RT (Germany) (Machine translation), 9/16/23

“The future of the world will be decided in Ukraine” – this was the motto under which the two-day conference of the “Yalta European Strategy” (YES) forum took place in Kiev last week. The event has been organized by the Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Pinchuk’s foundation since 2006. RT DE took the trouble to watch almost all of the video recordings of more than a dozen panels of the conference, which the organizer gradually published on YouTube a few days after it ended .

Why is that important? The YES has established itself as an annual meeting point for the loud and influential Ukraine lobby among the Western elites, a kind of mixture between a “Ukrainian Davos” and the “Munich SiKo on a small scale”. Ideas are developed, information is exchanged and plans for the future are made. It is a look into the workshop of Western thought about Ukraine, Russia, the West and the rest of the world. In a practical sense, it is the opportunity to understand what is being discussed and planned in governments, parliaments, editorial offices of well-known media, think tanks and military staffs about the current status of the Ukraine conflict.

Pinchuk is a multi-billionaire, media mogul and son-in-law of former President Leonid Kuchma. He also sees himself as a link between the Western establishment and Ukrainian business elites. As organizer of YES, he said in his welcoming speech:

“Ukraine is at the center of the universe. Ukraine has been at the center of European history for hundreds of years. Today it is at the center of world history. This war is the most important and significant war in world history.”

These words were received with enthusiasm by the audience. Many high-ranking and well-known participants who subsequently appeared in dozens of panels at the conference saw the situation similarly. Something eschatological was in the air, the philosophy of the morally based final battle between good and evil, rise and fall, form and chaos, reason and irrationality, etc.

So it started with images of the world apocalypse that President Vladimir Zelensky painted on the wall in his welcoming speech if Ukraine, as a champion of “democracy and humanism,” does not win this fateful battle:

“The speech is about the future of morality. If Russia wins, the world will turn into a world of slaves who will kill people like Putin just because they like it.”

He also compared Russia’s victory to the coming climate catastrophe. Historians and journalists gave this narrative a further “civilizational” component. According to the US historian Timothy Snyder, ancient Greek democracy and thus the civilization of the cities were only able to develop thanks to access to the fertile southern Ukrainian soil in the Black Sea region.

Later wars were mainly about control of these areas. The Polish colonization of the 16th and 17th centuries, Adolf Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union and Josef Stalin’s project of modernization are examples of this. Today Ukraine is the main breadwinner of the world population. If she loses, there will be global hunger.

Since Russia went to war without ideas or a vision of the future, this war was also the war against hopelessness. “It makes Russians angry that Ukrainians have hope,” he claimed. By hope he meant the desired accession to the EU and NATO. Since Russia does not rely on the power of ideas, but on the right of the strongest – i.e. brute force – a Russian victory means the triumph of the forces of chaos and darkness.

His Ukrainian colleague Jaroslav Grizak also shared this idea. A defeat of Ukraine would mean nothing less than the end of human civilization. According to him, the previous world wars were about “improving the world” (although he didn’t say exactly what). The Ukraine war is about the sheer survival of humanity.

Russia is a central problem. It is not capable of becoming a “normal European country”. Since reforms that always fail are always followed by a strengthening of tyranny, there is the so-called “Russian pendulum”, which inevitably culminates in aggression against its neighboring countries. This pendulum must be stopped, demanded Grizak.

The majority of other Ukrainian participants in the forum from politics and the media supported the idea that Russia cannot be improved, regardless of whether Vladimir Putin is in power in the Kremlin or a “better person” like Alexei Navalny. “We in Ukraine often say that only a dead Russian is a good Russian,” explained a Ukrainian politician. At one of the panels, four Ukrainian military officers who had come straight from the front sat on the podium. The death (of the heroic Ukrainians and the “evil Russians”) was a central theme.

Among them was lawyer and fighter Masi Nayyem, who lost his right eye in the war. The uncovered, gaping scar at this point allowed him to have a say because it gave him the credibility of a sufferer. Nayyem described what his fondest dream is:

“I cannot say that I am waging this war in the name of new values. I want to take revenge. I want to take revenge in the most cruel way possible in view of international conventions. The more Russians die, the better it is for me as a participant in hostilities. I have the right to kill Russians, and that is my greatest wish.”

“What the heroes fight for and give their lives for” – that was the name of the corresponding panel. The monologues of the hand-picked war participants were undoubtedly the emotional highlight of the entire two-day conference. The Western spectators showed respect and admiration for the hard-tested fighters – after all, they sacrificed themselves for their interests, which they openly admitted on occasion.

But there was also a bit of culture and entertainment. A Ukrainian singer and a writer should explain to the audience what makes the Ukrainian idea “so strong.” The panel also had a meaningful name. However, the reason for this was quite easy to identify.

“Ukrainians are smarter and better than Russians,” said a Ukrainian rock singer based in New York in unaccented English. The writer and avowed nationalist Sergei Shadan, who has been showered with Western prizes and awards, compared Ukraine to a young and cool punk band and Russia to an aging cabaret singer who is completely unaware that her time is over. At the end, the two sang passionate songs about “Peremoga”, the Ukrainian victory.

The respectable audience was amused. These Ukrainians are a wonderful people! Not only does it go to war against the Russians heroically and without fear of death, but it also sings. But will the oft-touted Ukrainian victory come at some point? Are there problems on the way to the glorious future of a transparent, successful, digitalized, climate-friendly country, a mandatory NATO and EU member that attracts investments, feeds the world and develops the most advanced technologies – as Prime Minister Denis Shmygal enthused in his speech ?

Yes, these problems exist, and at least one panel has been devoted to each of them. For example, the organizers correctly recognized that the majority of the world’s population is not on the side of Ukraine. Or that voters in the West could vote out Ukraine’s supporters in their governments. And finally, that the Russians simply cannot allow a military victory for Ukraine.

However, these difficulties still appear to be surmountable. The Third World can still be convinced by adapting the narrative. After all, ordinary people are on the side of Ukraine, as Zelensky and a British participant suggested. For Africa, for example, it would make sense to declare that the Russian war against Ukraine was the last “Western”, imperialist-colonial war. Russia is an eternal imperialist, whereas the West has overcome its colonial past.

Problems with “Ukraine fatigue” in the West could be solved by increasing “reporting” on “cruel” Russian war crimes. “Then people know who is good and who is bad, and of course they feel like supporting the good side,” said a US lawmaker. His French colleague added that people in his country are well aware that supporting Ukraine is simply “in our own economic interest.”

