Russia Matters, 6/2/25

1. “Astonishing” is the adjective Economist and Politico writers used to describe Ukraine’s operation to smuggle some 150 drones into Russia and launch them in a June 1 attack on Russian long-range bombers and early-warning aircraft at bases across Russia, including one base 2,500 miles away from Ukraine. “Today’s operation is likely to be ranked among the most important raiding actions in modern warfare,” the Economist proclaimed in reference to the June 1 attack, in which an estimated record of 11 to 12 Russian long-range bombers were damaged or destroyed within one day.¹ “The Ukrainians rewrote the rules of warfare again,” claimed Max Boot in his Washington Post column. Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy lauded the attack, calling it “brilliant,” and even some of Russia’s pro-war commentators conceded Ukrainian creativity in this instance. The June 1 attacks showed “the enemy is strong, cunning, technically savvy,” editors of the pro-war Russian telegram channel Dva Mayora wrote. Notably, both pro-Kremlin commentators, such as Georgy Bovt and Aleksey Zhivov, and opposition-minded Russian commentators, such as Alexander Baunov, discussed whether the June 1attacks could increase the probability of a nuclear strike by Russia. Pro-Kremlin commentator Sergei Markov warned against a nuclear response to Ukraine’s attacks, warning that “this would lead to real political and economic isolation in the world,” while “tactical nuclear weapons would not significantly change the military situation in Russia’s favor.” It should be noted that the June 1 strikes on Russian long-range bombers, which form the air leg of Russia’s strategic nuclear triad, could theoretically satisfy the criteria for Russia’s use of nuclear weapons per its 2024 Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.”² That said, however, even if all of the estimated seven Tu-95 bombers damaged or destroyed in the attack could not be repaired, that would still leave Russia with an estimated total of 45 such bombers and 15 more advanced Tu-160 bombers, meaning the air leg of the Russian strategic nuclear triad would still have 60 aircraft. Thus, while the tactics used in the June 1 attack contain innovations, such as mass launches of UAVs against multiple targets from trucks, the losses this attack has caused are unlikely to have a decisive impact on either the Russian strategic nuclear triad (which mostly relies on ICBMs), or on Russia’s ability to launch cruise missiles at Ukraine.*
2. “Ukraine and Russia agreed to hold a new prisoner exchange and swapped memorandums on a possible ceasefire to end Vladimir Putin’s three-year war,” but remained “far apart on terms for a lasting ceasefire after a second round of peace talks in Istanbul” on June 2, Financial Times reported. Ukraine should pursue a peace deal in earnest because it is losing in the war of attrition, according to George Beebe, while Moscow should follow suit because “although Moscow can break Ukraine, it cannot fix it.” “Only Trump can deliver the kind of deal that can secure Ukraine, stabilize Europe and still address Russia’s core concerns,” Beebe writes in a commentary for Responsible Statecraft. See the texts of both memoranda in the section on “Ukraine-related negotiations” to compare Russia’s and Ukraine’s negotiating positions.

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Zelenskyy’s Reckless Strikes Risk Undermining New START Treaty: The Role of Visible Nuclear Bombers

By Iain Muir, Substack, 6/2/25

The United States and Russia maintain their commitment to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), a vital framework for global nuclear stability. Signed in 2010 and extended until February 2026, the treaty limits each nation to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 700 deployed delivery systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

A key aspect of compliance involves parking nuclear-capable bombers in open view at airbases, enabling verification through satellite imagery. However, Ukraine’s drone attacks on 1 June 2025, authorised by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and targeting Russian strategic bombers at bases such as Belaya, Diaghilevo, Olenya, and Ivanovo, have raised concerns about the treaty’s stability.

While reports claim over 40 aircraft were damaged or destroyed, only 8-10 losses or damages have been visually confirmed.

This article examines the reasons behind U.S. and Russian adherence to New START, the role of visible bomber deployments, the risks posed by Zelenskyy’s actions, and the possible sources of satellite imagery used for Ukraine’s strikes, including the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

New START Framework

Implemented in 2011, New START seeks to reduce nuclear escalation risks by capping the strategic arsenals of the U.S. and Russia. The treaty allows 18 annual on-site inspections, biannual data exchanges, and notifications for changes in delivery system status, such as converting a bomber from nuclear to conventional roles. According to the September 2022 data exchange, the U.S. reported 659 deployed delivery systems and Russia 540, both within the 700-unit limit. Heavy bombers, such as the U.S. B-52 Stratofortress and B-2 Spirit or Russia’s Tu-95 Bear and Tu-160 Blackjack, count as one delivery system each, regardless of warhead capacity.

Satellite imagery is central to New START’s verification regime. Bombers stationed openly at bases like Minot Air Force Base (North Dakota) for the U.S. or Engels Air Base for Russia allow both nations to confirm compliance with treaty limits without relying solely on inspections. Although not mandated, this visibility supports transparency. Ukraine’s recent attacks, approved by Zelenskyy and targeting openly deployed bombers, have sparked concerns about the treaty’s future.

