By George Beebe & Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 5/21/25

Executive Summary

In advancing a peace settlement to resolve the Russia–Ukraine War, Washington must prioritize a concrete and detailed settlement to end this catastrophic conflict along terms that harmonize the vital, long-term interests of Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and the United States. A ceasefire is unlikely, unless the outlines of such a settlement are reached beforehand.

A peace settlement must address Ukrainian fears of future Russian aggression while simultaneously laying out a broader political framework that assuages Russia’s fears of strategic encirclement and international isolation. 

 A successful settlement is possible along these lines:

• In exchange for the West and Ukraine’s acknowledgement that Ukraine will not be part of the NATO alliance, Russia accepts Ukraine’s eventual E.U. accession, contingent on the constitutional enshrinement of rights for the Russian minority in Ukraine and Ukraine’s postwar upholding of the democratic process. 
• Russia accepts a Western–armed, trained, and maintained Ukrainian military force capable of deterring and defending against any new invasion (accompanied possibly by a ban on Ukraine’s possession of long-range missiles). In return, the United States should enter into talks with Russia on a new version of the New Strategic Arms Treaty, New START, as well as committing to a new version of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, INF. 
• The United Nations mandates a comprehensive reconstruction fund for Ukraine using frozen Russian assets held by the European Union, including reconstruction in the Russian–occupied areas of Ukraine.
• Ukraine and Russia accept a ceasefire along the current territorial battlelines, establishing a de facto border in the four provinces of eastern Ukraine that will not be further changed by force or subversion.
• Once a broader political settlement has been established, Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and the U.S. accept a U.N. peacekeeping and monitoring force drawn from neutral Global South countries, to adjudicate a ceasefire line.

The process of reaching a settlement will not be easy or quick and may require the exercise of U.S. leverage over Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. But such an accord could create security and stability for Ukraine and Europe more broadly, while also enabling U.S.–Russian detente and an eventual American military drawdown from Europe. 

Absent such a settlement, the war will continue to the detriment of Ukraine, placing its standing as a sovereign state — and its future integration within the European Union — in jeopardy.

Outline of a settlement

Although the parties to the conflict in Ukraine are still far from reaching a detailed peace accord, the basic outlines of what a settlement must entail are apparent.

• Geopolitical compromise: The West and Kyiv agree that Ukraine will not be a part of NATO or host Western forces; in turn, Moscow agrees not to try to block Ukrainian accession to the European Union. Such a compromise would address Russia’s most significant security concern — that Ukraine might become a base that Western militaries could use against it. But this also would allow Kyiv a viable path toward its vital goal of becoming part of the West politically and economically.
• Reciprocal security assurances: No agreement will be possible absent Russia’s acceptance that Ukraine must have a significant military capable of deterring and defending against any new invasion, something that will be viable only with ongoing Western arms, training, and maintenance aid (though certain categories of weapons, like long-range missiles, could be excluded). But such acceptance is unlikely outside the context of a broader European arms control framework that addresses Moscow’s concerns about threats posed by NATO conventional and nuclear capabilities against Russia. 
• E.U.–driven political reform in Ukraine: The political optics of accepting Russia’s demands to protect the linguistic and cultural rights of Ukraine’s Russian minority, defang what it regards as nationalist extremists, and hold new elections would be highly problematic for Kyiv (though Moscow could offer reciprocal protections for Ukrainian citizens of Russia). Ukraine would, however, have to address these issues as part of the E.U. membership process. Framing such reforms not as concessions to Russia, but as consequences of accession to the European Union, might be the only practical path toward resolving these sensitive issues. 
• Sanctions relief and reconstruction: To varying degrees, both Ukraine and Russia need economic relief — Ukraine from the extreme financial and demographic duress of war; Russia from Western sanctions that, while not crippling to its economy, have nonetheless produced a discomfiting dependence on trade with China and the Global South. Because Ukraine lacks sufficient air defenses to prevent Russian missile and bomb strikes against nascent reconstruction projects, Kyiv is very unlikely to attract large-scale reconstruction aid without Moscow’s agreement to a settlement. And much of the West will object to any sanctions relief for Russia absent a peace accord. 
• Pragmatism on territory: A compromise settlement on the fraught issue of delineating the border between Russia and Ukraine must be based on the recognition that neither side will cede territory it occupies at the time of settlement nor win new land at the negotiating table. But both sides should be able to agree that the de facto border will not be changed by force or subversion. The issue of the legal status of the territories concerned will have to be left for future negotiation.
• Stable separation of forces: Assuming the basic provisions of a peace settlement are agreed, technical arrangements to establish, monitor, and adjudicate a ceasefire must be established. Any peacekeeping and monitoring force will, however, have to be drawn from neutral countries under the aegis of the United Nations.

The procedural path to a settlement

Because continuing the war is its primary leverage over the terms of a settlement, Russia will not agree to a ceasefire without a clear understanding of the key provisions of a peace accord. Ukraine, however, will not agree to those broad provisions absent strong assurances that Russia cannot exploit a ceasefire to regroup and reinvade, nor will Russia agree without assurances that “peacekeepers” from NATO countries will not be introduced later. For these reasons, a negotiating process that begins by trying to establish a ceasefire before securing the broad parameters of a political settlement is likely to fail. 

Although direct Russia–Ukraine talks can play a role in arranging a settlement, very few of the necessary compromises can be struck through bilateral negotiations alone. Absent U.S. and European support, Ukraine lacks the leverage to compel Russian compromises over its defense capabilities, and Kyiv cannot negotiate over such matters as the U.S. and European force posture within NATO, which are of critical concern to Moscow. The bulk of the incentive and coercive power that can produce Russian and Ukrainian concessions rests with Washington. 

To achieve an agreement, the U.S. administration needs to play a central role in formulating a detailed plan for peace, which all parties would have to agree to. Because Russia has the upper hand on the battlefield and views U.S. intentions and capabilities as its chief security concern, the most important channel of negotiation will be between Moscow and Washington. The Russians will almost certainly persist in their refusal to agree to a permanent ceasefire without a reasonably concrete and detailed agreement, as ending the fighting would end their ability to bring pressure on the Ukrainians and the West to accede to a compromise that meets basic Russian conditions.¹

Nor is an early ceasefire without a settlement objectively desirable, as it would leave open so many of the issues that have led to conflict since 2014, therefore increasing the chances of a renewal of the war.²An unstable and fragile ceasefire — such as existed in the Donbas from 2015 to 2022 — would not provide Ukraine with the stability and security it needs to attract foreign investment and implement the reforms necessary to move toward E.U. membership.

U.S.–Russian agreement on the broad outlines of a political settlement could be followed by intense U.S. engagement with Ukraine to build support for a settlement and highlight the negative consequences that would almost inevitably flow from failure to settle the war. Bringing Ukraine around to accepting the key elements of a political settlement will require the United States to employ both honey and vinegar. An intense campaign of public diplomacy and direct engagement with Ukrainian political and business leaders will be necessary to persuade Ukrainians that prolonging the war would result in a more onerous settlement and that compromise now would secure Ukraine’s independence and anchor it in the West, even though NATO membership is unattainable. 

Ultimately, announced U.S. threats to cut off military and intelligence aid should Ukraine fail to compromise may be necessary. This may seem a harsh approach, but it may well be that it is only by being able to claim that President Volodymyr Zelensky has been forced to compromise by overwhelming U.S. pressure that he will be able to get hard-line elements in Ukraine — and in his own administration — to agree to a settlement, even if the alternative is far worse: defeat. 