And in addition to the heroism and ingenuity of the Ukrainian soldiers, only an intensification of arms deliveries can help against the slow advance of the Ukrainian army. “Weapons, weapons, weapons,” echoed so often through the hall on these days ( RT DE reported ).

Conclusion

YES 2023 was a first-class propaganda event, with the usual fantasies on this topic. It showed: The West is preparing for a long-term war against the “enemy of humanity” Russia. A Ukrainian (and therefore our own) defeat or a fragile peace are out of the question.

And this war is still being fought – as originally planned – by its loyal mercenary state Ukraine. However, its condition is worrying. It was therefore carefully examined whether the level of hatred against the enemy and the ambition of the remaining fighters were still high. The result: satisfactory.

Anger, sadness and a desire for revenge should now more than ever guide the soldiers’ final battle. The Victor Pinchuk Foundation has caught the spirit of the times and posted the one-eyed fighter Nayyem’s vows of revenge as the quintessence of the event, which lasted several hours, on the Internet. The short video translated into English is spreading like wildfire, and the bloody slaughter at the hands of strangers can continue.

By Ben Aris, Intellinews, 9/23/23

The Russian government has approved its first full wartime budget that will significantly increase military spending in 2024 as well as boost social spending to shelter the population from the effects of war and sanctions.

The draft budget for 2024 will increase military spending 1.7-fold and for the first time in the history of modern Russia will exceed social spending. The latter, however, will also increase, as will the costs of security forces and intelligence services, The Bell reported onSeptember 22.

To finance these huge expenses, the government will have to find somewhere an additional RUB7 trillion rubles in revenue compared to 2023. Firstly, this makes it inevitable that inflation will continue to accelerate and the Central Bank will maintain a high rate. And secondly, it almost inevitably means new taxes – and the authorities are already moving in this direction. So far the Ministry of Finance (MinFin) has done everything it can to avoid raising taxes other than hitting big business with a windfall tax on large enterprises that should bring in an extra RUB300bn ($4bn) of revenues. 

The draft federal budget for 2024–2026 must be submitted to the Duma before October 1. The government press service disclosed only the general parameters of the budget, without a breakdown of expenses, but Bloomberg was leaked figures for the most important items.

Military expenditures (item “National Defence”) in 2024 will amount to RUB10.8 trillion rubles — 1.7 times more than Russia will actually spend on defence in 2023 (RUB6.4 trillion, according to Bloomberg), and 2.3 times more than in the first war year of 2022 (RUB4.7 trillion).

RUB10.8 trillion rubles is approximately 6% of GDP, twice as much as the budget spent on defence items in the pre-war years. This ratio is comparable to US military spending in the 1980s, at the last peak of the Cold War (after 1988, the US never spent more than 6% of GDP on defence). Russia is still far from the USSR, which spent 12–14% of GDP on defence.

Almost nominal, but still, growth is planned for the “National Security” section, which takes into account spending on law enforcement agencies and intelligence services – from RUB3.2 to RUB3.5 trillion rubles.

Of the three remaining major sections of the budget, expenses for the National Economy – where government investments and subsidies to business are taken into account — will be reduced from RUB4.1 to RUB3.9 trillion rubles.

The remaining healthcare and education will remain unchanged: RUB1.6 and RUB1.5 trillion rubles, respectively.

The government’s willingness to dramatically increase military spending, without sacrificing anything else, is based on over-optimistic forecasts of budget revenues and expenditures.

The government expects that in 2024 the budget will receive RUB35 trillion in revenue, compared to RUB26.1 trillion planned for this year (an increase of RUB8.9 trillion rubles, or 34% compared to 2023). Of this, RUB11.5 trillion rubles should come from oil and gas revenues (RUB8 trillion is planned for 2023).

“The government’s expectation for revenues looks optimistic and unrealistic,” says Alexandra Prokopenko, a Russian finance expert. “The key take aways from Russia’s wartime budget: Putin prepares for the long war; guns above the butter (military spending exceeds social for the first time ever; and all the cows that can still give milk in Russia’s economy will be milked to death.”

Budget expenditures are planned at RUB36.6 trillion (an increase of RUB7.6 trillion, or 26.2% by 2023). This means that the budget deficit in 2024, according to the government’s plan, should be significantly reduced – from 2% of GDP planned for 2023 (RUB2.9 trillion rubles) to 0.8% of GDP (RUB1.6 trillion rubles).

These figures should be supported by the optimistic forecasts of the Ministry of Economy for 2024 included in the budget – GDP growth by 2.3% (and not less than 2% in 2025-2026), the price of Urals oil is $85 per barrel. The average dollar exchange rate in 2024, according to the forecast, will be RBU90.1 to the dollar. The current forecast of the Central Bank is somewhat more modest – for 2024 it promises 0.5–1.5% GDP growth and Urals at $60.

The bottom line is that the government, in order to finance the cosmic increase in military spending, while not forgetting about social ones, will have to find RUB9 trillion rubles of additional income somewhere in 2024 (an increase of 34%).

On the one hand, the nominal growth of budget revenues will be facilitated by the weakening of the ruble that has already occurred and accelerating inflation (by the end of 2023 it should be 7.5%).

On the other hand, a new budget rule, announced on September 22 by Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, should increase revenues. In fact, we are talking about a return to the old formula, forgotten after the start of the war: all oil and gas revenues received above the cut-off price set by the government go to the National Welfare Fund, and all income below this price goes to the budget. Only the cut-off price will now be $60 per barrel – $15 higher than it would have been under the old formula.

The chief economist for Russia at Bloomberg Economics, Alexander Isakov, estimated the effect of the new version of the fiscal rule at RUB1.5 trillion in additional budget revenues.

But all this will not bring RUB9 trillion, says The Bell. The government directly hinted at how they were supposed to receive them this same week, announcing the introduction of new duties for exporters. They will be in effect from October 1 until the end of 2024. Depending on the exchange rate, the duty will be 10% for fertilizer producers and 4–7% for all other industries. At an exchange rate of RUB80 per dollar and below, the duty will be reset to zero (but the forecast of the Ministry of Economy – the average annual rate of RUB90.1 – does not assume this).