Reasons for U.S. and Russian Compliance

The U.S. and Russia adhere to New START due to strategic, diplomatic, and practical considerations:

1. Strategic Stability: By limiting warheads and delivery systems, New START fosters predictability. Russia’s Tu-160 fleet at Engels, constrained by the treaty, assures the U.S., while U.S. B-52s at Barksdale offer similar reassurance to Russia. This mutual transparency stabilises deterrence, supporting a balanced strategic environment.

2. Robust Verification: The treaty’s mechanisms, including satellite monitoring and on-site inspections, ensure compliance. Openly parked bombers, visible via commercial satellite imagery from providers like Maxar, allow both nations to verify adherence to the 700-delivery-system limit. For example, the U.S. declares which B-52s are nuclear-capable, and Russia follows suit for its Tu-95s, with open deployments facilitating verification.

3. Diplomatic Credibility: Compliance strengthens both nations’ global standing. For the U.S., adherence highlights leadership in non-proliferation, reinforcing alliances and influence in forums like the United Nations. For Russia, it supports its position as a responsible nuclear power, enhancing diplomatic engagement. Visible bombers signal transparency, affirming commitment to the treaty.

4. Economic Pragmatism: Building additional bombers or warheads beyond treaty limits would require substantial investment. Both nations focus on modernisation within constraints—the U.S. with the B-21 Raider and Russia with the Tu-160M. Open parking avoids the high costs of hardened shelters or underground facilities, impractical for large fleets like the U.S.’s 66 B-52s or Russia’s 60+ Tu-95s.

5. Avoiding Escalation: Adhering to New START prevents actions that could prompt the other side to expand its arsenal, maintaining stability. Visible bombers reduce suspicions of covert buildup, as concealment could suggest non-compliance. Russia’s open deployment of Tu-95s at Ukrainka, for instance, aligns with treaty obligations, as does the U.S.’s approach at Minot.

Zelenskyy’s Attacks and Risks to New START

On 1 June 2025, Ukraine, under President Zelenskyy’s authorisation, launched a drone operation, codenamed “Web,” targeting Russian airbases hosting strategic bombers. The strikes, involving 117 drones, targeted aircraft at Belaya, Diaghilevo, Olenya, and Ivanovo. While initial reports claimed over 40 aircraft, including Tu-95s and Tu-22M3s, were damaged or destroyed, affecting a significant portion of Russia’s strategic cruise missile carriers, only 8-10 losses or damages have been visually confirmed through satellite imagery and other sources. Although Ukraine, a non-signatory, cannot directly violate New START, Zelenskyy’s decision to target these assets raises concerns about the treaty’s stability:

1. Exploitation of Transparency: New START’s Article VI requires observable strategic arms to prevent concealment, with Russia deploying Tu-95s and Tu-22M3s openly at bases like Olenya to comply. Zelenskyy’s strikes leveraged this visibility, using precise targeting data to hit bombers integral to Russia’s strategic forces. This could lead Russia to reconsider open deployments, potentially affecting treaty verification.

2. Potential Treaty Tensions: The attacks targeted aircraft linked to Russia’s strategic capabilities, which its nuclear doctrine (updated November 2024) considers critical. While Russia continues to engage with New START, Zelenskyy’s actions could prompt adjustments in deployment practices, complicating transparency and verification as the treaty nears its 2026 expiration.

3. Perceived U.S. Complicity: Despite Ukraine’s claim that the U.S. had no prior knowledge, suspicions of U.S. involvement, particularly through agencies like the CIA, may arise due to intelligence-sharing. Such perceptions could challenge trust, hindering future arms control discussions.

4. Strategic Imbalance: The confirmed loss or damage of 8-10 bombers reduces Russia’s delivery systems, potentially bringing it below the 700-unit limit. While not a violation, this could disrupt the treaty’s intended balance, possibly influencing Russia’s modernisation efforts within treaty constraints.

Ukraine’s Claim and Satellite Imagery Sources

Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) asserts that the U.S. had no prior knowledge of the 1 June attacks, supported by reports from BBC and Axios indicating independent planning under Zelenskyy’s direction. The operation’s precision, targeting remote bases like Belaya (4,000 km from Ukraine), suggests access to high-quality satellite imagery. Possible sources include:

1. Commercial Providers: Companies like BlackSky, Maxar, and Planet Labs have provided imagery throughout the Ukraine conflict. For example, Maxar imagery from May 2025 showed 40 Tu-22M3s and 11 Tu-95MSs at Olenya, aligning with strike targets. Ukraine likely acquired such data, which offers sufficient resolution to pinpoint aircraft.

2. Ukrainian Capabilities: Ukraine’s advanced drone programme, with models reaching 3,000 km, likely conducted reconnaissance to complement satellite data. The SBU’s deployment of 117 drones, some launched from Russian territory, suggests additional on-the-ground or aerial intelligence.

3. Western Allies: NATO allies like the UK, which shared imagery of Russian naval assets in 2024, or Germany, supporting Starlink systems, may have provided indirect assistance. However, commercial sources are more likely given Ukraine’s claim of independence.

