Trial by fire: Why the West won’t admit the truth about the 2014 Odessa massacre

By Tarik Cyril Amar, RT, 3/16/25

A sure sign that a news item inconvenient for Zelensky-regime Ukraine and its (remaining) Western supporters is important is that the Western mainstream media will do their best to ignore it. That rule has now held true for more than a decade. At some point in the future, it may stop operating, namely, if the West fully abandons its proxy war regime in Kiev.

Then, and only then, will the Western media heed a new “party line” by dumping that regime as well. But we are not there yet. Indeed, if it is up to the NATO-EU Europeans it may still be a long time before we will see Western mainstream media treating Ukrainian regimes truthfully and critically.

Exhibit A that the kid-gloves-for-Kiev rule is still in force: The way in which Western mainstream media audiences are not getting to hear much about a clearly momentous and, in its political implications, far-reaching finding by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR): A few days ago, the court decided an extremely important case against the Ukrainian authorities of both the major port city of Odessa and the capital Kiev.

The essence of the case and the court’s findings, which are available on its website, is not complicated. The Ukrainian authorities abysmally failed to avoid or respond adequately to severe street violence and killings that took place in Odessa in May 2014 between supporters and opponents of the regime change operation commonly known as “Maidan.”

Subsequently they also obstinately failed to investigate the incident. In other words, they first messed up criminally – or worse – and then engaged in a cover-up for over a decade. Not a minor issue if you consider that hundreds of victims were injured and 48 killed on that day.

Twenty-eight plaintiffs from Ukraine had challenged these failures of Ukraine’s current regime before the EHCR. After too many years of deliberation the court has now finally recognized – unanimously, including a Ukrainian judge – that the Ukrainian authorities committed “violations of Article 2 (right to life/investigation) of the European Convention on Human Rights, on account of the relevant authorities’ failure to do everything that could reasonably be expected of them to prevent the violence in Odesa on 2 May 2014, to stop that violence after its outbreak, to ensure timely rescue measures for people trapped in the fire, and to institute and conduct an effective investigation into the events.”

In addition, in one case, a “violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life)” was also found because of a delay in handing over a victim’s body for burial.

Take a step back and just consider the bare essentials: Unrest and mass killing have occurred, in a major city, too. And the public authorities of the state concerned have never provided a remotely adequate investigation or legal redress: Victims and their relatives were left without justice, perpetrators without punishment. In any country that is not content with being a failed state, an authoritarian swamp, or both, the above alone would be a scandal rocking and toppling governments.

But not in post-Maidan Ukraine. There, instead, major media, such as Ukrainska Pravda, for instance, are performing acrobatic mental contortions to protect their regime from the fallout of the ECHR decision. And how do they do so? By blaming the big bad Russians, of course. Because the very mature first principle of Ukrainian “agency” still is: If it succeeds, it was us; if it’s a fiasco, it was the Russians’ fault. So much for Ukraine’s “free” media and “civil society.” Yes, that’s sarcasm; yes, it’s richly deserved.

Those few Western mainstream media that have not entirely ignored the ECHR decision have, unsurprisingly, employed a similar tactic of obfuscation. Thus, Germany’s Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung does acknowledge that the ECHR “has condemned the Ukrainian authorities,” but reverts to common places about alleged Russian involvement to cushion the blow.

In reality, the court did go out of its way to find something negative to say about Russia, vaguely but demonstratively pointing to Moscow’s information warfare and intentions to “destabilize” Odessa. Yet when you read the ECHR’s press release on its decision honestly, one thing is perfectly clear: the gesturing toward Russia is unspecific and, in essence, rhetorical. It reads as if the judges felt they had to keep up appearances.

If anything, what we learn from these obligatory swipes at Russia is only one thing, namely that the ECHR is biased against it. Big surprise. And the real take-away point then is, of course, that the judges still found massively, comprehensively against the Ukrainian authorities. Even an anti-Russian bias could not sway them – to their credit – from acknowledging reality.

