By Andrew Korybko, Substack, 6/8/23

The exact same scenario that was previously smeared by the European External Action Service as a “recurring pro-Kremlin disinformation narrative” is now being extended credence by none other than former NATO chief Anders Rasmussen.

Former NATO Secretary-General Anders Rasmussen predicted that “If NATO cannot agree on a clear path forward for Ukraine, there is a clear possibility that some countries individually might take action.” He then speculated that “I think the Poles would seriously consider going in and assemble a coalition of the willing if Ukraine doesn’t get anything in Vilnius.” As surreal as it may sound, this exact same scenario forecast had hitherto been smeared as “Russian propaganda” by official EU entities.

The East StratCom Task Force (ESCTF), which is part of the European External Action Service, has a project called “EUvsDisinfo” where they debunk so-called “Russian propaganda”. They’ve regularly claimed that the specific scenario that NATO’s former chief just talked about is a “recurring pro-Kremlin disinformation narrative”, thus suggesting that Rasmussen is a “Russian puppet”. The ESCTF of course didn’t intend to discredit him and will likely recalibrate their narrative in light of his latest words.

Nevertheless, the point is that the exact same scenario that was previously smeared as a “recurring pro-Kremlin disinformation narrative” is now being extended credence by none other than the former leader of the US’ anti-Russian military bloc. This vindicates the repeated warnings from Russian Foreign Intelligence Service chief Sergey Naryshkin since the start of his country’s special operation that Poland is plotting a military intervention in Ukraine.

Considering the way in which the Western narrative on this scenario has evolved over the past year, it can therefore be concluded that there’s a credible chance of it unfolding in the coming future, which naturally prompts the question of what changed to account for this reversal. Rasmussen’s successor Jens Stoltenberg declared in mid-February that NATO is in a “race of logistics”/“war of attrition” with Russia, which implied that the latter’s military-industrial output is equivalent to his entire 31-member bloc’s.

Russia’s victory in the Battle of Artyomovsk proved that the abovementioned dynamics are trending in its favor, which bodes ill for Kiev’s NATO–backed counteroffensive. It’s precisely because the odds of success are increasingly stacked against it that this fascist regime just blew up the Kakhovka Dam out of desperation to divide the defenders’ focus in order to facilitate a breakthrough across the frontlines. There’s also the chance that it could expand the conflict to Belarus and/or Moldova for the same reason.

In the event that these gambits fail and Kiev’s NATO-backed counteroffensive can’t overcome the stalemate that this conflict has slipped into for over the past half year, then the West would have to do something else that they can spin to their voters as making this $165 billion proxy war seem worthwhile. Therein lies the relevance of meaningful progress being made on including Ukraine in NATO during next month’s summit exactly as Rasmussen suggested in order for it to be spun as a major defeat for Russia.

UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace already told the Washington Post in a recent interview that “We have to be realistic and say: [Ukraine joining NATO is] not going to happen at Vilnius’; It’s not going to happen anytime soon”, which even Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky begrudgingly recognized is true. For this reason, French President Emmanuel Macron suggested extending “tangible and credible” security guarantees to that former Soviet Republic during the upcoming summit instead.

Even if a series of mutual defense pacts similar in spirit to the one that the US reached with South Korea shortly after the armistice is agreed to, it might still not be enough to satisfy the Western public’s demands, nor those of Zelensky’s supporters at home. Poland, which aspires to become the regional hegemon of Central & Eastern Europe, could then take the lead in organizing the so-called “coalition of the willing” that Rasmussen predicted in order to de facto expand NATO’s nuclear umbrella over Ukraine.

The formal presence of NATO states’ conventional troops in that country could serve to inspire confidence in whatever Korean-like mutual defense pacts might soon be offered by the bloc’s members to Ukraine during next month’s summit. Moreover, they could also serve to freeze the Line of Contact (LOC) by deterring Russian attacks out of fear that they’ll indirectly trigger Article 5 if that alliance’s forces are injured as a result of whatever actions the Kremlin takes, including those done in self-defense.

The military-strategic dynamics of this conflict would therefore radically shift in an instant should Rasmussen’s scenario forecast come to fruition, particularly since the deployment of NATO states’ forces along the LOC could prevent Russia from pushing back into Ukraine if Kiev expands the conflict to Belarus and/or Moldova. At most, Moscow could then only hope for them to return to their prior positions instead of seeking to exploit their potential defeat to go on the offensive along those fronts.

