Russian Memorandum
Published by RT on 6/2/25:
The Russian delegation presented its peace proposal to the Ukrainian side during the talks in Istanbul on Monday.
Among the main points, Moscow’s memorandum calls on Kiev to withdraw its troops from the former Ukrainian territories that have joined Russia and confirm its neutral and non-nuclear status.
Draft as of June 1, 2025
Proposals of the Russian Federation (Memorandum) on the Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis
Section I
Key Parameters for a Definitive Settlement
1. International legal recognition of the incorporation into the Russian Federation of Crimea, the LPR, the DPR, and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions; full withdrawal from these territories of Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) units and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations;
2. Neutrality of Ukraine, implying its refusal to join military alliances and coalitions, as well as a ban on any military activity by third-party states on Ukrainian territory and the deployment of foreign armed formations, military bases and military infrastructure there;
3. Termination of all existing international treaties and agreements inconsistent with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of this Section, and refusal to conclude any such agreements in the future;
4. Confirmation of Ukraine’s status as a state without nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, with a direct ban on their receipt, transit and deployment on Ukrainian territory;
5. Establishment of maximum limits for the size of the AFU and other Ukrainian military formations, the quantity of armaments and military equipment, and their permissible specifications; dissolution of Ukrainian nationalist formations within the AFU and National Guard;
6. Guarantees of the full rights, freedoms and interests of the Russian and Russian-speaking population; granting the Russian language official status;
7. Legislative prohibition of the glorification and propaganda of Nazism and neo-Nazism, dissolution of nationalist organizations and parties;
8. Lifting of all current economic sanctions, bans and restrictive measures between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and refusal to impose new ones;
9. Resolution of issues related to family reunification and displaced persons;
10. Waiver of mutual claims for damages incurred during hostilities;
11. Removal of restrictions imposed on the Orthodox Church of Ukraine;
12. Gradual restoration of diplomatic and economic relations (including gas transit), transport and other connections, including with third-party states.
Section II
Ceasefire Conditions
Option 1.
Commencement of complete withdrawal of the AFU and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations from the territory of the Russian Federation, including the DPR, LPR, and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, and their pullback from the borders of the Russian Federation to a distance agreed upon by the Parties, in accordance with Provisions to be approved.
Option 2. “Package Proposal”:
1. Prohibition on redeployment of the AFU and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations, except for movements aimed at withdrawal from the borders of the Russian Federation to a distance agreed upon by the Parties;
2. Cessation of mobilization and commencement of demobilization;
3. Cessation of foreign supplies of military products and foreign military assistance to Ukraine, including the provision of satellite communication services and intelligence data;
4. Elimination of military presence of third countries on Ukrainian territory, cessation of participation of foreign specialists in military operations on Ukraine’s side;
5. Guarantees of Ukraine’s renunciation of sabotage and subversive activities against the Russian Federation and its citizens;
6. Establishment of a bilateral Center for Monitoring and Control of the Ceasefire Regime;
7. Mutual amnesty for “political prisoners” and release of detained civilians;
8. Lifting of martial law in Ukraine;
9. Announcement of the date for elections of the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada, which must take place no later than 100 days after the lifting of martial law;
10. Signing of an Agreement on the implementation of provisions contained in Section I.
Section III
Sequence of Steps and Timeline for Implementation
1. Work commences on drafting the Treaty text;
2. A 2-3 day ceasefire is declared for collection of bodies of the fallen in the “gray zone”;
3, Six thousand bodies of AFU servicemen are unilaterally transferred to the AFU;
4. A Ceasefire Memorandum is signed with specific dates for fulfillment of all provisions, determining the date for signing the future Treaty on Final Settlement (hereinafter, the Treaty);
5. A 30-day ceasefire regime takes effect from the moment the AFU withdrawal begins. Complete withdrawal of AFU units from the territory of the Russian Federation and full implementation of the “package agreement” must be completed within these 30 days;
6. Elections are conducted and government bodies are formed on the territory of Ukraine;
7. The Treaty is signed;
8. The signed Treaty is endorsed by a legally binding UN Security Council resolution;
9. The Treaty is ratified, enforced, and implemented.
***
Ukrainian Memorandum
Published by Reuters on 6/1/25:
KYIV, June 1 (Reuters) – Reuters has seen the text of the peace proposals that Ukrainian negotiators plan to present to the Russian side at peace talks scheduled to take place on June 2 in Istanbul.
The text of the Ukrainian document is published in full with no changes.
Ukraine-Russia Negotiations Framework
I. Key Principles of the Agreement and the Negotiation Process
• Full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.
• Confidence-building measures – addressing humanitarian issues: unconditionally return all deported and illegally displaced Ukrainian children. Exchange of all prisoners (the “all for all”
principle). Release by Russia of all civilian hostages.
