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By Paul Robinson, Landmarks, 12/11/24

The war in Ukraine is nearing the end of its third year, but as yet there is no indication of imminent peace. For the past three years, Western powers, led by the United States of America, have sought a solution to the war by means of a single strategy: supporting Ukraine and pressuring Russia. The aim has been peace through victory. This strategy has failed. Probably over 200,000 Russian and Ukrainian soldiers have been killed; possibly tens of thousands of civilians have been killed also; and property worth tens of billions of dollars has been destroyed. The time has come when the policy of peace through victory needs to be replaced by a policy of peace, pure and simple.

The return of Donald Trump to the US presidency in January 2025 offers an opportunity to pursue such a policy. President Joe Biden has shown no interest in mediating a peace process. Neither have any European leaders. Trump, however, has indicated that he wishes to do so, and as a first step has appointed General Keith Kellogg as his Special Envoy for Russia and Ukraine, tasked specifically with finding a way to end the war.

In this context, proposals for how to end the war in Ukraine have acquired a new importance. Unfortunately, to date, many such proposals have been divorced from any understanding of how in practice wars actually end. This paper thus seeks to ground policy recommendations in studies of war termination. To that purpose, it first analyzes war termination theories and then applies those theories to the war in Ukraine.

The paper examines the topic from the standpoint of what is most likely to produce a lasting peace settlement. The rights and wrongs of the Ukrainian and Russian causes are not the subject of concern. While it has been said that “there is no peace without justice,” it might be more correct to say that “there is no justice without peace.” The aim of the analysis is peace in the negative sense of an absence of war, not peace in the positive sense, as the achievement of justice. Some may object to this approach, but any peace plan that fails to place the ending of war at the top of its agenda is liable to fail.

How Wars End

The starting point for any realistic proposal to end the war in Ukraine must be an understanding of the conditions that are necessary for successful war termination, as well as of the barriers that prevent political leaders from recognizing that those conditions are present.

There are many variations of war termination, but in essence they boil down to two options:

1. The absolute victory of one side, allowing it to impose its terms on the other. In this case, the war ends because one of the warring parties ceases the struggle. This could be due to its complete destruction or disintegration (e.g. the Iraqi army in 2003), its withdrawal (e.g. the US withdrawals from Vietnam and Afghanistan), or its surrender (e.g. Germany and Japan in World War Two).
2. Neither side achieves absolute victory, and the war ends through a negotiated settlement that involves some degree of compromise by both parties. This need not mean that both sides do equally well in the final settlement: one may do decidedly better than the other. The form of the settlement may also vary. In some instances, it may take the form of a peace treaty. In other instances, it may consist of a ceasefire without any treaty (the Korean War being an example). Regardless, the key feature is that the settlement is negotiated not imposed.

In the first case, wars end when the losing side is either destroyed or gives up. Thus it has been said that “War is pressed by the victor, but peace is made by the vanquished1.

The second case is more complicated. According to a popular thesis developed by William Zartman, wars end when both warring parties perceive themselves to be in a “mutually hurting stalemate,” and when they both perceive the possibility of a way out via a negotiated settlement. At such point, the conflict is deemed to be “ripe” for termination2. The term “mutually hurting stalemate” is somewhat misleading, as it does not imply total deadlock; one side may hold a definite advantage over the other. However, it does imply that neither side believes itself to be able to achieve absolute victory, and it does imply that both sides perceive the existing situation to be harmful to their interests.

Objective criteria, such as success or failure on the battlefield, play into both these scenarios. However, what matters is not objective reality but rather the warring parties’ perceptions of reality3. In the first case, wars end because one side either perceives the war not to be worth continuing or perceives itself to have lost. And in the second case, wars end because both sides perceive that there is a mutually hurting stalemate and that there is possible negotiated way out. Bringing a war to an end is thus a question of altering perceptions. In the first case, it involves convincing the losing side that defeat is inevitable; in the second case it involves convincing both sides that victory is impossible.

Needless to say, this is easier said than done. Even if it is clear to an objective outside observer that one side has lost or that neither side is capable of absolute victory, those involved in the fighting may not view things the same way or may be unwilling to act on the knowledge. There are a number of explanations for this:

1. Cognitive biases: Political and military leaders, like all human beings, are subject to cognitive biases that prevent them from correctly assessing their situation. Optimism bias, sunk cost fallacies, the tendency to take risks rather than accept bad certainties, and so on, mean that wars generally continue long beyond the point when a purely rational actor with perfect knowledge would have brought them to a halt4.
2. Internal political and bureaucratic dynamics: Political leaders may be fed overly positive information by subordinates; they may be fearful of the political consequences of accepting defeat; or they may meet resistance from powerful forces who wish to continue the war. The attitudes of the general public, the political elite, and the military leadership all play into this dynamic5.
3. Imperfect information. War may be seen as a method by which involved parties exchange information about their relative strength and resolve. But as the great Prussian strategist Karl von Clausewitz pointed out, war is shrouded in uncertainty. Even if one has good information about the state of one’s war effort (which is not always the case), information about the state of the enemy’s is always limited. Future developments are also unpredictable. For instance, one cannot know for sure what one’s allies will do. Humans also tend to be less able to recognize change if it happens slowly than if it happens rapidly. Political and military leaders may not recognize their relative military decline until long after it has become critical if the decline is gradual, not due to a sudden and unexpected defeat. One study thus concludes that “combat is a relatively inefficient means of hastening war termination through information transmission.”6
4. Distrust (often referred to in academic literature as the “commitment credibility” problem). Even if leaders recognize that they have lost or are stalemated, they may be unwilling to negotiate because they do not trust their opponents to comply with the terms of any agreement – i.e. they do not believe that their enemy’s commitments are credible. Perceptions of past behavior are crucial in this regard7. If one’s enemies are seen to have broken agreements in the past, one will be reluctant to make new agreements with them, however bad one’s position. In extreme cases, fears of non-compliance can induce warring parties to continue to insist on absolute victory even in the face of obvious battlefield defeat8.
5. Spoilers. Efforts to make peace may be deliberately sabotaged either by individuals or groups within a state, or by third parties9.

The analysis above suggests that third-party state leaders who are seeking to end a war being fought by other states have two options:

1. Alter the perceptions of one side to convince it that it has lost and must concede. In this instance, it is obviously easier and quicker to alter the perceptions of the side that is in a weaker position. Trying to convince the stronger side that it is losing will likely be very difficult and only possible after a very long process which would involve so altering the dynamics of the war that the relative positions of the two warring parties are reversed.
2. Alter the perceptions of both sides to convince them a) that neither of them can win an absolute victory, b) that the current situation is harmful to their interests, and c) that there is plausible way out via negotiations. Given the problems noted above, this too is likely to be a slow process.

The quickest way to end a war is thus probably to work on convincing the weaker side that its cause is lost and that it must settle. The second quickest way is option 2 above. And the slowest is to try and alter the perceptions of the winning side in order to convince it that it is losing.

Political leaders whom one is trying to convince in this way will probably be loath to admit that their war will end in a suboptimal way. Peacemakers will have to overcome the barriers to recognizing reality mentioned above. To this end, one may offer the following possible courses of action:

1. Alter reality to conform with the desired outcome. This would involve exerting pressure on one side so as to weaken it, while aiding the other side so as to strengthen it. In accordance with the logic above, this is more likely to succeed, and more likely to have rapid effects, if it involves pressuring the weaker side and/or supporting the stronger side. This approach has a number of weaknesses, however:

• Given the uncertainties of war one cannot be certain that the combination of pressure and support will have the desired impact on objective reality;
• Even if it does, one cannot be certain that the perceptions of the warring parties will alter accordingly, especially (as is likely) if the change in objective reality is gradual; and
• Even if perceptions are suitably altered, one cannot be sure that the parties will respond in the desired manner due to the issue of distrust mentioned earlier.

2. Work to overcome the targeted state’s cognitive biases and the problem of insufficient information. The weaker party may not, for instance, recognize its position due to optimism bias or because it misunderstands the level of support it may receive in the future from allies. Frank conversations that disabuse state leaders of their illusions may be necessary.
3. Enable state leaders to overcome internal political opposition to a settlement of the war. This could be done, for instance, by promises of financial aid after the war, or by very overt arm-twisting that makes it clear to internal forces opposed to peace that their leader has been left with no other choice by key outside actors.
4. Devise the settlement in such a way as to reassure the warring parties that their opponents are likely to abide by the commitments they have made. In this regard, a formal peace treaty is preferable to a pure ceasefire, as the latter involves almost no commitments beyond ceasing military actions. In addition, the more contested issues that can be resolved in any peace treaty and not left hanging till later, the better. Security guarantees, the deployment of peacekeeping forces, and other similar devices may also help overcome problems of mutual distrust.
5. Engage with potential spoilers to convince them that it is not in their interest to sabotage negotiations. A combination of positive and negative inducements may be used to persuade them to adopt a more amenable position.

The War in Ukraine

The trajectory of the war in Ukraine has surprised all observers. One would be very hard put to find a single analyst who has correctly predicted all its ups and downs. War is inherently uncertain, and given this record, one would be rash to declare that one knows the likely future direction of the conflict. Nonetheless, after nearly three years of fighting certain things have now become sufficiently clear that one can draw fairly confident conclusions about some key issues.

First, it is now obvious that Russia is the stronger of the two parties. Moreover, its relative strength is growing. While one cannot rule out a reversal of the trend in Russia’s favor, it stretches plausibility to imagine that such a reversal could go so far as to render Ukraine stronger than Russia. The issue is more the extent of Russia’s future advantage than the existence of such an advantage.

Russia’s military superiority can be measured in many ways. The first is in terms of territorial gains. These have accelerated in recent months, with Russia capturing 725 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory in November 2024, the largest amount since the first weeks of the war in early 202210. The second is military production; Russia’s production of weaponry far exceeds that of Ukraine, and in key sectors, such as artillery shell and armored vehicle production, it exceeds that of all Ukraine’s Western allies put together. A recent German report noted, for instance, that “Production has strongly increased across all weapon systems,” with Russia producing sufficient weaponry not only to replace its losses but also to outfit new formations11. A third area is manpower. Russia began the war in February 2024 with an invasion force of at most 200,000 soldiers. By early 2023, the size of the Russian army in Ukraine had increased to around 360,000 men, and by early 2024 to about 470,0012. According to Vladimir Putin, in June 2024 the number of Russian troops in the zone of military operations was just under 700,00013. Despite claims of massive losses, the Russian army in Ukraine has grown considerably in size.