European support will be critical to persuading Ukraine to accept a settlement. But the countries of the European Union (and Britain) are so deeply divided over policy toward the war in Ukraine that it seems likely only firm U.S. leadership can bring them to collective acceptance of a settlement. Leading figures in Brussels and elsewhere have also nailed themselves so firmly to rejection of compromise that it will be extremely difficult for them to change course, unless Washington shows them that they have no choice. In this regard, the United States will need to put considerable pressure on the Europeans to highlight the importance of supporting a viable path toward Ukrainian membership in the European Union, an issue on which intense U.S. lobbying with Poland, Hungary, and other skeptics will be necessary.

U.S.–Russian relations as an incentive for compromise 

The greatest incentive for Russia to abandon or modify its maximalist demands on Ukraine and agree to a U.S. peace plan is the opportunity that it would give to establish a wholly new relationship with the United States, under which Washington would respect what Moscow sees as vital Russian interests and consult on issues of common concern. This is something that the administrations of Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and Vladimir Putin all sought in vain since the end of the Cold War. Between 2008 and 2011, it was also a core aim of President Dmitry Medvedev.³ 

Beginning with these U.S.–Russian issues has the immense advantage that they can be negotiated bilaterally between Washington and Moscow and do not have to include consultation with (and likely obstruction from) Kyiv and other European capitals. Of course, however, any U.S. agreement to Russian wishes in this area must be made conditional on Russia’s willingness to compromise in its approach to Ukraine. Thus, Moscow has been demanding Ukrainian “disarmament” as part of a peace settlement, and previous Russian statements have suggested that this should involve reducing the Ukrainian armed forces to a level where they could not defend the country. 

This is completely unacceptable, and it is essential that in any settlement the United States and NATO should be able to continue to arm Ukraine for its defense. This would also reduce the pressure on the Europeans to engage in a crash rearmament program and on the Americans to retain large military forces in Europe. U.S. negotiators should give the Russian government a clear choice: Either Russia agrees to the Western arming of Ukraine for defense (possibly with the exclusion of certain categories of weapons, such as long-range missiles) or the United States will increase its own military deployments in Europe and help to arm NATO’s European members to the teeth. This would lock Russia into a long-term military competition with the West similar to the one that helped ruin the Soviet economy. The Russian economy has sustained the war in Ukraine remarkably well, but the strains (especially the threat of inflation) are nonetheless great, and it is unlikely that they can be sustained permanently.

In return for the Russian government agreeing to long-term NATO aid in strengthening the Ukrainian armed forces, the Trump administration should urgently enter into talks on updating the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START. The present treaty expires in 2026 and, unless something is created to replace it, there will be no legal limit on a nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia. Pending the signature of a new treaty, the United States and Russia should agree to state a willingness to abide by the terms of New START. Both countries should also formally commit themselves to negotiating a new version of the previous Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF.⁴Under such an agreement, the United States could guarantee not to go through with its plan to deploy (nonnuclear but nuclear-capable) medium-range missiles in Germany, in return for Russia withdrawing its missiles from Kaliningrad and Belarus.⁵

In December 2021, in its ultimatum before invading Ukraine, Russia demanded that NATO withdraw forces and weaponry deployed to new member states in eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War.⁶It will most likely be impossible to get many European countries to agree to this, but it is entirely within the rights and competence of a U.S. administration to decide that American forces will not be deployed there or, if they are there, that they can be withdrawn in return for reciprocal limits on Russian forces (notably in countries and territories on the borders of the NATO states concerned: Kaliningrad, Belarus, and Transdniestria). 

Such U.S. force limits or withdrawals would be very much in line with the Trump administration’s desire to reduce U.S. commitments in Europe and increase the role of European NATO members in their own defense. A U.S.–Russian agreement along these lines would not fully satisfy Russia, because European NATO members would still be free to deploy their own troops; but Russia’s fears of NATO on its borders have always focused above all on U.S. forces.

Agreement on these issues could be accompanied or followed by the restoration of previous U.S.–Russian cooperation in other areas: on counterterrorism in response to what remains a dire threat to both the West and Russia; on the maintenance of stability in the Middle East and Russian help with a new Iranian nuclear deal, if the Trump administration genuinely wants one; and on limiting military deployments and confrontation in the Arctic. The United States should also promote a full restoration of Russia’s role in the Arctic Council and the restoration of what was called “Arctic Exceptionalism.” 

A much more complex issue is Russia’s demand for a new European security architecture, or consultation mechanism, which would end the NATO and E.U. attempt to monopolize security on the European continent, officially recognizing the role and droit de regard of Russia. This was something that was supposed to be established either under the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE, or through the NATO–Russia Council.⁷But from Moscow’s point of view, both institutions have been hopelessly compromised by the tendency of all the Western members to decide things on their own and then present Russia not with material for discussion but with a fait accompli.

However, any purely European consultative mechanism is inevitably going to mean that Russia is outnumbered by Western states and institutions. If, therefore, an eventual Ukrainian peace settlement is signed under the auspices of the United Nations and involves U.N. peacekeeping forces to patrol the ceasefire line and any demilitarized zone (and it is clear that only neutral U.N. forces in this role will be acceptable to Russia), then it might be worth considering the possibility of creating a committee of the U.N. Security Council on Ukrainian and European security, with the additional statutory membership of any nonpermanent Security Council members that contribute significant numbers of troops to a peacekeeping force or funds for Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Territorial issues

Realistically speaking, and as President Zelensky has himself stated, the Ukrainian military is not in a position to recapture the territories already lost to Russia.⁸Nor is there any chance in the foreseeable future that it will be able to regain them through negotiations. If the war continues, the Russian military is very likely to make additional gains, but to what extent and how quickly is not at all clear. 

On the one hand, the advantage that contemporary weaponry gives to the defense has meant that, over the past year, the Russian army has advanced only very slowly and at the cost of heavy casualties.⁹On the other hand, there has been extensive reporting in the Western media of heavy Ukrainian casualties, of exhaustion and demoralization among Ukraine’s frontline troops, and of resistance to conscription in the Ukrainian population.¹⁰There is therefore a real risk that the Ukrainian front will collapse at some point. Russia would then be able to make far greater gains and dictate the terms of peace, subjugating Ukraine and causing considerable embarrassment to the United States. 

If the war continues indefinitely and complete Ukrainian defeat is to be avoided, then present levels of U.S. military aid and intelligence sharing will also have to continue indefinitely. This would impose a heavy burden on limited reserves of U.S. weaponry and be very unwelcome to the present U.S. administration and many U.S. citizens. In terms of preventing Ukrainian defeat, U.S. intelligence is even more important than weaponry. Satellite intelligence identifies the location of Russian troops. Terrain mapping allows Ukrainian missiles to hit their targets. Starlink is essential for communication between Ukrainian units.¹¹

On the question of territory, at the time of writing, the official Russian position remains that, in return for a permanent ceasefire, Ukraine must withdraw from all the land it still holds in the provinces Russia claims to have annexed, including the cities of Kherson and Zaporizhia (though there have been hints that Russia is ready to give up this demand as part of a peace settlement).¹²This would be completely impossible for any Ukrainian government to accept, and the Trump administration has quite rightly advocated in its draft peace terms that the ceasefire line will therefore have to run where the final battle line runs.¹³ 

Nor, barring complete Ukrainian defeat, can any Ukrainian government agree legally to recognize Russian sovereignty over occupied territories.¹⁴It is possible however — as suggested in the draft peace proposals issued by the Trump administration — that the United States could do so, at least in the case of Crimea, which is a special case, having been transferred from the Russian Soviet Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic by a 1954 Soviet decree.¹⁵Russia and Ukraine will therefore need to agree that the legal status of occupied territories will be deferred for future negotiation and that neither will try to change the ceasefire line through force, subversion, or economic pressure. The likelihood in this case is that, as in the case of the de facto partition of Cyprus, talks will go on for decades or generations without resolution — but also, hopefully, without a return to war.