• Non-repetition of aggression: The aim of the negotiations is to restore a permanent basis for lasting peace and security and to ensure that aggression does not occur again.
• Security guarantees and engagement of the international community: Ukraine must receive robust security guarantees. The parties will invite the international community to participate in the negotiations and provide guarantees to ensure the implementation of the agreements.
• Sovereignty: Ukraine is not forced to be neutral. It can choose to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and move towards EU membership. Ukraine’s membership in NATO depends on consensus within the Alliance. No restrictions may be imposed on the number, deployment, or other parameters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as on the deployment of troops of friendly foreign states on the territory of Ukraine.
• Territorial issues: Territorial gains made by Russia since February 2014 are not recognized by the international community. The contact line is the starting point for negotiations. Territory issues are discussed only after a full and unconditional ceasefire.
• Sanctions: Some sanctions may be lifted from Russia, but in stages and only gradually, with a mechanism for resuming sanctions if necessary (snapback). Frozen Russian sovereign assets are used for reconstruction or remain frozen until reparations are paid.
• Implementation: Agree on a clear, balanced and achievable roadmap for implementation and enforcement of the agreements.
II. Next step – agreeing ceasefire and agenda of the leaders’ meeting
• After the meeting in Istanbul, the parties continue the talks which shall focus on: (1) full and unconditional ceasefire: its modalities and monitoring; (2) confidence building measures; (3) preparation, agreeing agenda and structure of future leaders’ negotiations on key topics.
• Negotiations to be held with the U.S. and Europe participating.
III. Ceasefire
• Full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea at least for 30 days (with the possibility of rolling extensions every 30 days) as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.
• Ceasefire monitoring, led by the US and supported by third countries.
IV. Confidence-building measures
• After successful exchange of PoWs after Istanbul talks, the parties continue the exchange process for all prisoners of war (“all for all” principle).
• Agreement on unconditional return by the Russian Federation of all deported and displaced Ukrainian children, and release by Russia of all civilian prisoners. These measures should include all categories of persons listed, starting from February 2014.
V. Leaders’ meeting
• The leaders of Ukraine and Russia meet to agree on key aspects of final peace settlement.
• Key topics of peace agreement to be agreed by the leaders:
1) Permanent and complete cessation of hostilities: conditions, monitoring, sanctions for violations
2) Security guarantees and non-repetition of aggression
3) Territorial issues
4) Economy, compensation, reconstruction
5) Penalties for breach of agreements
6) Conclusion of a final peace agreement
***
Fresh Ukraine, Russia demands show no interest for actual peace
By Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 6/3/25
The memos presented by Ukraine and Russia at their direct talks in Istanbul on Monday make it absolutely clear that, absent a strong U.S. intervention based on a detailed U.S. peace plan, there will be no peace settlement in Ukraine.
It is not just that several of the positions on both sides are completely mutually incompatible; they suggest that at present neither side is in fact interested in an early peace.
The Ukrainian memo, presented before the talks, sets a “full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.” Russia has already rejected this and will continue to do so — naturally, because it would mean giving up its main point of leverage for nothing in return. Nor indeed is a fragile and unstable ceasefire in the interests of Ukraine or the West. If Ukraine is to begin the extremely challenging process of economic reconstruction and democratic reform, it needs a stable and permanent peace.
The Ukrainian memo also states that “no restrictions may be imposed on the number, deployment, or other parameters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as on the deployment of troops of friendly foreign states on the territory of Ukraine.” Russia has already stated that it will not under any circumstances accept the presence of Western troops in Ukraine since it sees this as NATO membership in all but name. European leaders have also stated that a European force could only be deployed with a U.S. guarantee of support, a condition which the Trump administration has rejected.
The Ukrainian memo continues, “some sanctions may be lifted from Russia, but in stages and only gradually, with a mechanism for resuming sanctions if necessary (snapback). Frozen Russian sovereign assets are used for reconstruction or remain frozen until reparations are paid.” Moscow will obviously not agree to a final peace without the lifting of sanctions or firm assurances that they will be lifted.
On one key point, the Ukrainian memo does leave room for compromise: “Ukraine is not forced to be neutral. It can choose to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and move towards EU membership. Ukraine’s membership in NATO depends on consensus within the Alliance.” Russia has in fact already publicly stated that Ukraine has the sovereign right to seek EU membership. And on NATO membership, the memo is correct that this does not depend on Ukraine but on unanimous agreement (not merely “consensus”) among existing members.
The Trump administration (or any European government) is therefore in a position to block Ukrainian NATO membership without reference to Kyiv. The problem for Moscow however is that Poland and other European members of NATO continue to declare their support for Ukraine’s membership; and, if the Democrats win the U.S. elections in 2028, they could overturn Trump’s veto. The Russians therefore are insisting on a Ukrainian constitutional commitment to neutrality and/or a U.S.-Russian treaty to that effect — which Kyiv is refusing.