In fact, we are talking about an indirect tax for export-oriented businesses. A businessman working in the fertilizer market shared his calculations with The Bell: for his industry, the introduction of new duties is equivalent to an increase in the effective income tax rate in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 40% (the nominal rate is 20%), and taking into account the previously introduced one-time tax on excess profits – 55%.

This proposal was not particularly discussed with business, two of The Bell’s interlocutors say. Moreover, he claims that the chief commissioner for combating inflation, the Central Bank, did not participate in the discussion. This seems strange to The Bell’s interlocutor – after all, after the proposal appeared, experts immediately saw pro-inflationary risks in it.

The government does not have many other options for replenishing the budget, other than increasing or introducing new taxes. The growth of domestic demand, on which the economy grew (and with it non-oil and gas budget revenues) in 2023, should soon slow down due to an increase in the Central Bank rate.

At the same time, the budget, which plans to increase spending by 26%, means that high rates are here to stay, otherwise inflation will get out of control. And high rates, in turn, make it more expensive for the Ministry of Finance to service existing government debt (the yield of 40% of currently outstanding OFZs is tied to the Central Bank rate) and worsen the conditions for new borrowings.

This year budget on course for 2% GDP deficit

 Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin expects execution of the federal budget by the end of this year with a planned deficit of 2% of GDP.

“Sustainable focus on positive changes permits expecting execution of the federal budget this year with a deficit at the level of the initial projection of 2% of GDP,” he said at a meeting devoted to drafting federal budget for a three-year period. According to Economic Development Ministry’s data, “amid this background it is safe to speak about maintaining and even improving of those trends next year,” PM added.

Speaking about expenditures, he said that after the advancing period at the beginning of the year they returned to their traditional level and amounted to around RUB2.24 trillion in August.

According to preliminary figures provided by the Finance Ministry, Russia’s federal budget deficit totalled RUB2.81 trillion ($28bn) in January-July. (chart)

Russia had a surplus federal budget in August in the amount of around RUB230bn ($2.3bn), Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin said at a meeting devoted to drafting federal budget for a three-year period.

The Russian economy is adjusting to current challenges, he noted. “In August, federal budget ran a surplus, which amounted to around RUB230bn. Consolidated balance of the regions added another RUB140bn,” he said, noting that the Russian economy “is adjusting to current challenges.” The budget ran a surplus largely due to a surge in non-oil and gas revenues, PM explained, adding that they exceeded RUB1.8 trillion ($18.5bn) in August, up 56% compared with last year.

Oil and gas revenues of the Russian federal budget totalled RUB4.836 trillion ($44.76bn) in January – August 2023, which is 38.2% lower than a year ago, the Finance Ministry said on its website. Accumulation of extra oil and gas revenues during periods of the comfortable price situation and use of National Wealth Fund resources to cover shortfalls in oil and gas revenues in line with fiscal rule parameters provide for the budgetary system resilience to fluctuations in receiving oil and gas revenues, the ministry added.

Non-oil and gas revenues of the Russian budget amounted to RUB12.155 trillion ($124bn) in January – August 2023, the Finance Ministry said on its website.

“Non-oil and gas revenues totalled RUB12,155bn and surged by 24.2% year on year. The dynamics of receiving the largest non-oil and gas revenues of the federal budget (turnover taxes and income tax) remains consistently positive, including against the level of 2021 (as the least exposed to statistical effects of the base),” the ministry informed.

Food exports are emerging as a significant revenue source for Russia’s budget, following energy exports, according to Ruslan Davydov, Director of the Federal Customs Service. During an interview at the Eastern Economic Forum, Davydov highlighted the substantial increase in Russia’s grain exports compared to 2022.

Davydov stated, “Our agricultural products exports are performing well. We have almost exceeded last year’s exporting figures, with grain being the primary export, along with oil seeds, oil, vegetable oil, and sunflower seeds.” He noted that China, the Middle East, Egypt, and Kazakhstan are the primary importers of Russian food products. While food exports have increased by approximately 70% in volume, their value has been influenced by price dynamics.

In addition to food exports, Davydov discussed the remarkable growth in Russia’s car cargo transportation, which has more than doubled year-on-year in the past months of 2023. He highlighted the growth in both sea and railway cargo traffic, with car cargo traffic experiencing a 2.5-fold increase compared to 2022.

Furthermore, Davydov mentioned that China accounts for a significant share of Russia’s car imports, representing 92% in the period from January to August.

Note: Due to a vacation and then a move in recent weeks, I’m playing catchup on recent news and events. – Natylie

By Max Blumenthal, The Grayzone, 9/26/23

By celebrating a Waffen-SS volunteer as a “hero,” Canada’s Liberal Party highlighted a longstanding policy that has seen Ottawa train fascist militants in Ukraine while welcoming in thousands of post-war Nazi SS veterans.

Canada’s second most powerful official, Chrystia Freeland, is the granddaughter of one of Nazi Germany’s top Ukrainian propagandists.

In the Spring of 1943, Yaroslav Hunka was a fresh-faced soldier in the 14th Grenadier Division of the Waffen-SS Galicia when his division received a visit from the architect of Nazi Germany’s genocidal policies, Heinrich Himmler. Having presided over the battalion’s formation, Himmler was visibly proud of the Ukrainians who had volunteered to support the Third Reich’s efforts.

80 years later, the Speaker of Canada’s parliament, Anthony Rota, also beamed with pride after inviting Hunka to a reception for Volodymyr Zelensky, where the Ukrainian president lobbied for more arms and financial assistance for his country’s war against Russia.

“We have in the chamber today Ukrainian war veteran from the Second World War who fought for Ukrainian independence against the Russians and continues to support the troops today even at his age of 98,” Rota declared during the September 22 parliamentary event in Ottawa.

“His name is Yaroslav Hunka but I am very proud to say he is from North Bay and from my riding of Nipissing-Timiskaming. He is a Ukrainian hero, a Canadian hero, and we thank him for all his service,” Rota continued.

Gales of applause erupted through the crowd, as Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Zelensky, Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland, Canadian Chief of Defense Staff Gen. Wayne Eyre and leaders of all Canadian parties rose from their seats to applaud Hunka’s wartime service.

Since the exposure of Hunka’s record as a Nazi collaborator – which should have been obvious as soon as the Speaker announced him – Canadian leaders (with the notable exception of Eyre) have rushed to issue superficial, face-saving apologies as withering condemnations poured in from Canadian Jewish organizations.