All told, it makes perfect sense from the perspective of the West’s military-strategic and narrative interests for Poland to lead a “coalition of the willing” into Ukraine by sometime this summer, especially if Kiev’s NATO-backed counteroffensive fails to seriously shift the LOC. Although incredibly dangerous with respect to spiking the chances of a hot NATO-Russian war by miscalculation, those leaders might still choose to roll the dice out of desperation to obtain something that can be spun as a “victory”.

Russia foresaw precisely this scenario over a year ago, but it wasn’t until recently that more than just Poland had an interest in seeing it happen. The West smeared this forecast as “Russian propaganda” up until now in order to gaslight its targeted audience into thinking that nothing of the sort was being plotted, only for NATO’s former chief to now predict the exact same thing as Russia did. Everything is moving very fast so this prediction might soon unfold, though it can’t be taken for granted either.

By Dan Kovalik & Rick Sterling, Dissident Voice, 5/25/23

At the end of April of this year, the two of us ventured together to Russia. We went with the purpose of fact-finding and also to make a point that we do not believe that Russia should be isolated from the world through sanctions and travel bans.

At this moment, Russia is more isolated from the West than it has ever been, quite possibly in history. As just one example, while V.I. Lenin was able to famously travel from Finland via train to St. Petersburg, even during the height of WWI, the train from Finland to Russia ceased operating after February 24 of 2022. And indeed, it was through Finland that we decided to travel to Russia, simply because there are now very limited ways to travel there. Thus, while for years, even during the Cold War, one could easily fly directly from the US to Russia on Aeroflot and other airlines, that is no longer possible due to sanctions. Now, one can only fly there through Serbia, Turkey or the UAE, but those flights are quite expensive.

And so, we ended up choosing to fly to Helsinki, Finland and have a Russian friend who has a non-Russian passport (Russians with only Russian passports cannot travel to Finland) drive from St. Petersburg to pick us up. This turned out to be more easily said than done as our friend’s car broke down at the Finnish/Russian border. And so, we took a very expensive, three-hour cab ride to the border, met up with our friend and crammed ourselves into the cab of a tow truck to drive the remaining three hours to St. Petersburg – a quite inauspicious beginning to our journey.

Saint Petersburg streets are busy from early morning til late at night. This photo taken at 11:30pm

St. Petersburg (Leningrad)

Our first several days were spent in St. Petersburg, formerly “Leningrad.” We stayed strategically at the Best Western in Uprising Square – so named by the new Bolshevik government in 1918 to commemorate the Great October Revolution of 1917. In the Square is located the Moscow train station which we used to great effect during our journey, as well as the Leningrad Hero-City Obelisk. The Obelisk commemorates Leningrad’s designation as one of 13 “hero cities” in the Soviet Union which distinguished themselves for their exceptional sacrifices in resisting the Nazis during WWII. Two other cities we visited on our trip (Moscow and Sevastopol, Crimea) are also honored with this designation, as is Kiev, Ukraine and of course Volgograd (formerly “Stalingrad”).

During our stay, the city of St. Petersburg sure seemed more like Leningrad, for it was beginning to be decked out in red flags with hammers and sickles and stars to commemorate both May Day and Victory Day over the Nazis on May 9. We were told by long-time residents that the ubiquitous display of such symbols of the USSR was something new (at least since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991), and was spurred on by Russia’s Special Military Operations beginning in February of 2022. It appears that the Russian people, and the Russian government as well, are looking to the legacy of the Soviet Union as a source of strength, pride and unity during this time of war – a war that they view, we believe quite rightly, was forced on them.

The newly released Russian Federation “concept” on foreign policy states quite explicitly that Russia’s current foreign policy is informed by the two main objectives and successes of the USSR – the defeat of Nazism and global decolonization. Certainly, on paper at least, this belies the claim of some Western leftists that Russia is motivated in its relations with other nations by imperialist concerns.