Neutrality, Ukrainian self-defense, and the search for security guarantees 

In practice, a bar on Ukrainian NATO membership has already been conceded by the West, because every leading NATO government (including the Biden administration) has made clear that they will not fight to defend Ukraine.¹⁶This, by definition, rules out a NATO Article 5 guarantee for Ukraine. As President Zelensky himself stated publicly in March 2022, all the NATO governments he had talked to prior to the war had refused to promise that within five years Ukraine would be admitted to the organization. He therefore said that Ukrainian neutrality (which until 2014 was part of the Ukrainian constitution) could be accepted by Kyiv, if ratified in a referendum and accompanied by other guarantees to Ukraine.¹⁷

By the same token, a European “reassurance force” for Ukraine is impossible.¹⁸Russia categorically opposes any military force from NATO members in Ukraine, and there is a strong likelihood that if they were deployed — even in areas far from the front line — they would be attacked.¹⁹Assessments by European military analysts and retired officers have stated that Britain and France can only provide a small fraction of the troops necessary to create a force capable of fighting Russia in Ukraine if necessary.²⁰

Most European states (including Poland) have therefore already refused to contribute troops to such a force.²¹The British government — one of the proposal’s leading advocates and one of the few European states with serious armed forces — has said that this can only be formed if there is a U.S. “backstop.”²²This suggests a U.S. commitment to go to war with Russia over Ukraine, which is completely contrary to Trump administration policy, U.S. vital interests, and the wishes of a majority of U.S. citizens.

The deployment of such a force would also create a real risk that, at some point in the future, a Ukrainian government — or Ukrainian extremist forces — might deliberately restart a war with Russia in an effort to draw the United States in; for any realistic peace settlement will be bitterly unpopular with many Ukrainians, and so threats to a long-term peace settlement do not come only from the Russian side. The Trump administration has therefore been correct to be very cautious about offering help for such a European force. 

When considering alternative security “guarantees” to Ukraine, it is crucial to honestly recognize that, in international affairs and over the long term, no such absolute guarantees can exist. As long as Russia exists as a state, a potential threat to Ukraine will also exist (and, as long as Ukraine exists as a state, it will probably wish to recover its lost territories); but destroying Russia as a state is not remotely within Western capacity and would, in any case, involve a hideous risk of mutual nuclear annihilation and the end of civilization. 

Nor is any geopolitical alignment set in stone. In 1814, Great Britain was an ally of the German states (and Russia) against France. One hundred years later, it was an ally of France (and Russia) against Germany. One hundred and fifty years later, it was an ally of France (and Germany) against Russia. The British government’s language of a “100-year pact” between Britain and Ukraine is therefore meaningless.²³

In consequence, the task of the U.S. administration and its European allies should be not to fantasize about absolute or permanent guarantees to Ukraine. Instead, they should craft a peace settlement that both Moscow and Kyiv can live with (however unhappily), with the right mixture of incentives and deterrents to make a resumption of the war by either side as unlikely as possible.

In any peace settlement, Ukraine must therefore keep the right to maintain sufficiently strong armed forces that, in the event of new Russian aggression, would be able to put up a serious defense, inflict heavy casualties, and buy time for the massive supply of Western weaponry (as indeed they did in the months following the Russian invasion in Feb. 2022). Western governments should stockpile weaponry to supply to Ukraine in the event of new Russian aggression and should let Moscow know of this.

Any limitations on the numbers of Ukrainian troops should only be considered as part of a separate process introducing general and reciprocal limits of armed forces in Europe as a whole, based on (though inevitably different from, given the radically changed circumstances) the previous Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, CFE.²⁴

Russia’s demand for the “demilitarization” of Ukraine should therefore be quite unacceptable as it stands. However, the U.S. administration could consider a ban on the delivery of or help in producing certain categories of weapons to Ukraine, notably long-range missiles capable of striking deep into Russian territory. Thus, Article 13 of the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, by which the Soviet Union and NATO agreed to withdraw their occupying troops from Austria and establish Austrian neutrality, prohibited Austria from possessing missiles and artillery with a range of over 30 kilometers.²⁵

Fortunately, recent developments in military technology (especially drones) strongly favor defense and mean that it will be possible for Ukraine, with Western assistance, to build up defensive forces capable of deterring future Russian aggression by denying Russia a quick victory and ensuring heavy Russian casualties.²⁶

The supply of such weapons to Ukraine must remain open in any settlement, and it should be formally guaranteed that the supply of all forms of Western weaponry will automatically resume in the event of future Russian aggression. Ukraine should, however, also be warned that, if it breaks the terms of a peace settlement, weapons and intelligence support will not be provided, ensuring defeat. This should apply, for example, if a future Ukrainian government allows or encourages terrorism against Russian targets by groups based in Ukraine.

As for peacekeepers, the only ones acceptable to both Russia and Ukraine would have to be organized under the United Nations and drawn from countries that have remained neutral in the Ukraine War.²⁷ Ideally, these should be important states of the Global South.

Such troops could not and would not be intended to defeat a new Russian (or Ukrainian) offensive. However, before and especially during the war, Moscow has devoted immense diplomatic effort to wooing the members of what it calls the “Global Majority.”²⁸Moreover, while these states have refused to join in Western sanctions against Russia, they certainly did not want the war and would not want to see it resume.

It is therefore reasonable to assume that Russia would hesitate to launch an attack in which peacekeepers would be at risk of being killed, which would deeply alienate their governments. Given the importance that Russia attaches to the United Nations and its permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, a Ukrainian peace treaty signed under U.N. auspices and mandating U.N. peacekeepers would also carry more moral and political weight in Moscow than one signed simply between Russia, Ukraine, and Western states.

Sanctions and economic agreements

Economic incentives and deterrents regarding both Russia and Ukraine will be of key importance in achieving a settlement. A good start has been made with the U.S.–Ukraine agreement on minerals development, which, if implemented, will ensure long-term U.S. interest in Ukraine and that, in the event of new Russian aggression, a future U.S. administration will not be able simply to ignore Ukraine.²⁹

Economic issues cannot, however, be negotiated purely between Washington and Moscow, because the European Union plays a key role both in sanctions against Russia and through its control of $300 billion in sequestered Russian assets. Nonetheless, the U.S. administration can make very strong recommendations to the Europeans on how to proceed and threaten withdrawal of U.S. military aid to Ukraine and reduction of its commitment to Europe if they reject these recommendations.

