You can read my interview with Olga Baysha from last year here. – Natylie

ACURA, 3/26/23

When thinking about Ukrainian democracy under peril, Western observers typically think about the Russian invasion that began last year. But critics and dissidents inside and outside of Ukraine also warn of a different threat to democracy, one coming from within, with the war catalyzing an escalation of authoritarian trends under President Volodymyr Zelensky. One such critic is Olga Baysha, associate professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, and author of Democracy, Populism and Neoliberalism in Ukraine. Starting out her career as a news reporter and editor in Kharkiv, Baysha spoke to Jacobin’s Branko Marcetic about this growth in political repression.

1. Has repression of dissent in Ukraine gotten worse since the outbreak of the war? And are some of the things we’ve heard about in terms of centralising power – banning of media outlets and parties, bans on the Russian language, raids on Orthodox churches – new phenomena? To what extent are they a continuation of trends that were happening before the war? 

Zelensky’s war on journalism started one year before the current war. In February 2021, he signed sanctions by the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) against two parliamentary deputies from “Opposition Platform—For Life,” the main political rival of his own party. As a result of this unconstitutional move, three television channels controlled by the opposition—NewsOne, 112 Ukraine, and ZIK—were shut down. This happened after Zelensky’s approval rating, sinking throughout the course of his unpopular neoliberal reforms, fell below 30 percent, for which he blamed oppositional media. Later that year, other oppositional channels were sanctioned and banned as well: Strana.ua, First Independent Channel, UKRLIVE, Sharij.net, and Nash. 

In other words, the prosecution of oppositional journalists presented as “enemies of the people” started not because of the war but because of the falling popularity of Zelensky in the course of his neoliberal experiments. In January 2022, one month before the launch of Russia’s “special military operation” (SMO), sociological data showed that 64.7 percent of Ukrainians believed the country was moving in the wrong direction; Zelensky’s presidential approval rating was as low as 17 percent. In fact, it was Russia’s offensive in February 2022 that transformed Zelensky from an unpopular ruler selling Ukrainian land against the people’s will into a transnational hero struggling against tyranny.

The beginning of the current war just marked another level of efforts to crush dissent. As you know, in March 2022, eleven oppositional parties were banned. Along with banning the parties, Zelensky also implemented the NSDC decision to launch a telethon called “United News #UARAZOM,” which all national TV channels were expected to broadcast. Now, they have little choice but to show this telethon reflecting the “only true” version of events–the one approved by the presidential administration. As a matter of fact, the situation is very similar to what has been happening in Russia since the beginning of SMO–here, media are also instructed to present the only “reliable” (i.e., approved by the government) version of “truth.” The only difference is that nobody in the world argues that Russia is a “beacon of democracy”—the way Ukraine is presented for global audiences today. 

Meanwhile, all Ukrainian journalists and bloggers who did not want to promote Zelensky’s version of “truth” had to either shut up (voluntarily or under duress) or, if possible, emigrate. Among the latter are Tatyana Montyan, Dmitry Vasilets, Taras Nezalezhko, Ruslan Kotsana, Yuri Podolyaka, and many others. What about those arrested after the beginning of the current war, the problem is that nobody knows their exact numbers, and nobody knows for sure if they are still imprisoned, free, or simply alive. There is no public news about Dmitry Dzhangirov, Yuri Tkachev, Dmitry Marunich, brothers Kononovich, and other oppositionists who were arrested in Spring 2022. One can only judge on what is going on in the dungeons of the SSU (the Security Service of Ukraine) drawing on rare evidence provided by journalists who were detained and later released. One of them is Andrei Wojciechowski, an honored journalist from Kharkiv who was arrested and charged under Article 111 (treason) for alleged contacts with Russian journalists and officers of Russia’s Federal Security Service. His account of what he went through in jail is available on YouTube, and it is terrifying: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Umm7kbJIKmA. I know Andrei since 1991, when I started working as a journalist in Kharkiv, and I have no doubt he is telling the truth. 