Ukraine, by contrast, is experiencing severe difficulties. Not only is it inexorably losing ground, but it has little prospect of turning the situation around in its favor due to a) the extreme unlikelihood that Western support will increase substantially beyond its current level, b) manpower shortages, and c) growing problems of morale. The latest mobilization effort has not yielded the desired results, while desertion is become ever more prevalent. According to recent reports, over 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been charged with desertion during the war, of which some two-thirds were in 2024 alone. Recently Ukraine is estimated to have lost about 4,000 soldiers a month more than it has been able to recruit14. While the Russian army is growing larger, the Ukrainian army is growing smaller.

Protracted wars necessarily become wars of attrition and of morale. At present, Russia is winning in terms of attrition, while it also appears that Russian morale is holding up better than that of Ukraine. There is no obvious reason to suspect that either factor will change significantly in Ukraine’s favor in the short to medium term.

From this one can draw the conclusion that an absolute Ukrainian victory (measured in the terms set by the Ukrainian government itself – which is to say the recapture of all its lost territory) is almost impossible. That does not mean, however, that Russia is assured of victory in the sense of acquiring such a dominant position that it can force whatever terms it wishes on Ukraine. Such an outcome remains possible, should, for instance, Western aid to Ukraine entirely cease or should Ukrainian morale collapse. Absent that, however, Russia’s current advantage is not so great as to make such a result probable. Russia is advancing, but only slowly, and it has not demonstrated that it has the capacity to exploit any breaches it makes in the Ukrainian lines in such a way as to permit rapid advances over large distances. At the current rate, it will take Russia at least another 12 months just to capture the rest of Donetsk province. Ukraine’s capacity to resist and inflict heavy casualties on the Russians remains large. Moreover, much of Russia’s military production involves refitting old Soviet equipment. As stockpiles run down, production may begin to run down too, leading some commentators to believe that Russia’s military strength may peak in 2025.

Given this, Russia is not currently well placed to inflict such a massive military defeat on Ukraine as to force it entirely to submit. Objective reality, therefore, points towards a situation of mutually hurting stalemate, rather than absolute victory, albeit a stalemate which is hurting Ukraine far more than it is hurting Russia.

The question which then arises is whether the leadership of Russia and Ukraine correctly perceive this reality, and if they do, whether they are likely to act on this perception. The fact that the war continues, and that negotiations between the two are not even taking place, suggests that the answers to these questions are no. At the start of December 2024, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov declared that he saw “no grounds for negotiations yet.15” Russian officials continue to insist on their original demands – Ukrainian neutrality, demilitarization, and de-Nazification – to which they have now added recognition of the “new territorial realities,” in other words recognition of Russian control over those Ukrainian territories it has annexed. As yet, there is no sign of any flexibility that might indicate an understanding that the Russian army is not in a position to so weaken Ukraine as to be able to impose these terms by force.

Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky, by contrast, has recently demonstrated a tiny bit of flexibility, but arguably only a tiny bit. In late November 2024, he suggested that Ukraine would not be able to recapture “some” territory by force, notably Crimea, and stated that he would be willing to freeze the conflict and de facto abandon efforts to retake territory in return for NATO membership16. But the reference to “some” territory suggested also a continuing belief that other territory could be retaken by military means, while the request for NATO membership for all of Ukraine within its pre-2014 borders is hardly realistic. It is not obvious that Zelensky has yet come to terms with the reality of his situation.

Neither side, therefore, despite their decidedly limited military prospects, and the heavy losses they are suffering, at present acknowledges that the costs of continuing the war exceed the potential gains. In line with the analysis above, a number of reasons present themselves:

1. Cognitive biases. Leaders on both sides may genuinely believe their situation to be better than it is due to optimism bias. They may also be stuck in a sunk cost fallacy, believing that after having invested so much in the war, they must invest more in order to recoup their losses. In Russia’s case, optimism may be due to a belief that sooner or later the West will tire of the war, and abandon Ukraine. In Ukraine’s case, optimism may be due to endless assurances from Western politicians that they will support Ukraine for “as long as it takes.” Ukrainian leaders may also believe that they will be able to gradually obtain more and more powerful weapons from their Western allies, in the end tipping the war in their favor. The West’s incremental escalation during the war, gradually handing over different types of weapons that were once ruled out of bounds, has arguably encouraged this attitude. In addition, the fact that Ukraine’s military position has declined quite gradually may have made the decline more difficult to acknowledge than if it had resulted from a sudden defeat. A decisive shock may be required to jolt perceptions.
2. Internal political and bureaucratic dynamics. Both Putin and Zelensky may fear for their political future if they compromise. Of the two, Zelensky’s position looks the weaker, and so this factor may be a particular problem for him. Zelensky may face intense pressure from powerful forces within Ukraine who are resistant to any compromise. This could include elements of the military, including those associated in one way or another with the nationalist right.
3. Imperfect information. It would not be surprising if both President Putin and President Zelensky were being fed unduly positive reports by their subordinates. Information about the state of their opponents, including their losses, their morale, and their productive capabilities, is uncertain. So too are factors such as the likely future behavior of other countries, in particular of Ukraine’s Western backers. All this may feed into the cognitive biases mentioned above.

4. Distrust/Commitment credibility. It could be that Putin and Zelensky are in reality fully aware of the reality of their situation. However, to make peace they must not only perceive that they cannot achieve absolute victory but must also perceive a way out. They may not do so, because they so distrust one another that they consider it probable that the other will break any agreement, leaving them even worse off than before. The level of mutual distrust between Ukrainian and Russian political leaders is indeed enormous, due to perceptions of past behaviors. The Ukrainians see the Russians as having broken promises to guarantee Ukrainian security made by Russia in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994. They argue that Russia will use any ceasefire to strengthen itself prior to relaunching its war of conquest against Ukraine. As Zelensky said in January 2024, “A pause on the Ukrainian battlefield will not mean a pause in the war. A pause would play into [Russia’s] hands. It might crush us afterward.17” Russians, meanwhile, use exactly the same argument, but in reverse – Ukraine will use any ceasefire to rearm, and then restart the war on terms that are more favorable to itself. The experience of Ukraine’s failure to enact key clauses of the 2015 Minsk II agreement that was designed to end the war in eastern Ukraine, above all the failure to grant some degree of autonomy to Donbass, is often cited in this regard. So too are statements by Western leaders, such as former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, that the Minsk agreement was never meant to be fulfilled but was designed simply to give Ukraine time to recover its strength18. This has a powerful effect on Russian attitudes towards a potential ceasefire in the current war. Thus, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov commented in December 2024 that “the West is starting to talk about a ceasefire as a means to give Ukraine a respite, and give themselves the opportunity to once again pump Ukraine up with modern long-range weapons. This, of course, is not a path to peace.19”
5. Spoilers. There is a common assumption that America’s allies will inevitably fall in line with whatever policy the United States pursues. Thus, if the United States pushes for peace in Ukraine, European states will accept whatever deal is being proposed. This is not necessarily true. Some European countries, most notably Poland and the Baltic States, but to a lesser degree also France and the United Kingdom, consider preventing a Russian victory to be a vital national interest and have committed themselves so fully to the Ukrainian cause that it is quite possible that they will act as spoilers of any US-led peace effort, urging Ukraine to stand firm, and offering to make up for any decreases in American assistance.

Policy Conclusions

To date, the United States and its allies have conducted a two-pronged policy based on a) military and economic support to Ukraine, and b) economic pressure on the Russian Federation. One can identify three stages to this policy. At first, immediately following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the aim was simply to prevent Ukraine being defeated. Later, following Ukrainian successes in late 2022, it would appear that Western states believed that Ukraine could actually emerge militarily victorious, and military aid to Ukraine was premised on that possibility. Third, following the failure of the 2023 Ukrainian offensive, policy shifted away from achieving victory towards trying to prevent a further deterioration of the Ukrainian position so that when negotiations eventually begin, Ukraine can participate in a position if not of strength then at least not of enormous weakness.

Despite the shifting aims, however, the basic policy has remained the same: strengthen Ukraine and weaken Russia. This has not been successful. The longer the war has continued, the more the balance of power has shifted in Russia’s favor. This trend seems likely to continue, and it is probable that the longer Ukraine waits to make peace with Russia, the worse its position will be. In the meantime, it will suffer continued losses of people and physical infrastructure. It is clear, therefore, that the time has come for a shift in policy away from helping Ukraine fight its war and towards peacemaking.

The analysis above suggests certain conclusions as to what would best serve the interests of peace:

1. Increased pressure on Russia is unlikely to bring the war to an end in the short to medium term. Abandoning all military, political, and diplomatic pressure on Russia will increase its optimistic understanding of its relative strength, and thus encourage further its pursuit of absolute victory. For this reason, such an abrupt change in policy is not advisable. That said, increasing the pressure is unlikely to be any more productive than eliminating it. It is improbable, for instance, that the volume of military supplies to Ukraine will ever reach that provided in the winter of 2022-23, a volume that was insufficient to enable the Ukrainian 2023 offensive to succeed. However much aid Western states provide to Ukraine henceforth, the Russian military will almost certainly continue to enjoy an advantage over Ukraine, and the pressure on the Russian government to end the war on disadvantageous terms will therefore necessarily be weak, at least in the short to medium term. It is possible that continued pressure will eventually convince the Russian leadership that it cannot achieve its most important objectives by military means and also convince it that a continuation of the current situation is harmful to its interests. This, though, is likely to take a very long time, during which Ukraine will continue to suffer. Moreover, even if the Russian leadership is convinced in this way, the commitment credibility problem may mean that it might remain unwilling to abandon its objectives and might prefer to continue the war rather than accept a peace that it believes will prove short-lived. We can conclude, therefore, that while it would be unwise to significantly decrease pressure on Russia, the path to peace probably does not lie through doing the opposite.