The incident is now a major national scandal, occupying space on the cover of Canadian papers like the Toronto Sun, which quipped, “Did Nazi that coming.” Meanwhile, Poland’s Education Minister has announced plans to seek Hunka’s criminal extradition.

The Liberal Party has attempted to downplay the affair as an accidental blunder, with one Liberal MP urging her colleagues to “avoid politicizing this incident.” Melanie Joly, Canada’s Foreign Minister, has forced Rota’s resignation, seeking to turn the the Speaker into a scapegoat for her party’s collective actions.

Trudeau, meanwhile, pointed to the “deeply embarrassing” event as a reason to “push back against Russian propaganda,” as though the Kremlin somehow smuggled an nonagenarian Nazi collaborator into parliament, then hypnotized the Prime Minister and his colleagues, Manchurian Candidate-style, into celebrating him as a hero.

To be sure, the incident was no gaffe. Before Canada’s government and military brass celebrated Hunka in parliament, they had provided diplomatic support to fascist hooligans fighting to install a nationalist government in Kiev, and oversaw the training of contemporary Ukrainian military formations openly committed to the furtherance of Nazi ideology.

Ottawa’s celebration of Hunka has also lifted the cover on the country’s post-World War Two policy of naturalizing known Ukrainian Nazi collaborators and weaponizing them as domestic anti-communist shock troops. The post-war immigration wave included the grandfather of Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland, who functioned as one of Hitler’s top Ukrainain propagandists inside Nazi-occupied Poland.

Though Canadian officialdom has worked to suppress this sordid record, it has resurfaced in dramatic fashion through Hunka’s appearance in parliament and the unsettling contents of his online diaries.

“We welcomed the German soldiers with joy”

The March 2011 edition of the journal of the Association of Ukrainian Ex-Combatants in the US contains an unsettling diary entry which had gone unnoticed until recently.

Authored by Yaroslav Hunka, the journal consisted of proud reflections on volunteering for the 14th Grenadier Division of the Waffen-SS Galicia. Hunka decribed the Nazi Wehrmacht as “mystical German knights” when they first arrived in his hometown of Berezhany, and recalled his own service in the Waffen-SS as the happiest time in his life.

“In my sixth grade,” he wrote, “out of forty students, there were six Ukrainians, two Poles, and the rest were Jewish children of refugees from Poland. We wondered why they were running away from such a civilized Western nation as the Germans.”

The Jewish Virtual Library details the extermination of Berezhany’s Jewish population at the hands of the “civilized” Germans: “In 1941 at the end of Soviet occupation 12,000 Jews were living in Berezhany, most of them refugees fleeing the horrors of the Nazi war machine in Europe. During the Holocaust, on Oct. 1, 1941, 500–700 Jews were executed by the Germans in the nearby quarries. On Dec. 18, another 1,200, listed as poor by the Judenrat, were shot in the forest. On Yom Kippur 1942 (Sept. 21), 1,000–1,500 were deported to Belzec and hundreds murdered in the streets and in their homes. On Hanukkah (Dec. 4–5) hundreds more were sent to Belzec and on June 12, 1943, the last 1,700 Jews of the ghetto and labor camp were liquidated, with only a few individuals escaping. Less than 100 Berezhany Jews survived the war.”

When Soviet forces held control of Berezhany, Hunka said he and his neighbors longed for the arrival of Nazi Germany. “Every day,” he recalled, “we looked impatiently in the direction of the Pomoryany (Lvov) with the hope that those mystical German knights, who give bullets to the hated Lyakhs are about to appear.” (Lyakh is a derogatory Ukrainian term for Poles).

In July 1941, when the Nazi German army entered Berezhany, Hunka breathed a sigh of relief. “We welcomed the German soldiers with joy,” he wrote. “People felt a thaw, knowing that there would no longer be that dreaded knocking on the door in the middle of the night, and at least it would be possible to sleep peacefully now.”

Two years later, Hunka joined the First Division of the Galician SS 14th Grenadier Brigade – a unit formed under the personal orders of Heinrich Himmler. When Himmler inspected the Ukrainian volunteers in May 1943 (below), he was accompanied by Otto Von Wachter, the Nazi-appointed governor of Galicia who established the Jewish ghetto in Krakow.

“Your homeland has become so much more beautiful since you have lost – on our initiative, I must say – those residents who were so often a dirty blemish on Galicia’s good name, namely the Jews…” Himmler reportedly told the Ukrainian troops. “I know that if I ordered you to liquidate the Poles … I would be giving you permission to do what you are eager to do anyway.”

“Hitler’s elite torturers and murderers have been passed on RCMP orders”

Following the war, Canada’s Liberal government classified thousands of Jewish refugees as “enemy aliens” and held them alongside former Nazis in a network of internment camps enclosed with barbed wire, fearing that they would infect their new country with communism. At the same time, Ottawa placed thousands of Ukrainian veterans of Hitler’s army on the fast-track to citizenship.

The Ukrainian Canadian newsletter lamented on April 1, 1948, “some [of the new citizens] are outright Nazis who served in the German army and police. It is reported that individuals tattoooed with the dread[ed] SS, Hitler’s elite torturers and murderers have been passed on RCMP orders and after being turned down by screening agencies in Europe.”

The journal described the unreformed Nazis as anticommunist shock troops whose “‘ideological leaders’ are already busy fomenting WWIII, propagating a new world holocaust in which Canada will perish.”

In 1997, the Canadian branch of the Simon Wiesenthal Center charged the Canadian government with having admitted over 2000 veterans of the 14th Volunteer Waffen-SS Grenadier Division.

That same year, 60 Minutes released a special, “Canada’s Dark Secret,” revealing that some 1000 Nazi SS veterans from Baltic states had been granted citizenship by Canada after the war. Irving Abella, a Canadian historian, told 60 Minutes that the easiest way to get into the country “was by showing the SS tattoo. This proved that you were an anti-Communist.”

Abella also alleged that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (Justin’s father) explained to him that his government kept silent about the Nazi immigrants “because they were afraid of exacerbating relationships between Jews and Eastern European ethnic communities.”

Yaroslav Hunka was among the post-war wave of Ukrainian Nazi veterans welcomed by Canada. According to the city council website of Berezhany, he arrived in Ontario in 1954 and promptly “became a member of the fraternity of soldiers of the 1st Division of the UNA, affiliated to the World Congress of Free Ukrainians.”

