International Schiller Institute, 9/27/23

All reports indicate that President Biden intends to send U.S. Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) long-range missiles to Ukraine, with Germany then moving in lock step, sending Taurus long-range cruise missiles to Kiev, capable of hitting 500 kilometers deep into Russian territory. This escalation by NATO could very well bring NATO into direct warfighting with Russia and — by design or miscalculation — into a nuclear world war.

The Schiller Institute is today circulating worldwide an in-depth and well thought out peace proposal first published in Europe by four renowned German experts, titled, “Ending the War with a Negotiated Peace.” (Please see the press release at the bottom) The proposal, first published on August 28, 2023 is signed by Prof. Dr. Peter Brandt, Prof. Dr. Hajo Funke, General Harald Kujat (ret.), and Prof. Dr. H.C. Horst Teltschik. 

Peter Brandt is an historian and the son of former Chancellor Willy Brandt; Hajo Funke is a leading professor of political science at the Free University of Berlin; Harald Kujat is the former Bundeswehr Chief of Staff (2000-2002) and former Chairman of the Military Committee of NATO (2002-2005); and Horst Teltschik is a former top diplomat who operated out of the chancellery of Chancellor Helmut Kohl at the time of the Iron Curtain’s fall, and subsequently became president of the Munich Security Conference. 

What follows is the full text of the peace proposal:  peace proposal

Ending the war by a negotiated peace

Legitimate self-defense and the quest for a just and lasting peace are not contradictory

Negotiation proposal by Professor Dr. Peter Brandt, Professor Dr. Hajo Funke, General (ret.) Harald Kujat and Professor Dr. h. c. Horst Teltschik

Since the beginning of the Russian war of aggression on 24 February 2022, Ukraine has been waging a legitimate war of defense in which its survival as a state, its national independence and security are at stake. This statement is true regardless of the democratic and rule of law situation and constitutional reality and also regardless of the war’s much more complicated antecedents and its equally complicated global political backdrop.

However, the legitimacy of armed self-defense on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter does not release the government in Kyiv, and the states supporting it, from the obligation – not least vis-à-vis its own people – to exercise restraint, not to overreact by increasing violence and destruction and to promote a political settlement on the basis of a just and lasting peace. Even during the war – and especially during it – constant efforts to achieve a diplomatic solution must not let up.

This applies just as much to those states indirectly involved, including the Federal Republic of Germany, which is particularly obliged by the peace imperative of its Constitution. Moreover, on 2 March 2022, a few days after the start of the Russian attack, the Federal Government agreed to a resolution¹ tabled by Ukraine and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, calling for a “peaceful settlement of the conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine through political dialogue, negotiations, mediation and other peaceful means”. On 23 February 2023, another UN resolution² called on member states and international organisations to “redouble their support for diplomatic efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine”. This commitment also applies to the Ukrainian government, which continues to reject negotiations with Russia.³

Ukraine has so far resisted the Russian war of aggression thanks to comprehensive Western support. However, far-reaching decisions on the expenditures necessary to continue the war, contrary to all reason and despite the unachievable nature of the political goals, must not be left to the Ukrainian government alone. The constant ramping up of the war has already led to large numbers of Ukrainian casualties, both military and civilian, as well as to substantial destruction of infrastructure. The longer the war goes on, the more Ukraine’s casualties and destruction will increase and the more difficult it will be to achieve a just and lasting negotiated peace that also provides security for the states supporting Ukraine. There is already the potential for further escalation through foreseeable offensives by Russian forces, in the battle for Odesa and through the conflict that has broken out again over Ukrainian grain exports.

Since 4 June 2023, Ukrainian forces have been trying to break through the deeply layered Russian defensive positions and sever the land bridge between Russia and Crimea in order to cut off Russian forces from the logistics hub of Crimea. Ukrainian forces are losing large numbers of soldiers and (Western) armor in the fighting, without having achieved any sweeping success so far.

If the counteroffensive fails, it is to be expected that Ukraine will demand that Western soldiers follow Western weapons, as even the planned Western arms deliveries cannot compensate for the enormous losses of Ukrainian military personnel. Russia, on the other hand, has not yet deployed the mass of its active combat troops. It can therefore be assumed that after further Ukrainian losses in the counteroffensive, Russia will move to secure the annexed territories and thus achieve the goal of the “special military operation”.

Neither side can win the war

It has been clear for some time that neither Russia nor Ukraine can win this war, as neither will achieve the political goals for which they are fighting. Ukraine cannot defeat Russia militarily, even with Western support in the form of arms and ammunition and the training of Ukrainian soldiers. Even the delivery of “miracle weapons”⁴, which has been demanded by laymen time and again, will not be the hoped for “game changer” that could shift the strategic situation in Ukraine’s favour. At the same time, however, there is an increasing risk of even greater escalation, leading to a military conflict between NATO and Russia and the real danger of a nuclear war limited to the European continent, although the USA and Russia want to avoid it.⁵

This eventuality should be averted, as it would be most of all in Ukraine’s interest to seek a ceasefire as soon as possible, opening the door to peace negotiations. It is equally in the interest of the European states which unconditionally support Ukraine but lack a discernible strategy. And due to the increasing attrition of the Ukrainian armed forces, the risk is growing that the war in Ukraine will escalate into a European war over Ukraine.

Ukraine is increasing this risk by launching an increasing number of attacks against Russia’s strategic infrastructure with Western support, like the one against the Engels nuclear strategic base near Saratov on 26 December 2022 or the Kerch Bridge.⁶ Moreover, the West might feel compelled to intervene actively to prevent a crushing Ukrainian defeat. There is a growing realisation that this is a real danger. (Daily Telegraph: “Ukraine and the West are facing a devastating defeat.”)⁷

Is it possible to negotiate with Putin?

So far there is no evidence that the political goal of the “special military operation” is to conquer and occupy the whole of Ukraine and that subsequently Russia is planning to attack NATO states. Nor is there any evidence that Russia and the USA are making preparations for this eventuality. From a military point of view, however, one cannot completely rule out the possibility that Russian forces intend to conquer areas west of the Dnieper, as they have not yet destroyed the bridges over the river, although this would be to their advantage in the current configuration. Putin vigorously refutes that he is pursuing – as is often claimed – the imperialist goal of restoring the Soviet Union: “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart, whoever wants it back has no brain.”⁸

Putin was willing to negotiate with Ukraine and certainly still is – but always on the condition that the other side – the American, Ukrainian and Western sides – also want to negotiate. Putin has made several positive statements in this respect. For example, on the occasion of the declaration of partial mobilization on 21 September 2022: “This is what I would like to declare publicly for the first time. After the start of the special military operation, in particular after the Istanbul talks, Kyiv representatives voiced quite a positive response to our proposals. […] But a peaceful settlement obviously did not suit the West, which is why, after certain compromises were coordinated, Kyiv was in effect ordered to wreck all these agreements.”⁹

Also on 30 September 2022, in the declaration on the annexation of the four regions: “We call on the Kyiv regime to immediately cease fire and all hostilities; to end the war it unleashed back in 2014 and return to the negotiating table. We are ready for this, as we have said more than once.”¹⁰

On 17 June 2023, Putin told the African peace delegation: “We are open to a constructive dialogue with all those who want peace, based on the principles of justice and taking into account the legitimate interests of the different sides. “^11/12 On this occasion, Putin demonstratively showed an initialled copy of the draft treaty from the Istanbul negotiations.

The “Welt” wrote in a detailed editorial on 23 June 2023 that the Russian media also spoke of negotiations; one can assume that this was done with the approval of the Kremlin. The African initiative had been widely picked up and favorably commented on in Russian news coverage on the occasion of the Russia-Africa summit. The state news agency, RIA, published a commentary deploring the failure of the previous peace initiatives. Editor-in-chief Margarita Simonjan, who had previously called for tougher action by the Russian army, advocated a ceasefire and a demilitarised zone secured by UN peacekeepers. It was right to stop the bloodshed now, she said. Ukrainians should then vote in referendums to which country they want to belong. “Do we need territories that do not want to live with us? I am not sure about that. For some reason it seems to me that the president doesn’t need them either,” Simonjan said.¹³

The war could have been prevented,¹⁴ had the West accepted a neutral status for Ukraine – which Zelensky was initially quite willing to do – renounced NATO membership and enforced the Minsk II agreement on minority rights for the Russian-speaking population. The war could have ended in early April 2022 if the West had allowed the Istanbul negotiations to be concluded. It is now once again, and possibly for the last time, the responsibility of the “collective West” and especially the USA to set a course towards a ceasefire and peace negotiations.

It is imperative to ward off danger

Imperial rivalries, national arrogance and ignorance triggered the First World War, which has been called the seminal catastrophe of the 20th century. The Ukraine war must not become the seminal catastrophe of the 21st century! The increasing Europeanisation of the conflict threatens to slide into a major war between Russia and NATO, which neither side wants and, in view of the acute threat of nuclear catastrophe in such a case, cannot possibly want. Therefore, it is urgent to stop the escalation before it develops a momentum of its own that escapes political control.

Now it is up to the European states and the European Union, whose global political weight is constantly being reduced in the war and by the war, to direct all their efforts towards the restoration of a stable peace on the continent and thus prevent a major European war. Averting this requires the commitment of leading European politicians, namely the French President and the German Chancellor¹⁵ in a joint effort and in coordination with the US and Turkish Presidents, while there is still time and the “point of no return”, to which Jürgen Habermas has specifically referred, has not yet been passed.

Peace is possible – a way out of danger

Positions of the warring parties:

Ukraine:

– Negotiations only after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory or after the liberation of all Russian occupied territories.

– Obligation on Russia to bear the costs of reconstruction.

– Condemnation of the Russian leadership responsible for the attack.

– NATO membership after the end of the war.

– Security guarantees by states designated by Ukraine.

Russia:

– Consolidated neutrality of Ukraine – no NATO membership.

– No stationing of American and other NATO troops on Ukrainian territory.

– Recognition of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions as Russian territory.

– Ceilings on Ukrainian armed forces in general and for each armed force in particular.

– Arms control negotiations with the USA/NATO, in particular on verification mechanisms for NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defence System/BMDS in Poland and Romania.

Both warring parties have set preconditions for the start of negotiations after Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Istanbul agreements, and the Ukrainian president has even issued a decree forbidding negotiations. Both sides have also made demands for the outcome of negotiations that are impossible to fulfill in this way. Therefore, it is essential that all preconditions for the start of negotiations are dropped. The Chinese position paper offers a reasonable approach. It calls on the parties to “resume peace talks […] resumption of negotiations”.

The USA has an important role to play in bringing about negotiations and would have to pressure the Ukrainian president to negotiate. In addition, the USA (and NATO) must be prepared to engage in arms control negotiations, including confidence-building military measures.