Meanwhile, accounts of the Russian memo presented in Istanbul, as reported by the Russian media, include reported conditions for a ceasefire that Moscow must know are totally unacceptable to the Ukrainians — though this does not in itself rule out the possibility of Russia being willing to compromise on some of them in a final settlement if it meets its goals in other areas — especially bilateral relations with Washington.
They include “complete withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Donbas, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions. The second option for the ceasefire is a ban on major redeployments of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the abolition of mobilization and martial law, and the cessation of supplies of foreign weapons.”
This is not going to happen, absent Russian victory on the battlefield. Ukraine will never agree to surrender territory that it still holds, nor will European countries agree to end all weapons supplies.
In return for a ceasefire, the Russian memo as reported calls for “international recognition of these regions and Crimea as part of Russia.” This is utterly pointless. It is not just that neither Ukraine nor Western countries will legally recognize the Russian annexations; China, India and South Africa have also refused this, and will continue to do so. The best that Russia can hope for (as was indeed provisionally agreed at the Istanbul talks in March 2022) is to defer the legal status of these territories for future negotiation.
As part of an eventual peace settlement, Russia is also apparently demanding that:
-Kyiv must announce the date of the presidential and Rada elections, which must take place no later than 100 days after the lifting of martial law;
-The size of the Ukrainian military be limited;
-A legal ban on Nazi & neo-Nazi propaganda. Dissolution of “nationalist” parties & organizations;
-Restoration of rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church;
-A peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine must be approved by a legally binding resolution of the U.N. Security Council;
-It is necessary to ensure the full rights, freedoms and interests of Russian speakers;
-Renouncing mutual claims with Ukraine in connection with damage from military operations.
Formal endorsement of the peace treaty by the UNSC makes very good sense. The other Russian conditions however will be exceptionally difficult for Kyiv to meet under Russian pressure — not least because in several cases they would need the legal approval of the Ukrainian parliament, which is very unlikely to give it.
Only Washington can offer Russia compromises in other areas (for example on U.S. force deployments in Europe) that could persuade Moscow to reduce these conditions to reasonable levels; and only Washington could then pressure Kyiv and European capitals into accepting them. Some of the Russian conditions (including minority rights) are not only legitimate, but essential if postwar Ukraine is to progress towards eventual EU membership, but a formula has to be found whereby Ukraine can agree to them as a starting point of the EU accession process, and not as surrender to Moscow.
The Trump administration can be forgiven its exasperation with the state of the peace process. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake — from the point of view of America’s own interests — for the U.S. to walk away from it. Apart from the fact that sooner or later Washington would inevitably be dragged back in, three recent developments have highlighted how a prolonged continuation of the war will involve serious risks for the U.S.
Thus the weekend’s devastating Ukrainian attack on Russia’s nuclear-capable bomber fleet undermines nuclear security between the U.S. and Russia.
The bipartisan bill to go before the U.S. Senate next week (with the encouragement of the EU presidency) proposes 500% tariffs on imports from countries that buy Russian oil and gas. Presumably the senators are thinking of China. They appear to have forgotten that it also means India (and other U.S. partners). India has no intention of bowing to a U.S. diktat that would radically increase its energy costs and undermine its economy; and the imposition of 500% tariffs on India would ruin a vital U.S. relationship in Asia.
Finally, the EU has passed a new package of sanctions against Russia including measures to target the so-called “shadow fleet” of internationally-flagged tankers transporting Russian energy exports. This is also an affront to countries like India that buy this energy — and consider that they have a perfect right to do so under international law, since Western sanctions against Russia have not been approved by the United Nations, or agreed by themselves.
Last month, an Estonian patrol boat attempted to board a tanker bound for Russia in international waters, and Moscow sent a fighter jet to warn the Estonians off. Finland and Sweden have also threatened to detain such ships. Russia in response briefly detained a Liberian-flagged Greek tanker exiting Estonia through Russian waters. Russian politicians have threatened retaliatory seizures: “Any attack on our carriers can be regarded as an attack on our territory, even if the ship is under a foreign flag,” warned Alexei Zhuravlev, the deputy chairman of Russia’s parliamentary defense committee.
If both sides stick to their positions, then naval clashes will be not only possible, but certain. It is also obvious that these NATO members would never engage in such wildly reckless behavior unless they believed that in the event of such clashes, the U.S. military would come to their aid. The Trump administration needs to rein them in very firmly indeed. It also however needs to continue trying to bring an end to the Ukraine War, for as long as the war continues, so will the danger of a local collision between Russia and NATO members, from which the U.S. will not be able to remain aloof.