Also among the new generation of Ukrainian Canadians was Michael Chomiak, the grandfather of Canada’s second-most-powerful official, Chrystia Freeland. Throughout her career as a journalist and Canadian diplomat, Freeland has advanced her grandfather’s legacy of anti-Russian agitation, while repeatedly exalting wartime Nazi collaborators during public events.

Canada welcomes Hitler’s top Ukrainian propagandists

Throughout the Nazi German occupation of Poland, the Ukrainian journalist Michael Chomiak served as one of Hitler’s top propagandists. Based in Krakow, Chomiak edited an antisemitic publication called Krakivs’ki visti (Krakow News), which cheerled the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union – “The German Army is bringing us our cherished freedom,” the paper proclaimed in 1941 – and glorified Hitler while rallying Ukrainian support for the Waffen-SS Galicia volunteers.

Chomiak spent much of the war living in two spacious Krakow apartments that had been seized from their Jewish owners by the Nazi occupiers. He wrote that he moved numerous pieces of furniture belonging to a certain “Dr. Finkelstein” to another aryanized apartment placed under his control.

In Canada, Chomiak participated in the Ukrainian Canadian Committee (UCC), which incubated hardcore nationalist sentiment among diaspora members while lobbying Ottawa for hardline anti-Soviet policies. On its website, the UCC boasted of receiving direct Canadian government assistance during World War Two: “The final and conclusive impetus for [establishing the UCC] came from the National War Services of Canada which was anxious that young Ukrainians enlist in military services.”

The UCC’s first president Volodymyr Kubijovych, had served as Chomiak’s boss back in Krakow. He also played a part in the establishment of the 14th Grenadier Division of the Waffen-SS Galicia, announcing upon its formation, “This historic day was made possible by the conditions to create a worthy opportunity for the Ukrainians of Galicia, to fight arm in arm with the heroic German soldiers of the army and the Waffen-SS against Bolshevism, your and our deadly enemy.”

Freeland nurtures media career as undercover regime change agent in Soviet-era Ukraine

Following his death in 1984, Chomiak’s granddaughter, Chrystia Freeland, followed in his footsteps as a reporter for various Ukrainian nationalist publications. She was an early contributor to Kubijovych’s Encyclopedia of Ukraine, which whitewashed the record of Nazi collaborators like Stepan Bandera, referring to him as a “revolutionary.” Next, she took a staff position at the Edmonton-based Ukrainian News, where her grandfather had served as editor.

A 1988 edition of Ukrainian News (below) featured an article co-authored by Freeland, followed by an ad for a book called “Fighting for Freedom” which glorified the Ukrainian Waffen-SS Galician division.

“Countless ‘tendentious’ news stories about life in the Soviet Union, especially for its non-Russian citizens, had her fingerprints as Ms. Freeland set about making a name for herself in journalistic circles with an eye to her future career prospects,” the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) reported.

Citing KGB files, the CBC described Freeland as a de facto intelligence agent: “The student causing so many headaches clearly loathed the Soviet Union, but she knew its laws inside and out – and how to use them to her advantage. She skillfully hid her actions, avoided surveillance (and shared that knowledge with her Ukrainian contacts) and expertly trafficked in ‘misinformation.’”

In 1989, Soviet security agents rescinded Freeland’s visa when they caught her smuggling “a veritable how-to guide for running an election” into the country for Ukrainain nationalist candidates.

She quickly transitioned back to journalism, landing gigs in post-Soviet Moscow for the Financial Times and Economist, and eventually rising to global editor-at-large of Reuters – the UK-based media giant which today functions as a cutout for British intelligence operations against Russia.

Canada trains, protects Nazis in post-Maidan Ukraine

When Freeland won a seat as a Liberal member of Canada’s parliament in 2013, she established her most powerful platform yet to agitate for regime change in Russia. Milking her journalistic connections, she published op-eds in top legacy papers like the New York Times urging militant support from Western capitals for Ukraine’s so-called “Revolution of Dignity,” which saw the violent removal of a democratically elected president and his replacement with a nationalist, pro-NATO government in 2014.

In the midst of the coup attempt, a group of neo-Nazi thugs belonging to the C14 organization occupied Kiev’s city council and vandalized the building with Ukrainian nationalist insignia and white supremacist symbols, including a Confederate flag. When riot police chased the fascist hooligans away on February 18, 2014, they took shelter in the Canadian embassy with the apparent consent of the Conservative administration in Ottawa. “Canada was sympathizing with the protesters, at the time, more than the [Ukrainian] government,” a Ukrainian interior ministry official recalled to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

Official Canadian support for neo-Nazi militants in Ukraine intensified after the 2015 election of the Liberal Party’s Justin Trudeau. In November 2017, the Canadian military and US Department of Defense dispatched several officers to Kiev for a multinational training session with Ukraine’s Azov Battalion. (Azov has since deleted the record of the session from its website).

Azov was controlled at the time by Adriy Biletsky, the self-proclaimed “White Leader” who  declared, “the historic mission of our nation in this critical moment is to lead the White Races of the world in a final crusade for their survival… A crusade against the Semite-led Untermenschen.”

As Nazi family history surfaces, Freeland lies to the public

Back in Canada, Freeland’s troubling family history was surfacing for the first time in the media. Weeks after she was appointed in January 2017 as Foreign Minister – a post she predictably exploited to thunder for sanctions on Russia and arms shipments to Ukraine – her grandfather’s role as a Nazi propagandist in occupied Poland became the subject of a raft of reports in the alternative press.

The Trudeau government responded to the factual reports by accusing Russia of waging a campaign of cyber-warfare. “The situation is obviously one where we need to be alert. And that is why the Prime Minister has, among other things, encouraged a complete re-examination of our cyber security systems,” Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale declared.

Yet few, if any, of the outlets responsible for excavating Chomiak’s history had any connection to Russia’s government. Among the first to expose his collaborationism was Consortium News, an independent, US-based media organization.

For her part, Freeland deployed a spokesperson to lie to the public, flatly denying that “the minister’s grandfather was a Nazi collaborator.”

When Canadian media quoted several Russian diplomats about the allegations, Freeland promptly ordered their deportation, accusing them of exploiting their diplomatic status “to interfere in our democracy.”