A strong incentive to Russia to make and stick to a peace settlement would be the lifting of Western sanctions. Though these have done far less damage to the Russian economy than Western governments hoped — and have in some ways even strengthened it (through the need to build up substitutes for Western imports) — the reduction in Western energy imports from Russia has made Russia much more dependent on energy exports to China, thereby allowing Beijing to set prices to Moscow’s disadvantage.³⁰

However, as part of a settlement Western sanctions should be not ended but suspended, with — as in the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran — a “snapback” clause that guarantees that they would automatically resume if Russia launched a new attack on Ukraine. President Putin authorized the full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 because he thought Russia could easily win a complete victory [sic]. After the experience of the past three years, he cannot possibly expect such an outcome in the future.

The Russian assets held by the European Union (in fact, mainly by Belgium) should go to the reconstruction of Ukraine. Russian agreement to this could be gained by two means: a face-saving agreement whereby Russian assets would go into a joint fund for Ukrainian reconstruction under the United Nations, which the European Union would also contribute to; and a proviso that the fund would also pay for reconstruction in the Russian–occupied areas of Ukraine, which have also suffered very badly since 2022, and in the case of the Donbas since 2014.

The E.U. contribution to this U.N. fund would also form part of the process of helping Ukraine move toward eventual membership in the European Union — a possibility that Russia has agreed to and that should form an explicit part of any peace settlement. Whether Ukraine will be capable of joining the European Union in anything like the union’s present form is of course questionable; but the economic and political reforms that Ukraine will be required to undertake as part of the E.U. accession process would be beneficial in and of themselves and, if implemented, would contribute greatly to the country’s move toward the West — much more so than a NATO accession process that is, in any case, impossible. 

Minority rights and internal governance 

The path toward E.U. membership also provides a way for Ukraine to guarantee the linguistic and cultural rights of the country’s Russian minority without seeming to bow to Moscow’s demands for “denazification,” since these rights are guaranteed under principles of the E.U. Charter of Fundamental Rights, which Kyiv will have to accede to in order to qualify for membership.³¹

The official status of the Russian language and Ukrainian Russians as a national minority should be established in the Ukrainian constitution. However, as reportedly discussed in the Istanbul peace negotiations early in the war, this should also form part of a mutual agreement whereby Russia guarantees Ukrainian–language rights to Ukrainians in Russia.

Ukraine will, of course, have to hold democratic elections as part of the E.U. accession process; and, while these would likely not bring a pro–Russian government to power, it is possible that they would lead to the replacement of President Zelensky, perhaps by a figure more inclined to compromise with Russia. Many E.U. states also have laws banning neo–Nazi parties and symbols, which could be adopted by Ukraine as part of its strategy of joining the European Union. The union should insist on similar laws in Ukraine as part of the E.U. accession process.

As part of any settlement, Russia must guarantee noninterference in the internal affairs of Ukraine (including a specific ban on support for insurrection, as occurred in the Donbas in 2014) and respect for Ukrainian elections and Ukrainian democratic legitimacy. In return, Ukraine should guarantee not to foment rebellion or support terrorism against Russia in the Russian–controlled areas of Ukraine or in Russia itself. This is a crucially important part of any peace settlement that has been almost completely neglected in the West.

Since 2014, Ukraine has engaged in the assassination of pro–Russian officials and leaders in occupied areas of Ukraine and, since the Russian invasion of 2022, has greatly intensified this strategy and extended it to Russia itself.³²Should such attacks continue after a peace settlement, whether by the Ukrainian state itself or by Ukrainian nationalist groups, this would create a huge danger that Russia would resume the war and might even have widespread global sympathy in doing so, given the fear of terrorism that exists in most countries around the world. 

The example of the threat of war between India and Pakistan caused by terrorist attacks on India should be very clear before our eyes; and indeed, were Pakistan not armed with nuclear weapons, it seems highly likely that India would have invaded Pakistan in response to these attacks. On the other hand, if Ukraine has a realistic path toward E.U. membership, this would inhibit Kyiv from engaging in or turning a blind eye to such attacks, for the resulting instability and danger of new war with Moscow would undoubtedly create a huge barrier to progress toward membership.

Conclusion

A peace settlement along these lines would meet the vital interests of Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and the United States. Ukraine would receive all realistic and practicable guarantees against future Russian aggression, the chance to move toward E.U. membership (which would itself be a major deterrent to Russia), and large funds for reconstruction. Russia would be guaranteed against Ukraine becoming a Western military springboard against it, and it would be able to reestablish normal economic relations with the West, thereby allowing it to recover from damage to its economy and to escape dependence on China.

Europe would no longer be faced with the terrifying danger of having to continue to back Ukraine in a war without help or guarantees from the United States. Washington would escape the risk of being drawn into a potentially catastrophic clash with Moscow against its will. It would be free to gradually reduce some of its military deployments to Europe and to concentrate its resources and attention on other issues of greater concern to the American people.

In its negotiations with Moscow, the Trump administration will need to aim at agreement on reasonably firm and concrete points, because the Russians feel that, under previous U.S. administrations, American professions of goodwill led nowhere and promises not backed by formal agreements were empty. If Russia rejects these points, then the war will obviously continue and so should U.S. aid to Ukraine.

The aim of this aid should not be — as under the Biden administration — Ukrainian “victory” but rather to change the cost-benefit analysis in Moscow, by inflicting such losses on Russia that accepting a reasonable compromise will seem preferable to continuing to suffer them in pursuit of maximalist gains that may be unachievable. The very slow progress and heavy casualties of the Russian army over the past year, and the increasing threat of inflation in the domestic economy, suggest that this strategy has a good chance of working — but only if continued aid to Kyiv is combined with a continued offer to Moscow of a reasonable compromise.

If an agreement on these points with Russia can be reached, then it should be presented to Ukraine and European countries as a settled matter that they can either accept (with limited modifications) or reject — with the clear warning that, if they reject it, U.S. aid and intelligence-sharing will be withdrawn and U.S. military commitments in Europe reduced.

The Europeans would be forced to recognize the need to strengthen their own security and not adopt empty ideas (like a “reassurance force” for Ukraine) that depend completely on U.S. backing. As for President Zelensky, it seems likely that the only way that he will be able to get the Ukrainian political establishment to agree to a compromise peace is if he can present this as a fait accompli forced on him by Washington, which he has no choice but to accept.

And failing such a settlement, the war will continue, and to Ukraine’s disadvantage. Even if U.S. aid continues and complete collapse can be avoided, Ukraine will continue to be devastated, its male population decimated, and the day when it can begin to reconstruct and move toward the European Union indefinitely delayed. In pushing for an early settlement, the Trump administration is therefore acting as a true friend of Ukraine.

By Patrick Armstrong, Website, 5/20/25

One of the things I’ve often heard and seen Russians say is that the West has always hated Russia and always will. When it needs Russia it will pretend friendship but when the emergency is over it’s back to the same. Britain is often named as the chief hater. I’ve filed this away as something Russians believe to be true but may be exaggerated; after all, every nation is the innocent hero of its own stories. And as Palmerston (of whom more below) said “Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests“. Take Britain for example. At the moment London is the principal actor in the anti-Russia/pro-Ukraine camp; before that Cold War opponent; then ally against Hitler; then variable; then ally against Germany; then opponent in the Great Game; then enemy in the Crimean War; then ally against Napoleon and back and forth we go until the first and reasonably amicable trade contacts in Elizabeth’s time. From one to the other as interests dictated.