2. Negative and positive inducements to Ukraine are more likely to bring the war to a quick conclusion. As a general rule, it is the weaker party that brings the war to an end, by finally recognizing its position and either unilaterally ceasing the struggle or signaling its willingness to make concessions. Given that Ukraine is the weaker party, the surest and fastest way to peace therefore probably lies in negatively altering its perceptions of its ability to achieve key objectives by means of negative inducements (diplomatic pressure, withdrawal of aid, etc.), while also providing it some positive inducements, such as promises of economic assistance following the end of the war.One of the problems of Western policy over the past decade, from the Maidan revolution of 2014 onwards, has been that Western states have been unwilling to pressure Ukraine to make the concessions required for a peaceful settlement of its political conflict with Russia. This has had fatal consequences. For instance, the failure to induce Ukraine to fulfil the promises made in the Minsk II agreement to grant autonomy to Donbass led to the collapse of the agreement, and arguably therefore contributed to the outbreak of full-scale war in 2022. Meanwhile, the policy of incremental escalation pursued by the USA and its allies has possibly convinced Ukrainian leaders that they will always eventually be able to push their Western allies to go one step further. Dangling false hopes in front of Ukraine – for instance, promises of eventual NATO membership or hints of some form of direct Western involvement in the war – encourages optimism bias and prevents Ukraine from correctly perceiving the weakness of its position. The time has come for firm diplomacy that aligns perceptions with reality.A careful balance will be required between pressuring Kyiv enough to induce a change in its perceptions that encourages it to seek peace, and pressuring it so much that it changes Moscow’s perceptions in a way that encourages it to further pursue war. The correct balance will be difficult to find. But it is clear that to date the balance has been skewed in the wrong direction, and that a move in the direction of more pressure on Kyiv is required.
3. Such firmness should assist with the problem of internal opposition to peace within Ukraine. Overcoming that opposition will be difficult, but if President Zelensky can tell both the Ukrainian people and key players within the political elite and the military that future Western support is dependent on making peace, then his hand will be considerably strengthened.
4. A formal peace treaty is much preferable to a Korean-style ceasefire. Negative and positive inducements will be unlikely to succeed as long as both parties remain suspicious that the other side will use a ceasefire as a breathing space to rearm prior to restarting hostilities. A Korean-style ceasefire is therefore best avoided. A formal treaty, by contrast, commits both parties not merely not to resume fighting but also to a recognition of the resolution of their differences. Formal treaties can, of course, be broken, but doing so is a much more significant breach of promise than ending a ceasefire. Treaties thus provide a degree of reassurance that ceasefires do not.
5. Issues such as territorial boundaries should be formally resolved in any treaty. By the same logic as above, it is best that any treaty be as comprehensive as possible and not leave issues hanging that might be the basis for future disputes and serve as an excuse for recommencing the war. For this reason, it would be better if any treaty ending the Russo-Ukrainian war formally recognized the new border between the two countries. Most proposals to end the war suggest that Ukraine should de facto recognize the loss of territory but not de jure, because this would be politically easier to accept. However, in the absence of de jure recognition, Russia and Ukraine will be locked into a permanent territorial dispute that will perpetually endanger the peace. Knowledge that this will be the case accentuates the credible commitment problem.

6. Both Ukraine and Russia need reassurance that the end of the war will truly be the end, not merely a respite used by the other side to recover prior to a restart. This is perhaps the key to a successful peace process, as it is clear that at present neither side believes this to be the case. The importance both Ukraine and Russia attach to the issue of Ukraine’s potential NATO membership reflects this. To Ukraine, NATO membership is the guarantee par excellence that Russia will be unable to attack it again. This is why Zelensky has recently expressed a willingness to forego other benefits in order to achieve this single objective. For Russia, however, a Ukraine in NATO is one that could potentially restart the war but this time with the backing of the whole of the Western alliance. From a Russian point of view, the only way of guaranteeing that Ukraine will not restart the war is rendering it incapable of doing so, which means its neutrality and de-militarization.This creates a serious dilemma for any peacemaker: security guarantees for Ukraine are essential for overcoming the credible commitment problem. Without them, Ukraine may continue to fight even if its leaders recognize that its position is hopeless. But what are security guarantees for Ukraine are perceived as security threats by Russia. And likewise, what Russia sees as security guarantees are perceived as security threats by Ukraine. Squaring this particular circle will be extremely difficult, but arguably it is the most important task of any mediator, as unless it is circled the war cannot end.Examples of how perhaps this could be done include leaving the issue of NATO membership open, but with guarantees that NATO troops and long-range weaponry will not be permitted in Ukraine; accepting NATO membership for Ukraine but reconfiguring the entire European security structure in such a way that Russia no longer views NATO as threatening; the provision of some sort of peacekeeping force that neither side considers hostile; making Ukraine neutral but providing security guarantees in some manner that does not include NATO; or something else entirely. Some of these potential solutions are rather more implausible than others. Some may also require considerable arm twisting of the Ukrainian leadership by American diplomats. But what is clear is that providing the necessary reassurances to both sides will require very original thinking.
7. Efforts will be required to neutralize spoilers. States such as Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia fear that anything short of a decisive Russian defeat will embolden Russia in a way that could eventually threaten them. They will therefore be inclined to encourage Ukraine to resist any peace efforts. To prevent this, they too will require reassurance. This will probably require some sort of commitment by the United States to the continued defense of Europe.

Final Conclusions

Of all the issues mentioned above, the credible commitment problem is possibly the most important. A combination of positive and negative inducements may alter the perceptions of one or both sides in such a way as to make them more amenable to peace, but this cannot be guaranteed. Furthermore, any step that makes one party’s perceptions more pessimistic, and so renders it more willing to negotiate, is likely simultaneously to make the other party’s perceptions more optimistic, and so render it less willing to do so. Moreover, even if the parties’ perceptions are altered in the desired manner, they will not act in the desired manner if they remain convinced that any ceasefire will only be a temporary pause used by their opponents to strengthen their position prior to recommencing hostilities.

Studies of war termination suggest that warring states may forego secondary objectives if they are able to achieve another objective of very considerable value. At that point, as one study notes, the side that has achieved a super-valuable objective could continue fighting but “does not because the costs of going further threaten to escalate the conflict, and it is less motivated to keep going because additional increments of the good are not as valuable.20” It is important, therefore, to identify what those at war consider “super-valuable” and seek to guarantee that. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, it would appear that the most valuable thing sought by both sides is security, defined as freedom from fear of a future conflict. Arguably, it was Russian fears of the movement of Ukraine into the NATO camp, of apparent Ukrainian hostility, and of an escalation of the war in eastern Ukraine into a wider conflict involving Western powers, that motivated Russia’s leaders into launching a preventive war against Ukraine. Likewise, fears that anything less than victory may produce such a result further down the road persuades Russian leaders to keep on going. At the same time, having been invaded by Russia, Ukraine has well-founded fears of future Russian aggression and seeks a settlement that protects it against further such aggression hereafter.

Any settlement of the war must therefore address the issue of the future security of both parties. That means that any third party attempting to mediate between the two must take seriously the security concerns of both belligerents. In particular, ignoring the concerns of the stronger party is very unlikely to result in successful war termination. Accepting this will require a considerable change in attitude from Western leaders. It is also a precept that many in the West will doubtless strongly resist. Overcoming this resistance may require some strong diplomacy and will involve taking steps that incite sharp criticism from some quarters. The potential benefits, however, far outweigh the risks.

Paul Robinson (DPhil, Oxford University) is professor of public and international affairs at the University of Ottawa. His research and teaching embraces military ethics, Russian history, security and defence policy. He is the author or editor of 14 books. Prior to his graduate studies, he served as a regular officer in the British Army Intelligence Corps from 1989 to 1994, and as a reserve officer in the Canadian Forces from 1994 to 1996.

1 H. A. Calahan, “What Makes a War End: An Analysis of Some Current Hypotheses,” Journal of Peace Research, 4 (1969): 303.

2 William Zartman, International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: The National Academy Press, 2000), 228.

3 Chione Robinson, “A Theory of War Termination for Peacemakers,” Canadian Forces College Review, 2020: 88.

4 Robinson, “A Theory of War Termination,” 83.

5 Shawn T. Cochran, War Termination as a Civil-Military Bargain: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Politics of Protracted Armed Conflict (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 2.

6 Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 220.

7 Reiter, How Wars End, 222. Carmela Lutmar, “War Termination,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Feargal Cochrane, Ending Wars (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 75.

8 Reiter, How Wars End, 4

9 Lutmar, “War Termination.”

10 Jasmine Laws, “Russia Seizes Ukraine Territory the Size of Singapore,” Newsweek, 2 December 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-seizes-ukraine-territory-size-singapore-1994209.

11 Guntram B. Wolff, Alexandr Burilkov, Katelyn Bushnell, Ivan Kharitonov, “Fit for War in Decades: Germany’s Slow Rearmament vis-à-vis Russia,” Kiel Report, no. 1, 2024: 21

12 Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine through 2024,” RUSI, 13 January 2024, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russian-military-objectives-and-capacity-ukraine-through-2024.

13 “Putin Says Almost 700,000k Russian Troops Fighting in Ukraine,” The Moscow Times, 16 June 2024, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/15/putin-says-almost-700k-russian-troops-fighting-in-ukraine-a85419.

14 Samya Kullab and Voldymyr Yurchuk, “Desertion Threatens to Starve Ukraine’s Forces at a Crucial Time in its War with Russia,” AP, 29 November 2024, https://apnews.com/article/deserters-awol-ukraine-russia-war-def676562552d42bc5d593363c9e5ea0.

15 David Brennan, “Russia Sees ‘No Grounds for Negotiations’ with Ukraine, Putin Spokesman Says,” ABC News, 4 December 2024,https://abcnews.go.com/International/russia-sees-grounds-negotiations-ukraine-putin-spokesperson/story?id=116441134.

16 Alexander Butler, “Zelensky says Ukraine could temporarily cede territory to Russia in exchange for Nato membership,” The Independent, 30 November 2024, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/zelensky-putin-russia-ukraine-war-ceasefire-trump-b2656221.html.

17 Jim Heintz and Illia Novikov, “Ukraine’s Zelenskyy rules out a ceasefire with Russia, saying Moscow would use it to rearm,” CTV News, 11 January 2024, https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/ukraine-s-zelenskyy-rules-out-a-ceasefire-with-russia-saying-moscow-would-use-it-to-rearm-1.6721024.

18 “Attempt to ‘Give Ukraine Time:’ Merkel on Minsk Agreement,” TASS, 7 December 2022, https://tass.com/world/1547141.

19 “Russia Says West Seeking Ukraine Ceasefire to Rearm Kyiv amid Scholz’s Visit,” First Post, 2 December 2024, https://www.firstpost.com/world/russia-says-west-seeking-ukraine-ceasefire-to-rearm-kyiv-amid-scholzs-visit-13840919.html.

20 Reiter, How Wars End, 45.

TASS, 12/16/24

MOSCOW, December 16. /TASS/. This year has been “a pivotal year” in terms of achieving the goals of the special military operation, Russian President Vladimir Putin told a Defense Ministry Board meeting.

He also pointed out that the country will continue to develop its nuclear potential.

TASS has compiled the Russian leader’s key statements.

On special military operation

The outgoing year “was pivotal in achieving the special military operation goals.”