By this time, however, her family secrets had tumbled out of the attic and onto the pages of mainstream Canadian media. On March 7, 2017, the Globe and Mail reported on a 1996 article in the Journal of Ukrainian Studies confirming that Freeland’s grandfather had indeed been a Nazi propagandist, and that his writing helped fuel the Jewish genocide. The article was authored by Freeland’s uncle, John-Paul Himka, who thanked his niece in its preface for helping him with “problems and clarifications.”

“Freeland knew for more than two decades that her maternal Ukrainian grandfather was the chief editor of a Nazi newspaper in occupied Poland that vilified Jews during the Second World War,” the Globe and Mail noted.

After being caught on camera this September clapping with unrestrained zeal alongside hundreds of peers for a Ukrainian veteran of Hitler’s SS death squads, Freeland once again invoked her authority to scrub the incident from the record.

Three days after the embarrassing scene, Freeland was back on the floor of parliament, nodding in approval as Liberal House leader Karina Gould introduced a resolution to strike “from the appendix of the House of Commons debates” and from “any House multimedia recording” the recognition made by Speaker Anthony Rota of Yaroslav Hunka.

Thanks to decades of officially supported Holocaust education, the mantra that demands citizens “never forget” has become a guiding light of liberal democracy. In present day Ottawa, however, this simple piece of moral guidance is now treated as a menace which threatens to unravel careers and undermine the war effort in Ukraine.

**Note: Polish officials have announced that they are seeking extradition of Hunka to Poland for war crimes.

By John Mearsheimer & Sebastian Rosato, UnHerd, 9/14/23

It is widely believed in the West that Russian president Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine was not a rational act. On the eve of the invasion, then British prime minister Boris Johnson suggested that perhaps the United States and its allies had not done “enough to deter an irrational actor and we have to accept at the moment that Vladimir Putin is possibly thinking illogically about this and doesn’t see the disaster ahead”. US senator Mitt Romney made a similar point after the war started, noting that “by invading Ukraine, Mr Putin has already proved that he is capable of illogical and self-defeating decisions”. The assumption underlying both statements is that rational leaders start wars only if they are likely to win. By starting a war he was destined to lose, the thinking went, Putin demonstrated his non-rationality.

Other critics argue that Putin was non-rational because he violated a fundamental international norm. In this view, the only morally acceptable reason for going to war is self-defence, whereas the invasion of Ukraine was a war of conquest. Russia expert Nina Khrushcheva asserted that “with his unprovoked assault, Mr Putin joins a long line of irrational tyrants”, and appears “to have succumbed to his ego-driven obsession with restoring Russia’s status as a great power with its own clearly defined sphere of influence”. Bess Levin of Vanity Fair described Russia’s president as “a power-hungry megalomaniac”; former British ambassador to Moscow Tony Brenton suggested his invasion was proof that he is an “unbalanced autocrat” rather than the “rational actor” he once was.

These claims all rest on common understandings of rationality that are intuitively plausible but ultimately flawed. Contrary to what many people think, we cannot equate rationality with success and non-rationality with failure. Rationality is not about outcomes. Rational actors often fail to achieve their goals, not because of foolish thinking but because of factors they can neither anticipate nor control. There is also a powerful tendency to equate rationality with morality since both qualities are thought to be features of enlightened thinking. But this too is a mistake. Rational policies can violate widely accepted standards of conduct and may even be murderously unjust.

So what is “rationality” in international politics? Surprisingly, the scholarly literature does not provide a good definition. For us, rationality is all about making sense of the world — that is, figuring out how it works and why — in order to decide how to achieve certain goals. It has both an individual and a collective dimension. Rational policymakers are theory-driven; they are homo theoreticus. They have credible theories — logical explanations based on realistic assumptions and supported by substantial evidence — about the workings of the international system, and they employ these to understand their situation and determine how best to navigate it. Rational states aggregate the views of key policymakers through a deliberative process, one marked by robust and uninhibited debate.

All of this means that Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine was rational. Consider that Russian leaders relied on a credible theory. Most commentators dispute this claim, arguing that Putin was bent on conquering Ukraine and other countries in Eastern Europe to create a greater Russian empire, something that would satisfy a nostalgic yearning among Russians but that makes no strategic sense in the modern world. President Joe Biden maintains that Putin aspires “to be the leader of Russia that united all of Russian speakers. I mean… I just think it’s irrational.” Former national security adviser H. R. McMaster argues: “I don’t think he’s a rational actor because he’s fearful, right? What he wants to do more than anything is restore Russia to national greatness. He’s driven by that.”

But there is solid evidence that Putin and his advisers thought in terms of straightforward balance-of-power theory, viewing the West’s efforts to make Ukraine a bulwark on Russia’s border as an existential threat that could not be allowed to stand. Russia’s president laid out this logic in a speech explaining his decision for war: “With Nato’s eastward expansion the situation for Russia has been becoming worse and more dangerous by the year… We cannot stay idle and passively observe these developments. This would be an absolutely irresponsible thing to do for us.” He went on to say: “It is not only a very real threat to our interests but to the very existence of our state and to its sovereignty. It is the redline which we have spoken about on numerous occasions. They have crossed it.”

In other words, for Putin, this was a war of self-defence aimed at preventing an adverse shift in the balance of power. He had no intention of conquering all of Ukraine and annexing it into a greater Russia. Indeed, even as he claimed in his well-known historical account of Russia-Ukraine relations that “Russians and Ukrainians were one people — a single whole”, he also declared: “We respect Ukrainians’ desire to see their country free, safe, and prosperous… And what Ukraine will be — it is up to its citizens to decide.” None of this is to deny that his aims have clearly expanded since the war began, but that is hardly unusual as wars unfold and circumstances change.

It is worth noting that Moscow sought to deal with the growing threat on its borders through aggressive diplomacy, but the United States and its allies were unwilling to accommodate Russia’s security concerns. On 17 December 2021, Russia put forward a proposal to solve the growing crisis that envisaged a neutral Ukraine and the withdrawal of Nato forces from Eastern Europe to their positions in 1997. But the United States rejected it out of hand.

This being the case, Putin opted for war, which analysts expected to result in the Russian military’s overrunning Ukraine. Describing the view of US officials just before the invasion, David Ignatius of The Washington Post wrote that Russia would “quickly win the initial, tactical phase of this war, if it comes. The vast army that Russia has arrayed along Ukraine’s borders could probably seize the capital of Kyiv in several days and control the country in little more than a week.” Indeed, the intelligence community “told the White House that Russia would win in a matter of days by quickly overwhelming the Ukrainian army”. Of course, these assessments proved wrong, but even rational policymakers sometimes miscalculate, because they operate in an uncertain world.