On May 2, 2014, that reality was gruesome: in clashes between pro-Maidan and anti-Maidan protesters, some died from gunshot wounds, but the preponderant majority, 42, of the victims died in a fire in the Odessa House of Trade Unions that broke out during and because of the fighting. While some of the fire’s victims received help from outside, others were deliberately blocked up in the burning building or beaten savagely when they escaped it.

The fire, in other words, may have been the result of deliberate arson or it may have started semi-accidentally when Molotov cocktails were deployed by both sides. But the key point is that it was not merely an accident. At least once it was blazing, it was a weapon because that’s how it was used. How do we know this? In case of a genuine accident, everyone helps put a fire out. Yet that was not at all the case here. Even police and fire services deliberately refrained from intervening.

Both sides fought, but the victims of the fire and thus almost all victims on May 2, belonged to the anti-Maidan side, which was far inferior in numbers and systematically demonized as “pro-Russian,” that is, smeared as “traitors.” And that is, of course, the reason why their relatives cannot receive justice in Ukraine and why those who killed or helped kill these victims are not prosecuted: they belong to the side which was in power then and is still in power now.

The West has its own reasons to ignore this ECHR finding: its whole narrative of why it went to proxy war against Russia in Ukraine is shot through with lies: beginning with the Maidan Massacre of February 2014, which was blamed on the old regime but really committed by pro-regime change, pro-Western snipers, as Ivan Katchanovski has long shown in painstaking detail.

Think about it: This was a false-flag operation that greatly helped catalyze a large regional war, pitting Ukraine and the West against Russia, with a clear potential of escalation to World War III. And the West will still not correct the record.

And in this enormous Western information war offensive, misrepresenting the Odessa killings of May 2014 has been almost as important as covering up the true nature of the Maidan Massacre in Kiev just over two months before.

Now, with the proxy war being lost for Ukraine and its Western supporters, an honest reckoning with these deceptions would expose how we were lied into it. And that is precisely why it cannot happen. At least not yet: Too many American, European, and Ukrainian politicians, generals, experts, journalists, and academics have too much to lose.

This absence of truth and justice can lead to more killing. In Odessa, one of the pro-Maidan street fighters of May 2014 has just been gunned down in broad daylight: Demyan Ganul was an open and proud far-right extremist and neo-Nazi, tattoos and all. He led his own outfit, called the Street Front and made a habit out of mocking the victims of the Trade Union House fire by having barbecue parties in front of the building on the fire’s anniversaries. He was generally violent, allegedly not only beating but also raping victims, including males. He terrorized others into fighting in the war. In his spare time, he toppled Russian monuments.

The Ukrainian authorities have announced that the investigation of Ganul’s end is now under the personal supervision of Interior Minister Igor Klimenko. The priorities of the Zelensky regime are ugly and unsurprising.

Larry Johnson: New York Times Fantasy Tale of Ukraine’s Almost Great Victory Over Russia

By Larry Johnson, Substack, 3/30/25

Larry Johnson is Managing Partner of BERG Associates, and former CIA Officer and State Department Counter Terrorism official.

The New York Times article discussed below can be found here.

Adam Entous of the New York Times just published a lengthy article that pretends to tell the true history of the war in Ukraine. I can summarize the massive story in one sentence — Ukraine would have destroyed the weak, incompetent Russians if only the Ukrainian generals had followed the guidance from the US military. If you’re looking for a signal that the war in Ukraine is on its last legs, this article is it. This is a ridiculous attempt to burnish the image of the Pentagon and US European Command as strategic and tactical geniuses who could have beaten the Russians if only those damn Ukrainians had followed their advice.