Phase I – Ceasefire

To start the peace process, the UN Security Council should consider a draft resolution along the following lines and mandate further measure as outlined below:

1. The UN Security Council:

• shall adopt, in accordance with Article 24(1) of the UN Charter, a timetable and schedule for a ceasefire and for negotiations to end the Ukrainian war and restore peace, consistent with the primary responsibility assigned to it by its members for the maintenance of international peace and security,
• shall decide on a general and comprehensive ceasefire between the warring parties, Russia and Ukraine, with effect from “Day X”. The ceasefire shall be without exception and without limitation or special arrangements, irrespective of the deployment of the opposing armed forces and weapons systems. It shall be binding and implemented in a general and comprehensive manner,
• shall entrust a High Commissioner for Peace and Security in Ukraine with the political responsibility for the implementation of the timetable and schedule as well as all measures decided by the UN Security Council in this context,
• shall decide on the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force¹⁶ in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter, tasked with observing and enforcing the ceasefire and the security and military measures agreed between the parties to the conflict.

2. The parties to the conflict shall cease all hostilities on the date determined by the UN Security Council (“Day X”).
3. No more weapons and ammunition shall be supplied to Ukraine from that date. Russia shall also cease supplying arms and ammunition to its forces in the territories occupied since 24 February 2022 and Crimea.
4. All irregular foreign forces, military advisors and intelligence personnel of both warring parties shall be withdrawn from Ukrainian territory by Day X +10.

Phase II – Peace Negotiations

1. Peace negotiations shall begin on Day X +15 under the chairmanship of the UN Secretary-General and/or the UN High Commissioner for Peace and Security in Ukraine at UN Headquarters in Geneva.
2. Both parties to the conflict shall reaffirm their determination to conduct the negotiations with the firm intention of ending the war and seeking a peaceful and lasting settlement of all issues in dispute. They shall take account of Russia’s letters to the United States and NATO of 17 December 2021, insofar as they are relevant to the bilateral negotiations, and Ukraine’s position paper for the negotiations of 29 March 2022, and build on the results of the Istanbul negotiations.
3. Elements of a negotiated settlement:
4. a) The parties to the conflict

– would not consider each other as adversaries in the future and would undertake to return to the principles of equal and indivisible security,

– would undertake to renounce the threat and use of force,

– would undertake not to take any preparatory measures to wage war against the other party,

– would undertake to show transparency in their military planning and exercises and greater predictability in their military and political actions,

– would accept the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force on Ukrainian territory in a 50 km wide zone from the Russian border, including the regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson within their administrative boundaries,

– would undertake to resolve all disputes without the use of force through the mediation of the United Nations High Comissioner or if necessary, by the guarantor states. The right of Ukraine to individual and collective self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter would not be affected.

1. b) Russia

– would withdraw its armed forces from the territory of Ukraine to the borders of 23 February 2022,

– would withdraw its armed forces on its own territory to no less than 50 km from the Ukrainian border, if they have been deployed to this zone since 24 February 2022.

1. c) Ukraine

– would withdraw its armed forces from a zone no less than 50 km from the Russian border, including the regions of Luhansk Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson,

– would declare as permanent its status as a neutral state and would not join any military alliance, including the North Atlantic Alliance. Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and state independence would be guaranteed by corresponding pledges of guarantor powers.¹⁷ The guarantees would not apply to Crimea, and the regions of Luhansk Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson within their former administrative borders,

– would renounce the development, possession, and deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory,

– would not allow the permanent or temporary deployment of the armed forces of a foreign power or its military infrastructure on its territory,

– would not permit exercises and manoeuvres by foreign armed forces on its territory,

– would implement the agreed ceilings¹⁸ on Ukrainian armed forces within two years.

1. d) The problems related to Crimea and Sevastopol would be negotiated bilaterally through diplomatic channels within 15 years and resolved by renouncing military force.
2. e) The future status of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions would be mutually agreed in the negotiations. Russia would allow refugees to return. If the negotiating partners failed to reach an agreement on this issue, the United Nations High Commissioner for Peace and Security in Ukraine would hold a referendum within two years of the peace treaty coming into force, in which the population would decide on the future status. Ukrainian citizens who were permanent residents of these regions on 31.12.2021 would be eligible to participate. Russia and Ukraine would undertake to recognize the results of the referendum and implement them in their respective national legislations by the end of the year in which the referendum took place. For the population of regions that decided to remain within Ukraine, the Ukrainian government would incorporate into its constitution minority rights according to European standards and implement them by the end of the year in which the referendum took place (in accordance with the Minsk II Agreement).
3. f) Guarantor states, which are members of the European Union, would promote Ukraine’s membership by supporting rule of law and democratic reforms.
4. g) The reconstruction of the Ukrainian economy and infrastructure would be promoted through an international donor conference.
5. h) Both Parties would participate in and constructively support a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the CSCE format with the aim of establishing a European security and peace order. The conference would take place within one year of the entry into force of the Peace Treaty.
6. i) The Treaty would enter into force as soon as both Parties and five guarantor states had signed the Treaty and, to the extent necessary, the parliaments of these states had approved it, and Ukraine had enshrined its status as a neutral, independent and non-aligned state (without the goal of NATO membership) by amending its constitution.¹⁹
7. k) Any delays would not justify either breaking the ceasefire or withdrawing from the agreements reached so far.

Phase III – A European Security and Peace Order

In the long term, only a European security and peace order can guarantee Ukraine’s security and freedom, in which Ukraine and Russia have their place. This European security architecture would ensure that Ukraine’s geostrategic position would no longer play a key role in the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and Russia. The way to achieve this is through a conference in the CSCE format that builds on the great progress made in the “Charter of Paris” and develops it further, taking into account the current security and strategic framework.

Published: 28/8/2023

¹ www.un.org/depts/german/gv-notsondert/a-es11-1.pdf
² www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_res_es_11_6.pdf
³ According to FAZ, Ukraine still sees no chance for a negotiated peace with Russia. “This peace must be fought for. And Russia must be defeated. Otherwise, there will be no peace,” the Ukrainian ambassador in Berlin, Oleksii Makeiev, told the newspapers “Rheinische Post” and “General-Anzeiger”.
⁴ German politicians, who do not understand the strategic principle of end-means relationships, are again demanding the delivery of Taurus cruise missiles. https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ukraine-liveticker-deutsche-politiker-fordern-lieferung-von-marschflugkoerpern-faz-19030454.html
⁵ And then there’s the whole question of, if Ukraine is really losing, let’s assume that the Ukrainian military cracks […] and the Ukrainians are on the run. Again, I’m not saying that’s going to happen, but it is a possibility. What is NATO going to do? Are we going to accept the situation where Ukraine is being defeated on the battlefield in a serious way by the Russians? I’m not so sure. And it may be possible in those circumstances that NATO will come into the fight. It may be possible that the Poles decide that they alone have to come into the fight, and once the Poles come into the fight in a very important way, that may bring us into the fight, and then you have a great power war involving the United States on one side and the Russians on the other. https://mate.substack.com/p/john-mearsheimer-ukraine-war-is-a?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email
⁶ seymourhersh.substack.com/p/opera-buffa-in-ukraine
⁷ www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2023/07/18/ukraine-and-the-west-are-facing-a-devastating-defeat/
⁸ https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine
⁹ http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69390
¹⁰ http://www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465
¹¹ www.mdr.de/nachrichten/welt/osteuropa/politik/ukraine-krieg-russland-putin-afrika-friedensmission-100.html
¹² Azali Assoumani, President of Comoros and Chair of the African Union, after meeting President Putin: “President Putin has shown that he is ready for dialogue and to find a solution, and now we have to convince the other side. I hope we will succeed.” https://augenauf.blog/2023/07/28/afrikanische-union-waffenstillstand-in-ukraine-ruckt-naher-wenn-selenski-will/
¹³ The editorialist of the “Welt” writes: “Putin currently considers negotiations and a ceasefire to be the most advantageous option. At any rate, a better one than having to decide for himself how many of the conquered territories he can hold. For Ukraine’s counteroffensive is advancing. The costs of the war are also growing with each passing day and are detrimental to developments in the country. The population feels this, and Putin, who does not want any social tensions around next year’s presidential election, knows it.” The author concludes: “Should the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia be taken up seriously at some point – for example, because Ukraine’s counteroffensive has not produced the desired results – nothing will have changed in the conflict: Ukraine will need credible security guarantees from the West so that Russia does not invade Ukraine again after the ceasefire.

At the very least, it is a sign that the Kremlin is testing the waters, but it should be heeded because it takes up what the Chinese initiative has always emphasized, namely that the Istanbul negotiations, that were not finalized, should be “resumed”. (Compare Harald Kujat’s ceasefire and peace plan, printed in Funke: “Ukraine. Negotiation is the only way to peace”. Berlin 2023: S. 100-104).
¹⁴ Jeffrey D. Sachs: “In fact, the war was provoked by the U.S. in ways that leading U.S. diplomats anticipated for decades in the lead-up to the war, meaning that the war could have been avoided and should now be stopped through negotiations.” consortiumnews.com/2023/05/24/the-war-in-ukraine-was-provoked/
¹⁵ President Biden on 31.05 2022 in NYT: “As President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has said, ultimately this war will only definitively end through diplomacy.” www.nytimes.com/2022/05/31/opinion/biden-ukraine-strategy.html
¹⁶ The selection and composition should not follow the usual force generation procedure of the UN, but the troop contributors should be coordinated by the negotiating partners. Military contingents of the following states could be acceptable to both sides: Austria, Brazil, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Pakistan, Switzerland, Turkey.
¹⁷ In its position paper on the negotiations in Istanbul on 29 March 2022, Ukraine named the following states as its favored guarantors: Russia, Great Britain, China, USA, France, Turkey, Germany, Canada, Italy, Poland, Israel.
¹⁸ On the basis of the text of the treaty as annexed to the initialed Istanbul text and its listed ceilings.
¹⁹ Ukraine could make the entry into force of the treaty dependent on a nationwide referendum.

By Alice Speri, The Intercept, 9/27/23

Co-published in Ukrainian in partnership with Zaborona, and in French in partnership with Mediapart.

This article includes descriptions of sexual violence.

BUCHA, UKRAINE — THE FIRST RUSSIAN soldiers arrived several days after Bucha had fallen, looking for any men left behind. Anna, a widow, lived alone with her mother and teenage daughter.

“We have no men,” Anna told the soldiers, speaking in Russian. She warned her mother not to speak, worried that the soldiers would pick up on her distinct Western Ukrainian speech and mark her as a banderivka, a pejorative Russians often use to refer to Ukrainian nationalists or people they think of as such.

Anna showed the Russians her father’s death certificate, which noted that he had been born in Russia’s far east. “It’s what saved us,” she later told me.