The Russian decision to invade was also the product of a deliberative process, not a knee-jerk reaction by a lone wolf. Again, many observers dispute this point, arguing that Putin operated without serious input from civilian and military advisers, who would have counselled against his reckless bid for empire. As Senator Mark Warner, the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, put it: “He’s not had that many people having direct inputs to him. So we’re concerned that this kind of isolated individual [has] become a megalomaniac in terms of his notion of himself being the only historic figure that can rebuild old Russia or recreate the notion of the Soviet sphere.” Elsewhere, former ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul suggested that one element of Russia’s non-rationality is that Putin is “profoundly isolated, surrounded only by yes men who have cut him off from accurate knowledge”.

But what we know about Putin’s coterie and its thinking about Ukraine reveals a different story: Putin’s subordinates shared his views about the nature of the threat confronting Russia, and he consulted with them before deciding on war. The consensus among Russian leaders regarding the dangers inherent in Ukraine’s relationship with the West is clearly reflected in a 2008 memorandum by then ambassador to Russia William Burns; it warned that “Ukrainian entry into Nato is the brightest of all redlines for the Russian elite (not just Putin). In more than two and a half years of conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle-draggers in the dark recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to find anyone who views Ukraine in Nato as anything other than a direct challenge to Russian interests… I can conceive of no grand package that would allow the Russians to swallow this pill quietly.”

Nor does Putin appear to have made the decision for war alone, as stories of him plotting in Covid-induced confinement implied. When asked whether the Russian president consulted with his key advisers, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov replied: “Every country has a decision-making mechanism. In that case, the mechanism existing in the Russian Federation was fully employed.” To be sure, it seems clear that Putin relied on only a handful of like-minded confidants to make the final decision to invade, but that is not unusual when policymakers are faced with a crisis. All of this is to say that the Russian decision to invade most likely emerged from a deliberative process — one with political allies who shared his core beliefs and concerns about Ukraine.

Moreover, not only was Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine rational, but it was also not anomalous. Many great powers are said to have acted non-rationally when in fact they acted rationally. The list includes Germany in the years before the First World War and during the July Crisis, as well as Japan in the Thirties and during the run-up to Pearl Harbor. In both cases, the key policymakers relied on credible theories of international politics and deliberated among themselves to formulate strategies for dealing with the various issues facing them.

This is not to say that states are always rational. The British decision not to balance against Nazi Germany in 1938 was driven by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s emotional aversion to another European land war coupled with his success at shutting down meaningful deliberation. Meanwhile, the American decision to invade Iraq in 2003 relied on non-credible theories and emerged from a non-deliberative decision-making process. But these cases are the exceptions. Against the increasingly common view among students of international politics that states are often non-rational, we argue that most states are rational most of the time.

This argument has profound implications for both the study and the practice of international politics. Neither can be coherent in a world where non-rationality prevails. Inside the academy, our argument affirms the rational actor assumption, which has long been a fundamental building block for understanding world politics even if it has recently come under assault. If non-rationality is the norm, state behaviour can be neither understood nor predicted, and studying international politics is a futile endeavour. Only if other states are rational actors can practitioners anticipate how friends and enemies are likely to behave in a given situation and thus formulate policies that will advance their own state’s interests.

All of this is to say that Western policymakers would be well-advised not to automatically assume that Russia or any other adversary is non-rational, as they often do. That only serves to undermine their ability to understand how other states think and craft smart policies to deal with them. Given the enormous stakes in the Ukraine war, this cannot be emphasised enough.

This is an edited extract from How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy by John Mearsheimer and Sebastian Rosato

Kremlin website, 9/12/23

Ilya Doronov: There is one more important question regarding the developments in Ukraine. It is widely rumoured now that a new mobilisation is possible in Russia.

What can you tell those who are watching us now?

Vladimir Putin: Look, forced mobilisation is taking place in Ukraine. It comes in waves, one after another, and I do not know if there is anyone left to call up there.

We carried out a partial mobilisation. As you know, we called up 300,000 people. Over the past six or seven months, 270,000 people have volunteered for contract service in the Armed Forces and volunteer units.

Ilya Doronov: Is this in addition to the partial mobilisation?

Vladimir Putin: Yes, of course, they signed up in the past six or seven months. People go to military recruitment offices and sign contracts. As many as 270,000 have done this. Moreover, the process continues. Every day, between 1,000 and 1,500 people come to sign up, every day.

You know that this is the distinguishing feature of the Russian people, Russian society. I do not know if this is possible in any other country because our people consciously sign up in the current situation, knowing that they will be ultimately sent to the frontline. Our men, our Russian men, realising in full measure what lies ahead and understanding that they might die defending their Motherland or be seriously wounded, they still make this choice, voluntarily and consciously, to protect their country’s interests.

You spoke about elections. They have been held everywhere, including in the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions and in the Lugansk and Donetsk republics. They were held in difficult conditions there, and I admire the courage of the staff at polling stations. When bombing raids began there – the enemy also targeted voting stations, people went into basements, leaving them to resume their work when the raids were over. People came to voting stations and stood in lines despite the possibility of attacks on them.

Why am I saying this? The reason is that our soldiers, our men, our heroes who are fighting on the frontline know that there are people they must protect, and this is the key point. We are protecting our people.

Ilya Doronov: We’ll be finishing soon. But I still have several questions.

On September 1, a new history textbook was delivered to schools. I will not discuss it in detail because we interviewed your aide, Vladimir Medinsky, who specified the official position.

But it contains the following phrase. I quote: “You know, life is always more complicated than any ideological or newspaper stereotypes. A decade will pass and our time will come under rigorous scrutiny. Historians will ask what steps by world leaders, including the leadership of our country, were right and timely, and in what cases a different course of action should have been taken.”

If possible, I wanted to ask you, let us not wait for the historians from the future. From your point of view, what was done correctly and where errors have been committed over this period?

Vladimir Putin: No, let us wait for the historians from the future. It is only the future generations that will be able to assess what we have done for this country in an objective way.