The article opens with an admission — this should be no surprise to Russia — that the US was actively and heavily involved in equipping Ukraine with weapons, intelligence and plans to attack and kill Russians:

“On a spring morning two months after Vladimir Putin’s invading armies marched into Ukraine, a convoy of unmarked cars slid up to a Kyiv street corner and collected two middle-aged men in civilian clothes. . . . The passengers were top Ukrainian generals. Their destination was Clay Kaserne, the headquarters of U.S. Army Europe and Africa in Wiesbaden, Germany. Their mission was to help forge what would become one of the most closely guarded secrets of the war in Ukraine. . . . Its evolution and inner workings visible to only a small circle of American and allied officials, that partnership of intelligence, strategy, planning and technology would become the secret weapon in what the Biden administration framed as its effort to both rescue Ukraine and protect the threatened post-World War II order.”

Entous appears to have another objective in mind with his article — blame Trump.

“Today that order — along with Ukraine’s defense of its land — teeters on a knife edge, as President Trump seeks rapprochement with Mr. Putin and vows to bring the war to a close. . . . Now, with negotiations beginning, the American president has baselessly blamed the Ukrainians for starting the war, pressured them to forfeit much of their mineral wealth and asked the Ukrainians to agree to a cease-fire without a promise of concrete American security guarantees — a peace with no certainty of continued peace.”

Entous also makes sure to give the United States credit for any and all successes, whether real or not, while blaming Generals Zaluzhnyi and Syrsky for the failures. “Ain’t our fault the Ukrainians fucked this up,” is the implied lament that permeates the article. We, the US, were the backbone don’t cha know:

“But a New York Times investigation reveals that America was woven into the war far more intimately and broadly than previously understood. At critical moments, the partnership was the backbone of Ukrainian military operations that, by U.S. counts, have killed or wounded more than 700,000 Russian soldiers. (Ukraine has put its casualty toll at 435,000.) Side by side in Wiesbaden’s mission command center, American and Ukrainian officers planned Kyiv’s counteroffensives. A vast American intelligence-collection effort both guided big-picture battle strategy and funneled precise targeting information down to Ukrainian soldiers in the field.”

In the following passage, you have another example of the blame game as well as the specious claim that Russia was suffering incomprehensible losses, only to be saved by fractious politics in Kiev:

“As the Ukrainians won greater autonomy in the partnership, they increasingly kept their intentions secret. They were perennially angered that the Americans couldn’t, or wouldn’t, give them all of the weapons and other equipment they wanted. The Americans, in turn, were angered by what they saw as the Ukrainians’ unreasonable demands, and by their reluctance to take politically risky steps to bolster their vastly outnumbered forces.

“On a tactical level, the partnership yielded triumph upon triumph. Yet at arguably the pivotal moment of the war — in mid-2023, as the Ukrainians mounted a counteroffensive to build victorious momentum after the first year’s successes — the strategy devised in Wiesbaden fell victim to the fractious internal politics of Ukraine: The president, Volodymyr Zelensky, versus his military chief (and potential electoral rival), and the military chief versus his headstrong subordinate commander. When Mr. Zelensky sided with the subordinate, the Ukrainians poured vast complements of men and resources into a finally futile campaign to recapture the devastated city of Bakhmut. Within months, the entire counteroffensive ended in stillborn failure.”

The Entous article, taken as a whole, celebrates the Ukrainian illusory victories while ignoring the facts about Russia’s actual military conquests. Not one word about Russia’s taking of Mariupol early in the war. Not one word about the small size of Russia’s initial force in February 2022, which was dwarfed by Ukraine. Not one word about Russia’s rejuvenated defense industry cranking out artillery, artillery shells, tanks, armored vehicles and drones. Nope. Russia is just a weak nation that Ukraine had on the ropes, and Ukraine failed to administer the coup de grace advocated by the same US military leaders who were driven out of Afghanistan.

While Entous admits that Biden and his team repeatedly crossed lines they had previously refused to penetrate, he fails to explain that Russian successes on the battlefield were the primary reason for Biden’s desperate moves.

‘Time and again, the Biden administration authorized clandestine operations it had previously prohibited. American military advisers were dispatched to Kyiv and later allowed to travel closer to the fighting. Military and C.I.A. officers in Wiesbaden helped plan and support a campaign of Ukrainian strikes in Russian-annexed Crimea. Finally, the military and then the C.I.A. received the green light to enable pinpoint strikes deep inside Russia itself.”

