the death of Russian servicemen was a central, recurring topic of the meeting, coming up time and again and at length. In a generally patriotic register, unsurprisingly – as, by the way, it would be on any similar occasion in, for instance, the US, the UK, or France. Yet the key point to note is that Putin and his government do not rely on silencing the memory of loss. It is true that Russia keeps its total casualties secret, as does Ukraine. That is what states at war often do. But anyone who things that the Russian public is not permitted to think about the fact that Russians die in this war, needs to watch this discussion: the opposite is true.

Putin also repeatedly took the opportunity to acknowledge the military service, heroism, and sacrifice of the soldiers fighting at the front. Addressing the case of a soldier who had sacrificed himself to protect his unit, the president sent a warning to those in the West, clearly especially French president Emmanuel Macron, who “want to return to the times of Napoleon and forget how that ended.” “Indeed,” he then generalized, “all mistakes of our enemies [yes, that’s the term he used], [our] opponents have begun with just that – with underestimating” Russia and, in particular, its unity.

Putin praised the contribution of, by implication, all civilians in the rear and especially women, to the war effort in terms that may, at first sight, appear rhetorical. But, as he underlined, he meant it: “Your work also brings victory closer […] It’s not hyperbole […] your work facilitates the unity of [our society] around our boys, who are fighting, around our motherland. That is the aim of your work and it accomplished this task. And that is a most important condition for achieving success, I say [that] entirely deliberately.”

What made this explanation particularly interesting was the reference point Putin chose, namely World War I. Not, let’s note, World War II or the Great Fatherland War, that is, the specific struggle against Nazi Germany between 1941 and 1945. So much, again, for those in the West who cannot grasp that Putin is not obsessed with the Soviet Union. His horizon is Russia’s history as a whole and hence much wider.

Regarding his view of World War I, Putin revealed two intriguing facets of his thinking. He believes that, first, the Russian Empire of the day was merely months away from winning instead of losing (as it did in 1917, the year of two revolutions) and, secondly, that the decisive factor in its defeat was social disunity. In his own words, “in Russia [social unity] was not achieved during World War I, [instead, our] society began to break down, fall apart […] The fact that our country did not make it through to victory by merely a few months was linked to [that] disintegration of [our] society.”

Unsurprisingly, in that area, Putin sees a decisive difference with the, that is, his Russia of today: “And you,” he assured his audience, but surely also speaking about himself, “your position – that is the most important [thing]: that it unites the country. That is one of the elementary conditions of achieving success.”

Regarding the current search for a way to end the war by Russia and the US (under new management) – despite the Zelensky regime’s delusions and the NATO-EU Europeans’ best efforts to keep the bloodbath going – there were no surprises at this meeting. But there was a particularly and – most likely deliberate – signal that Moscow is not ready to make concessions on what it sees as its vital national interests and therefore indispensable war aims: It was the bereaved mother of a fallen (and highly decorated) 21-one year old elite soldier (from the legendary 810th Separate Guards Naval Infantry Brigade) who stressed that everyone was waiting for “victory” and that “we have to go through with this to the end; we must not make concessions to anyone.”

Unsurprisingly, the president agreed, confirming that concessions are not part of the plan. And that, to quote in full an important passage, “we [Russia] must select for ourselves […] a […] peace which will satisfy us and which will secure tranquility for our country in a long historical perspective. We need nothing from others, but we won’t hand over what is ours. And we need such a kind [of peace], precisely such a kind, which will secure the stable development of our country in conditions of peace and security.”

The phrase “We need nothing from others, but we won’t hand over what is ours” deserves special attention. Not only because it was widely reported in the Russian media. But also because it is important to be clear about what it implies: As Moscow now claims that both Crimea and four eastern oblast administrative regions in Ukraine now belong to Russia, it is crucial not to misunderstand its president here: For Russia – like or not – these regions are now formerly Ukrainian and currently part of “ours.” Putin’s statement was emphatically not about Russia’s border with Ukraine as of 2013.

Western observers and politicians would do very well to note at least three points from this meeting: 1) The above: Russia may be ready for a compromise but it will not compromise its key war aims, and that concerns, of course, not only territory but also Ukraine’s real neutrality. 2) Putin is confident – and probably with good reason – that Russia is united in pursuing these aims. If negotiations should lead nowhere, Moscow will not be afraid of continuing the war. 3) The Russian government sincerely believes – and I guess, so do many Russians – that this is a fight that is fundamentally defensive and that Russia must win it to secure a prosperous and independent future. That again means that Moscow will not agree to a peace – or truce – that does not reflect its de facto victory.