But a month ago I read something that made me wonder if maybe the Russians had a point. It was Orlando Figes’ book on the Crimean War and I was astounded to see the same anti-Russia tropes that we see today. (All page numbers from Kindle edition)

• The first difficulty for the Allied propagandists in this very ostentatiously Christian age was to justify going to war against a Christian country in support of a Muslim country. For a French newspaper, it was about stopping “the Greek heresy [from being] imposed by Cossack arms on all of us”. (209) In Britain by the assertion that Christians in the Ottoman Empire were perfectly safe (with the British and French overlooking) while Russian dominance would see “their places of prayer either demolished, or converted into temples of a faith as impure, demoralizing, and intolerant, as Popery itself. What British Christian can hesitate as to the course proper for such a country as ours, in such a case as this? (223) Whew! Russia, “blessed by inhuman Priests” (368), isn’t really Christian after all. (But what an image! Cossack sotnyas galloping through Barsetshire to sabre Archdeacon Grantley!)
• And they were as loathsome as their religion. The war was “the crusade of civilization against barbarism” (209) “The defence of mankind” against a “hopeless and degenerate people” bent upon the conquest of the world, a “religious war”. (224) “For the cause of right against injustice”. (223) Against “a country which makes no advances in any intellectual or industrial pursuits, and wholly omits to render her influence beneficial to the world”. (449) Insolence, arrogance and pride; a “bully”. (554) “A Holy War” against the Russians, “heathens”, “infidels” and “savages”. (650) An Anglican clergyman thundered that Russia’s offensive against Turkey was an attack “on the most sacred rights of our common humanity; an outrage standing in the same category as the slave trade, and scarcely inferior to it in crime”. (223)
• These horrid people were unrelentingly expansionist. A popular pamphlet dating from 1828, On the Designs of Russia, written by a future Crimean War general, projected a desire to conquer all of Asia Minor and effect the collapse of British trade with India. (73) The foundation of this was the forged Testament of Peter the Great (102) which set out a plan to conquer Europe; it was widely quoted for years.
• To return to Lord Palmerston. Tremendously influential for decades and Prime Minister for the last year of the Crimean War, he was very anti-Russian. As far as he was concerned, “The main and real object of the war was to curb the aggressive ambition of Russia.” (267) The fighting in the Crimea was just the start and his desired result was put forth in his memorandum to the British Cabinet in March 1854. The Crimea and Caucasus to the Ottoman Empire; Finland to Sweden, the Baltics to Prussia, Bessarabia to Austria, Poland independent. (540) Liberation movements against tsarist rule to be supported. (443) (Britain had already been providing weapons to Imam Shamyl’s forces in the long-running Caucasus war. (453)) Poland enthusiastically supported the idea (449) It was generally expected that the fall of Sevastopol would bring Russia to its knees and the Western powers could impose their conditions on the Russians. (269) But, when it finally fell in September 1855, Russia didn’t. Now what? France, which had done the heaviest fighting, was not sympathetic to Palmerston’s desires for more war in the Balkans or the Baltic. The Allies certainly weren’t about to commit the forces required to hold Sevastopol. And so they departed six months later. As the Emperor himself said “Sevastopol is not Moscow. The Crimea is not Russia. Two years after the burning of Moscow, our victorious troops were in Paris”. (535) And he was right: at the end the map hadn’t changed much.
• And, of course, people who objected to this were “pro-Russian” and therefore “un-English” (204)

**************************************

Back then Russia was an autocracy ruled by a man ruling by Divine Right (and the Brits happily allied with the last of the series in 1914); then it became “the world’s first socialist state” (and the Brits happily allied with that in 1941 – earlier if Churchill had got his way) and now it’s Russia again but without a hereditary ruler and an all-encompassing ideology. None of these changes, apparently, have made a bit of difference: still expansionist, all round nasty, contributing nothing good to the world, contumacious, better broken up but very unstable and soon to collapse. Our side, of course, from its morally immaculate position, is ever in defence of the Right. If you disagree, you’re “pro-Russian” and therefore “un-English/American/Canadian/European/everything good”.

We’re dealing with something here that doesn’t seem to be very fact-based. Maybe the Russians do have a point.

By Ariel Uraujo, InfoBrics, 5/30/25

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions

The Baltic Sea, a historically contested region, has once again become a flashpoint for geopolitical tensions, with recent incidents raising the specter of broader conflict. The escalating tensions is being described by some analysis—amid the war of narratives—as a reaction to Moscow’s actions but it would be more accurate to describe it as a reflection of deeper systemic pressures driven by Western policies. One may recall that NATO’s expanding presence and provocative maneuvers in the region have significantly contributed to the current unease.

In May 2025, for example, Poland reportedly intervened after detecting a Russian “shadow fleet” ship near a Baltic Sea cable. This incident followed reports of Russia conducting major naval drills in the region, interpreted by some as a show of force. Additionally, the Russia-Estonia standoff over maritime boundaries has further inflamed tensions, with both sides accusing each other of provocative actions

These incidents, framed by Western media as Russian aggression, are seen in Moscow as defensive responses to encirclement by NATO and its allies. As Gerald Walker notes (an expert writing for Modern Diplomacy), “the Baltic Sea’s strategic importance has grown since Sweden and Finland joined NATO, transforming the region into a near-NATO-controlled waterway. This shift has prompted Russia to assert its presence more forcefully, as evidenced by its Baltic Fleet’s ‘Safety of Navigation’ exercise in early May, which focused on protecting civilian maritime traffic from interception.”

To put it simply, Moscow views the Baltic Sea as a critical strategic space, vital for its economic and security interests. The region hosts key energy infrastructure, including pipelines like Nord Stream, which have been targets of Western sabotage in the past. Russia’s naval exercises, far from being unprovoked, are a response to NATO’s increased military presence, including joint exercises and deployments near Russian borders.

There is an energy angle, as well, one just needs to consider the recent EU memorandum to bolster energy cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, signed by energy ministers of the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) High-Level Group. It signals a strategic intent to reduce dependence on Russian energy, thereby isolating Moscow economically.

From Moscow’s perspective the overall context has a history. One may recall that the Baltic Sea has long been a contested space, with Russia’s access to its ports being a cornerstone of its maritime strategy since the days of Peter the Great. The expansion of NATO to include Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—has placed the alliance directly on Russia’s doorstep, a development Russia views as a direct threat. The recent incidents, including the alleged shadow fleet activities, can be framed as Russia protecting its legitimate interests against the reality of encirclement. Moscow in any case argues that its naval drills are routine and necessary to maintain readiness, especially in light of NATO’s aggressive posturing.

Energy dynamics, as mentioned, further complicate the situation. The Baltic Sea is a critical corridor for energy infrastructure, and recent Western efforts to diversify energy sources are seen as a direct challenge to Russia’s economic leverage. The memorandum signed by Baltic states to enhance energy cooperation is a case in point, aiming to integrate renewable energy and reduce reliance on Russian gas. From Russia’s vantage point, these initiatives are less about energy security and more about geoeconomic/geopolitical maneuvering to marginalize Moscow. Suffice it to say, such actions risk escalating frictions by framing Russia as an economic adversary amid military tensions .

As I noted in October 2024, the Baltic region’s strategic importance cannot be overstated, with Russia seeking to uphold its position   amid growing Western pressure. Finland and Estonia, NATO members, have signed a Baltic Sea security agreement and announced plans to potentially blockade the Gulf of Finland, a vital route for Russian shipping. The Gulf is crucial for Russia, hosting key ports like Primorsk for oil exports and the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant.