The Russian Armed Forces hold “a strong strategic initiative across the entire line of engagement in the special military operation zone.”

Russian servicemen have liberated 189 settlements in the special military operation zone over the year.

It is necessary to keep pushing the pace in the special military operation zone.

The situation on the battlefield will not change even if Ukraine lowers the call-up age to 14.

On Ukrainian authorities

Russia is not at war with the Ukrainian people, but with “the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev that seized power back in 2014.”

The problem between Russia and Ukraine stems from “the bloody anti-constitutional coup” in Kiev in 2014.

The Kiev regime commits crimes against the Ukrainian and Russian people on a daily basis.

The regime of Vladimir Zelensky does not protect the interests of the Russian people.

“It seems that this regime is losing all the characteristics of statehood.”

On unstable situation in world

The military and political situation in the world remains “uneasy and unstable.”

The incumbent Washington administration and the West continue to try to rule the world, and continue “imposing on the world their so-called rules, which they change time and again in their interests.”

“The US continues to send weapons and money to the actually illegitimate ruling regime in Kiev, sends mercenaries and military advisors, thus encouraging further escalation of the conflict.”

The essence of what the US is trying to do with regard to Russia is to push it to its red line and then scare the American people with claims of a Russian threat.

On US, NATO aspirations

“NATO’s aspirations long ago went beyond the so-called zone of historical responsibility.”

“In addition to the so-called eastern front, the alliance is expanding its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Encouraged by the United States, new military and political alliances are being formed, undermining the security architecture that has existed for decades.”

NATO countries are increasing defense spending and are forming strike groups with servicemen from the alliance’s countries.

The US plans to deploy intermediate range high-accuracy weapons are worrisome.

Russia will drop its voluntary restrictions on the deployment of intermediate-and shorter-range missiles if the United States begins deploying such weapons.

Russia is forced to take additional measures to ensure its security, but it will not get involved in a full-fledged arms race: “Our approach here is careful and prudent.”

On development of Russian Armed Forces

Russia now has up to 1.5 million servicemen in the Russian Armed Forces.

This year, about 1,000 people are signing up to join the military every day. “People are going to the front voluntarily.”

On nuclear deterrence

The proportion of state-of-the-art weaponry in Russia’s strategic nuclear forces has reached 95%.

Russia adheres to its policy of nuclear deterrence in its updated nuclear and by no means indulges in saber rattling.

Moscow will continue to support the potential and balanced development of its nuclear forces.

“It is important to keep non-strategic nuclear forces on constant alert and to continue the practice of holding exercises.”

***

Transcript of Putin’s Meeting with Defense Ministry

Kremlin website, 12/16/24 (AI generated translation)

President of Russia Vladimir Putin: Comrades,

Today, as part of an expanded meeting of the Defence Ministry Board, we will discuss the main results of work for 2024 and identify tasks to strengthen the defence capability and further develop the Armed Forces.

I note right away that the outgoing year has become a landmark in achieving the goals of the special military operation. Thanks to the professionalism and courage of our soldiers, the heroic work of employees of defense enterprises and the truly nationwide support of the army and navy, the Russian troops firmly have the strategic initiative along the entire line of contact.

This year alone, 189 settlements have been liberated. I would like to sincerely thank our heroes: the soldiers and officers who are fighting selflessly and steadfastly on the front line, the personnel of the Defence Ministry, the National Guard, our special services and other law enforcement agencies who are clearly carrying out all the tasks set, no matter how difficult they may be, who do not spare themselves, do not spare their lives for the sake of victory, for the sake of the Fatherland.

Our duty is to always remember our comrades who died defending the Motherland and our people, to surround their families and children with constant care. I have said it many times and I will repeat it again: their children are our children. We must never forget this.

I ask you to observe a minute of silence in memory of our fallen comrades.

(A minute of silence is announced.)

Thank you.

Dear members of the board!

Today, the military-political situation in the world remains difficult and unstable. Thus, the bloodshed in the Middle East does not stop, and the high conflict potential remains in a number of other regions of the world.

We see that the current US administration and almost the entire collective West are trying to maintain their global dominance and continue to impose their so-called rules on the international community, which they change over and over again, twisting them as it suits them. As a matter of fact, there is only one stable rule: there are no rules for those who do this, for those who consider themselves to be the head of the whole world, for those who consider themselves to be the Lord’s representatives on earth, although they themselves do not believe in the Lord.

And against undesirable states, [they] are waging hybrid wars, implementing a policy of deterrence, including against Russia. In an effort to weaken our country and inflict a strategic defeat on us, the United States continues to pump weapons and money into the de facto illegitimate ruling regime in Kiev, sending mercenaries and military advisers, and thereby encouraging further escalation of the conflict.

At the same time, under the pretext of a mythical Russian threat… They simply frighten their own population by saying that we are going to attack someone, because the tactics are very simple: they bring us to the red line, through which we can no longer retreat, we begin to respond, and immediately frighten their population – then, in ancient times, with the Soviet – now Russian threat. Meanwhile, NATO countries themselves are increasing military spending. Near the Russian borders, strike groups of alliance troops are being formed and cobbled together. Thus, the number of American military personnel in Europe has already exceeded 100 thousand people.

NATO’s aspirations have long gone beyond the so-called zone of its historical responsibility. In addition to the so-called eastern flank, the alliance is increasing its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. At the instigation of the United States, new military-political alliances are being formed, which undermine the security architecture that has developed over decades.

No less concerned are the activities of the United States to create and prepare for deployment in the forward zones of high-precision ground-based strike weapons with a range of up to 5,500 kilometers. At the same time, the transfer and deployment of these missile systems in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region are already being practiced.

Let me remind you that such measures were previously prohibited by the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, which was terminated at the initiative of the United States. We have repeatedly stated that the termination of this treaty will lead to negative consequences for the entire global security, but at the same time we stressed that we will not deploy intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles until American weapons of this kind appear in some region of the world. In fact, Russia took these obligations unilaterally. But, as I have already said, if the United States starts deploying such systems, then we will lift all our voluntary restrictions.

Given the growing geopolitical tensions, we are forced to take additional measures to ensure the security of Russia and our allies. We are doing this carefully and carefully, without being drawn into a full-scale arms race to the detriment of our country’s socioeconomic development.

We are paying serious attention to improving the combat strength of the Armed Forces and building up their capabilities. As part of these tasks, the Leningrad and Moscow military districts and a number of new units and formations have been formed. The staff strength of the Armed Forces has been increased to 1.5 million servicemen.

The army and navy are being re-equipped with modern weapons and equipment at an accelerated pace. For example, the share of such weapons in strategic nuclear forces has already reached 95 percent.

At the same time, we have clarified the basic principles for the use of nuclear weapons, which are set out in the updated Basic Principles of State Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence. I would like to emphasise once again that no one should accuse us of rattling nuclear weapons: this is a policy of nuclear deterrence.

Along with the nuclear triad, general-purpose forces are developing at a high pace. The troops are receiving advanced robotic systems, including the use of artificial intelligence technologies. Among them are reconnaissance and attack drones, unmanned boats and multi-purpose robotic platforms.

Today, it is important to continue the progressive, systematic development of the army and navy, to achieve the goals of the special military operation, to be ready for a prompt and effective response to potential challenges to the security of our country. At the same time, it is necessary to focus on solving the following priority tasks.

First. Of course, strategic nuclear forces remain one of the key tools for maintaining stability and protecting Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will continue to support their potential and balanced development, and work to create new systems and complexes of deterrence forces. Along with this, it is important to keep non-strategic nuclear forces in constant combat readiness, to continue the practice of conducting exercises with the development of issues of their use.

Second. I have already spoken today about the risks associated with the deployment of intermediate-range missiles by the United States in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. We will respond to such threats in a comprehensive manner. At the same time, the most important task is to ensure the timely detection of the launch of such missiles and their interception. At the same time, it is necessary to debug all the issues of serial production and deployment of such domestic strike systems, including hypersonic ones.

As you know, Russia’s latest powerful weapon is the Oreshnik medium-range missile system. In November, in response to strikes on the territory of our country using Western weapons, it was successfully used: a ballistic missile in non-nuclear hypersonic equipment was used. In the near future, serial production of such complexes should be ensured to protect the security of Russia and our allies. And this will certainly be done.

Third task. It is necessary to more actively introduce the experience gained during the special military operation into the combat training of troops, as well as into the programs of higher military educational institutions. At the same time, it is necessary to improve the methods of conducting military operations, clarify the fundamental statutory documents, increase the level of mastery of weapons and equipment, as well as the effectiveness of command and control of troops, especially at the tactical and operational-tactical levels.

And I would like to emphasise once again that talented officers and sergeants who have proved themselves in a difficult combat situation should become the basis of the command staff of the Armed Forces, as well as become teachers of military educational institutions.

Fourth. The experience of conducting a special military operation should be fully taken into account when determining the priority areas for the development of domestic weapons and equipment, the tactics of their use. For example, high-precision weapons systems use new methods of guidance at the final section of the missile flight, which made it possible to use them against complex and fortified objects, and to use them successfully.

The noise immunity of the onboard equipment of missile weapons has been significantly increased, and new methods of delivering flight tasks have been worked out. In the future, it is necessary to calculate them in real time for promptly identified targets – an extremely important task for our military-industrial complex. I will say more about this.

Another important innovation was the direct exchange of information between the units directly involved in the special operation and defense industry organizations – which I have just mentioned. As a result, for a number of products, the average time to eliminate the identified shortcomings is now five to seven days. But this is not enough: we need to do it even faster.

There are also positive changes in the organisation of the repair of equipment, its fine-tuning taking into account the requirements of the combat situation. But of course, there are also problems, they remain, and they need to be consistently resolved. And, of course, we must continue to do everything necessary to accelerate the introduction of advanced technologies and other innovations in the military sphere.

Fifth. To reduce the time for decision-making when managing units on the battlefield, an interspecific information exchange system based on mobile devices has been created and has shown its effectiveness. More than six and a half thousand such systems have already been delivered to the troops. As a result of their use, the time for setting tasks has decreased by one and a half to two times. Now, due to the introduction of advanced developments of the defense industry, it is necessary to form a single information loop as soon as possible, combining reconnaissance and destruction means at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of management.

Sixth. It is necessary to increase the production of robotic systems and unmanned systems of various classes and types. At the beginning of the special operation, we had problems in this area: some samples turned out to be expensive and difficult to operate. Today, several thousand drones for various purposes enter the troops every day. It is necessary to continue to improve their combat and operational characteristics. It is equally important to train the operators of such complexes, to train them according to programs developed on the basis of the experience of real combat operations.