Entous also falsely reports the reason for Russia’s withdrawal of forces from Kiev in March of 2022. He insists the Ukrainians had fought Russia to a standstill. Yet, we now know, that Putin ordered the withdrawal of forces as a sign of good faith as part of the Istanbul peace negotiations, which were subsequently sabotaged by the United States and our blond-haired bitch, Boris Johnson.

“In March (2022), their assault on Kyiv stalling, the Russians reoriented their ambitions, and their war plan, surging additional forces east and south — a logistical feat the Americans thought would take months. It took two and a half weeks.”

By the summer of 2022, the United States military started playing word games. Even though USEUCOM was providing Ukraine with targeting intel that was used to hit Russian targets, the US military leaders opted to employ euphemisms.

“Inside the U.S. European Command, this process gave rise to a fine but fraught linguistic debate: Given the delicacy of the mission, was it unduly provocative to call targets “targets”?

“Some officers thought “targets” was appropriate. Others called them “intel tippers,” because the Russians were often moving and the information would need verification on the ground.

“The debate was settled by Maj. Gen. Timothy D. Brown, European Command’s intelligence chief: The locations of Russian forces would be “points of interest.” Intelligence on airborne threats would be “tracks of interest.”

Entous’ article, after a long introduction, discusses Ukraine’s war in four separate sections. In Part 3 –The Best-Laid Plans — Entous recounts Ukraine’s failed counteroffensive in June of 2023, without calling it a failure. He tries to claim it as a lopsided victory, at least in Bakhmut, because Russia allegedly suffered more casualties than Ukraine, even though Russia enjoyed a decisive advantage in artillery and drones. At no point does Entous blame the US generals, who Entous claims planned the counteroffensive, for authorizing a plan that did not provide attacking Ukrainian troops with air cover.

“Though counts vary wildly, there is little question that the Russians’ casualties — in the tens of thousands — far outstripped the Ukrainians’. Yet General Syrsky never did recapture Bakhmut, never did advance toward Luhansk. And while the Russians rebuilt their brigades and soldiered on in the east, the Ukrainians had no such easy source of recruits. (Mr. Prigozhin pulled his rebels back before reaching Moscow; two months later, he died in a plane crash that American intelligence believed had the hallmarks of a Kremlin-sponsored assassination.)”

Entous, in the closing paragraphs of Part 3, grudgingly admits the counteroffensive was a clusterfuck, but refuses to assign any blame to the incredible US military leaders.

“But to another senior Ukrainian official, “The real reason why we were not successful was because an improper number of forces were assigned to execute the plan.”

“Either way, for the partners, the counteroffensive’s devastating outcome left bruised feelings on both sides. “The important relationships were maintained,” said Ms. Wallander, the Pentagon official. “But it was no longer the inspired and trusting brotherhood of 2022 and early 2023.”

You really should try to read the entire piece (I’ve linked to it above), but wear your hip waders, you’ll be walking through a massive pile of Male Bovine Excrement, aka BS.

***

Matt Taibbi: Biden Lied About Everything, Including Nuclear Risk, During Ukraine Operation (Excerpt)

By Matt Taibbi, Substack, 3/31/25

…The [New York Times] piece is also an extraordinarily comprehensive betrayal of Zelensky and Ukraine, exponentially worse than the “dressing down” by Trump. Authored by longtime veteran of controversial intel pieces Adam Entous, it’s sourced to 300 American and European officials who seem to be responding to their apparent sidelining via a shameless tantrum, exhibiting behavior that in the field would get military men shot. Not only do they play kiss and tell with a trove of operational secrets, they use the Times to deflect blame from their own failures onto erstwhile Slavic partners, cast as ignorant savages who snatched defeat from the jaws of America-designed victory. It’s as morally abhorrent a piece of ass-covering ever as I’ve seen in print, and that somehow is not its worst quality.