Moscow deems this a violation of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, warning of serious consequences. The Atlantic Alliance’s growing presence, including exercises in Lithuania and a new headquarters in Mikkeli, further fuels Russian concerns about encirclement. As NATO’s expansion continues, the risk of escalation increases in this strategically critical region, thus threatening global stability.

Last month, I further highlighted how NATO’s rhetoric often ignores Russia’s legitimate security concerns, painting it as the sole aggressor in a complex geopolitical landscape. These observations remain relevant, as the current incidents reflect a continuation of this ongoing dynamic. Russia’s actions, while assertive, are not escalatory in isolation; they are responses to a broader pattern of Western containment, which goes beyond the matter of Ukraine as seen in the Arctic as well. In fact, with Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership, the Alliance’s territorial reach now extends as far out as Russia’s eastern Arctic flank, thus making Russia the sole non-NATO Arctic nation.

To sum it up, the Baltic Sea’s rising tensions are a symptom of deeper mistrust between Russia and the West, deeply rooted in post-Soviet NATO’s expansion. Moscow’s perspective is one of defensive pragmatism: it seeks to protect its strategic interests in a region increasingly dominated by NATO’s presence and Western economic initiatives. The danger lies in miscalculation—where even a minor incident could spiral into a larger confrontation.

Moscow, for one thing, has consistently called for dialogue to de-escalate, while setting red lines, yet these calls are often drowned out by accusations of aggression. A sober approach requires working toward mutual de-escalation in an increasingly volatile environment.

By Alexander Libman, NYU Jordan Center for the Advanced Study of Russia, 5/13/25

The last three years demonstrated the astonishing resilience of the Russian economy. Not only did it not collapse after major foreign sanctions were imposed in the wake of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine; it even demonstrated high growth rates in 2023-2024. It is this economy that allows Putin to replenish his army and, most crucially, to find new soldiers without resorting to what would be an extremely unpopular mass mobilization—simply by offering very high payments to new recruits.

Two sets of factors have allowed the Russian economy to survive and even to grow during the last years. The first is associated with the limits of sanctions—here, internal contradictions in the sanctions regime reduced its effectiveness. The second is associated with the nature of the Russian economy itself.

Sanctions certainly would have worked better if they were joined not only by the Western states, but also by non-Western countries, especially China and India. They would also have been more effective had they more resolutely targeted Russia’s main sources of revenue, oil and gas, at a much earlier stage. Throughout 2022, Russia benefitted from skyrocketing prices for its resource exports, which simplified its process of economic adaptation to the new reality.

An alternative course of sanctions from the point of view of these two issues was, however, likely not feasible. Most of the Global South perceived the war in Ukraine as a regional European conflict and the West as hypocritical and self-interested. As a result, it saw absolutely no reason to sacrifice its own economic interests to shore up Western ones. Similarly, from China’s point of view, given the unavoidable reality of economic and political confrontation with the US, there was little to be gained from supporting a West that would not offer anything in return.

Immediately sanctioning Russian oil and gas would likely have significantly damaged European economies, especially Germany’s—which is even now struggling with stagnation and decline of its industrial base. This effect, in turn, would make Germany less able to support Ukraine, and its electorate less willing to accept further costs of conflict. Even now, after the EU undertook substantial efforts to decouple its economy from Russian energy, it is simply buying resources from other, more expensive sources—and sometimes, as in the case of LNG (liquefied natural gas), from Russia itself. Meanwhile, Russia is selling oil and gas to customers it had originally found less attractive than Europe. In short, Russia is simply too big to be completely cut off from global energy markets.

Beyond its relative imperviousness to Western sanctions, the most important reason for Russia’s economic performance over the last two years was a specific economic model that it managed to create. In somewhat simplified form, the mechanism of Russian economic growth boils down to the following five elements.

1. Since the start of the war, Russia massively increased its military spending. The Russian government notably did not use coercive tools— requisitions, reallocation of workforces, or mandatory industrial plans—to strengthen the military sector. Instead, it continued to rely on market mechanisms, which means that, even now, the Russian economy can be described as a “war economy” only with an asterisk.

2. To ensure that it is able to maintain the output necessary to continue fighting, the Russian military-industrial complex had to increase employment. This increase happened in a country that already before the full-scale invasion suffered from major workforce deficits that were only exacerbated after 2022 due to emigration and the recruitment of soldiers. As a result, military companies had to substantially increase salaries for their employees.

3. These larger salaries led to increasing consumption spending. And here another key feature becomes highly relevant: unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is a market economy, where private business has enormous experience in adapting to various challenges. Private companies responded to the growing demand by providing consumer goods and services. The decision of many Western firms to leave Russia was seen as a unique chance for expansion. Russian business showed enormous creativity in finding ways around sanctions. Still, private firms also required more workers—a fact that contributed to the labor shortage and the increasing salaries, which then, in turn, strengthened the consumption boom.

4. The Russian Central Bank is also an important element of Russia’s recent economic success. Run by a highly professional management team, it managed to act quickly to avoid bank runs and the collapse of the banking sector in the early days of the full-scale invasion. This strategy also supported the economic adaptation discussed above.

5. From the point of view of this model, sanctions play an ambiguous role. They make import of consumer goods and technologies more expensive, which is a problem for Russia. However, paradoxically, they strengthen Russian economic performance by preventing capital flight from the country. Under other conditions, Russian companies, concerned about the risky and unstable environment in Russia, might move their consumption-boom profits to safe locations abroad. Now, these locations are not safe anymore—and as a result, money stays inside Russia and is further invested in production and infrastructure.

While this model worked reasonably well in the last couple of years, the high growth rates of 2023 and 2024 will most likely not be sustained in the future. In a nutshell, Russia has reached a state of full employment—there are no more workers available to expand production. As long as the war continues, there is no solution to this problem because of limited access to new technologies and constant demand for soldiers for the frontlines. Even worse, in 2024, as a reaction to the terrorist attack in Moscow, the Russian government introduced numerous restrictive measures against labor migrants from Central Asia, who, in the past partially solved the Russian workforce problem.

Without new workers, more demand does not lead to more growth, but only to more inflation, which in 2025 is expected to reach10%. The Central Bank reacts to increasing inflation by increasing its interest rate, which is now at the extremely high level of 21%. So far, however, the effects of this policy have been limited, primarily because large parts of the Russian economy have access to money “outside” the standard banking lending mechanism, e.g., through governmental subsidies and procurement. The Russian government is also increasing tariffs and taxes, which will only strengthen inflation.

This means, however, that the Russian economy is facing a dilemma. Sectors without privileged access to state money—which is, of course, distributed not based on economic merit but on political and lobbying considerations—will have no choice but to reduce their output due to the high interest rate and expensive credit. However, even this high interest rate, for which the Central Bank is heavily criticized in Russia, does not solve the inflation problem.

Russia’s immediate economic outlook is thus far less optimistic than the last two years would suggest. Most likely, Russia is sliding into a form of stagflation, characterized by zero growth, high inflation, and—unlike most other stagflation episodes in world history—low unemployment. In the short run, this state of affairs will make economic sentiment in the country more pessimistic. In the long run, it will lead to an increasing gap between Russia and leading world economies. In 2025, the Russian GDP is expected to grow by 1-2%, which is a substantial decline compared to over 4% in 2024. In particular, the non-defense industry is likely to slide into economic slowdown. Declining oil prices, which could be driven by the new US trade tariffs, are likely to weaken the Russian economy even further.