And the seventh. We need to continue to expand military and military-technical cooperation with allies and partners, with those who are ready and willing to work with us, and these are the majority of countries in the world.

Comrades,

I have already spoken today about the enormous support of the army and navy from Russian society. People understand what we are fighting for, what we are defending, they help front-line soldiers and join their ranks themselves. This is an extremely important thing that reflects the state of our society.

Here is a figure: this year, on average, more than 1000 people enter military service under contract every day. People voluntarily go to the front. And the social guarantees of servicemen and their families must be constantly strengthened and developed. This is the most important, systemic task of the state.

Yes, a lot has been done in this area in recent years. This year alone, more than 55,000 servicemen have been provided with housing, and in the next three years, it is planned to allocate another 113 billion rubles to provide housing subsidies to military personnel.

The savings and mortgage system demonstrates high efficiency. Over the 20 years of its operation, more than 202 thousand servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have been provided with housing. I would like to add that it is necessary to continue to equip military camps and, of course, to increase the level of medical support.

The priority in the work of all authorities should be to resolve the social issues of the participants in the special operation, to take care of the families of those who died – I already spoke about this at the beginning – and those who were seriously injured during the hostilities. This should be the focus of our attention. It is necessary to delve into the problems of each of our comrades-in-arms, his family and really help solve their problems. This is the task of the Defence Ministry, the Government of the Russian Federation, and all leaders at all levels of government.

In conclusion, I would like to once again thank all the participants in the special military operation for their valor, courage and heroism, and wish the personnel and civilian personnel of the Armed Forces, the leadership of the Defence Ministry success in their service, in their difficult and responsible work aimed at protecting Russia’s sovereignty and national interests and the security of our people.

I am sure that you will continue to adequately solve all the tasks assigned to you.

Thank you for your attention.

Vladimir Putin: As usual, allow me to say just a few words – to conclude this part of your work.

The minister spoke about the illegitimacy of the regime in Kyiv, with which we are at war. I would like to emphasise once again that we are not at war with the Ukrainian people, but with the regime – the neo-Nazi regime in Kiev, which seized power back in 2014. This is the source of power – a coup d’état.

All the troubles of both Ukraine and Russia began just after this bloody anti-constitutional coup d’état. This matters today because these people who are in power commit crimes against their own people and against ours every day. This regime has generally lost – at least it is obviously losing – the signs of statehood.

When we talk about illegitimacy, what do we mean? Did you not go to the elections? They did not go. Does the constitution make it possible to extend the powers of the president? No. The Constitution makes it possible to extend the powers of only the representative body of power – the Rada, that’s it. And the reference to martial law does not matter: there are no ways in the constitution to extend the powers of presidential power.

And where is the supreme court? Where is the Constitutional Court? A legitimate question. The chairman of the supreme court is in prison – they just keep silent about it, no one talks about it, but he was put behind bars. The powers of the Supreme Court include, among other things, the cancellation of unauthorized decisions of the president. Several cancellations took place, after which they were sent to prison. And the head of the regime immediately, on the same day, announced: he will be imprisoned. As you know, in all civilized countries, only the court determines whether a person is guilty or not guilty, whether he will be imprisoned or not. No, representatives of the administrative bodies said here: he will be imprisoned. This is the supreme court.

There is also a constitutional one. Do you know what happened to the Constitutional Court? The security guards have stopped letting the chairman of the Constitutional Court go to work – they are simply not allowed to work. In the end, the Constitutional Court as a whole was paralyzed, and the Chairman of the Constitutional Court himself went abroad, where, as far as we know, he is provided with state protection in the country of his residence, since there is a threat to his life.

Are these signs of statehood? No, these are just signs of the loss of statehood. Therefore, crimes are committed one after another.

I think that the next crime will be the reduction of the mobilization age to 18 years. This is exactly a crime, because even if you reduce it to 14, as in Hitler’s Germany, creating a “Hitler Youth”, it will not change the situation on the battlefield. This is clear to everyone.

But I think that at the behest of those countries whose interests are protected by the Kiev regime – it does not protect the interests of the Ukrainian people, this is already obvious today – at the behest of those whose interests it serves and defends, they will also reduce mobilization to 18 years old – and the boys will be driven to slaughter. Just as today people are caught on the street, like stray dogs, during forced mobilization, and today they are driven under bullets, so they will drive the boys, it seems to me. And then these figures of this regime will simply flee abroad under the cover of those whose tasks they are carrying out today, that’s all. Most likely, this will be the case.

Some figures of the past, recent years have already fled – they are already abroad, this is well known. And they feel good, because they stole money from the Ukrainian people, stole it from their pockets. And all these “pockets” are also abroad, with those sponsors who keep them on this hook: they stole money, accounts there, everything – and they dance to any music, performing any tasks.

It seems to me that this will continue until we achieve the goals of the special military operation.

He said what is happening with mobilization in Ukraine, and you all know this very well. He mentioned that in this sense we have personnel. Last year, over 300,000 of our citizens, our men, came to the military registration and enlistment offices and signed contracts for service in the Armed Forces – over 300,000.

This year, at the moment, there are already over 430 thousand, and this flow of volunteers does not stop. Thanks to this attitude to the fate of our country, to the fate of our children, we are doing what I have said and what Defence Minister [Andrei Belousov] was talking about: in fact, this is a turning point on the line of contact and our combat activity, a complete interception of the strategic initiative. But, of course, this is not enough.

By the way, when I spoke about these crimes, I was referring not only to crimes against the Ukrainian people, primarily against our people, including in the Kursk Region and other border regions.

Yes, of course, from a military point of view, no matter who you talk to, everyone, both our and foreign experts, believes that there is a gamble in Kursk, so they say: “Kursk adventure.” This is obvious, because there is no sense in what the Kiev regime is doing in the border regions. But from the point of view of crimes against the peoples of Russia – this is an obvious thing – this is a crime. This is especially true of the suffering of the civilian population.

Here, of course, the sacred duty of the Armed Forces is to throw the enemy out of our territory. The task of the military justice bodies is to record all these crimes, especially against the civilian population. And the task of the special services is to find and punish the criminals.

Now, as for how much money we spend and what it results in, an extremely important thing, of course. The minister said: we spend 6.3 percent of GDP on the military component – on increasing and strengthening the defense capability. This is decent money, it is about 2.5 percent higher than we used to spend. But these are not the largest, oddly enough, costs in the world – even among countries that do not have any armed conflicts.

Nevertheless, this is a lot of money, and we need to use it very rationally, very rationally, ensuring first of all social guarantees for our servicemen and the effective operation of the defence industry. And what is very important is the rational use of what the country gives to the Armed Forces: this applies to social services, equipment and weapons. It is very important to receive everything in a timely manner, to assess competently what comes in, to be able to use it and train personnel, to train people who know how to do it – they do it competently and effectively.

There are a lot of tasks here. On the whole, they are being resolved – both in what is happening in the people’s agro-industrial complex, as we are saying now, and in what is happening right on the line of contact. And we need to set up our entire military organisation for such joint work to achieve the final result.

In this regard, the latest types of weapons, including those that are well-known both in our country and abroad. First of all, I mean medium-range weapons. You all remember well and know that the Soviet Union decided to eliminate ground-based intermediate-range missiles. And the Americans did the same with their Pershings.

But the Americans, in addition to ground-based intermediate-range missiles, also had the same sea-based and air-launched missile systems, while the Soviet Union did not. Therefore, to a certain extent, we went for unilateral disarmament. A potential enemy left these systems at sea and in the air, and we did not receive anything at all.

Но в наше время, в российское уже, мы создали гораздо более современные, чем у США, комплексы морского базирования. Это и «Калибры», это и гиперзвуковые комплексы «Цирконы». Создали новейшие ракеты средней дальности воздушного базирования Х-101 с дальностью, которая кратно превышает то, что есть у вероятного противника, – свыше 4000 километров. И эта система может быть оснащена и специальном боезарядом, то есть ядерным.

And finally, the Oreshnik system, which has already proven itself well, is very powerful. I would like to repeat once again – specialists know this, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces Sergey Karakayev is here, he thinks so and told me about it – when used in a complex manner, when several systems are used in a group at the same time, it is comparable in power to the use of nuclear weapons. But it is not nuclear, since there is no nuclear fuel, no nuclear component, no contamination. And this is a very important element when deciding what means of armed struggle we can use.

But we must watch very carefully what is happening in other countries, what is being put into service or may be put into service in the near future, in the near future in other leading military countries. So, as we have done so far, we must act precisely in the near future and in the medium term.

Let me return once again to what was just said: we spend 6.3 percent of GDP on increasing and strengthening our defense capability. In order for all components in the country, all components of the state’s life – the economy, the social sphere in the broadest sense of the word, science, education, healthcare – to develop, we also cannot pump up these expenses to infinity, increase them to infinity.

I say this so that we all understand: the state, the Russian people, give everything they can to the Armed Forces to fulfill the tasks that you and we face. And our task is to ensure the security of the Russian people, to ensure the security of our people and the future of Russia.

I really hope that the pace that has been picked up in recent months on the combat contact line will be maintained. I want to thank you for your service and wish you all the best.

Thanks a lot.

Interview with Volodymyr Ishchenko, The Bullet, 12/4/24

Volodymyr Ishchenko is a Ukrainian sociologist who was politically active and took part in several left-wing initiatives in Ukraine before moving to Germany in 2019. Ishchenko currently works at the Freie Universität in Berlin and continues his research on the Ukrainian “revolutions,” the left, and the political violence of the extreme right, which he has been studying for 20 years. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, he has also written extensively in several international media outlets on different aspects of the conflict. He was interviewed by Philippe Alcoy and Sasha Yaropolskaya for the journal Révolution Permanente.

Philippe Alcoy, Sasha Yaropolskaya (PA-SY): Here in the West, there is much reporting of the enthusiasm of Ukrainians to defend their country. Yet today, we see images of young men deserting or refusing to serve in the army. Can you tell us how the Ukrainian population currently feels about the situation of the war with Russia?

Volodymyr Ishchenko (VI): There is no enthusiasm, or at least, this enthusiasm is limited to a much smaller group of people than in 2022. At that time, the enthusiasm was caused not only as a reaction to the Russian invasion but also by the fact that Russia’s initial invasion plan failed in a matter of days. There was not only outrage that Russia had attacked our country but also immense hopes for victory in that spring, and even more so after the Ukrainian counter-offensive in September 2022, with expectations of a greater success of the counter-offensive in 2023.