She tried to appear welcoming, heeding a neighbor’s advice. “It’s going to be worse if you don’t let them in,” the elderly woman had warned.

At first, the fact that they were three women alone did not feel uniquely threatening to Anna. Some of her neighbors were hiding male relatives in the basement — a far more dangerous proposition. In the early days of the occupation, Anna and her daughter, Maria, ventured into town, where they collected humanitarian aid from the local hospital and scavenged for melted ice cream in abandoned stores. They saw the mutilated bodies of men on the streets.

Anna’s friendliness seemed to appease the first group of soldiers — the “orcs,” as she and many Ukrainians routinely call Russian troops. After searching the home, they gave Anna and her daughter white armbands to wear, a signal that they had been “filtrated” and posed no threat to the occupiers.

It wasn’t until the second group of soldiers barged into Anna’s yard when she realized that women, alone in the occupied ghost city, faced a different sort of risk. Their leader, a tall man in his early 20s, struck her temple with the back of his weapon and demanded oral sex. He also threatened to rape Maria, who was 13 at the time. Anna acquiesced to his threats to protect her daughter, she says, setting off a chain of events that would lead her own government to investigate her for collaboration with the Russian occupiers even as it eventually came to recognize her as a victim of wartime sexual violence.

I met Anna and Maria this summer at their home in Bucha: the city that first became synonymous with the horrors of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. They spoke for hours, talking excitedly over one another, repeating a story they had told many times but rarely, it seemed, to a willing listener. (Anna and Maria are pseudonyms; I am withholding their full names to protect their privacy.) Well into the conflict’s second year, as Ukrainian forces seek to liberate territories that remain under Russian occupation, their story is emblematic of the fissures tearing through Ukrainian society. On the one hand, Anna’s ongoing ordeal is a product of enduring stigma around sexual violence. On the other, it reflects deep-seated social divisions that have plagued Ukraine for years and have only escalated amid the current conflict.

As survivors in each liberated town revealed fresh evidence of Russian atrocities, Ukrainians clamored for justice and nursed a growing vindictiveness against those perceived to have helped the occupiers. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy set the tone, signing a sweeping and unforgiving law targeting collaborators just days after last year’s invasion.

In Bucha, neighbors summarily judged Anna’s wartime choices and shunned her as a traitor. But her interactions with Russian soldiers also posed a set of challenges for law enforcement officials, who have pledged that no crime stemming from the conflict will go unpunished. Local and international prosecutors have opened hundreds of investigations targeting Russian soldiers over wartime atrocities, including sexual violence. At the same time, local authorities have investigated thousands of Ukrainian citizens for collaboration.

At once a victim and a suspected collaborator, Anna was caught between overlapping quests for justice, facing neighbors — and a law enforcement apparatus — unable to reconcile those contradictions.

“At the beginning no one believed that the Russians were capable of such things. People believed that those under occupation were not exactly collaborators but were quite friendly with the Russians,” said Kateryna Ilikchiieva, Anna’s attorney, referring to the sexual assault her client described. “People don’t understand exactly what collaboration is, and so they think that any contact with the enemy is collaboration.”

The legislation passed last year further entrenched that belief. The law does not specifically prohibit relationships with Russians, but it does bar Ukrainians from sharing information that could have “serious consequences” with enemies of the state. In practice, any contact with Russians is fodder for speculation. “People understand even sex with Russian soldiers as collaboration,” said Alena Lunova, advocacy director at the Ukrainian human rights group ZMINA.

In Anna’s case, the suspicion alone prompted relentless questioning by multiple law enforcement agencies and the dismissal, for months, of her reports that she was abused. She is probably not alone; human rights advocates warn that some victims of Russian sexual violence are not speaking out because they fear being labeled and possibly investigated as collaborators.

In that sense, Anna’s story is a cautionary tale.

Pasha Giraffe

Long before Russian troops invaded Bucha in February 2022, Anna’s all-female household generated rumors. Neighbors had gossiped for years about her supposed drinking and promiscuity. They even whispered about Maria, who stopped going to school after the pandemic. The two lived with Anna’s 74-year-old mother in a disheveled house surrounded by a large, overgrown yard — on the margins of both the city and society, not caring much about what people said about them. Anna, with her blue hair and extravagant jewelry, looks at once much older than her 41 years and also like a sister to Maria, who dyes her hair bright red and wears artsy makeup.

While most of Bucha’s residents fled as the Russians advanced, Anna and her family stayed put. Her mother, who is largely bedridden, didn’t want to leave her home. Besides, they had little money and nowhere to go. They followed news of the incursion on TV until the power went out and the sky filled with smoke.

When the first group of soldiers came knocking, Maria noticed many of them seemed barely older than she was. She tried hard to seem friendly, thinking it safer.

The terror began in mid-March, when the leader of the second group of soldiers, called Pasha Giraffe by his compatriots due to his towering height, told Anna that some man would eventually have his way with Maria, so why not now. It had taken them three months to get to Ukraine, another soldier said; they missed women and “needed relaxation.” Anna insisted that Maria was a child and pleaded with the soldiers; she told them she knew they were good men. She agreed to sleep with them so they would not touch Maria. “I took everything on myself,” she told me.

After that, different groups of soldiers started coming by the house several times a day. They would announce themselves by firing shots in the air and hang around a pit fire in the yard, bragging about the people they had killed. Sometimes they would tell jokes and ask Anna and Maria to sing with them. Other times they were more menacing; Pasha Giraffe would cock his weapon when talking as if to remind them that he was in charge. Some of the soldiers were convinced that Anna and her daughter were spies for the Ukrainian army: They once burned Maria’s L.O.L. dolls — plastic figurines that are popular around the globe — because they believed that a laser light in the toys was a recording device. The soldiers were unpredictable and “twisted,” Anna and Maria said. They were always drunk, and most came to the house for sex.

Anna didn’t want her mother to know what was happening, so she never took them inside. Instead, one by one, they filed into a garage in the back of the yard, “like they were waiting in line for the bathroom,” Anna said. There were sometimes up to 10 men a day, she recalled, maybe 30 to 50 different soldiers in a two-week period.

Meanwhile, the other soldiers lingered in the yard with Maria. They put their arms around her waist, sometimes touched her legs, but never more, she said. She credits her mother, but also what she described as her wits. “I learned how to be around them,” she said. “We were playing nice, trying not to be rude. We played their game, said Zelenskyy is a jerk, Putin is great, telling them they were liberators.”

Anna believes most of the soldiers must be dead by now, but she said she would kill Pasha Giraffe herself if she could. She got to know some others by their nicknames as well: There was Sergeant, Shamil, Puppy, and Monarch, who broke down toward the end of the occupation and apologized to Anna. He didn’t know why they came to Bucha, he said, nor why they did what they did.

Her familiarity with the soldiers would come in handy, months later, when Anna was summoned to identify perpetrators of war crimes.

Return to Bucha

Throughout the monthlong occupation of Bucha, Russian soldiers killed at least 501 people, according to a newly erected memorial that officials warn is incomplete. When the city was liberated in early April 2022 and residents returned, they found dozens of Ukrainian bodies in mass graves. There was a mound of partially burnt corpses in a shallow patch in Anna’s neighborhood. Others were scattered in the streets, some with their hands tied behind their backs, bearing signs of torture.

Not far from Anna’s home, on the leafy outskirts of the city, three brothers were found slain, at least one of whom had worked as a police officer. There was also a woman who taught the Ukrainian language, whom neighbors believe was targeted along with her husband and son for refusing to speak Russian to the occupiers. Some people who had fled found their homes looted and burnt; other homes were untouched.

Ira, a neighbor who lives down the street from Anna and asked me to use only her first name, was among those who returned. On April 4, the first day returning residents were allowed into the city, she walked through her yard, cradling her cat, as the executed bodies of her husband and two other male relatives lay on the ground nearby.

Ira remembers seeing Anna and Maria that day. Like other residents, she had heard rumors that the two were among those looting abandoned houses. Blurry photos and videos had circulated on social media, some taken surreptitiously through slits in neighbors’ fences. In one, Anna is pushing a wheelbarrow carrying a large piano. In another, she stands next to a resident whom neighbors also accused of looting; after the invasion, he killed himself because of the shame, Ira said. In yet another photo, Anna appears to be smiling.

The smile is what bothers Ira most. The day she returned to Bucha, she photographed Maria and Anna: the daughter flashing a wide grin, the mother a more subdued one. Ira said they had greeted her from down the street waving a victory sign. “We were so happy to see living souls,” Maria told me.

But to Ira and others, the fact that they were still alive, seemingly in good spirits, and that their house was mostly intact, were indisputable signs of their treason. “They are smiling at the same time that there are bodies in my yard,” she said. “Does a victim act like that?”

Ira Gavriluk holds her cat as she walks among the bodies of her husband, brother, and another man, who were killed outside her home in Bucha, on the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine, Monday, April 4, 2022. Russia is facing a fresh wave of condemnation after evidence emerged of what appeared to be deliberate killings of civilians in Ukraine. (AP Photo/Felipe Dana)Throughout the monthlong occupation of Bucha, Russian soldiers killed at least 501 people. Many were found scattered in streets and backyards, some with their hands tied behind their backs, bearing signs of torture, on April 4, 2022. Photo: Felipe Dana/AP

Rumors about Anna grew worse as more residents trickled back into the city. On social media, people referred to her as a “whore”; some asked for her address and threatened to kill her. Some neighbors said that she had been “in charge” of the looting, an offense they put on par with the actions of Russian soldiers. They also reported her to the police.

The looting is not all that neighbors blame Anna for. Some municipal workers who had stayed during the occupation and were beaten by soldiers accused her of riding in an armored vehicle with the Russians and guiding the soldiers to them. Neighbors speculated that two elderly residents, whose bodies were found piled among others not far from Anna’s home, were targeted by the Russians after yelling at her for looting. Some neighbors wondered how the soldiers had been able to identify the police officers, former members of the military, and community leaders they executed. “Someone told them,” said Ira. “Maybe it was Anna.”

As I spoke with Ira, an elderly woman stopped to listen, interjecting that the white armband the soldiers gave Anna was a sign “she was in their camp.” Another neighbor, who only gave her name as Svitlana, noted with scorn that Anna had taken to wearing earrings with a Ukrainian flag after the city was liberated. “She started working on her new image after the occupation,” said Svitlana. When residents hurled insults at her, she added, Anna told them that the Russians would be back. Her father was Russian, Svitlana stressed. “It’s in her DNA.”

Then there was the sex with soldiers. Her neighbors accused her of enjoying it. They told me about rumors that she drank with the soldiers, danced with them, and even fired their weapons.