You know, I recall what Prince Potyomkin wrote to Catherine the Great about the annexation of the Crimea. I will not be able to reproduce the exact quote, but I can convey the meaning. He wrote the following: The time will pass and the future generations will blame you for failing to annex Crimea in spite of being able to do so, and you will feel ashamed. State interests come first. We are guided precisely by these considerations, we give them top priority, and we are certainly not ashamed of that.

Ilya Doronov: I have a sports-related question. What I have in mind is the Olympic Games that will be held in France next year.

Before I ask my question, I would like all of us to applaud our tennis player, Daniil Medvedev, who put up a fight at the US Open finals in New York. It was a good final match, with a Russian and a Serb, two Orthodox believers, playing.

Let us thank Daniil for this. True, there was no flag – I saw the broadcast – nor any mention that he is from Russia.

President of France Emmanuel Macron also said about the Olympic Games which his country will host next year that there will be no Russian or Belarusian flags – nothing.

What can you tell our athletes, for whom the Olympics is truly the goal of their life? They are waiting and they will have to miss them.

Vladimir Putin: I will say this. The situation being what it is, we should in the first place be guided by the athletes’ interests. Each of them, who trained for these crucial competitions for years or even decades, should take a decision all on their own.

As for the Olympic Movement itself, this is what I would like to say. I believe that the current management of international federations and the International Olympic Committee are distorting Pierre de Coubertin’s original idea that sport must be beyond politics, that it should not disunite people – it should unite them.

What has happened over the past few decades? The Olympic Movement has been caught in the trap of financial interests. International sports and the international Olympic Movement has been commercialised, which is unacceptable, and this commercialisation has resulted in… What am I talking about? The sponsors, commercial airtime, the leading Western companies, which ultimately provide the basis for the functioning of the International Olympic Committee and the movement as a whole, directly depend on the political organisations and governments in their countries.

Taken together, this combination has created a situation in which international sports and the Olympic Movement are declining and no longer fulfil their main functions. The main idea [of sports] is not only to break records but to bring people together, but the international Olympic Movement is no longer doing this. This is deplorable for the Olympic Movement itself because alternative movements will be created, one way or another, and nothing can be done about this because it is an objective process.

Next year, we will hold the World Friendship Games; we will hold competitions within the framework of BRICS, and those who are depoliticised will happily attend them. This will have a destructive effect on the current international organisations. They must be rejuvenated, including in terms of personnel.

It is regrettable that this is happening, but we will protect the interests of our athletes. This is the first point. Second, we will create alternative possibilities for them, including in terms of the financial results of their achievements.

Ilya Doronov: The Ministry of Sport provided statistics for the EEF or before the EEF, according to which 55 Russian Olympic athletes have changed their citizenship, and the number including non-Olympic athletes is over 100. Do you understand these people?

Vladimir Putin: I said at the beginning of my answer that people worked towards their goals for decades but have been prevented from reaching them for political reasons.

You know, there is one more element in this. I do not know if I can say this, but some people say that sports and international competitions have become the sublimation of war. There is something in this.

I am not judging anyone, but it is important for athletes, especially top-class ones, to hear the anthem and see the flag of their country when they stand on the podium. But ultimately everyone makes his or her own choice. This is what I believe.

Ilya Doronov: I will ask you one last question.

We opened today’s plenary session by stating that ten years ago we proclaimed the Far East, Siberia and the Arctic our priorities.

I would like to take a peek into the future and talk about what the Far East, Siberia, and Russia may look like ten years from now.

Right now, we are witnessing a sort of reincarnation at a new stage, perhaps, comparable to the Soviet Union when there was a young pioneer movement, and now we have the Movement of the First. Some time ago, we brought back the music of the Soviet anthem. An exhibition titled Russia is being prepared at VDNKh, which also reminds us of the past.

The future image, for example, for Ukraine is clear and it includes NATO and EU membership. In the West, the image of the future also looks, shall we say, rosy.

What is the image of the future for Russia?

Vladimir Putin: You have just mentioned that for some countries, the image of their future includes their membership in organisations like NATO or the EU. Do you realise what you have just said? In other words, their future is linked not only to interaction with others, but with their complete dependence on others.

In the defence sphere, they need someone to provide cover for them; otherwise, they will fail. In the economic sphere, they need someone to send them funds, or else they will not be able to lift their economy. By the way, no one wants peace in Ukraine because, if the war comes to an end, they will have to answer to their people for the economic and social aspects, and there is not much to show. I doubt that, once the hostilities are over, the recovery of Ukrainian economy will ensue. Who will even feed them? I doubt it.

We are the makers of our future. I recently met with young scientists at Sarov. They asked me questions too, at least we talked about this. What about? I want to say this, maybe in a different format, but the core idea will be the same. Scientists engage in R&D. Industrialists work in the sphere of material production, agriculture, in the industrial sector, etc. Cultural figures create images to preserve our values, which shape the inner life of every person and each citizen of Russia. All of this taken together will certainly yield a result. All of this should become embodied in our country’s self-reliance, including in the areas of security and defence. But this does not mean that this country will go into self-isolation. This means that we will develop our own country and make it even stronger in cooperation with our partners and friends and in integration with the overwhelming majority of countries that represent most of the world population.

I have already mentioned industry, science, and so on. But in so doing, we must under all circumstances preserve the soul of Russia, the soul of our multi-ethnic and multi-faith nation. This humanitarian component, along with science, education and real production, will be the basis upon which this country will advance, while feeling and taking itself as a sovereign and fully independent state with good prospects for development. It will be this way.

Look, despite all the restrictions imposed against Russia… What did they hope for? They expected our financial system to fall into pieces, the economy to collapse, industrial plants to grind to a stop, and thousand-strong work teams to be left jobless. But nothing of that happened. Last year’s performance placed Russia among the top five major world economies in terms of purchasing power parity and the economy’s volume. There is every chance that we will continue along this path. I did say that inflation in Russia had grown somewhat, but it is within the bounds of relevant indicators. Unemployment is at a historical low of three percent. This is unprecedented – a three-percent national unemployment figure.

Of course, some other workforce-related issues emerge in this connection, but they are being addressed as well. Real incomes are rising for the first time in several years. Yes, these are modest incomes, as I said, but the trend is in the right direction. Real disposable incomes and real wages are also growing. Taken together, all of this gives us every reason to think that Russia not only has a sustainable and good future but also that this future is secured by the efforts of our entire multi-ethnic people.