As we now know, last year’s Ukrainian campaign failed to achieve any of its objectives. We witnessed, instead, the relatively successful advance of Russian forces. This has consequences for how people feel about war. In public opinion, in particular, there are clear trends: when the situation on the front line was good for Ukraine and with chances of improvement, support for negotiations was very low. But when the situation deteriorated and hopes that Ukraine could win the war diminished, support for negotiations increased, while support for, and trust in, Zelensky decreased.

Much indicates that the enthusiasm of 2022 was quite fragile. And this is not the first time that we have seen this kind of dynamic. After the “Orange Revolution” of 2004 and the “EuroMaidan Revolution” of 2014, people had high expectations that quickly yielded to disappointment. A similar dynamic occurred after the election of Zelensky in 2019, and again in 2022. One line of interpretation was that these events were the manifestation of the rise of the Ukrainian nation with a quasi-theological dynamic, as the ultimate outcome of a national liberation struggle.

You mentioned desertion. The number of people trying to escape across the border is high. An even more telling statistic is that of the majority of men subject to military service and aged 18 to 60 who have not updated their data with the military recruitment office. This requirement had been introduced in order to make Ukrainian conscription a little more effective and to avoid resorting to the rather brutal method of grabbing people off the street but rather to try to collect data on all potential conscripts and then to start mobilizing them more effectively. If people do not update the data, they are punished with a large fine, and if they don’t pay it, they invite even more complications in their work and life.

So, it is a very serious matter. Yet despite everything, the majority of Ukrainian men have not obeyed this requirement. And as for Ukrainian men abroad, according to estimates, only a few have updated their data, although everyone was required to do so. This means that the real desire to sacrifice oneself for the state is very low.

Military conscription is becoming increasingly brutal. Videos have emerged of arrests of military conscripts in public and of clashes between police and military personnel on one side, and citizens present at the scene.

PA-SY: Is there a parallel to the situation in Russia on the issue of military conscription? And is there a fear on the part of the state that pushing for a larger conscription could lead to social discontent as in Russia, where for years there was a movement of conscripts’ families, especially wives and mothers, who mobilized to support their husbands and sons?

VI: In Russia, the regime was afraid of launching a large-scale conscription effort. It has tried to find different ways to avoid large waves of military conscription. But I feel that Ukraine, especially when supplies from the United States were low, had no choice, and so it lowered the conscription age. This was accompanied by great brutality on the part of the police.

PA-SY: Are there potential social protests that could arise from this situation?

VI: There is much one can say about this. Unlike Russia, conscription has always existed in Ukraine. So, this is not a single wave of conscription, like the one Putin announced in September 2022 in response to the Ukrainian counter-offensive. The Ukrainian army obtains its soldiers mainly through conscription. Volunteers do not constitute the majority of the Ukrainian army, and their number has become negligible since 2022. All the brutal methods of mobilization are the result of a weak desire to volunteer for the army.

PA-SY: Why is it so weak?

VI: The most generous explanation for the Ukrainian state, and also the one that is repeated in some circles, is that this is simply because the United States did not supply enough weapons. This argument implies a very specific idea of ​​how the war could be won. But it is far from certain that, even if all the weapons and supplies had been delivered in 2022, a decisive victory over Russia could have been won. I won’t speculate about this. But I don’t think that there is a consensus among military experts.

The other side of the coin is that the shipment of weapons to Ukraine is conditional on the effectiveness of Ukrainian mobilization. And so, amendment of the law on conscription this year was linked to the shipment of weapons by the United States. This is confirmed by many Ukrainian politicians. The United States expected Ukraine to make conscription more effective.

Today, the most urgent issue is to reduce the conscription age. It has already been reduced from 27 to 25, and now there is strong pressure to lower it even further, to 22, or even to 18.

There’s a strong argument against this. That is the most fertile demographic cohort of the Ukrainian population, and it is also one of the smallest. In fact, if you send these young people to be massacred, the ability of the Ukrainian population to regenerate its numbers after the war will diminish even further. According to the latest UN projections for the Ukrainian population, by the end of the century it will number only 15 million, compared to 52 million in 1992, right after the disintegration of the USSR.

And this is not even the worst-case scenario. It’s based on the rather optimistic assumption that the war will end next year and that millions of refugees, especially fertile women, will return and be able to contribute to the reproduction of the Ukrainian population, which is not certain, to say the least.

This is an impossible choice. Throughout history, many nations have fought long wars against imperial conquests. And not necessarily only against imperial conquests, by the way. Take revolutionary France. After 1789, France was able to defeat the coalition of the greatest European powers until 1812, when Napoleon was defeated in Russia. For two decades, France defeated all of Europe. Such was the power of revolution. After 1917, revolutionary Russia was able to defeat the coalition of the strongest imperialist powers that all intervened because of the power of its revolution and its ability to build an effective, large, and victorious Red Army. In the Vietnamese War, the Vietnamese defeated France and the United States over a period of decades. Afghanistan defeated the USSR and the United States in a war that lasted from 1979 to 2021. Theoretically, one might think that a small nation could defeat a much larger enemy. But that requires a different social stature and politics than those of Ukraine.

All of these wars were fought by countries that had large peasant populations that could mobilize in large-scale revolutionary or guerrilla wars. In Vietnam, the demographics held up over the decades, despite the genocide that the United States committed, and even though the balance of forces was so lopsided. Such is the power of revolution.

Post-Soviet Ukraine is a very different country. Its demographic structure is very different from Vietnam’s, Afghanistan’s, and even Ukraine’s of a hundred years ago, when it was a largely peasant country with multiple revolutionary armies – the Red Army, Makhno’s anarchist army, armies of the various nationalist warlords – all of whom benefited from the demographics of the peasantry. Today’s Ukraine is a modernized urban society with a declining demographic. It’s not going to be able to wage war for decades.

And there are no revolutionary changes in today’s Ukraine. The three Ukrainian “revolutions” – 1990, 2004, and 2014 – did not create a strong revolutionary state capable of establishing an effective apparatus that could mobilize an army and the economy. The idea behind these “revolutions” was that Ukraine should integrate into the US-led world order as a kind of periphery. This type of integration would benefit only a narrow middle class, some opportunistic oligarchs, and transnational capital.

In Ukraine, the regime is still discussing a rather moderate tax increase – that after two and a half years of war. That says a lot about how much Ukrainians trust the state and about their willingness to defend that state. The question of social class was very important because the conscripts came mainly from the lower classes. These are mainly poor people who could not bribe the recruitment officers to let them go and people who could not find a way to flee the country.

PA-SY: Zaluzhnyi, head of the Ukrainian armed forces, and Kuleba, the foreign minister, were dismissed this year. Could you talk of the political struggles within the Ukrainian bourgeoisie?

VI: Zaluzhny is a potential political opponent of Zelensky. It was dangerous for Zelensky to see a popular general become a politician. This was one of Zelensky’s motives in sending him to the UK as ambassador. As for Kuleba, there was also a problem of trust.

We can analyze this as building a vertical power structure, an informal way of consolidating the elite and of governing the country using both formal institutions, such as the democratic Constitution and the Parliament, but also informal mechanisms. All Ukrainian presidents have tried to build this informal power. Zelensky’s power vertical started to be built before the invasion. But the war offered more opportunities, and his chief of staff, Andrei Yermak, is considered the second most powerful person in the country, with enormous informal power and the ability to build an effective informal structure that consolidates power around the presidential office.

The dynamics of these conflicts, that sometimes break out into public view, remain mostly hidden. They are mainly related to the results at the front and to military developments. In case of bad developments for the Ukrainian army, these conflicts would intensify, and some radical nationalists, even some oligarchs, could raise their heads, and so forth.

A lot depends on the position of the US and the EU and the strategy that Trump will choose. Zelensky has to end this war in a way that could be presented to the Ukrainian public as a victory, for example, by obtaining EU or NATO membership or some generous funding programs for Ukraine, even if it loses territory. With an outcome perceived as a defeat, Zelensky would probably not have much future.

PA-SY: What is the role of the far right in Ukraine?

VI: This topic has been widely discussed in Western media throughout the war. Some liberal media outlets try to portray the Ukrainian far right as less dangerous than the Western far right, because it is fighting on the right side of history against a Russia that is the more important enemy. The Zelensky regime has tried to appeal to these sectors of the far right by holding official ceremonies for the Azov Battalion or celebrating the birthday of Stepan Bandera, the extreme nationalist and Nazi sympathizer. It is difficult to follow from France how this dynamic is evolving as the war progresses.

PA-SY: Is the far right a small but powerful segment due to its presence in the military. Or is it gaining popularity outside of traditional sectors of the far right? Does the far right play a significant role in the Ukrainian political landscape, or is its influence being exaggerated by the media?

VI: When people in the West discuss the Ukrainian far right, I think they are using the wrong point of comparison. For example, in France, the far right, mainly the Rassemblement national, Le Pen’s party, is much less extreme than the movements that we are talking about in Ukraine. Le Pen’s party probably does not use Nazi symbols and has a more sophisticated attitude toward the Vichy collaboration during World War II. They are trying to clean themselves.

But such is not the case in Ukraine. You mentioned Stepan Bandera, who is openly glorified, and even more so the Waffen-SS, especially by members of the Azov Battalion. The degree of extremism of the Ukrainian far right is much greater than that of the West’s far right.

Recently, an international conference, “Nation Europa,” was held in Lviv, the largest city of Western Ukraine, to which groups such as Dritte Weg from Germany, CasaPound from Italy, and similar neo-Nazi groups from many European countries were invited. All major far-right organizations of Ukraine participated, including the Svoboda party and prominent members of Azov/National Corps. These Ukrainian parties, organizations, and military units are generally referred to as the “far-right,” but they have international relations with Western groups that are much more extreme and violent than the mainstream far-right parties. Incidentally, most of the Ukrainian military units that participated in this conference have ties to the Ukrainian military intelligence service, the GUR.

The ideologically sanctioned capacity for political violence of the Ukrainian far right is much greater than that of the dominant far-right parties in the West. They have much more weaponry and many paramilitary movements built around official military units that are capable of political violence. Unlike mainstream Western far-right parties seeking parliamentary status, the power of the Ukrainian far right has always rested on its ability to mobilize in the streets and to threaten violence. They have not been able to get elected, with the exception of the elections of 2012, when the far-right Svoboda party won over 10% of the vote. (But the far right was able to gain much more significant representation and to form the largest factions in many local councils in Western Ukraine.)