The people who quarterbacked the NATO side of the Ukraine war are so pleased with themselves, they can’t keep from boasting about things that will make the average American want to pitchfork the lot of them. Entous describes a tale told “through a secret keyhole” that reveals how America was “woven into the war far more intimately and broadly than previously understood.” (Translation: it was hidden from us.) Sources not only make it clear that the public was lied to on a continuous basis from the outset of the conflict, but they describe how we were lied to, apparently thinking the methods clever. Some are small semantic gambits the idiots wrongly believe exculpated their actions, but the main revelation involves one gigantic, inexcusable deception. From Joe Biden down, they all lied about the risk of World War III.

They risked our lives and our children’s lives, knowingly, repeatedly, and for the worst possible reason: politics. Afraid to admit a mistake, they planned individual excuses while letting bureaucratic inertia expand the conflict. Worse, as was guessed at on this site late last year, the Biden administration after last November’s election increased the risk of global conflict by “expanding the ops box to allow ATACMS and British Storm Shadow strikes into Russia,” in order to “shore up his Ukraine project.” If you check this “secret history” against contemporaneous statements of American and European leaders, you’ll find the scale of the lies beyond comprehension. Heads need to roll for this…

…If you’re wondering when we ever heard an American official acknowledge a non-zero threat of nuclear retaliation throughout this conflict, the answer is, never. In fact we were consistently told by Biden and everyone else that the opposite was true, that “World War III won’t be fought in Ukraine,” because the United States was not bringing its own troops into the theater of battle:

According to the Times, as Biden was saying these things, his administration “time and again… authorized clandestine operations it had previously prohibited.” This in turn forced us to “dispatch” advisers “to Kyiv and later… closer to the fighting,” out of concern of more line-crossing. The military and the CIA were then given permission to launch strikes “deep inside Russia itself,” which prompted thoughts from Entous:

In some ways, Ukraine was, on a wider canvas, a rematch in a long history of U.S.-Russia proxy wars — Vietnam in the 1960s, Afghanistan in the 1980s, Syria three decades later… It was also a grand experiment in war fighting, one that would not only help the Ukrainians but reward the Americans with lessons for any future war.

How many times were we scolded that this was no “proxy war,” and not a quagmire like Vietnam or Afghanistan? A hundred? A thousand? As early as April 28, 2022, right when this “partnership” run out of the Wiesbaden “warren” began, Biden explicitly denied we were in a proxy war, and said Russia was only making such claims to excuse their failures in defeating Ukraine:

Internally, concern along these exact lines was growing. American M777 howitzer batteries were effective at first against Russian troops, but soon they learned to pull material behind the 15-mile limit of those shells. Ukraine and some American and NATO officials began demanding the administration escalate by deploying “High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, known as HIMARS, which used satellite-guided rockets to execute strikes up to 50 miles away.” This is the moment when the Biden administration passed the point of mass-deception no return:

The ensuing debate reflected the Americans’ evolving thinking. Pentagon officials were resistant, loath to deplete the Army’s limited HIMARS stocks. But in May, General Cavoli visited Washington and made the case that ultimately won them over… At the White House, Mr. Biden and his advisers weighed that argument against fears that pushing the Russians would only lead Mr. Putin to panic and widen the war. When the generals requested HIMARS, one official recalled, the moment felt like “standing on that line, wondering, if you take a step forward, is World War III going to break out?”

Unbelievable! The U.S. began delivering HIMARS missiles to Ukraine in June 2022, which means for almost two years a White House that claimed not to be worried about World War III or nuclear war was worried about exactly that, each time they took a “step forward.” There were many steps after HIMARS, all cataloged by Entous, who began short-handing the nuclear war concern by referring to “red lines.”

When we upgraded from HIMARS to ATACMS missiles, expanding the range to 190 miles, it was “a particularly sore subject for the Biden administration,” because Russian commander Valery Gerasimov had “warned General [Mark] Milley that anything that flew 190 miles would be breaching a red line.”

