Russia Matters, 4/21/25

1. With the 30-hour Easter ceasefire come and gone, Western and Ukrainian officials will re-convene in London this week to discuss a confidential document that contains “ideas for how to end the war in Ukraine by granting concessions to Russia, including potential U.S. recognition of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and excluding Kyiv from joining NATO,” according to WSJ’s Michael Gordon and Alan Cullison. In the shorter-term the U.S. proposes freezing the frontline “while designating the territory around the nuclear reactor in Zaporizhzhia as neutral territory that could be under American control,” according to these two journalists. While Russia won’t be sending a representative to the April 23 talks, which will bring together U.S., Ukrainian and European officials, Vladimir Putin signaled that he is prepared to explore a partial ceasefire even as he declared the Easter truce expired. “The proposal not to strike at civilian infrastructure facilities” should be a “subject for careful study,” he told Russian media on April 21. In his remarks to Russian journalists on that day Putin also, somewhat surprisingly, acknowledged that the Easter weekend ceasefire was partially observed by the Ukrainian side.¹
2. When asked about the pending expiration of New START, Alexey Arbatov, who is one of Russia’s most renowned nuclear arms control experts (if not the most renowned), warned that the U.S. and Russia “may find ourselves on the ladder of escalation to a nuclear war, from which it is almost impossible to jump off… without the New START treaty and the numerous preceding treaties and agreements, we would now find ourselves back in the nightmare days of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.” While New START cannot be extended as it is, the signatories could adopt “politically binding statements that the parties will not exceed the New START ceilings,” according to Arbatov. “There is another, more formal option. It is possible to use Article 15 of the New START Treaty and amend it to allow for its agreed extension for a five-year period more than once,” he proposed. In the meantime Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed doubts Russia needs a replacement for New START, at least for as long as the relationship with the U.S. is adversarial. “Americans… continue to label us an adversary… You can’t just cherry-pick one element from the New START Treaty—like the right to inspect each other’s nuclear facilities—and ignore the rest,” he asserted.
3. CSIS’s dive into China-Russia military ties not only explores heavily-sanctioned Russia’s increasing dependence on China for supplies of “critical defense components,” but also reveals a shift in leadership roles in RF-PRC wargames. “As China’s military capabilities grow, CSIS analysts highlight a shift in leadership within joint drills—such as the 2021 Zapad/Interaction exercise where China led operations—signaling a potential role reversal with China as the senior partner in future engagements,” according to this U.S. think-tank’s April 2025 report, entitled “How Deep Are China-Russia Military Ties?”