Their main source of power comes from their ability to mobilize outside parliament, unlike parties formed by oligarchs (big capital) or by the weak liberals. Ukrainian nationalists can draw on a political tradition that goes back to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which was part of a family of fascist movements in interwar Europe. And post-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists have often drawn their inspiration directly from the OUN. This tradition has been upheld in the Ukrainian diaspora, particularly in North America. The Canadian public is only now discovering the number of Ukrainian fascists that its government welcomed after World War II. Other post-Soviet Ukrainian political currents don’t have this advantage of a preserved political tradition.

The members of the Azov battalion have today become very legitimate as war heroes. They enjoy extraordinary media attention and present themselves as an élite unit, a claim that the media uphold. Many Azov speakers have become celebrities. They have also benefited from a certain whitewashing in Western media, which before 2022 referred to them as neo-Nazis. Today, they easily forget this part of history.

And finally, we must think not only about the far right itself but also about the complicity of Ukrainian and Western elites in whitewashing the Ukrainian far right and ethno-nationalism. Not only in Ukraine but also in the West, discussing this topic today can immediately lead to ostracization. For example, Marta Havryshko, a Ukrainian historian who moved to the United States, continues to write critical articles about Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainian ethno-nationalist politics, the Ukrainian far right, and she receives thousands of threats, death threats, rape threats.

PA-SY: Is Azov, in your view, the main force of the Ukrainian far right? Wasn’t it greatly weakened in the battles of Mariupol and Bakhmut? Do you think that it will still play an important role in the future, in the recomposition of the far right?

VI: On the contrary, Azov has grown, now forming two brigades – the 3rd Assault Brigade and the Azov Brigade of the National Guard. This is in addition to a special unit, the Kraken, which are subordinate to the GUR (military intelligence). Their political appeal and publicity in the media have grown considerably. Their legitimacy has also grown. So, they are not weakened, but strengthened. And contrary to popular myth, they have not become depoliticized.

PA-SY: Are you afraid that after the war, the extreme right, and in particular those that had fought at the front, will be the only force to have a sufficiently coherent ideological project for post-war Ukraine, given the absence of ideology of the neoliberal project for Ukraine and the weakness of the left?

VI: That depends entirely on the outcome of the war. And the range of possible outcomes is still very large. A nuclear war is a possible outcome, although one hopes that it is not the most likely one. In that case, everything we are discussing today will no longer matter. A lasting ceasefire is also possible, but unlikely.

The radicalization of the Ukrainian far right will depend on the stability of Zelensky’s government and the stability of the Ukrainian economy. In the event of the disintegration of state institutions and a failing economy, the nationalists will have a good chance of consolidating their power because they are a very legitimate, very well-known, and militarized political force.

PA-SY: What is the situation of the labour movement? There have been some minor strikes in Ukraine since the beginning of the war, especially in the health sector. But it is difficult to know what the real situation is. What is the situation and the capacity of the working class to organize and perhaps play a role, at least to counterbalance the rise of the extreme right in the country?

VI: The working class cannot play any role in the current situation. The labour movement in Ukraine was weak long before the war. The last really massive political strike was in 1993 among the miners of Donbass. They demanded autonomy for Donbass and closer relations with Russia, ironically. But even that strike was linked to the interests of the “red directors” of former Soviet enterprises who had a lot of power in the immediate post-Soviet years. They used the strike to obtain some concessions from the government. Eventually, the strike led to early elections and a change of government. But since then, there has been no large-scale strike.

For three decades, we have seen only small-scale strikes, usually limited to individual companies, at best to certain segments of the economy, and very rarely politicized. Moreover, it was precisely the inability to launch a political strike during the EuroMaidan of 2014 that led to the escalation of violence because that protest movement was unable to put sufficient pressure on a government that was unwilling to make concessions. This gave the radical nationalists the opportunity to promote their violent strategy of protest.

And so yes, since the current large-scale invasion, strikes are banned. The strikes that have taken place are probably informal strikes.

What will happen after the war still depends a lot on how it ends. But from what we understand, the empowerment of the labour movement would require some economic growth so that workers are not laid off. This requires a successful reconstruction of the Ukrainian economy.

In some very optimistic – but not necessarily likely – scenarios, Ukrainian soldiers returning to the Ukrainian economy could demand more from the government. That has indeed happened after some wars, particularly after World War I. But that remains speculative today. Much darker scenarios now seem more likely…

PA-SY: As concerns the situation and the positions of the Ukrainian left, at the beginning of the war, many articles and texts presented the point of view of Ukrainian left activists and explained how blind some of the Western left is for not supporting NATO arms deliveries more. In your articles, you try to present a more nuanced point of view on the war.

How have the positions of the Ukrainian left, the organized left, but also intellectuals, changed since the two years after the invasion? Is the left adopting a more critical position toward the Ukrainian government and NATO’s role in the conflict?

VI: The Ukrainian left has always been very diverse.

Ironically, the largest left party in Ukraine, the Communist Party of Ukraine, supported the Russian invasion. The Communist Party of Ukraine was a very important party… until EuroMaidan. It was the most popular party in the country in the 1990s. The Communist Party candidate won 37% of the vote in the 1999 presidential elections. Even on the eve of EuroMaidan, the Communist Party won 13% of the vote. Although its support had declined, it had significant representation in parliament and effectively supported the government of Viktor Yanukovych. After EuroMaidan, it lost its electoral stronghold in Donbass and Crimea, as these territories were cut off from Kiev. The party also suffered repression due to the government’s “decommunization” policies – the party was suspended, and in 2022, it was permanently banned, as were a number of other so-called pro-Russian parties.

Petro Simonenko, the leader of the party since 1993, fled to Belarus in March 2022. From Belarus, he supported the Russian invasion as an anti-fascist operation against the “Kiev regime.” The communist organizations in the areas occupied by Russia have merged with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and participated in the local elections organized by Russia in 2023, even entering some local councils. The same merger occurred with the soviet-type Ukrainian trade unions in the occupied areas. Such is the lion’s share of what was called the left in Ukraine.

At the same time, there were much smaller and younger left groups. They were always critical of the communists and integrated better with the democratic socialists and the liberal left in the West. They also had a very different social base than the communists – closer to the pro-Western NGO-ized “civil society” of the middle class in Ukraine. After the invasion began, they were able to communicate their position much more effectively to the West through a kind of identity politics: “We are the Ukrainian left. The stupid and arrogant Western left does not understand anything about what is happening in the country.”

Of course, this position was very problematic, to say the least, from the very beginning. For comparison, the Communist Party had 100,000 card-carrying members in 2014. The young left milieu had no more than 1,000 activists and sympathizers in the whole country, even in the best years of its development, and their numbers have been declining since then, after Euromaidan. Among that left, most supported Ukraine, many volunteered for the army, but they were not able to create a left-wing military unit comparable to the extreme right units, even on a much smaller scale. Many also participated in humanitarian initiatives.

Today, some of them are tending to revise their positions on the war, especially in response to the brutal conscription. It is really difficult to claim that the war is still some kind of “people’s war” when the majority of Ukrainians do not want to fight. The extent to which they are willing to express this revised position also depends on their fear of repression. It is difficult to speak critically of the war in the Ukrainian public sphere. That kind of criticism exists mostly in private conversations, in “friends only” Facebook accounts and so on, and is articulated only very cautiously in publications.

There is also criticism of the ethno-nationalism coming from this left environment because it has become too difficult to ignore how Ukraine has changed in two years, with the spread of discrimination against Russian speakers and the regime’s ethnic assimilation policies. For example, Russian is no longer taught in Ukrainian schools, even as an option, even in massively Russian-speaking cities like Odessa, where probably 80-90% of even ethnic Ukrainian children speak Russian with their parents. A recently introduced bill could ban speaking any Russian in schools, not only in class with teachers, but also during breaks, in private conversations of students among themselves. The bill has already been approved by the Minister of Education.

The third segment of the Ukrainian left is Marxist-Leninist, and is part of what I call the “neo-Soviet revival” that is happening in many post-Soviet countries. They are usually organized in kruzhki – literally ‘circles’. These are proto-political organizations, something more than just Marxist-Leninist reading groups. They are much more popular in Russia, where they are able to create YouTube channels with hundreds of thousands of subscribers. In Russia, Belarus and Central Asia, kruzhki can involve thousands of young people who have not lived a single day in the USSR, but who are critical of the social and political reality of their country and who find in orthodox Marxist Leninism instruments to deal with this reality. They exist and have even developed in Ukraine as well, despite decommunization and the rise of anti-Russian nationalism and anti-communist attitudes.

Almost from the very beginning, these groups opposed their governments and adopted a revolutionary defeatist position. One can wonder whether a social revolution is even possible, as it was a hundred years ago in Ukraine in the collapsing Russian Empire. Nevertheless, from the very beginning, these groups criticized forced conscription, called for internationalism, and did not try to legitimize the actions of the Ukrainian state. •

Volodymyr Ishchenko is a political activist in Ukraine and editor of the review Spiln’ya. He is a research associate at the Institute of East European Studies, Freie Universität Berlin.

By Brian McDonald, Twitter, 12/15/24

The fall of Assad and the “loss” of Syria isn’t actually that critical for Russia. Historically, the Soviet Union endured much larger setbacks in the Middle East. For example: Egypt’s sudden shift from a Soviet ally to a US partner in the 1970s.

Despite investing heavily in Egypt through military aid and infrastructure projects like the Aswan Dam, Moscow was blindsided when Anwar Sadat aligned with Washington. Yet, the USSR eventually restored much of its influence in the region through alliances with other Arab states.

This precedent makes a key point: Russia’s geopolitical fortunes in the Middle East aren’t tied to a single leader or country. The region’s fluid power dynamics mean that today’s setback can be tomorrow’s opportunity.

Russia’s approach to Syria, therefore, should be viewed through this broader historical lens. Strategic losses are part of a long game where influence can quickly be regained.

Plus, the rebel leaders have already said they are open to a deal with Moscow. And Russia has quite a bit to offer them. For instance, lots of cheap grain.

***

Interpreting Putin’s Remarks On Syria, Israel, And Turkiye

By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 12/20/24

Putin commented on Syria’s regime change during his annual Q&A session on Thursday. According to him, Russia’s military intervention succeeded in its goal of preventing the creation of an Afghan-like terrorist enclave. The groups that just seized power there, including terrorist-designated and -affiliated ones, have apparently changed their views over the years. That’s why the West wants to establish relations with them. The regime change therefore can’t be seen as a defeat for Russia.