Dan takes his turn playing guitar on St Petersburg street at 11 pm

While in St. Petersburg, we visited the site of the terrorist attack which claimed the life of Russian journalist Vladlen Tatarsky and wounded over 30 others, at least 10 gravely. The attack involved the bombing of a cafe in the picturesque University district of St. Petersburg along the Neva – a soft target if there ever was one. The cafe remains closed, and three sets of memorials for Tatarsky are set up around it, consisting of flowers and photos. Of course, the Western press has tried to do everything it can to justify this vicious attack upon civilians, writing off Tatarsky as “pro-Kremlin” and “pro-war” (as if the Western press can’t be fairly characterized as “pro-war” and “pro-Pentagon”) and simply glossing over the numerous other civilians wounded in the assault as collateral damage.

Rick and Dan at the site where Russian journalist was killed

Moscow

As planned, we left St. Petersburg by train to Moscow after several days. We took the faster “Sapsan” (Falcon) train to Leningrad Station in Moscow (it is still called that). The train ride, reaching 120 mph, was smooth and comfortable. We sat across from two Russian women, one of whom was quite friendly. She told us of her son who lives in Boston and who, quite sadly for her, she hasn’t seen in years. She kept sliding over hard candy to share with us. And, when she saw Dan nervously biting his nails, she kindly handed him her nail filer for him to use. This type of sharing on the train is quite common in Russia as we would continue to discover on our journey.

Rick with train compartment companions

Moscow too was being decorated for the May 9 Victory Day celebration. Red Square was sealed off from the public to prepare for the event, and the city was on high alert for possible terrorist attacks, one of which would come while we were in Russia with the drone attack upon the Kremlin itself. Despite the fears of attack, Muscovites were out on the streets day and night. Both Moscow and St. Petersburg were incredibly vibrant – much more so than our cities back home which are still feeling the effects of the lockdowns during the pandemic. Gorky Park was particularly lively with throngs of families with children enjoying the spring weather, swings and slides. Colorful tulips were in full bloom.

From appearances, Russia largely did not appear to be a country at war. However, everyone we talked to confided in us about their concerns for the war – for the loss of life on both sides, the fact that it was lasting much longer than people had expected, and the danger that the war could expand into a greater conflagration. Some Russians expressed their fear that nuclear weapons would end up being used before this was all over, though they believed that the US would be the first to launch them. At the same time, the Russians showed their usual stoicism in the face of such dangers, with one family with whom Dan had dinner stating almost matter-of-factly that “Russia has always had difficult times, and it will have them again.”

After several days in Moscow, and our hopes for visiting the Donbass falling through, we took the long, 27-hour train ride to Crimea – a region now fully in the crosshairs of the proxy war.

Arriving in Crimea

Ukrainian President Zelensky says he will “take back” Crimea. US leaders Victoria Nuland and Jake Sullivan say they support him. Indeed, Sullivan recently suggested Ukraine is free to use the F-16 fighter jets in attempting to “recapture” Crimea.” We traveled to Crimea to see the situation and learn details of how and why Crimea seceded from Ukraine in 2014.

A highlight of the train ride was passing over the new 12-mile long Kerch Strait bridge which connects mainland Russia to the Crimean peninsula. As our train approached the bridge, we could see that saboteurs had been active. There was a fuel tank on fire in the near distance. A couple passengers did not want us to photograph this, probably thinking it gives publicity to the enemy.

As we departed the train in Crimea at the beautiful station in the Capitol city, Simferopol, the loudspeakers on the platform greeted us with traditional Russian songs.

We then drove the roughly two hours to Yalta where we stayed while in Crimea. Along our drive, we saw the giant mosque which the Russian government is building along the highway in an area where Tatars, who generally practice the Islamic faith, protested to have land to live and worship. The Tatars had been persecuted during WWII as suspected collaborators and forcibly removed from Crimea to other Soviet Republics.

A number of Tatars have moved back to Crimea over the years and now make up about 12 percent of the population of Crimea. Meanwhile, about 65 percent of the Crimean population is ethnic Russian and about 15 percent is Ukrainian, though about 82 percent of the population overall speaks Russian on a daily basis.

As we were told while in Crimea, one of the first things President Putin did after Crimea returned to Russia in 2014 was to try to make good relations with the Tatar community by “rehabilitating” them from the claims of collaboration made by Stalin government, giving them the land they protested for, providing them with modest monetary reparations and building them the new Mosque.