Anna doesn’t deny taking the piano, which she said she found in the street and took into her home, with the help of some neighbors, after the Russians left the city. Many residents who remained in Bucha looted, she added, thinking that those who fled wouldn’t return. But she said she never gave the soldiers information about her neighbors, nor did she fire their weapons. She laughed when I told her what the neighbor said about her riding in an armored vehicle. And she says she spoke openly to her neighbors of having slept with soldiers, telling them she had done it to protect her daughter.

Ira doesn’t believe her. She noted that several other women in Bucha who were raped by soldiers had been killed afterward, while another woman who emerged from a cellar after the invasion looked barely alive and was unable to speak of the abuses she had survived. “That’s an example of how a person goes through violence, not smiling,” Ira said. Anna, she insisted, “either is a very good actress, or has a mental problem, but it’s not sexual violence.”

Our Orcs

As Anna’s neighbors whispered, Ukrainian authorities began to investigate her.

For several weeks, a steady stream of law enforcement officials came to her house. Throughout the visits, Anna took every chance to report the soldier’s abuses, repeatedly asking for a lie detector test to prove she was telling the truth. Nobody believed her, she said, because she wasn’t beautiful and because her clothes were dirty. “If you survived the occupation, you were a collaborator,” she said. “People who were not in the occupation just do not understand what happened here and what it was like.”

Ukrainian soldiers were the first to stop by, looking for weapons the Russians might have left behind. After that, most of the officials who came didn’t explain what they were looking for, and Anna didn’t always know what agency they were with. Photos Maria took on her phone show that several worked for the Department of Strategic Investigations, a special unit of Ukraine’s national police.

Someone from the local prosecutor’s office came too. Anna is not sure how the office learned of her ordeal but said the prosecutor, Roman Pshyk, was the only one who appeared to take her account of the sexual violence seriously. Pshyk accompanied her to a gynecological exam shortly after the city was liberated, where she was horrified to see many elderly women. In the waiting room, she thanked herself for having protected her mother in addition to Maria.

Pshyk, who has since left the office, told The Intercept that Anna’s case was one of more than 100 investigations into Russian crimes the prosecutor launched after Bucha’s liberation. “Any report of sexual harassment prompts a criminal prosecution investigation,” he said. “We can’t only take the position of the victim. We need evidence.” He added that his office had not yet heard the rumors about Anna and focused only on her testimony. He said the office later referred the case to national police and to Ukraine’s intelligence services, the SBU, though Anna didn’t hear from them until several months later.

When the local police came to her house, they found cans of spray paint in the garage and claimed that it was used by Russians to mark the homes of allies. Other officers searched every room in the house, rummaging through drawers and asking for receipts to prove that items weren’t stolen. Svitlana, the neighbor, told me that police shared photos of items they discovered at Anna’s home with other residents, in an effort to identify stolen property. The police did not respond to The Intercept’s questions.

Some of the officers were rough. In June last year, they demanded all the phones in the house, with no explanation. When Maria yelled at them and tried to film them, they snatched her phone and shoved and handcuffed her. Vitaliy Pelehatiy, a senior investigator with the Department of Strategic Investigations who was in charge that day, told The Intercept that officers were searching for stolen property and confiscated the phones as part of the investigation.

“They behaved like orcs,” said Anna. “Our orcs.”

A Slow Reckoning

Sexual violence goes substantially underreported virtually everywhere, but in conflict zones, the stigmatization of victims can be exacerbated. As Ukrainian forces seized back control of occupied territories last year, reports began to emerge of widespread sexual violence by Russian troops. The true toll may never be known, particularly in large swaths of the country that remain under occupation. Even in liberated areas, advocates caution that fear and persistent taboos about sexual violence make the scale of the abuses virtually impossible to assess. Often, they say, law enforcement agencies’ own biases and failures only compound the problem.

“Because it is a shame to talk about sexual violence, our society charges these people as if they’re not a victim but more of a perpetrator,” said Gyunduz Mamedov, a deputy to Ukraine’s previous prosecutor general and a rare, outspoken critic of the collaboration law. The suspicion with which sexual violence victims are routinely treated, he said, amounts to “a double victimization.”

Seven months into the war, in September 2022, Ukraine’s prosecutor general opened an office within the war crimes division to investigate and prosecute conflict-related sexual violence, or CRSV. It was a formal recognition of systemic abuses — and the fact that an array of Ukrainian agencies has failed to adequately support survivors.

It was around this time that Anna’s interactions with the authorities took a turn. “After that, they started to work on the sexual violence case more sensitively, or to work on it at all,” said Ilikchiieva, her attorney, a volunteer who was connected to Anna by a legal nonprofit earlier this year.

Late last summer, two SBU officers came to Anna’s house and handed her a document recognizing her status as a victim. In the months that followed, they asked more questions about her contacts with soldiers, and last November they finally gave her the polygraph she had been demanding for months.

In a two-hour interview with the SBU officers, she told me, they asked her a wide range of questions: Was she raped? By how many people? What about the looting? Did she work with Russia’s security services or kill anyone? It felt just as much an investigation into war crimes by the Russians as a probe into Anna herself. The officers warned her she would go to jail if she lied, and she answered all their questions. Afterward they drove her home, and a few days later an officer called to say she had passed the test.

The officers’ questions were the closest Ukrainian officials came to acknowledging that they suspected Anna of collaboration. The SBU did not respond to The Intercept’s request for comment. Anna’s lawyer said she was never notified of a formal investigation, though Anna’s various interactions with law enforcement authorities pointed in that direction. Despite the lack of formal charges against her to this day, Anna’s neighbors in Bucha have no doubt about her guilt.

Iryna Didenko, the prosecutor in charge of conflict-related sexual violence at the office of the prosecutor general of Ukraine, acknowledged in an interview that “huge mistakes” were made in the first months after the invasion and that law enforcement officials were unprepared to deal with victims. Investigators often didn’t keep information confidential, she noted, at times sharing it widely within the community. When she came in, she took over cases involving sexual violence from other agencies and overhauled the investigative interview process. Now, there must be a woman on every team, and investigators have been instructed to speak to witnesses and victims more empathetically. Didenko launched pilot programs in Kherson and Kharkiv, territories that Ukrainian forces liberated last year, where multiagency teams were trained by international experts on best practices when dealing with conflict-related sexual violence.

Changing the culture of law enforcement, Didenko said, will take time. She also said there is a need for greater public education about sexual violence. She cited a USAID-led survey, published in May, in which most respondents noted that survivors of sexual violence “constantly face biased attitudes from Ukrainian society,” discouraging them from seeking help. “People will sometimes say a victim of rape may not have been against it,” she said. “But we are seeing changes; there is stronger support for victims.”

Didenko declined to comment on Anna’s case specifically, citing confidentiality, but Anna said Didenko visited her earlier this year and was shocked to learn about how investigators had treated her. A week later, the phones Anna had been trying to get back from police for nearly nine months were returned to her.

By the end of last year, Didenko’s office had opened more than 220 sexual violence investigations; the office ultimately filed charges against Russian soldiers in 62 cases. Didenko acknowledged that there are likely many more incidents that are not on her office’s radar because of the stigma associated with sexual violence and fear, in some liberated areas, that the Russians might return. Earlier this summer, Ukraine’s prosecutor general Andriy Kostin introduced a new plan to strengthen protections for victims of wartime sexual violence. Russia often uses such violence, he wrote, “as a form of torture, a way to humiliate and break resistance.”

Splitting Society

The first calls for legislation to punish Ukrainian collaborators came on the heels of the 2014 Donbas conflict, during which Ukrainian separatists, backed by Russian troops, seized large swaths of land in the country’s east, in a precursor to the current war. Russia went on to unilaterally annex those lands following last year’s full-scale invasion.

Vitaliy Ovcharenko, a prominent blogger-turned-soldier from the Donbas’s Donetsk region, helped draft a law in 2017 that would have imposed civil penalties on officials and administrators who had supported the separatist effort, including banning them from holding public office. In towns that remained under Ukrainian control, he told me, residents who had aided pro-Russian forces, at times leading to the abuse or death of their neighbors, roamed freely. It wasn’t uncommon for people who had been tortured to run into their torturers at local shops. “There was a crisis of justice in Ukrainian cities, and no one cared, no one was taking responsibility, and no one knew how to bring these collaborators to justice,” Ovcharenko said.

Ovcharenko’s proposal stalled after being introduced in Parliament in 2018. He and other local activists believed there was no appetite among Ukraine’s political leadership for criminalizing collaboration. He said that human rights advocates in Kyiv, some 500 miles away, accused him of being a traumatized veteran out for vengeance and warned that the proposed law had a violent, “vigilante” connotation to it. “They said, ‘We don’t need this confrontation in society.’ I told them, ‘If you left Kyiv and got to the ground, you would see that there are already confrontations,’” he said. “When society feels that there is no regulation from the government, it starts mass regulation by the people — and that ends with broken tires, broken windows, Molotov cocktails, and violence.”

Several parties, including Zelenskyy’s, introduced similar proposals in later years, but they never came up for a vote, partly because of Ukrainian legislators’ concerns that they would enflame social divisions. It was also unclear how collaboration would overlap with existing laws, including on treason.

Until last year: After the invasion, legislators voted Zelenskyy’s version into law so hastily that the legal advisers who evaluated the bill noted that they had done so under time pressure and “in extraordinary circumstances.” The result, many critics charge, was a “bad law” whose overly vague contours effectively criminalize a much broader range of behavior than originally intended. In some parts of the country, it could potentially apply to tens of thousands of people.

The law prohibits participation in political, legal, and law enforcement activities under the occupying authorities and the transfer of resources to them, as well as acts that lead to the “death of people or other serious consequences.” It bans Russian propaganda in educational institutions and the “public denial by a citizen of Ukraine of the armed aggression against Ukraine.” Penalties range from bans on holding government jobs to confiscation of property and prison sentences of up to 15 years.

While its proponents argue that it serves as a deterrent, the legislation leaves little room for the complexities of war and people’s need to survive it. The law applies to Ukrainians providing Russian forces with information about military or civilian targets — as was the case with the agent who helped direct a Russian missile attack on a crowded café earlier this summer that killed 13 people. But it has also been used against local officials who remained in their posts under the new authorities, teachers showing up for work in occupied areas, and private citizens selling hogs or other goods to Russians or expressing opinions, including via social media, that are seen as supportive of the invasion.

So far, prosecutors have investigated more than 6,000 cases of alleged collaboration, according to Ukrainian government records. While many were tried in absentia, scores of people have been convicted already.

Some civil society groups and officials have called on the government to amend the law and apply it more selectively. Iryna Vereshchuk, the Ukrainian minister responsible for reintegration, warned against branding “everybody” who remained in occupied territory a collaborator. “Many people look to the future with fear because they don’t know if they fall under those categories,” she said last year. Tamila Tasheva, the government’s permanent representative for occupied Crimea, also called for a separate approach for Ukrainians who have lived under occupation for years.