4. U.S. Intelligence, Including CIA: The U.S., potentially through the CIA or National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), has shared imagery with Ukraine since 2022, primarily for defensive purposes, as seen in the 2022 Moskva sinking. The CIA’s role in intelligence coordination could suggest its data was indirectly used for Zelenskyy’s strikes. U.S. officials, including Pentagon spokesman John Kirby, maintain that intelligence is not provided for offensive operations, and no direct evidence links CIA imagery to the 1 June attacks. Ukraine’s claim suggests any U.S. data was repurposed independently.

5. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT): Groups like AviVector published detailed analyses of Russian airbases, such as May 2025 imagery of Olenya, shared on platforms like X. Ukraine’s intelligence, under Zelenskyy’s oversight, likely used such data for targeting.

The most likely scenario involves Ukraine combining commercial imagery from Maxar or BlackSky with drone reconnaissance and OSINT, enabling precise strikes without direct U.S. involvement. However, the CIA’s broader intelligence-sharing role could have indirectly contributed, potentially raising questions about U.S. neutrality in the context of New START.

Conclusion

The U.S. and Russia uphold New START due to strategic stability, robust verification, diplomatic credibility, economic pragmatism, and the need to maintain balance. Openly parked bombers at bases like Minot and Engels facilitate satellite verification, ensuring compliance with the 700-delivery-system limit. However, Ukraine’s 1 June 2025 attacks, authorised by President Zelenskyy, target this transparency, with only 8-10 aircraft losses or damages visually confirmed. These actions risk disrupting the treaty’s framework. Ukraine likely sourced targeting data from commercial satellite providers, its own drones, OSINT, and possibly indirect CIA or allied intelligence, supporting its claim of no U.S. prior knowledge. Zelenskyy’s provocative actions underscore the challenges facing arms control as New START approaches its 2026 expiration.

For further details on New START, consult the U.S. State Department or Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs treaty resources.

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Russia’s talking heads discuss the Ukrainian attacks on air bases across the RF this weekend

By Gilbert Doctorow, Website, 6/2/25

In an essay yesterday, I mentioned the Ukrainian drone attacks over the weekend on airbases across the Russian Federation from Murmansk in the North, to the Moscow region and Central Russia, across all of Siberia to the Baikal region (Irkutsk). My brief remarks were based on Western accounts, principally, The Financial Times, which in turn was re-transmitting what Kiev had to say about its daring and seemingly highly successful feats destroying Russian strategic bombers.

Note that the Ukrainians had stressed that the aircraft destroyed were being used to launch missiles that were fired on Ukraine. However, for our purposes in looking at the broader threat to Russian security that their destruction poses, should it have occurred as the Ukrainians say, these aircraft are key components in the Russian nuclear triad for strategic defense against the United States. The Ukrainians claim to have destroyed 40 such bombers, meaning one-third of the Russian fleet in this category of aircraft.

Last night, the Sunday edition of Vladimir Solovyov’s widely watched talk show featured a military expert panelist who told us a good deal more about what happened and in which directions Russian investigation of this calamity and thoughts of retaliation are headed.

Firstly, the Russians deny that the destruction was as extensive as the Ukrainians claim. They insist that their local air defenses neutralized most of the incoming drones. They speak of some damaged aircraft without specifying how many. On the other hand, they are considering a nuclear response in line with their nuclear doctrine of retaliation for attacks which endanger Russian national security. This in its own way is an acknowledgement that something awful did occur. The same panelist makes it clear that the ongoing investigation has already led to arrests of Russians who facilitated the attack by acts of commission and omission.

The attack this weekend took 18 months to prepare. The positive conclusion we may draw is that a follow-on attack is improbable if not impossible to carry out. Nonetheless, the events of the weekend highlight serious security problems that it will not be easy for Russian authorities to correct.

Specifically, it is now known that the Ukrainian drones were brought into the Russian Federation in truck-trailers. This means that the border inspections by Russian customs were strangely lax at more than one border crossing and on more than one date. Secondly it raises the questions about the complicity of the truck drivers, some of whom have now been arrested and who, under questioning say they had no idea what the containers held.

Then there are questions one must pose regarding the long time that these trailers were kept in place in the general vicinity of Russia’s most important air bases. How could their presence not have raised questions for local officials?

Finally, the investigation has revealed that Russian military recruits on the airbases under attack photographed what was happening and the destruction of planes, and then put these images up on social media. That they had kept their personal phones with them was itself a violation of military regulations. That they posted images identifying the strategic bombers which were damaged is itself punishable under Russian wartime law.

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The next set of questions, for which as yet we have no answers, is how the Kremlin will respond to this attack that would appear to meet the criterion for nuclear escalation under the latest Russian doctrine.

Will President Putin now declare war on Ukraine, as his legalistic mind would suggest, to clear the way for destruction of the ‘decision making centers’ in Kiev, with or without all staff on board? Will he break off all peace negotiations, as logic would have it?

We will not have long to wait to get answers. I expect to see them in the coming week.