Historical Background

All in all, we spent five days seeing the sights and meeting people in the capital Simferopol, Sevastopopol and Yalta. We were guided by translator and native Crimean Tanya. In the past, Tanya worked for US Aid for International Development (USAID), teaching Russian to US Peace Corps volunteers.

Crimea has a rich agricultural sector. It was severely hampered after Ukraine dammed the canal bringing fresh water from the Dnieper River. After Russian forces intervened, they removed the dam and agriculture is once again thriving. Crimean cities are busy with the streets and sidewalks full. In the parks, there are teens skate boarding and seniors playing chess.

The situation in Crimea is emblematic of the Ukraine crisis overall. In both Crimea and the Donbass (eastern Ukraine), the majority of people are ethnically Russian, their native language is Russian and they voted overwhelmingly for the elected but overthrown President Yanukovich.

From the 15th century Crimea was part of the Ottoman Empire. It became part of the Russian Empire in 1783 after the army of Catherine the Great defeated the Turks.

In 1921, Crimea became the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic.

In 1954, Soviet Premier Khrushchev designated Crimea to be part of the Ukraine republic. This was done without consulting the Crimean people but it was not a major change since they were all part of one country, the Soviet Union. As we were told in Crimea, “Nobody could imagine the Soviet Union breaking up.”

As the Soviet Union was breaking up, Crimeans held a referendum in January of 1991. They voted overwhelmingly (94% in favor) to become the “Autonomous Republic of Crimea” and to separate from Ukraine. There was contention with Kiev and ultimately it was agreed that Crimea would be autonomous but within Ukraine. There was desire but not the urgency to secede from Ukraine at this point.

The desire to separate from Ukraine became more urgent in late 2013 and early 2014 as Crimeans watched with alarm as Russophobic ultra-nationalist and neo-nazi groups increasingly dominated violent protests in Kiev’s Maidan plaza. The book To Go One’s Own Way documents how the Crimean parliament and presidency issued statements, pleas and warnings about the threat to Ukrainian unity beginning in November 2013.

As we discuss in an upcoming article, the government of Ukraine reacted to the Crimean referendum to reunite with Russia quite punitively, and it continues to punish the Crimeans for their decision. At the same time, Russia has actively invested in the peninsula and made major improvements in the overall infrastructure there. In light of the foregoing, it is safe to say there are relatively few Crimeans who ever wish to return to Ukraine.

Dan Kovalik is a human rights attorney and author of seven books. Rick Sterling is a journalist based in the San Francisco Bay Area. Read other articles by Dan Kovalik and Rick Sterling.

Earlier today I posted an excerpt of a piece by Ray McGovern in which he presents John Mearsheimer’s response to his question of whether Russia had any other viable options than war in February of 2022. Mearsheimer answered that he did not think Putin had any other option. Given McGovern’s recent comments, it seems that he agrees with Mearsheimer’s assessment. Below is a rebuttal by Prof. Geoffrey Roberts whose articles explaining Putin’s reasons for invading in 2022 I’ve posted in the past. While he has demonstrated that he understands very well Putin’s concerns that led to his decision to invade, he disagrees that it was necessary. – Natylie

By Prof. Geoffrey Roberts, Brave New Europe, 5/31/23

‘Did Putin have ‘other options’ on Ukraine?’ asked Ray McGovern, ex-CIA analyst and long-time anti-war activist. His question was directed at the signatories of a recent statement in the New York Times calling for an urgent diplomatic initiative ‘to end the Russia-Ukraine war before it destroys Ukraine and endangers humanity.’

Whilst welcoming this intervention by a group of distinguished former US national security officials, McGovern queried their assumption that invading Ukraine was just one of Putin’s options in February 2022.

McGovern’s own answer to the question (in an interview with Judge Napolitano) is that Putin had no choice but to go to war to safeguard Russia’s security.

The NYT statement’s eminent signatories can speak for themselves, but McGovern’s question is a good one and merits a response from those like myself who oppose both Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the Western proxy war on Russia.

Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, a group of Russian Studies scholars, myself included, issued an ‘appeal’ headlined ‘End the Invasion of Ukraine Now!’:

The invasion is Putin’s war, a war of choice not necessity. The prime responsibility for the conflict, and all its sorrowful, devastating and dangerous consequences, is his.