But lawmakers have so far refused to budge, with few politicians willing to be seen as soft on those who are considered traitors in the popular imagination.

“The government is pretty understanding of what’s going on. It’s not a secret for those who are working with the issue, but the problem is that you need to explain to society why we need to change this law,” said ZMINA’s Lunova. “They can split society with this issue of collaboration.”

The phenomenon is hardly unique to Ukraine. “Every war has its collaborators, and every war has an often brutal response to those collaborators,” said Shane Darcy, deputy director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the University of Galway, who has researched the issue globally. Still, models for how to address it are scarce. Even international humanitarian law — the body of law that rules conduct in armed conflict — has a “blind spot” when it comes to collaboration, Darcy added.

International law posits that life should continue as normally as possible under occupation and requires occupying authorities to continue providing administrative services to civilians, allowing them to recruit former public servants to keep running them so long as it is not by coercion. “Of course, in a situation of occupation, it’s very hard to draw a fine line between what’s coercive and what’s not,” said Darcy. At the same time, international law also allows states to punish collaborators, provided they do so humanely. “Ukraine — to their credit — seem to be subjecting everyone to a legal process,” he added. “They’re not stringing collaborators from lampposts.”

Ukraine’s justice system is grappling with how to handle some 80,000 alleged crimes by Russian forces. Critics of the collaboration law argue that, at best, it’s impractical because it places more strain on a system that’s already overburdened. “We understand the situation, but you can focus on those whose crimes are really critical, against state security, whose actions really have heavy consequences,” said Lunova. “You shouldn’t prosecute those who put a like on Facebook.”

Nadia Volkova, a human rights attorney and director of the Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group, who helped draft a never-implemented transitional justice plan after the 2014 conflict, argued that the mass prosecution of low-level collaborators risks causing long-term harm. Already, last year’s invasion deepened divisions that had long split Ukraine. “They are manipulating these differences that have always existed in Ukraine, because it was never a unified nation in a way,” she said. “They are pitting people against each other. One might think that they want to show everybody that if you’re not going to be supporting Ukraine, this is what is going to happen to you, you’re going to be held responsible. But if they want to unify the nation, it’s not really the way to go.”

Neighbors and Traitors

As Ukrainian forces wrestle territory back from Russian control, accusations of collaboration have become ubiquitous across the country. Old conflicts are sometimes recast in light of the ongoing conflict. Victims turn on victims.

“Sometimes it’s real cases, with real records, real evidence,” Leonid Merzlyi, the chief judge in Irpin city court, whose jurisdiction includes Bucha, told me when I visited his courtroom. “In other cases, it is neighbors’ fights.”

Though collaboration cases are usually investigated by national authorities and heard before higher courts, Merzlyi was well aware of their nuances. “If someone didn’t leave an occupied area, we need to know, why? And if someone had Russian soldiers visiting their house, why?” he said. “We need to analyze every case. It’s very crucial for Ukrainian society.”

While some Ukrainians in occupied areas “were supporting the enemy before, and it was clear,” he continued, others may have been “protecting their children, and they were forced by this natural feeling of protection, and it’s hard to judge in that case.”

Anatoliy Fedoruk, the mayor of Bucha for 24 years, noted that there were fewer allegations of collaboration there as compared to other areas that were occupied for longer periods of time, but he acknowledged that long-standing hostilities between neighbors were exacerbated by the conflict. “Often, people on the same street or even in the same family are ready to eat each other,” he said. “We are a civilized society and we do not prove things by conjecture: There should be evidence — whether of collaboration or of rape — not rumors.”

When we met, Fedoruk said that he wasn’t familiar with Anna’s case and couldn’t comment on ongoing investigations. The next day, however, a team of municipal workers came to inspect Anna’s rooftop. It had been damaged by shelling, and she had been asking the city to repair it for months. (They still haven’t fixed it, she recently told me.)

Anna and Maria’s war crimes case is currently in the pretrial phase, Ilikchiieva told me. As part of the prosecutor general’s investigation, the two have traveled to Kyiv in recent months to identify soldiers in hundreds of photos authorities pulled from Russian social media. During one visit, Pelehatiy, the senior police investigator who had repeatedly visited Anna at home and who had been in charge when police handcuffed Maria, stood on a side of the room, watching skeptically. Pelehatiy told The Intercept he had heard about Anna’s reports of sexual violence by soldiers, but that she had never told him directly about them. “He does not believe her,” Ilikchiieva said.

He’s not the only one. According to Ira, she and other neighbors have spoken with officers who agree that Anna is a liar, playing the part of the victim. “Everyone can see it,” she said, “but they can’t do anything with it.”

For Anna, it makes little difference whether she will ever face criminal charges for looting or collaboration. Either way, she is now an outcast in Bucha.

Last winter, someone vandalized her fence. On Christmas Eve, while she and Maria were out, two young men from the neighborhood smashed their windows with baseball bats, stole a TV, and beat her mother, she said. After she reported the attack to police, one of the men returned to fix the fence and brought a different TV; he told Anna that he had not touched her mother. In January, the same men attacked Maria as she walked home, threatening her with a knife. Again, Anna reported the incident to police. She said they did nothing.

Anna has come to resent her neighbors and the Ukrainian officials who failed her just as much as she hates the Russian soldiers who abused her. “The worst part,” she said, “was not the orcs.”

By Gilbert Doctorow, Website, 10/11/23

A couple of days ago, I mentioned how Russian state television news was providing viewers with information about aspects of the ongoing armed conflict between Hamas and Israeli armed forces that you would not find in Western media during the first days of reporting. In particular, it was immediately evident from the news briefings on Vesti that Russian emphasis was on the military side rather than on the humanitarian catastrophe side.

BBC, Euronews, CNN have all focused attention on the slaughtered Israeli citizens and the apparent savagery of the Hamas fighters including today’s revelations about the hundred or more men, women and children who were decapitated in a Hamas raid on a kibbutz in the South of Israel. Russian news from day one showed pictures of the latest generation Israeli tank destroyed by a grenade dropped by a drone and of Hamas fighters approaching Israeli shores from the sea on paragliders. On two successive Evening with Vladimir Solovyov shows, images of the destruction to Israel’s billion dollar wall around Gaza and similar engineering feats by the insurgent as they moved deep into Israel proper. Solovyov’s panelists also provided expert analysis of the military threats Israel faces from the neighborhood if the war in Gaza escalates.

 Why is this difference in what is reported important? Because coverage of the slaughter of civilians by Hamas fighters and interviews with relatives of those taken captive to Gaza as hostages plays into the hands of the Hamas strategists: it places enormous pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to proceed with a land invasion of Gaza which will result in many thousands of deaths among Israeli Defense Force soldiers as well as deaths of civilians in Gaza that may be an order of magnitude higher. The violence of an Israeli invasion may be so shocking as to justify outside Palestinian forces, namely Hezbollah in Lebanon and Arab fighters in Syria, in Iraq, in Yemen to send contingents of armed men to join the battle on the side of Hamas in Gaza.

The Western reporting has provided a wealth of material for those who would denounce the Hamas fighters as “sub-human.” However, considering the great sophistication of the Hamas methods to overcome Israeli technical devices at the border and the wall itself intended to prevent such a raid from the enclave, considering the 5,000 or more missiles sent by Hamas into Israel that overwhelmed the “Iron Dome” Israeli defenses, it is unreasonable to speak of the executions and hostage taking as spontaneous or expressions of raw anger by Arab youths. No, it had to be planned in advance and handed over to disciplined fighters for implementation with a certain military objective in mind: namely to provoke the Israeli government and draw it into the lair of urban, guerilla warfare in Gaza.

A couple of days ago, in my geopolitical analysis of the conflict, I mentioned that the dispatch of a U.S. naval force led by the aircraft carrier Gerald Ford to the waters adjacent to Israel was likely intended to intimidate Iran and possibly to prepare for an American attack on Iran under accusations that Teheran had aided and guided the Hamas attack. However, the Biden administration has now stated clearly that it has no evidence Iran was involved in preparing the Hamas action. This confirms what the supreme religious leader of Iran said yesterday in a public speech, namely that the Palestinians themselves are fiercely independent and that they alone prepared the assault on Israel. He insisted that in the West people under-appreciate the skills and determination of Palestinians. It is only individual American politicians like would-be Republican candidate for the presidency Nikki Haley and the ever saber rattling Republican Senator Lindsey Graham who are calling for Iran to be attacked now.

Based on the information about the military capabilities of pro-Hamas forces in the neighborhood aired on the Solovyov show last night by first quality Russian experts, it is far more likely that the United States military presence is intended for use against Hezbollah in Lebanon than against Iran. This organization is now said to be the strongest pro-Palestinian force in the region with tens of thousands of fighters, with advanced military equipment including perhaps one hundred thousand missiles ready for use against Israel at any time. Israel’s last incursion into Lebanon to crush Hezbollah in 2006 ran into serious difficulties when enemy strength surprised them. Some fifty Israeli tanks were said to have been destroyed then. There is no question that Hezbollah has become more powerful since. Its war hardened forces received battlefield experience very relevant to the present Hamas-Israel conflict when they fought in the civil war in Syria.

One of the Russian experts who spoke at length about the situation in Israel on Sunday night was Yevgeny Satanovsky, who is a professor attached to two centers of Near East studies in Moscow. He appeared in the past on Russian television talk shows when the subject was Russian-Turkish relations but his core specialty is in fact Israeli politics and the economy. It was difficult to follow Satanovsky’s remarks in detail because he was speaking as if to academic friends over a cup of coffee and there was a lot of jargon. But his appraisal of the Israeli military’s degraded state was clear enough. The deplorable discipline within their army compounded the initial problems from the intelligence failures of Mossad. The common denominator both in intelligence and in military command was hubris, undeserved self-confidence, lulled by technological superiority over the enemy. But just as Hamas outfoxed Israeli intelligence by returning to 19th century methods of communications, couriers and face to face meetings in place of electronic means that Israel can intercept, so fairly rudimentary bulldozers were sufficient to break through the Israeli wall and a combination of firearms and drones neutralized the sensors and cameras protecting Israel from Gaza raids.

Said Satanovsky, the Israeli military has suffered an additional debilitating flaw, namely the succession of second quality generals who rose to the premiership of Israel over the past thirty years and the politicization of military ranks. He blamed in particular the 2005 decision by then prime minister Ariel Sharon to withdraw all Israeli presence from inside Gaza and to secure the enclave from its perimeter.

For those who want to know more about who Satanovsky is, he has a large entry in the Russian language edition of Wikipedia. Suffice it here to say that he calls himself an atheist as well as a “Russian Jew,” and for several years at the start of the new millennium he helped to create the Russian Jewish Congress and served as its president for three years. He has a teaching affiliation with the International Center of University Instruction on Jewish Civilization in the Jewish University of Jerusalem.