…To many watching from afar, it seemed like simple common sense that using American weapons and American support personnel to attack Russians in Russia risked drawing this country into a shooting war with a nuclear enemy at any moment. Those of us who said these things were dismissed as alarmist, Putin-loving fellow-travelers. Now we have Entous describing American officials feeling the same after the opening of “ops box” attacks:

With Wiesbaden’s points of interest and coordinates, as well as the Ukrainians’ own intelligence, HIMARS strikes into the ops box helped defend Kharkiv. The Russians suffered some of their heaviest casualties of the war… The unthinkable had become real. The United States was now woven into the killing of Russian soldiers on sovereign Russian soil.

We never heard any concern of this type. Instead, we were told repeatedly that if anyone was risking World War III, it was Putin, and moreover that any nuclear risk would not involve Europe or the United States, but Ukraine. Former Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul described nuclear combat as a “low probability event” at the outset of the war, noting Russia had no reason to strike at us, because “they are not under an existential threat. NATO is not going to invade Russia.” A little over a year later, America was “woven into” the killing of Russians on Russian soil….

Steve Jermy: Right now NATO could not win a war with Russia

By Ret. Royal Navy Commodore Steve Jermy, Responsible Statecraft, 1/29/25

(Ret.) Royal Navy Commodore Steve Jermy commanded warships in the 5th Destroyer Squadron and Britain’s Fleet Air Arm. He served in the Falklands War and in the Adriatic for the Bosnian and Kosovo campaigns, and retired after an operational tour, in 2007, as Strategy Director in the British Embassy in Afghanistan. He is the author of Strategy for Action: Using Force Wisely in the 21st Century and now works in offshore energy.

In 2024, reflecting a popular Western belief, former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said: “NATO is the most powerful and successful alliance in history.” Yet just two years earlier in 2022, after a 15-year campaign, NATO was defeated by the Taliban, a rag-tag group of poorly armed insurgents.

How can NATO’s humiliating defeat and Austin’s view be reconciled?

Of course NATO was never the most powerful military alliance in history — that accolade surely goes to the World War II Allies: the U.S., Russia, Britain, and the Commonwealth nations. Nevertheless, after 1945, NATO did its job, did it well, and those of us who served in it were proud to do so.

Since the Berlin Wall’s fall, though, its record has become tarnished. Satisfactory in Kosovo. Humiliated in Afghanistan. Strategic failure looming in Ukraine. Are we really sure NATO is up to the job of defending democratic Europe from a supposedly expansionist Russia in the doomsday scenario of a conventional NATO-Russia war?

The doomsday NATO-Russia war scenario is the defining way to explore this question. “Amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics,” and our strategic analysis needs to start all the way back in NATO’s logistics rear areas, then work forward to a future line of battle on the continent of Europe.

First, unlike Russia, no major NATO nation is industrially mobilized for war, as evidenced by the fact that Russia is still outproducing NATO on 155mm shells for Ukraine. Which, incidentally, gives the lie to the view that Russia is poised to take more of Europe — if we in NATO truly believed this, we would all be mobilizing at speed.

More importantly, it is not clear that NATO could mobilize at the speed or scale needed to produce the levels of equipment, ammunition, and people to match Russia. And certainly not without a long build up that would signal our intent. This is not just about lost industrial capacity, but also lost financial capacity. Of the largest NATO nations, only Germany has a debt to GDP ratio below 100%.

Second, to have the remotest chance of success in this doomsday scenario of a NATO-Russia war, U.S. forces would need to deploy at scale into continental Europe. Even if the U.S. Army was established at the necessary scale — with a 2023 establishment of 473,000, under one third of the current Russian Army, it is not — the overwhelming majority of American equipment and logistics would have to travel by sea.

There, they would be vulnerable to Russian submarine-launched torpedoes and mines. As a former underwater warfare specialist, I do not believe that NATO now has the scale of anti-submarine or mine-warfare forces needed to protect Europe’s sea lines of communication.

Nor, for that matter, would these forces be able to successfully protect Europe’s hydrocarbon imports, in particular oil and LNG so critical to Europe’s economic survival. Losses because of our sea supply vulnerability would not only degrade military production, but also bring accelerating economic hardship to NATO citizens, as soaring prices and energy shortages accompanying an outbreak of war rapidly escalated the political pressure to settle.