Nothing that has happened in the last 15 months has led me to change my mind.

Ukraine’s economy has been wrecked and its society devastated by hundreds of thousands of casualties and the mass flight of millions of its citizens. In Eastern and Southern Ukraine, the homelands of millions of pro-Russian Ukrainians have been laid waste. Russia has suffered thousands of casualties, including an estimated 30,000-40,000 fatalities. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians are fighting in both sides’ armies, with many millions more actively supporting either the pro-Russian or the Ukrainian nationalist cause. Ukrainian ultra-nationalism has never been stronger, or more virulent, and both Russia and Ukraine are now much more authoritarian and repressive societies.

Russia and the West are locked in an economic and sanctions war whose price is being paid by the hundreds of millions of people struggling with sky-rocketing energy costs and inflationary food prices. NATO continues to expand with Finland’s admission into the organisation, and Sweden is slated to follow. Never has the Western military alliance’s collaboration been so deep and far-reaching, or more dangerous.

We are on the cusp of a renewed nuclear arms race and the threat of atomic warfare has never been greater. Arms manufacturers are coining it and Western hawks are cock-a-hoop about their long-sought-after confrontation with Russia. In academia there are calls for ‘decolonising’ Russian Studies and, even, for a McCarthyite purge of anyone who refuses to toe the anti-Russia line. The lies, distortions, manipulations, and inversions of the relentless and unrestrained propaganda war signal that the post-truth age truly has arrived, and with a vengeance.

None of this is Putin’s sole responsibility. He started the war but the West has kept it going. Without the West’s proxy war against Russia, the battles in Ukraine would have ended long ago, thereby saving the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

Had Putin known then what we know now about the course of the war, would he have gone ahead with the invasion? I very much doubt it. I strongly suspect he would have persisted with his extant policy of militarised diplomacy.

Initiated in late 2021, Putin’s strategy of diplomatic demands backed by the threat of military force certainly got the West’s attention. He was inundated with phone calls and visits from western leaders urging him to keep the peace. NATO and the United States stonewalled his key demands for Ukraine’s neutralisation and an end to NATO’s expansion, but they did concede the admissibility of Russia’s core principle of the indivisibility of security. There was also some negotiating progress on arms control issues. Slowly but surely the strategy was beginning to work.

When, in mid-February 2022, Putin asked his foreign minister whether Russia should continue negotiating, Lavrov replied: “I think our opportunities are far from exhausted. Negotiations should not be endless, but I think we should still continue to pursue and build on them at this point.”

Lavrov evidently believed Putin would continue his militarised diplomacy, and judging by their remarks at the Russian Federation’s Security Council on 21 February, so did other members of his inner circle, such as former President Dmitry Medvedev, the Council’s secretary, Nikolai Patrushev and the FSB’s foreign intelligence chief, Sergey Naryshkin.

That expectation was widespread in the West, too, where many astute and well-informed commentators were adamant Putin would be mad to go to war when the diplomatic game had only just begun. “Godot Likely to Arrive Before Russia Invades Ukraine” was the headline of Ray McGovern’s piece for antiwar.com on 22 January 2022.

A month later, Putin shocked and surprised us all by abruptly abandoning diplomacy and launching a large-scale invasion of Ukraine.

My answer to McGovern’s question – what else Putin could have done? – is that he should have stuck to diplomacy.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to argue the strategy of militarised diplomacy had little chance of success. But Putin did not know that at the time, and nor do we know now that diplomacy was destined to fail. The only way to test that hypothesis would have been for Putin to continue his diplomatic offensive for a few more months. The same applies to what might have happened if Putin had taken an intermediate course of action, such as incorporating rebel Donetsk and Luhansk into the Russian Federation rather than signing mutual defence pacts with each of them as pretext for the Special Military Operation (SM0).

No war is inevitable until the moment of decision. All wars are the result of contingency and choice. On the eve of the Ukraine war, Putin had a range of available choices. We can’t be sure what any of their outcomes would have been. All we know for certain is that the consequences of Putin’s actual choice – irrespective of the final outcome of the war – have been calamitous and potentially catastrophic.

Putin chose war because he felt it was the best choice, not because he had no alternatives.