Putin then defended his armed forces’ conduct during recent events by claiming that Russia no longer had any ground troops in Syria. Moreover, the estimated 30,000 Syrian and “pro-Iranian units” that were defending Aleppo surrendered the city to just 350 militants, after which they gave up the rest of the country to them too with few exceptions. He also revealed that Russia evacuated 4,000 Iranian fighters to Tehran while other allied units fled to Lebanon (a reference to Hezbollah) and Iraq without a fight.

As for the future of Russian influence in Syria, Putin claimed that “The overwhelming majority of [the groups that control the situation there] tell us that they would be interested in our military bases remaining”. He then proposed that they could be used to deliver humanitarian aid. The main beneficiary of the latest events is Israel, in his opinion, since they’ve practically demilitarized Syria and expanded their occupation zone in the country. He condemned those moves and hoped that they’d leave someday.

Putin also took the opportunity to condemn Israel’s illegal settlements in Palestine as well as its ongoing military operation in Gaza. These are all consistent Russian positions and nothing new. Observers might have been surprised though that he didn’t also condemn Turkiye. Instead, he explained that “Turkey is doing everything to ensure its security on its southern borders as the situation in Syria develops”, which he said is aimed at returning refugees and “push[ing] back Kurdish formations on the border.”

In connection with that second imperative, Putin expressed hope that there won’t be an aggravation of the situation like some have reported that Turkiye is planning. He also said that “we need to solve the Kurdish problem. Within the framework of Syria under President Assad, this had to be solved, now we need to solve it with the authorities that control the territory of Syria, and Turkey needs to somehow ensure its security. We understand all this.” This basically amounts to giving Turkiye a free pass in Syria.

Putin’s apparent double standard towards the similar issues of Turkish and Israeli military involvement in post-Assad Syria can be explained by Russia’s complex interdependence with the former. They’re closely tied together through nuclear energy cooperation, air defense systems (S-400s), natural gas, trade, and Istanbul’s prior role in mediating between Moscow and Kiev. By contrast, although Israel hasn’t armed Ukraine nor sanctioned Russia, there’s much less trade and no military-technical cooperation.

There are also optics to consider as well. Although Syria is still politically divided and Turkiye does indeed back the UN-designated Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) terrorist group, there’s no denying that many Syrians support Ankara as do many other Muslims in the region. The same can’t be said for Israel, which is universally reviled in Syria, except among some of the Druze that welcomed the self-professed Jewish State’s forces, and fiercely hated by most Muslims in the region.

It’s therefore better for Russia’s soft power interests to criticize Israel for occupying part of Syria while remaining silent about Turkiye doing the same thing. Likewise, considering the domestic and regional mood, it also makes sense for Putin to remind everyone about the pro-Iranian units’ cowardice in giving up cities without a fight and then fleeing abroad. After all, “Russia Dodged A Bullet By Wisely Choosing Not To Ally With The Now-Defeated Resistance Axis”, so it has no reason to sugarcoat what they did.

Altogether, Putin’s remarks on Syria, Israel, and Turkiye show that Russia eschews responsibility for what just happened in Syria, condemns Israel for its ongoing invasion there, and downplays Turkiye’s own. This is a coldly realist and ultra-pragmatic approach to the latest developments that fully aligns with Russia’s national interests as Putin sincerely understands them to be. It also contradicts the expectations that many members of the diverse non-Mainstream Media community had of him condemning Turkiye.

As can be seen, Putin doesn’t really care that Turkiye is a NATO member nor that it patronizes terrorist-designated HTS since he’s always insisted that the most important factor in their contemporary ties is the excellent working relationship that he has with his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The Russian leader sang his praises in October 2022 while speaking at the Valdai Club’s annual meeting when he was asked about whether his views on him had changed over the past two years. Here’s what he said:

“He is a competent and strong leader who is guided above all, and possibly exclusively, by the interests of Turkiye, its people and its economy…President Erdogan never lets anyone get a free ride or acts in the interests of third countries…But there is a desire on both sides to reach agreements, and we usually do it. In this sense, President Erdogan is a consistent and reliable partner. This is probably his most important trait, that he is a reliable partner.”

Putin wasn’t playing “5D chess to psyche out Turkiye” like some members of the diverse non-Maisntream Media community imagined at the time but was candidly sharing his views about Erdogan. Those who took his words seriously therefore knew better than to expect him to condemn Turkiye for its actions in Syria. Putin’s responsibility is to ensure Russia’s national interests, not conform to his online supporters’ fantasies about him spewing this or that talking point, which requires maximum flexibility.

“Non-Russian Pro-Russians” and even some Russians might be disappointed with his position towards recent events in Syria, but they should at least understand the reasons behind it. Russia couldn’t stop what just happened, which was the result of the Syrian Arab Army’s and pro-Iranian units’ cowardice in the face of the foreign-backed terrorist-driven blitz, and it won’t go to war with Turkiye over this either. By adapting to this new reality, Putin now has the best possible chance of advancing Russian interests.

It doesn’t mean that he’ll succeed, but there’s no guarantee of failure as would have been the case had he criticized Turkiye after being unable to stop it and unwilling to go to war with it afterwards. Even if things don’t work out like he envisages, Russia’s mutually beneficial bilateral ties with Turkiye won’t be jeopardized, nor will his country’s soft power be damaged since it’s not opposed to the outcome that the domestic and regional majority support. Putin’s pragmatic hedging therefore preserves Russian interests.

***

Putin Thinks Al-Qaeda in Syria Is Reformed Too

By Joe Lauria, Consortium News, 12/20/24

Russian President Vladimir Putin said Russia’s goal to defeat jihadism in Syria had actually succeeded because the rebranded al-Qaeda force that seized power on Dec. 8 has put its extremist past behind it. 

Putin said this in answer to a Western journalist at a Moscow news conference (video) on Thursday:

“Those who pay your salary would like to present the current developments in Syria as Russia’s defeat. I assure you that this is not the case, and here is why. We came to Syria ten years ago to prevent the creation of a terrorist enclave there, like the one that we saw in some other countries, for example, Afghanistan. We have achieved that goal, by and large.

Even the groups that were fighting against the Assad regime and the government forces back then have undergone internal changes. It is not surprising that many European countries and the United States are trying to develop relations with them now. Would they be doing this if they were terrorist organisations? This means that they have changed, doesn’t it? So, our goal has been achieved, to a certain degree.”

The remark aligns Putin with Western nations who claim that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) — which was al-Nusra Front and before that al-Qaeda in Syria — is no longer a terrorist group and is fit to rule Syria. 

This conclusion, after less than 10 days of HTS in power, puts a spin on events that seeks to benefit both Russia and the West.  Both sides now need to portray the militants as reformed extremists.   

Putin is right to say that at least one of Moscow’s goals in Syria in 2015 was “to prevent the creation of a terrorist enclave there.”

(Other goals appeared to have been to save Russia’s Mediterranean bases in Syria, which they may still do, and to protect gas sales to Europe at the time — now lost to sanctions —  against a rival pipeline project through Syria to Europe led by Qatar, which necessitated overthrowing Bashar al-Assad, who opposed it.) 

Putin told the U.N. General Assembly from the podium in New York on Sept. 28, 2015 — days before Russia intervened in Syria at the governments’ invitation — that Moscow’s aim was to defeat jihadism there lest it spread, threatening regional and Russian security. 

Russia had to that point already fought Western-backed jihadists in a 30-year struggle against encroachment into its sphere of influence by militant Islamism.

The support the U.S. and Gulf Arab nations gave these terrorist groups opened a three-decade Western rift with Russia that began in Afghanistan and ran across the Northern Caucasus to the Balkans and then into Syria.

Russia was opposed to regime change in Syria not only on principle, analysts and diplomats at the U.N. told me in June 2012, but because the likely new regime would be headed by an Islamist government inimical to Russian interests.

In his 2015 U.N. speech, Putin appealed to the U.S. to join Russia in a military campaign against the common enemy of ISIS, al-Qaeda and other jihadists, the way the U.S. and the Soviet Union had fought together against Nazism.

The Obama administration arrogantly rejected the proposal out of hand with some American commentators calling it “Russian imperialism.” But it would be odd to invite your adversary to join your imperial adventure. 

In fact the United States was in alliance with al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups trying to overthrow al-Assad and did not want to fight them. Putin understood that the U.S. had long supported Islamist extremists.

He pointed this out at the U.N. in 2015:

“The situation is extremely dangerous. In these circumstances, it is hypocritical and irresponsible to make declarations about the threat of terrorism and at the same time turn a blind eye to the channels used to finance and support terrorists, including revenues from drug trafficking, the illegal oil trade and the arms trade. 

It is equally irresponsible to manipulate extremist groups and use them to achieve your political goals, hoping that later you’ll find a way to get rid of them or somehow eliminate them. … the people you are dealing with are cruel but they are not dumb. They are as smart as you are. So, it’s a big question: who’s playing who here? … 

Relying on international law, we must join efforts to address the problems that all of us are facing, and create a genuinely broad international coalition against terrorism. Similar to the anti-Hitler coalition, it could unite a broad range of parties willing to stand firm against those who, just like the Nazis, sow evil and hatred of humankind.”  [Emphasis added.]  

So the question is, has the HTS and lesser extremist groups in Syria really changed their stripes? Have they really transformed from Jihad to Jefferson?

The U.S., the U.K. and the EU are in the process of dropping HTS’ terrorist designation and the U.S. in lifting the $10 million bounty on its leader’s head.

But it seems too early for Putin to say that the HTS — in nominal charge in Damascus — are no longer terrorists because the West would not be “developing relations” with them “if they were terrorist organisations.”  It belies what he knows to be true, that the U.S. has had relationships for decades with some of the most notorious terrorists on the globe to achieve short-term strategic objectives.

Putin may be saying they aren’t terrorists anymore as a way to get out of admitting Russia likely failed in Syria to prevent terrorists from taking over. He did not cite Russian intelligence saying these are reformed killers, but said they must be reformed because otherwise the West would have nothing to do with them, when he knows full well the West has had plenty to do with them when they were openly terrorists. 

This may just be Putin trying to find a creative way out of the fact that Assad’s overthrow appears to have been a Russian defeat unless the HTS are truly reformed. And if they are reformed, still very much uncertain, the U.S. and Turkey would have been behind it, not Russia.   

A commenter on this article on X suggested Putin was just making fun of the journalist. Perhaps he was employing sarcasm but it was on the record and people take Putin seriously. 

What happens in Syria over the coming months will tell the rest of this story. Will Alawis, Christians and other minorities be left alone to live as they please?

Or will the HTS reanimate as terrorists to go after are these vulnerable peoples? Will the HTS serve the interests of stability in Syria and the region as Putin seems to think?

Or will they revert to what they have long been, especially now that they have power?