I mention this aspect of the man’s past and present because it brings us to the special relationship that Russia has with Israel. More than one million Soviet and Russian Federation Jews emigrated to Israel. These included people from every walk of life, including some scandalously wealthy crooks who evaded Russian justice for crimes including murder and are not extradited. Since the start of the Special Military Operation, their numbers have risen with the arrival in Israel of Russia’s ‘fifth column’ personalities in the entertainment industry, in finance, in government. With the Hamas attack some of those, like the billionaire banker Mikhail Fridman, took the first plane out of Israel for Moscow this past Sunday, as reported in a feature article of The Financial Times.. The scoundrel who assisted Yeltsin’s fraudulent election in 1996 and then stayed on in power to enrich himself, serving in a succession of high positions, Anatoly Chubais, also slithered out of Israel the same day, but not to Moscow, where he would face arrest. Their compatriots in Russia snigger over the cowardice and selfishness of these high visibility characters.

Of course the vast majority of Russian settlers in Israel are normal, hard working folks and it is they to whom the Vesti journalists turn now for first-hand accounts of the impact of the Hamas attack. They can be doctors receiving the wounded at hospitals or officials in the mayor’s office of one or another Israeli city. You will not see them on CNN.

On the other side of the coin, Russia has and needs excellent relations with the Arab world. Fifteen per cent of the Russian population is Muslim, with their cultural and religious center in Kazan, some 860 km southeast of Moscow, in a wealthy oil-producing region. Chechnya is also a Muslim center in the Russian Federation and its leader Ramzan Kadyrov is well known in the Middle East. More to the point, Russia is a highly valuable partner of Saudi Arabia in Opec+ in which they jointly set production targets and price targets for the global oil industry. And Russia has close relations with the United Arab Emirates, particularly financial arrangements. The UAE dirham is now used as a currency for settling import-export transactions by Russia. Of course, Russia is closely aligned with Iran as a fellow member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and, as from 1 January 2024, BRICS. The close ties to Syria need no explanation, since Russia singlehandedly saved the government of Bashar Assad from the radical fundamentalist fighters that Washington was arming. The closeness of Russian ties with Iraq was in full evidence yesterday during the state visit of the Iraqi prime minister to Moscow. Russian companies Lukoil, Gazpromneft and others have already invested $16 billion in production assets in Iraq.

The official position with respect to the war now raging between Israel and Hamas was stated yesterday on television by President Putin: it can be solved only with implementation of the UN resolution on creation of a fully sovereign Palestine state, i.e. the “two state solution” that has been so long discussed but never brought to fruition. However, what will follow the creation of such a state is equally important and remains terra incognita: which world powers will guarantee the security of these two states?

By Artin Dersimonian, The Nation, 9/13/23

Even before the latest phase of the war in Ukraine, the narrative surrounding Western policy toward Moscow has focused on Russian President Vladimir Putin. Such an approach ignores the reality that Putin acts rather as the adjudicator, and ultimate stabilizer, of the country’s fractious political elite. Nevertheless, recent reporting on Russia has remained fixated on Putin, effectively dismissing the rest of society and institutions as inept and insignificant.

In March 2014, following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger wrote in The Washington Post that “the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one.” Unfortunately, this assessment has become only more pertinent since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last February. As a result, the very possibility of a policy based on and directed toward Russia, not Putin, has seemingly faded from Western public “debate.” This approach, beyond skewing our perception of the more fundamental problems we face vis-à-vis US-Russia relations, allows the West to march blindly ahead without considering its own role in the current state of troubled relations.

Washington has a history of adopting confrontational foreign policy stances toward individual leaders (admittedly often less-than-savory characters), rather than toward strategic objectives that support or defend US national interests. This has been the case with Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Moammar El-Gadhafi in Libya, and Bashar al-Assad in Syria. These three countries continue to suffer political, economic, and humanitarian challenges, which therefore raises the question: What has Western policy achieved?

While many in the West like to believe that the values we hold dear and that form the basis of our societies are universal, the reality is quite different. As such, by demonizing leaders who don’t adhere to our principles, we often end up misunderstanding different cultures and how their societies produced such individuals and elevated them to positions of power.

While a policy solely directed toward an individual leader does indeed make for an easy-to-digest narrative for domestic audiences, it often undermines strategic US interests and regional stability, ultimately limiting our room for maneuver. By characterizing leaders whom we dislike as the embodiment of evil (or even the proverbial Hitler) and ourselves as the benevolent democratic crusader, we not only delude our own populations, but engage in diplomatic malpractice too.

While support amongst Russians for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine remains harder to assess from a sociological perspective (although indicators point toward a general acceptance of the conflict), the example of Crimea’s annexation offers a salient point of reference. Studies have demonstrated that most Russians view the annexation of Crimea as a positive event; so too, in fact, do a majority of Crimea’s residents, according to Western-funded research surveys.

Reportedly, Putin was being pushed by hard-line members of the political elite to go even further in 2014, along the lines of what’s unfolding across eastern and southern Ukraine today. While in the West, Crimea’s annexation was a clear breach of international law, for many Russians it was a “reunification” and historically justified. Clearly, our problems aren’t limited to Putin, but rather in our overall relations with Russia.

Indeed, Putin has been at the helm of the Russian state for over 23 years, during which time he’s increasingly silenced domestic opposition and engaged in a more assertive foreign policy. However, as my colleagues Anatol Lieven and George Beebe wrote in Responsible Statecraft: “Far from being the Stalinist autocrat often portrayed in the West, Putin has generally operated more like the strong chairman of a squabbling board of directors, maintaining his own position by balancing one elite faction against another.”

Furthermore, it is important to remember that Putin came to power following almost a decade of post-Soviet economic, political, and societal collapse. During this period, Washington was deeply involved in Russian affairs under President Boris Yeltsin, as the former professed a desire to help the Russian state and its people transition to liberal democracy and a market economy. However, such actions were increasingly viewed from within Russia as damaging not only to the country itself but also to Russian-American relations moving forward. An insightful few in the US observed this trend and tried to warn that Washington’s complicity in Yeltsin’s bombing of the parliament in 1993, the war in Chechnya in 1994, and the financial crisis in 1998 were paving the way for a leader representative of this budding perspective. Therefore, Putin today is rather a useful bellwether of the political elites thinking in the largest, resource-rich and nuclear-equipped state on earth.

The centuries-long experience of Russia, not simply Putin’s “imperial delusions,” have produced specific national interests that today’s governing elite view as vital. The importance of domestic stability and the power of the state, both preserved through Russia’s sovereignty, are two such interests. Much like those in the West, Russians are strongly opposed to perceived interventions in their domestic political processes.

With regards to the crisis over Ukraine, Moscow’s unwillingness to tolerate an anti-Russian government, let alone a pro-NATO one, is explained not only by historical, psychological, and fraternal factors, but also long-standing security concerns. The invasions of Russia in 1812 by Napoleon’s Grande Armée and in 1941 by Nazi Germany have resulted in a hyper-sensitivity to potential threats on its extensive border, especially from the direction of Europe. While in no way excusing Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine, Americans should at least be able to understand these permanent national interests given Washington’s own Monroe Doctrine, which views any intervention by external powers across North and South America as potentially threatening to US national security. A doctrine those on the political right increasingly allude to when discussing perceived Chinese encroachments into the Western Hemisphere.

The lack of any clear rules of engagement, like those between the USSR and the US following the Cuban missile crisis, and the withering away of arms control agreements are just two examples of the strategic dangers currently facing US-Russia relations. With a dearth of Russia experts within the US national security apparatus, rapidly diminished access to the country itself, and the dramatic deterioration in diplomatic engagement across the board such hazards are only likely to deepen.

Unfortunately, to deal with these issues it appears that some in the West are instead betting on the weakening and subsequent disintegration of Russia, a contingency which holds immense dangers and little promise. An alternative fantasy is a regime change in Moscow that brings to power a Russian leader who would abandon the war in Ukraine, cheerfully ceding regional influence to the United States and NATO. As challenging as it may be for some in the West to appreciate, the reality is that the Russian leader who will one day replace Putin will likely be even more nationalistic, militaristic, and unpredictable—not some imaginary liberal democrat currently in exile.

As Thomas Graham, senior director for Russia on the National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration, recently explained in these pages, once the full-scale fighting in Ukraine has ended, “a new opportunity could emerge” for US-Russia relations. However, this will be possible only if Washington treads “cautiously but purposely in the pursuit of American interests in a region Moscow considers essential to its status as a great power.”

Russia, in one form or another, has been there long before Putin and will most likely remain there long after he has gone. Therefore, Western commentariat and policy makers alike need to begin considering what a future Russia policy might look like, instead of holding their breath in hopes that brave Ukrainian sacrifices will render the need for such thinking obsolete. 

By Howard Altman, The Drive, 9/22/23

The first time I met Kyrylo Budanov, commander of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and the mastermind of many a thorn in Russia’s side, was in November 2021. He was a young brigadier general, largely unknown beyond the borders of his homeland, where he was a special operations hero who was thrice wounded fighting the Russians since 2014. We sat down on couches in the middle of a busy Washington D.C. hotel lobby and he laid out how Russia was about to attack Ukraine as visitors milled about unaware of the heady discussion taking place. His prediction, which included a battle map, would prove prophetic just three months later.

Budanov, who reached out to me last week asking if I wanted to meet up with him during an otherwise secret trip to D.C., is now one of the world’s most famous sitting generals. He is the architect of the constant asymmetrical operations against Ukraine’s great foe, Russia, and has become the subject of numerous stories, including interviews with The War Zone, and ubiquitous memes (more on that later).

A top target of Russia, it is no longer safe for him to meet in a crowded hotel lobby, so I agree to meet him in his room. Outside his door stands a burly man dressed in black, clearly security.

“Do you have a gun?” I am asked.

“No, I am a journalist,” I respond and with that, I am waived in.

Budanov greets me with a smile and a handshake. Unlike our last encounter, he is dressed not in his uniform, but in a dark blue suit, blue shirt and salmon-colored tie.

Against a sweeping vista of the U.S. capitol city seen through the huge window behind us, we sit down at a table with a bowl of fresh fruit, some untouched packs of nuts and bottles of water. For the next hour, through an interpreter, we discuss everything from his blunt assessment of the ongoing counteroffensive, attacks he helped orchestrate inside Russia, the systematic campaign against Russia’s air defenses, warnings about Abrams tank usage, doubts about Prigozhin’s death, what Ukraine needs from the U.S. and, of course, his favorite Budanov meme. All the while, sitting across from me, he stares that unnervingly stoic Budanov stare, the one you’ve seen in many photos.

At his request, out of concern for his security, we agree to hold the interview until after his journey to the U.S. is finally revealed through very public visits to the Pentagon and White House with his president, new defense secretary and their contingents.