None of this means, however, that Russia is approaching economic collapse, which some observers have been so eager to predict. For now, the Russian economy remains a functioning one, allowing Putin to continue his war.

Russian Memorandum

Published by RT on 6/2/25:

The Russian delegation presented its peace proposal to the Ukrainian side during the talks in Istanbul on Monday.

Among the main points, Moscow’s memorandum calls on Kiev to withdraw its troops from the former Ukrainian territories that have joined Russia and confirm its neutral and non-nuclear status.

Draft as of June 1, 2025

Proposals of the Russian Federation (Memorandum) on the Settlement of the Ukrainian Crisis

Section I

Key Parameters for a Definitive Settlement

1. International legal recognition of the incorporation into the Russian Federation of Crimea, the LPR, the DPR, and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions; full withdrawal from these territories of Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) units and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations;

2. Neutrality of Ukraine, implying its refusal to join military alliances and coalitions, as well as a ban on any military activity by third-party states on Ukrainian territory and the deployment of foreign armed formations, military bases and military infrastructure there;

3. Termination of all existing international treaties and agreements inconsistent with the provisions of Paragraph 2 of this Section, and refusal to conclude any such agreements in the future;

4. Confirmation of Ukraine’s status as a state without nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, with a direct ban on their receipt, transit and deployment on Ukrainian territory;

5. Establishment of maximum limits for the size of the AFU and other Ukrainian military formations, the quantity of armaments and military equipment, and their permissible specifications; dissolution of Ukrainian nationalist formations within the AFU and National Guard;

6. Guarantees of the full rights, freedoms and interests of the Russian and Russian-speaking population; granting the Russian language official status;

7. Legislative prohibition of the glorification and propaganda of Nazism and neo-Nazism, dissolution of nationalist organizations and parties;

8. Lifting of all current economic sanctions, bans and restrictive measures between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and refusal to impose new ones;

9. Resolution of issues related to family reunification and displaced persons;

10. Waiver of mutual claims for damages incurred during hostilities;

11. Removal of restrictions imposed on the Orthodox Church of Ukraine;

12. Gradual restoration of diplomatic and economic relations (including gas transit), transport and other connections, including with third-party states.

Section II

Ceasefire Conditions

Option 1.

Commencement of complete withdrawal of the AFU and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations from the territory of the Russian Federation, including the DPR, LPR, and the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, and their pullback from the borders of the Russian Federation to a distance agreed upon by the Parties, in accordance with Provisions to be approved.

Option 2. “Package Proposal”:

1. Prohibition on redeployment of the AFU and other Ukrainian paramilitary formations, except for movements aimed at withdrawal from the borders of the Russian Federation to a distance agreed upon by the Parties;

2. Cessation of mobilization and commencement of demobilization;

3. Cessation of foreign supplies of military products and foreign military assistance to Ukraine, including the provision of satellite communication services and intelligence data;

4. Elimination of military presence of third countries on Ukrainian territory, cessation of participation of foreign specialists in military operations on Ukraine’s side;

5. Guarantees of Ukraine’s renunciation of sabotage and subversive activities against the Russian Federation and its citizens;

6. Establishment of a bilateral Center for Monitoring and Control of the Ceasefire Regime;

7. Mutual amnesty for “political prisoners” and release of detained civilians;

8. Lifting of martial law in Ukraine;

9. Announcement of the date for elections of the President of Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada, which must take place no later than 100 days after the lifting of martial law;

10. Signing of an Agreement on the implementation of provisions contained in Section I.

Section III

Sequence of Steps and Timeline for Implementation

1. Work commences on drafting the Treaty text;

2. A 2-3 day ceasefire is declared for collection of bodies of the fallen in the “gray zone”;

3, Six thousand bodies of AFU servicemen are unilaterally transferred to the AFU;

4. A Ceasefire Memorandum is signed with specific dates for fulfillment of all provisions, determining the date for signing the future Treaty on Final Settlement (hereinafter, the Treaty);

5. A 30-day ceasefire regime takes effect from the moment the AFU withdrawal begins. Complete withdrawal of AFU units from the territory of the Russian Federation and full implementation of the “package agreement” must be completed within these 30 days;

6. Elections are conducted and government bodies are formed on the territory of Ukraine;

7. The Treaty is signed;

8. The signed Treaty is endorsed by a legally binding UN Security Council resolution;

9. The Treaty is ratified, enforced, and implemented.

***

Ukrainian Memorandum

Published by Reuters on 6/1/25:

KYIV, June 1 (Reuters) – Reuters has seen the text of the peace proposals that Ukrainian negotiators plan to present to the Russian side at peace talks scheduled to take place on June 2 in Istanbul.

The text of the Ukrainian document is published in full with no changes.

Ukraine-Russia Negotiations Framework

I. Key Principles of the Agreement and the Negotiation Process

• Full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.

• Confidence-building measures – addressing humanitarian issues: unconditionally return all deported and illegally displaced Ukrainian children. Exchange of all prisoners (the “all for all”

principle). Release by Russia of all civilian hostages.

• Non-repetition of aggression: The aim of the negotiations is to restore a permanent basis for lasting peace and security and to ensure that aggression does not occur again.

• Security guarantees and engagement of the international community: Ukraine must receive robust security guarantees. The parties will invite the international community to participate in the negotiations and provide guarantees to ensure the implementation of the agreements.

• Sovereignty: Ukraine is not forced to be neutral. It can choose to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and move towards EU membership. Ukraine’s membership in NATO depends on consensus within the Alliance. No restrictions may be imposed on the number, deployment, or other parameters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as on the deployment of troops of friendly foreign states on the territory of Ukraine.

• Territorial issues: Territorial gains made by Russia since February 2014 are not recognized by the international community. The contact line is the starting point for negotiations. Territory issues are discussed only after a full and unconditional ceasefire.

• Sanctions: Some sanctions may be lifted from Russia, but in stages and only gradually, with a mechanism for resuming sanctions if necessary (snapback). Frozen Russian sovereign assets are used for reconstruction or remain frozen until reparations are paid.

• Implementation: Agree on a clear, balanced and achievable roadmap for implementation and enforcement of the agreements.

II. Next step – agreeing ceasefire and agenda of the leaders’ meeting

• After the meeting in Istanbul, the parties continue the talks which shall focus on: (1) full and unconditional ceasefire: its modalities and monitoring; (2) confidence building measures; (3) preparation, agreeing agenda and structure of future leaders’ negotiations on key topics.

• Negotiations to be held with the U.S. and Europe participating.

III. Ceasefire

• Full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea at least for 30 days (with the possibility of rolling extensions every 30 days) as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.

• Ceasefire monitoring, led by the US and supported by third countries.

IV. Confidence-building measures

• After successful exchange of PoWs after Istanbul talks, the parties continue the exchange process for all prisoners of war (“all for all” principle).

• Agreement on unconditional return by the Russian Federation of all deported and displaced Ukrainian children, and release by Russia of all civilian prisoners. These measures should include all categories of persons listed, starting from February 2014.

V. Leaders’ meeting

• The leaders of Ukraine and Russia meet to agree on key aspects of final peace settlement.