But, to answer your question, the intimidations and prosecution of oppositional journalists in Ukraine, presented as “enemies of the people,” started long before Zelensky’s presidency. Since the victory of the Maidan in 2014, Ukrainian radicals—encouraged and supported by post-Maidan power–have been intimidating those who protested the ideology of integral nationalism, propaganda of Nazism, and the policy of omnipresent de-Russification. The most famous figure in this respect is Oles Buzina, who was killed by radicals in 2015; the names of the killers are well known, but they are still free—in contemporary Ukraine, extremists are considered heroes struggling against Russia and its “collaborators.” It is within this context that we should consider the persecutions of the Russian Orthodox Church. The first attempts of the seizures of its temples were recorded as early in the beginning of the 1990s, after Ukraine declared its independence, but at those times these were isolated cases. Now, we are dealing with a state policy of eradicating any kind of cultural and political “otherness.” This is a political course aimed at creating a unified Ukraine, in which, as Zelensky boasts, “there is no left and right,” “the government becomes the people,” and everybody is “like-minded,”—a rosy dream of any totalitarian ruler.

2. Pro-Russian sympathies or even outright collaboration with Moscow are often cited by the SBU, private blacklists, and even media outlets in claims of treason and collaboration. Should we accept these charges at face value? 

To become a “collaborator” in the eyes of Zelensky’s regime, one need not have deep sympathies with Russia or to collaborate with it—it is enough to state anything that would contradict Zelensky’s version of truth. For example, while speaking to the participants of the Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in June 2022, Zelensky explained that Russia’s “disinformation thesis” is that its war against Ukraine “is allegedly something about NATO, about the role of America, about the West’s attempts to advance somewhere in Europe.” In other words, anybody who would dare to link the ongoing war with NATO expansion and the interests of the military-industrial complex of the United States would be considered a mouthpiece for Russia and collaborator.  

This happened to the British musician Roger Waters of Pink Floyd fame, after a CNN interview in which he criticized the role of the U.S. government in the Russia-Ukraine war and argued that the conflict hinged on the action and reaction of NATO pushing right up to the Russian border. Waters was immediately declared an “enemy of Ukraine” and his name was put on Myrotvorets–a website where all the names of “Ukraine’s enemies” are listed, along with their home addresses, telephones, and other personal information. The same destiny awaited numerous other well-known foreign public figures who dared to articulate the conflict not in the way considered “true” by the government of Ukraine. Among them are Oliver Stone, Henry Kissinger, John Mearsheimer, and many others, including hundreds of foreign journalists who have visited Donbas, which was considered by the Ukrainian government as “complicity of terrorism.”

No wonder that the number of Ukrainians accused of being “collaborators” is so big. According to the SSU, from February 24 to the middle of November, it started more than 18,000 criminal proceedings related to “crimes against national security,” which include treason, sabotage, and assistance to the aggressor state. These are official figures, which do not show the real picture; one can only imagine how many people in the territories first occupied and later left by Russian troops were declared “collaborators” with all the ensuring consequences that are not necessarily legal. Extrajudicial killings have become a norm in the war-torn Ukraine. Suffice it to mention the names of Kremennaya Mayor Vladimir Struk, who was abducted and killed in March 2022 because of his pro-Russian stance, or Denis Kireev, one of the negotiators at the first Gomel meeting (the first round of negotiations with Russia after the beginning of the current war) who was killed right in the center of Kyiv as a warning to other collaborators. The most terrible thing is that such extrajudicial executions have been normalized in public discourse; governmental officials do not shun admitting that “traitors” and “collaborators” deserve to be punished without regard to legality. NSDC Secretary Danilov, for example, called all those sympathizing with Russia “rats” who need to be poisoned. 

3. Isn’t it true that some parties, opposition politicians, and government critics – like Medvedchuk and Opposition Platform – for Life, and even the Orthodox Church of Ukraine – do have Russian ties and more Russia-friendly positions? So why should we be troubled by the fact that they’re being banned, prosecuted, raided etc.?

Medvedchuk is an odious figure. He is a millionaire, and the godfather of his daughter Daria is none other than Vladimir Putin. Obviously, this may make Medvedchuk loathsome in the eyes of many. However, one should not forget that Medvedchuk’s television channels, banned by Zelensky, represented the views of different groups within Ukrainian society that opposed Ukraine’s war against Donbas, the prosecution of dissenters, or Zelensky’s neoliberal reforms. Among those speaking on the shows of these channels, there were oppositional deputies, economists, political experts, leaders of people’s associations, activists, and more. In other words, these channels represented various strata of the Ukrainian population—their public opinion, with all its variation and subtle shading. 