Our exclusive conversation, reported in full, has been lightly edited for clarity and context.

TWZ: It’s been a while since we actually saw each other. Is this the first time you’ve been back in Washington D.C. since?

KB: Yes

TWZ: What brings you to Washington? Who you meeting with and what goals do you have for this visit? Have US officials asked you for any advice or insights?

KB: My current visit is not actually mine. It’s part of a presidential visit and I’m assisting him on this trip. And surely there are meetings waiting for me with military leaders of this country as part of the presidential delegation.

TWZ: Is this the first time President Zelensky has asked you to come on one of these foreign trips?

KB: No.

TWZ: Can you tell me who you are meeting with?

KB: We’ll have meetings within the DoD and the special services of the U.S.

TWZ: Will you meet with the CIA?

KB: (Laughs and declines to answer)

TWZ: Are you being asked by the U.S. for your insights based upon the defense that Ukraine’s put up? Is the U.S. asking for your advice on how to fight a peer competitor?

KB: Thank God there’s not a single place across the world that has that kind of competitor and that kind of fighting, so not war on that level of intensity. But if such recommendations are required from us, we’ll gladly provide those.

TWZ: I want to talk a little bit about the ongoing counteroffensive. I know that you’re not the general in charge of land forces, but as the eyes and ears of the Ukrainian military, what’s your assessment? Do you still believe that Ukraine will retake Crimea this year or will a counteroffensive push on until next year?

KB: Our counteroffensive operation started at the beginning of summer and is still ongoing. It hasn’t stopped. And as you’ve rightly said I’m not the commander-in-chief of the General Staff. That is why questions about the tempo or progress of the counteroffensive operation should be addressed to the General Staff. But speaking of Crimea, you could not have missed that since the middle of August, there’s been a certain intensification going on with regard to Crimea, and that might indirectly give you a hint about the answer to your question.

So first of all, the fact itself is that we’re engaging the military infrastructure and military targets in occupied Crimea and the occupier’s infrastructure. If we’re going deeper into strikes against the air defense system, it’s more complicated here. First of all, the air defense systems themselves are very costly equipment and it takes a lot of time to produce those and Russian flags those systems because all this inventory is currently engaged in fighting against Ukraine and also in protection of Moscow. They’ve taken away air defenses from everywhere else.

That is why, naturally, when we engage in another and another air defense battalion of the Russian military, they need to think about where they can pull those systems from and where are they able to tolerate less defenses in other places.

The second point in engaging defenses is that we’re making those holes in the overall air defense coverage. Those holes are exploited for other things. Also, we’re depleting their air defense missile stocks because those are not limitless. And from the political standpoint, we’re also demonstrating the obvious inability of Russian air defense systems, which respectively makes them less lucrative on the world arms markets.

TWZ: And this is part of a coordinated campaign, it’s not just Crimea, right? You’re doing this inside Russia, with the strikes on air bases and other targets and on Moscow?

KB: Let’s put it like this, we have never confirmed [attacks on Moscow] officially (Budanov laughs) and I will be keeping that stance. But I can share my opinion about those strikes. All the above-mentioned factors clearly coincide with the strikes inside Russia. Especially when we’re talking about the obviously decreasing demand for Russian weapons because when the whole world sees that some drones are attacking Moscow, nobody wants to buy Russian air defense systems any longer. And that is very painful for them. And it links back to additional factors which are absent when we’re discussing Crimea.

One side note. There’s a completely opposite situation in terms of demand on weapon systems. There’s a very high demand on Ukrainian drones now. We can’t sell those now because all of them are used for warfighting, but after the war ends, this will have a lot of meaning.

Now speaking about the strikes deep into Russia, including Moscow, that are conducted by someone. There is a social side of it. Because now the Russian population and especially large Russian businesses really start to feel the impact of war. Because before that, it was just a war going on on TV. Yes, it did have some financial impact on big players, but smaller ones weren’t even touched. But demonstrative strikes, such as strikes against Moscow city – the skyscraper district in Moscow – demonstrates to everyone that now it touches upon them.

Besides that, it undermines the belief of the population in an all-powerful Russian regime that is the strongest one in the world. They start asking those logical questions, like: “where’s our air defenses that are supposed to protect us?” And they start blaming their authorities for that, for stealing all the money. The next aspect is strikes against critical military infrastructure. It includes oil refineries that supply fuel to the warfighting as well as the factories and plants that produce components for military equipment. So that’s the overall picture.

TWZ: Talk to me about the sabotage attack on Chkalovsky Air Field, located less than 20 miles from Moscow.

KB: Those were activities of sabotage groups.

TWZ: Are they connected to you?

KB: Of course all of those [groups] are in some kind of connection with us.

TWZ: Did you suggest that attack? Orchestrate it? Plan it?

KB: Of course. We’re assisting them, let’s put it that way.

TWZ: Did you select the target and help them figure out how to enter the base and blow up the planes?

KB: Let’s skip that one.

TWZ: What effect is being able to breach such a secure base having in Russia?

KB: The explanation here is the same because it was an attack conducted in a secure area actually inside Moscow because that airfield is within the greater Moscow [region]. It demonstrates the obvious inability of the regime to protect even its most critical and secure infrastructure. And if we’re talking about airframes, of course, Russia has a lot of those but some of them, such as the Il-20, are not in big numbers available.

TWZ: Did you suggest that those particular aircraft be targeted?

KB: (Laughs) So we’re going back to the spot where I didn’t want to go.

TWZ: What is the military chatter you are picking up in the wake of this attack? Is there panic? Consternation?

KB: We’re aware of the very negative reaction because they got the blame for it. This surely wasn’t the task, but it’s a side effect. And they received the blame because they were supposed to ensure security and they let those sabotage people come into that secure facility and conduct this sabotage operation.

TWZ: Who received the blame?

KB: The FSB. Besides that, of course, it’s a blow against the political leaders, and military leadership of the Russian Federation because they are not able obviously to ensure proper guarding of strategic critical airfields in Moscow.

TWZ: Do you think they have a dartboard with your face on it at the FSB?

KB: (Laughs) I don’t know, I haven’t been there.

TWZ: I want to return a little bit to the counteroffensive. It’s obviously a big part of what’s going on. And you must get tired of being asked about the pace of this. What do you tell people when they bring that up?

KB: I’m also always referring those questions to the General Staff. They’re doing the fight. I’m just assisting.

TWZ: Can you talk about how this will progress into the winter? When we first met and I asked if you were concerned about fighting in the cold, you said, ‘It’s no problem.’ So does this pending weather concern you?

KB: It’s not a problem at all. And as everyone saw last time, it’s not a problem to fight in winter for both sides – for us and for Russians. It’s not a pleasant thing to do, but it’s not a big deal. There’s one very important nuance that makes a difference between current warfighting and the previous periods of fighting. Currently, all main instances of fighting are done on foot without using any materiel. This is linked to the high saturation of artillery systems on the forefront and also portable anti-tank weapons. And that’s true for both sides. Those [armored] systems are not enough to create a gap in the orbits of the enemy – to create a powerful breakthrough as in classic doctrine. But it is well enough to deter any attempt of the enemy of any side to conduct that breakthrough with materiel and convoys.

Also, there’s a high level of saturation with both anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields. Anti-tank mines are making a lot of difference because when such a mine goes off on their wheels, it completely destroys the wheels and that piece of materiel is not able to move any further. Damage done to a piece of equipment is minimal but it still cannot move any longer. Those anti-tank mines are a big problem for those tracked vehicles. And a new feature that hasn’t been observed anywhere before is the high number of FPV [First Person Video] suicide drones on both sides which are able to engage practically any piece of equipment.

All of those above-mentioned factors reduced the possibility of using armored equipment in practically all of the main directions to the minimum. Now that hardware is only used for evacuation or to swiftly transport infantry teams to a particular spot but it doesn’t take part in the fighting.

TWZ: Given that, those 31 Abrams tanks heading to Ukraine…

KB: We’re looking forward to seeing that. We haven’t seen them yet.

TWZ: Will they make a difference given all these factors and given the difficulty of maneuvering in mud?

KB: They should be used in a very tailored way for very specific, well-crafted operations because if they are used at the front line and just in a combined arms fight, they will not live very long on the battlefield. They need to be used in those breakthrough operations, but very well-prepared.

TWZ: Are you confident that’s going to happen? Let me step back to the situation in June near Malaya Tokmachka where there were a number of armored vehicles were destroyed.

KB: Actually there wasn’t that much materiel that was destroyed. There was a lot of damaged materiel. And by now it’s repaired. The number of those that were destroyed was not that high. But it’s the very example we’ve just talked about. So if if we just deploy some battalion tank group into the battlefield somewhere, just as long as it gets under the range of artillery it will get hit.

I will share two other examples on the enemy side. Similar situations could be observed during Russian attempts to attack Vuhledar last winter. The same thing happened. They went on attack in combat convoys and there were dozens of pieces of equipment that just didn’t get through. And by the way, what is peculiar about that specific operation was that it was commanded personally by Gen. [Sergei] Gerasimov, and when all that equipment was destroyed, he blamed everyone around him and just left the frontline.

I’ll provide you with one more different example. It’s about how Wagner units advanced. When they did manage to take Bakhmut [on May 21], they were not using armored vehicles. They were only using artillery support to infantry actions on foot. So practically they were just using infantry.

TWZ: That’s expensive in terms of lives, right? Are you able to talk about the toll these kinds of attacks are taking on Ukrainian forces?

KB: Regretfully I don’t possess precise numbers of our casualties. But it is completely logical that all of our casualties – both killed in action and wounded in action – went up as we shifted to offensive operations if we compare those with the previous periods. But there is still this very interesting peculiarity that even though we’re on the offensive, our numbers of casualties are still lower than on the enemy’s side who are in defense.

But having described the overall realities of our current situation we’re smoothly coming to the conclusion that we will have to change something. The conclusion is that we’ll need additional weapons systems and capabilities that could still change this balance we have today. Because looking at the situation solely from the perspective of manpower, if we compare the Ukrainian potential with Russian potential, the Russians have a lot more human resources. That is why we cannot keep on fighting just soldier on soldier. This will not deliver the results we want.

TWZ: So what do you have to do to change this?

KB: We need to resolve the issue of increasing numbers of overall artillery barrels on the battlefield. And we need longer-range weapon systems in order to engage their command posts, their logistics storages, etc., etc.

TWZ: When you meet with U.S. officials are you going to ask for [Army Tactical Missile System] ATACMS? And what are you going to say to convince them to provide ATACMS?

KB: I think that this issue will be raised.

TWZ: What’s your argument for them?