• Key topics of peace agreement to be agreed by the leaders:

1) Permanent and complete cessation of hostilities: conditions, monitoring, sanctions for violations

2) Security guarantees and non-repetition of aggression

3) Territorial issues

4) Economy, compensation, reconstruction

5) Penalties for breach of agreements

6) Conclusion of a final peace agreement

***

Fresh Ukraine, Russia demands show no interest for actual peace

By Anatol Lieven, Responsible Statecraft, 6/3/25

The memos presented by Ukraine and Russia at their direct talks in Istanbul on Monday make it absolutely clear that, absent a strong U.S. intervention based on a detailed U.S. peace plan, there will be no peace settlement in Ukraine.

It is not just that several of the positions on both sides are completely mutually incompatible; they suggest that at present neither side is in fact interested in an early peace.

The Ukrainian memo, presented before the talks, sets a “full and unconditional ceasefire in the sky, on land and at sea as a necessary background and prerequisite for peace negotiations.” Russia has already rejected this and will continue to do so — naturally, because it would mean giving up its main point of leverage for nothing in return. Nor indeed is a fragile and unstable ceasefire in the interests of Ukraine or the West. If Ukraine is to begin the extremely challenging process of economic reconstruction and democratic reform, it needs a stable and permanent peace.

The Ukrainian memo also states that “no restrictions may be imposed on the number, deployment, or other parameters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as on the deployment of troops of friendly foreign states on the territory of Ukraine.” Russia has already stated that it will not under any circumstances accept the presence of Western troops in Ukraine since it sees this as NATO membership in all but name. European leaders have also stated that a European force could only be deployed with a U.S. guarantee of support, a condition which the Trump administration has rejected.

The Ukrainian memo continues, “some sanctions may be lifted from Russia, but in stages and only gradually, with a mechanism for resuming sanctions if necessary (snapback). Frozen Russian sovereign assets are used for reconstruction or remain frozen until reparations are paid.” Moscow will obviously not agree to a final peace without the lifting of sanctions or firm assurances that they will be lifted.

On one key point, the Ukrainian memo does leave room for compromise: “Ukraine is not forced to be neutral. It can choose to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and move towards EU membership. Ukraine’s membership in NATO depends on consensus within the Alliance.” Russia has in fact already publicly stated that Ukraine has the sovereign right to seek EU membership. And on NATO membership, the memo is correct that this does not depend on Ukraine but on unanimous agreement (not merely “consensus”) among existing members.

The Trump administration (or any European government) is therefore in a position to block Ukrainian NATO membership without reference to Kyiv. The problem for Moscow however is that Poland and other European members of NATO continue to declare their support for Ukraine’s membership; and, if the Democrats win the U.S. elections in 2028, they could overturn Trump’s veto. The Russians therefore are insisting on a Ukrainian constitutional commitment to neutrality and/or a U.S.-Russian treaty to that effect — which Kyiv is refusing.

Meanwhile, accounts of the Russian memo presented in Istanbul, as reported by the Russian media, include reported conditions for a ceasefire that Moscow must know are totally unacceptable to the Ukrainians — though this does not in itself rule out the possibility of Russia being willing to compromise on some of them in a final settlement if it meets its goals in other areas — especially bilateral relations with Washington.

They include “complete withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Donbas, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions. The second option for the ceasefire is a ban on major redeployments of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the abolition of mobilization and martial law, and the cessation of supplies of foreign weapons.”

This is not going to happen, absent Russian victory on the battlefield. Ukraine will never agree to surrender territory that it still holds, nor will European countries agree to end all weapons supplies.

In return for a ceasefire, the Russian memo as reported calls for “international recognition of these regions and Crimea as part of Russia.” This is utterly pointless. It is not just that neither Ukraine nor Western countries will legally recognize the Russian annexations; China, India and South Africa have also refused this, and will continue to do so. The best that Russia can hope for (as was indeed provisionally agreed at the Istanbul talks in March 2022) is to defer the legal status of these territories for future negotiation.

As part of an eventual peace settlement, Russia is also apparently demanding that:

-Kyiv must announce the date of the presidential and Rada elections, which must take place no later than 100 days after the lifting of martial law;

-The size of the Ukrainian military be limited;

-A legal ban on Nazi & neo-Nazi propaganda. Dissolution of “nationalist” parties & organizations;

-Restoration of rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church;

-A peace treaty between Russia and Ukraine must be approved by a legally binding resolution of the U.N. Security Council;

-It is necessary to ensure the full rights, freedoms and interests of Russian speakers;

-Renouncing mutual claims with Ukraine in connection with damage from military operations.

Formal endorsement of the peace treaty by the UNSC makes very good sense. The other Russian conditions however will be exceptionally difficult for Kyiv to meet under Russian pressure — not least because in several cases they would need the legal approval of the Ukrainian parliament, which is very unlikely to give it.

Only Washington can offer Russia compromises in other areas (for example on U.S. force deployments in Europe) that could persuade Moscow to reduce these conditions to reasonable levels; and only Washington could then pressure Kyiv and European capitals into accepting them. Some of the Russian conditions (including minority rights) are not only legitimate, but essential if postwar Ukraine is to progress towards eventual EU membership, but a formula has to be found whereby Ukraine can agree to them as a starting point of the EU accession process, and not as surrender to Moscow.

The Trump administration can be forgiven its exasperation with the state of the peace process. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake — from the point of view of America’s own interests — for the U.S. to walk away from it. Apart from the fact that sooner or later Washington would inevitably be dragged back in, three recent developments have highlighted how a prolonged continuation of the war will involve serious risks for the U.S.

Thus the weekend’s devastating Ukrainian attack on Russia’s nuclear-capable bomber fleet undermines nuclear security between the U.S. and Russia.

The bipartisan bill to go before the U.S. Senate next week (with the encouragement of the EU presidency) proposes 500% tariffs on imports from countries that buy Russian oil and gas. Presumably the senators are thinking of China. They appear to have forgotten that it also means India (and other U.S. partners). India has no intention of bowing to a U.S. diktat that would radically increase its energy costs and undermine its economy; and the imposition of 500% tariffs on India would ruin a vital U.S. relationship in Asia.

Finally, the EU has passed a new package of sanctions against Russia including measures to target the so-called “shadow fleet” of internationally-flagged tankers transporting Russian energy exports. This is also an affront to countries like India that buy this energy — and consider that they have a perfect right to do so under international law, since Western sanctions against Russia have not been approved by the United Nations, or agreed by themselves.

Last month, an Estonian patrol boat attempted to board a tanker bound for Russia in international waters, and Moscow sent a fighter jet to warn the Estonians off. Finland and Sweden have also threatened to detain such ships. Russia in response briefly detained a Liberian-flagged Greek tanker exiting Estonia through Russian waters. Russian politicians have threatened retaliatory seizures: “Any attack on our carriers can be regarded as an attack on our territory, even if the ship is under a foreign flag,” warned Alexei Zhuravlev, the deputy chairman of Russia’s parliamentary defense committee.

If both sides stick to their positions, then naval clashes will be not only possible, but certain. It is also obvious that these NATO members would never engage in such wildly reckless behavior unless they believed that in the event of such clashes, the U.S. military would come to their aid. The Trump administration needs to rein them in very firmly indeed. It also however needs to continue trying to bring an end to the Ukraine War, for as long as the war continues, so will the danger of a local collision between Russia and NATO members, from which the U.S. will not be able to remain aloof.