Following publication of our ‘appeal’, I put on my historian’s hat and set out to explore the reasons for Putin’s momentous decision to go to war. I concluded he went to war to prevent Ukraine from becoming an ever-stronger and threatening NATO bridgehead on Russia’s borders. The invasion was a preventative action designed to nip in the bud a dire, future threat from a heavily armed, ultra-nationalistic Ukraine that, with NATO’s help, would seek to recover Crimea and the Donbass by force.

My surmise is that what tipped the balance of his calculations in favour of military action was Zelensky’s inflammatory speech to the Munich Security Conference on 19 February 2022 in which he threatened Ukrainian re-acquisition of nuclear weapons.

As I also noted in my article, some pro-Russia supporters have attempted to shore up the case for war by claiming Ukraine’s armed forces were actively preparing a major attack on the Donbass. However, there is no convincing evidence for this hypothesis and it is not a justification that Putin himself has used. It was a preventative war that Putin launched at the end of February 2022, not a pre-emptive strike.

Explanation is not the same as justification. While Putin may see his invasion of Ukraine as a necessary, defensive act, we don’t have to accept his rationalisations. Moreover, we are entitled to judge his action by its results as well as its motivations and intentions.

The only valid moral-political justification for war is necessity. Putin’s decision-making failed that test because a fundamental threat to Russian security in the form of a powerful NATO enclave in Ukraine was emergent but not yet fully formed. His fears about Ukrainian nuclear rearmament were authentic but they were also exaggerated: it is far from clear the West would have been a willing accomplice of Zelensky’s nuclear ambitions given Ukraine’s commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Above all, the possibilities of a negotiated solution to the Ukrainian crisis had not been exhausted when he decided to invade. There was time and scope for the continuation of diplomacy.

Sticking to peace entailed its own risks and costs, notably NATO’s continued military build-up in Ukraine, but going to war was hardly a risk-free option.

Paradoxically, the person who started the Ukraine war may also be our best hope for ending it and securing a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was not so much an abandonment of militarised diplomacy as its radicalisation. Putin went to war to force Ukraine and the West to concede what they had refused to negotiate. As the abortive Istanbul peace talks of spring 2022 show, he came tantalisingly close to success in the form of a deal with Ukraine that could have ended the war before it really got going. Reportedly, those talks were curtailed by Ukraine at the West’s behest, but that is no excuse for Putin’s miscalculations in launching the SMO, the over-estimation of his own military forces and the under-estimation of Ukrainian resilience and of Western resolve.

The longer the war goes on the bigger will be the price of peace for Ukraine in terms of its statehood and lost territories. But, remarkably, Putin remains open to diplomacy and to a negotiated end to the war, providing the terms meet Russia’s security requirements and protect the interests of pro-Russian Ukrainians.

Currently, the prospects for peace are depressingly dismal, but as the contingencies of the war change, so, too, will the range of feasible human choices, hopefully in a direction that leads to a ceasefire and then to the kind of diplomatic settlement that could and should have prevented the conflict in the first place.

By Ray McGovern, website, 5/24/23

When Professor John Mearsheimer spoke on “Where is the Ukraine War Going?” at the Committee for the Republic on May 22, I was able to ask the first question of the Q & A. I referred to the conventional wisdom that Putin had “other options” to invading Ukraine and noted that, so far, no one has able to tell me what those options are. I asked John if he knew what those espousing that conventional wisdom might be talking about. My question and Mearsheimer’s response can be seen beginning at minute 51:30 of the video:

The following is a transcription of John’s comments:

“No, I don’t think he had any options. I do believe that Putin was deeply committed to finding a negotiated settlement to the problem. As I said to you in my formal comments, he was deeply committed to the Minsk agreement because what he wanted to do was to shut down the conflict in the Donbas so he would not have to invade.

And, with regard to NATO expansion, EU expansion, and the efforts to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border, he went to great lengths to explain to the West why that was unacceptable. And on December 17, 2021, he sent a letter to Biden and to NATO saying that you have to do x y and z, so we can find a solution to this problem. And we refused to go along. And I think that Putin was left in a position where he felt he had no choice, because, to answer your question, there was no other way to deal with the problem. So I think that he, with great reluctance, invaded Ukraine.”

Ep. 1 pic.twitter.com/O7CdPjF830

— Tucker Carlson (@TuckerCarlson) June 6, 2023

Link here.