KB: My argumentation is very simple. The majority of [Russian] command posts and logistic storages are beyond the distance of 85 kilometers (about 50 miles) which is the maximum range for our current [Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) munitions] – for [M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems or] HIMARS that we have. The Russians just place command posts and other things beyond those distances so we don’t have anything to reach them there. And the situation is the same with Russian aviation at the airfields. Fighting Russian aviation using air defense systems is very costly and ineffective. Aviation should be taken out at the air bases.

TWZ: Are you talking about airfields in Russia?

KB: No, we’re talking about the airfields in the occupied areas of Ukraine.

TWZ: Like those bases in Crimea.

KB: Crimea is Ukraine.

TWZ: On Tuesday, a U.S. official said the new Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), a replacement for ATACMS, is coming online soon and could potentially open up the availability of ATACMS for Ukraine. Do you have a sense of how many ATACMS the U.S. has that they can give you?

KB: So let’s wait for the official announcements to be made. There are still different ways how this situation can turn out so let’s wait for [the official announcement] but I can say conditionally that if it’s 100 missiles, this won’t change the situation.

TWZ: You need thousands?

KB: At least hundreds.

TWZ: Do you think you will return to Ukraine with good news about ATACMS?

KB: I always hope for the better. We’ll do everything to make that happen.

TWZ: Let me switch to the Russian side of this war. As Ukrainian forces push through that Robotyne-Verbove salient, as there’s success near Bakhmut with the recent capture of Andriivka and Klischiivka, and as the Russians are trying to push through toward Kupiansk, how can the Russians man all these areas?

KB: It’s not actually like that.

TWZ: So tell me, because you know better than I do!

KB: The offensive operation in the south will continue as it’s been ongoing as long as we have resources. In parallel to that, of course, are operations for the de-occupation of Bakhmut. You’ve very rightly mentioned that we recently have taken back Klischiivka, which looks like it’s a very small [spot] of land, but it’s important because it’s on a hill overlooking the rest of the terrain.

The next step is to cut off all the supply routes that go into Bakhmut. Practically this operation we’re following is a track really similar to the Russian one which they used to take Bakhmut. The only difference is that they still conducted those frontal attacks on the city which led to very high casualties in manpower. We won’t be doing that. We will try and envelop the city and only after it’s enveloped will we be entering the city.

And you mentioned the Russian actions in Kupiansk. Those are just local operations that cannot be called a campaign or an offensive operation. They had certain success a few months ago but after that they were stopped at certain defense lines and there’s nothing happening since.

TWZ: Is the operation in Bakhmut designed to pin down Russian forces and keep them from reinforcing the Berdiansk and Melitopol attack axes?

KB: For sure, and it has delivered the result that we wanted. For example, the Russians recently redeployed their only reserve force – the 25th Army – which was just recently raised and hasn’t completed its creation. Now it’s redeployed to roughly the north of Bakhmut and that’s the place where it’s going to be buried.

TWZ: How many forces does the 25th Army have?

KB: About 15,000 men. It’s not that much. And besides that, the threat for Russians to lose Bakhmut makes them redeploy at all times additional and additional forces to the Bakhmut area, which of course drains their resources from other directions like the south.

TWZ: Speaking of which, are the Russians able to reinforce their defense against the Burdiansk and Melitopol pushes? Are they able to bring enough troops there to prevent Ukrainian advances, given all the stresses?

KB: So we’re going back to the previous question. All that they have already have been thrown into the fire. And now all the backbone of current Russian airborne troops is in defense and trying to deter the movement of our offensive groupings in the south. Before that, there were units of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade. That brigade was completely defeated, completely smashed, and now they have withdrawn being replaced by airborne troops.

TWZ: How do you protect that Robotyne-Verbove salient against a Russian incursion?

KB: You can’t invent anything new. You have to be powerful in defense, but you have to be constantly pushing forward. In this case, they will just physically be unable to fight back. So to continue the way it actually happens now across the whole of the front line.

TWZ: Will you strike the Kerch Bridge again and if so, what will Putin do?

KB: It’s not a question of will we strike or won’t we strike. We’re doing that regularly so we will finish it. It’s just an issue of time.

TWZ: And what will Putin do?

KB: He’ll get upset once again. What can he do?

TWZ: Did you sink the Project 22160 class patrol ship Sergey Kotov with uncrewed surface vessels (USV) and do you have any pictures to show that?

KB: It is damaged. Its propeller was damaged and also it’s got a hole on the backside of the body on the right. It’s 50 by 100 centimeters (about 5.5 square feet). So it will be sent for repairs and this ship will spend some time in the dock.

TWZ: Can you talk about some of the weapons you’ve been using – the modified Neptunes, the sea drones, the UAVs?

KB: We’re using everything we have available. The list of various drones produced in Ukraine is quite large now and we’re using everything we can. The Neptunes are in the process of development, which is still ongoing and they are being improved and improved. But the problem with those is that we don’t have the line to produce a lot of them. So the problem is in the quantity of those available.

TWZ: So when you request a strike with a modified Neptune, what kind of targets are you looking at given the limited number?

KB: The purpose of moves with those weapon systems is to make holes in Russian air defense coverage and then to exploit that hole in the air defense coverage for other operations.

TWZ: I want to do a complete shift here. Were you guys involved with the attack on a Wagner-backed militia in Sudan? CNN reported that Ukrainians were likely involved in the attack on the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) forces with FPV drones.

KB: I will only say the following: About two to three months ago I was giving an interview to one of the media, I don’t remember which specific one. I answered them back then that anywhere across the world we will be seeking and hunting down Russian military criminals, and sooner or later that time will come whenever they are. That is why we shouldn’t be surprised when in any territory, something happens to Russian military criminals.

Then speaking about your specific question about Sudan, regretfully I cannot confirm or deny. I suppose it’s not a big secret that there were and there still are Wagner fighters in the same way as everywhere in central Africa. Russia has led itself to a situation where it’s on the verge of strategic collapse. Russia step-by-step will be gradually lose what it has won. It has paid a large price in terms of men, in terms of financial resources, everywhere across the world. The more Russia fights against us, the more it loses.

TWZ: Who killed former Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin?

KB: I wouldn’t be in a hurry to say he’s killed.

TWZ: You think he might be alive?

KB: I just wouldn’t rush with that question. I don’t possess any confirmation.

TWZ: You don’t have confirmation that he’s dead yet?

KB: We don’t possess that.

TWZ: Do you trust Elon Musk?

KB: (Laughs) In what sense?

TWZ: There was the discussion over Walter Isaacson’s book excerpt and whether Musk shut off Starlink to prevent a Ukrainian attack on Sevastopol last year, or whether as he claimed he denied a request to provide it.

KB: Look, [Starlink] is a private property of a private person. Yes we really very widely use his products and services. The whole of the line of contact talks to each other to some extent using his products and services. The only thing I can say here is that without those services and products it would be a catastrophe. But it is true that he did turn off his products and services over Crimea before. But there’s another side to that truth. Everybody’s been aware of that.

TWZ: So he did turn it off?

KB: This specific case everybody’s referring to, there was a shutdown of the coverage over Crimea, but it wasn’t at that specific moment. That shutdown was for a month. There might have been some specific cases I’m not aware of. But I’m totally sure that throughout the whole first period of the war, there was no coverage at all.

TWZ: But did he ever put it on and then shut it off?

KB: There have been no problems since it’s been turned on over Crimea.

TWZ: I want to get to some personal questions. Are you still living in your office with your family? What’s that like?

KB: Yes, it’s like that.

TWZ: Are you concerned about your safety? Are the Russians trying to kill you?

KB: Why don’t you understand that [my wife and I are living in my office]? Why is that strange for you?

TWZ: It’s not strange, I just wanted to get your reaction….

KB: We’re absolutely fine. She has been living with me since the February invasion. And she’s a police officer herself. She’s actually a professor at our national police academy. She’s teaching legal psychology. It’s not a problem for her as it might have been for someone else.

TWZ: In an excerpt from his new book, Financial Times reporter Christopher Miller writes about a situation where you were in a meeting with President Zelensky, Denys Shmyhal, Ukraine’s prime minister; Valery Zaluzhny, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; Ivan Bakanov, head of the Security Service of Ukraine and then-Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov. You laid out a map and you explained what was about to happen. Can you talk about that moment and what it was like to convince your fellow leaders that the Russians were actually going to invade?

KB: It’s already history and frankly, currently, I cannot recall a specific meeting you’re referring to but as an intelligence chief, surely I’m reporting the information I have to the leadership of the state and all the people involved in the administration.

TWZ: Were you disappointed in not being named defense minister?

KB: Absolutely not.

TWZ: Would you even want that job?

KB: No, I love my current job.

TWZ: I read that you were attending Ostroh Academy to study political science. Are you interested in running for office?

KB: You’re wrong. I’ll explain. I’m writing my PhDs there.

TWZ: What’s your thesis?

KB: Global interaction between special services across the world, how they interact, and how they influence their domestic policies.

TWZ: Are you going to write a book after this is all over?

KB: (Laughs) I’ll write my PhD first. And under the calendar plan that they’ve provided me with I have two years to do that.

TWZ: When we first met, you were an up-and-coming one-star general – brigadier general – but outside of Ukraine not many people had known who you were. Now you’re world famous. What do you think about the memes like the Budnov eyes and the jokes?

KB: (Laughs) I cannot influence those anyhow, what can I do about those? But some of them I need to admit surprised me (laughs). Especially after I had my haircut and there was this meme with Prigozhin’s head and mine. So it was right after his insurrection attempt in Russia and the meme was four pictures. First was mine and I said I will give you the sign. And then he is kind of asking what will be that sign and I say you’ll get it. The next picture is me being bald (laughs). That was one I really kind of remember.

TWZ: Was that one of your favorites? Do you have a favorite?

KB: I like that one.

TWZ: Any message you want to give to the American public?

KB: No, I think we’ve covered everything. The only thing I can say is that Ukraine will be forever grateful for all the assistance that’s been provided to Ukraine. And the victory over the Russian Federation will be the same extent an American victory. It will be the same for Ukraine and America together. It will be our joint victory.

TWZ: When will that happen do you think?

KB: In any case it’s close.

TWZ: This year? Next year?

KB: So currently it’s hard to prognose that because there are so many factors playing in and even if we go back to our offensive operation currently, in the General Staff, no one’s being able to surely say for how long will that continue.

After the interview wrapped, Budanov and I have a few more minutes of small talk. Budanov agrees to some photographs and then goes back to his busy day. Meetings await at the Pentagon and White House. On Thursday, he accompanied President Zelensky to both. But despite being in Washington, he is never far removed from what is taking place back home.

Friday morning, there was a Ukrainian missile strike on the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Crimea. During a round of fact-check questions, I asked him about the GUR’s role in that attack.

“We just gave some intelligence assistance,” he tells me. “We always give 24/7 intel information to the General Staff.”

It’s the kind of assistance that has kept Kyrylo Budanov a hero in Ukraine and a wanted man to Russia.