Third, our airports, sea ports, training, and logistics bases would be exposed to conventional ballistic missile attack, against which we have extremely limited defenses. Indeed, in the case of the Oreshnik missile, no defense.

An Oreshnik missile arriving at Mach 10+ would devastate a NATO arms factory, or naval, army and air force base. As in Ukraine, Russia’s ballistic campaign would also target our transport, logistics, and energy infrastructure. In 2003, while I was working for the British MOD’s Policy Planning staffs, our post 9/11 threat analysis suggested a successful attack against an LNG terminal, such as Milford Haven, Rotterdam, or Barcelona, would have sub-nuclear consequences. The follow-on economic shock-waves would rapidly ripple across a European continent, now increasingly dependent on LNG.

Fourth, unlike Russia, NATO nations’ forces are a heterogenous bunch. My own experience, while leading the offshore training of all European warships at Flag Officer Sea Training in Plymouth, and later working with NATO forces in Afghanistan, was that all NATO forces were exceptionally enthusiastic but had very different levels of technological advancement and trained effectiveness.

Perhaps more contemporarily important, other than a handful of NATO trainers forward deployed in Ukraine, our forces are trained according to a pre-drone “maneuver doctrine” and have no real-world experience of modern peer-to-peer attritional warfighting. Whereas the Russian Army has close to three years experience now, and is unarguably the world’s most battle-hardened.

Fifth, NATO’s decision-making system is cumbersome, hampered by the need to constantly communicate from Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe to national capitals — a complexity made worse each time another nation is admitted.

Worse still, NATO cannot do strategy. Shortly after arriving in Afghanistan in 2007, I was shocked to find that NATO had no campaign strategy. In 2022, notwithstanding numerous Russian warnings about NATO expansion constituting a red-line, NATO was wholly unprepared, strategically, for the obvious possibility of war breaking out — as evidenced again by our inability to match Russia’s 155mm shell production.

Even now, in 2025, NATO’s Ukraine strategy is opaque, perhaps best summarized as “double-down and hope.”

In summary, NATO is positioning itself as Europe’s defender, yet lacks the industrial capacity to sustain peer-to-peer warfighting, is wholly dependent on U.S. forces for the remotest chance of success, is unable satisfactorily to defend its sea lines of communication against Russian submarine, or its training and industrial infrastructure against strategic ballistic bombardment, is comprised of a diverse mix of un-bloodied conventional forces, and lacks the capacity to think and act strategically.

An easy NATO victory cannot be assumed, and I am afraid that the opposite looks far more likely to me.

So what? Conventionally, we could now work out how to redress the manifest weaknesses revealed. Strategic audits to confirm the capability gaps. Capability analyses to work out how to fill the gaps. Conferences to decide who does what and where costs should fall. Whilst all the time muddling on, hoping that NATO might eventually prevail in Ukraine, notwithstanding all the evidence to the contrary.

But without unanimous agreement of the NATO nations to increase military investment at scale, we would be lucky to solve these capability shortfalls within ten years, let alone five.

Or we could return to consider — at last — the judgement of many Western realists that NATO expansion was the touchpaper for the Russo-Ukraine War. The Russians warned us, time and again, that such expansion constituted a red line. So too did some of our very greatest strategic thinkers, starting with George Kennan in 1996, Henry KissingerJack Matlock, even Bill Burns in his famous ‘Nyet means Nyet’ diplomatic telegram, and most recently John Mearsheimer with his 2014 forecasts. All ignored.

The truth is that NATO now exists to confront the threats created by its continuing existence. Yet as our scenario shows, NATO does not have the capacity to defeat the primary threat that its continuing existence has created.

So perhaps this is the time to have an honest conversation about the future of NATO, and to ask two questions. How do we return to the sustainable peace in Europe that all sides to the conflict seek? Is NATO the primary obstacle to this sustainable peace?