What I am trying to say is that, no matter whether one likes Medvedchuk or not, but his television channels served as public platforms where Ukrainian citizens could voice their grievances. It is this possibility of accumulating oppositional strength through consolidating oppositional public opinion that scared Zelensky. Along with millions of Ukrainians, Medvedchuk was a strident opponent of the land reform, for example, which has nothing to do with “collaborating” with Russia. On the other hand, “a Russia-friendly position,” which you mention, is a sentiment that most people living in the southeastern regions of Ukraine shared (at least before the current war) due to close historical ties between the two states—you can hardly find a family in southeastern Ukraine that does not have relatives in Russia. 

As a famous opinion poll made by Kiev Institute of Sociology in April of 2014 showed, more than 75 percent of people living in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, believed that Ukraine and Russia should be independent but friendly states with open borders and without visas. Needless to say, these people did not support the Maidan with its anti-Russian agenda. Most dwellers of other eastern regions of Ukraine shared this view. This is the crux of the issue—the post-Maidan government of Ukraine ignored the opinions of half of the country and, instead of negotiations on which the anti-Maidan Ukraine counted, launched the so-called “anti-terrorist operation” against the rebellious Donbas in April 2014, which manifested the beginning of what later became known as the “Donbas war.” It is widely acknowledged nowadays that during the first stage of the conflict, the rebels were primarily locals; only in August 2014, when they appeared to be facing defeat, did Russia support them with its own troops. 

What I am trying to say is that the problem with Ukraine’s struggle against the so-called “pro-Russian agenda” is that this has been an agenda of millions of Ukrainian citizens whose opinions were completely ignored. Of course, many “anti-Maidan others” did not welcome Russia’s SMO, and in this sense public attitudes towards Russia may be changing now (it is difficult to judge because no opinion polls are reliable nowadays). However, we should not forget that the number of refugees moving to Russia—2.8 million people, the highest of any country receiving Ukrainians amid the conflict—suggests that pro-Russian sentiments among many Ukrainians are still high, despite all Zelensky’s talks about the unprecedented unity of the Ukrainian nation during the war, one of the main ideologemes he promotes in his speeches.

4. What kind of impact has this repression of dissident voices and tightening of government control over the media had on the Ukrainian political landscape, and on public opinion over the course of the war?

Even before the war, Zelensky demonstrated intolerance to independent media and the political process in general–I discuss this in detail in my book “Democracy, populism, and neoliberalism in Ukraine.” Political forces that ended up in opposition to neoliberal transformations have been attacked by him and his party members not politically (based on opposing opinions) but morally (based on the accusation of “hampering historical progress”). In place of a struggle of “right and left,” there was a permanent struggle between “right and wrong,” to use Chantal Mouffe’s dictum—this has been the essence of Zelensky’s “politics.” The opponents of his land reform, for example, were attacked on the ground that they ostensibly tried to preserve the Soviet way of life.

“The truth is on our side” has been one of Zelensky’s central messages for the world since the beginning of the current war. The problem with this “truth,” as it should be clear now, is that it is established administratively; anybody who dares to question it is declared a “collaborator” and “traitor”; they are being wiped out of the information space controlled by the government. Another thing is that it is impossible, within the digital environment of interconnected information networks, to close discourse fully and establish meanings that remain forever fixed. This impossibility manifests itself in the revival of oppositional discourse in new discursive-material configurations that cannot be controlled by the government. Oppositional journalists and bloggers who were able to flee Ukraine now run their media channels from abroad; all of those who are still able to work moved to Telegram—a platform beyond the reach of the Ukrainian government. It is noteworthy that the popularity of Telegram among Ukrainians has grown significantly since the beginning of the ongoing war, which reflects people’s dissatisfaction with the one-dimensionality of Ukraine’s official propaganda. With the adoption in December 2022 of the new media law of Ukraine, which, in the opinion of the European Federation of Journalists, “is worthy of the worst authoritarian regimes” because it establishes censorship in the information space, Telegram’s popularity in Ukraine is set to increase further as it will be the only channel offering an alternative to the official perspective while opposition channels on other platforms, such as YouTube and Facebook, have been increasingly blocked in Ukraine. 

5. The war has also seen an escalation in what the government has called “de-Russification” of Ukraine. What are the implications of this, particularly since conflict over the role of Russian heritage in Ukraine has been one of the factors that’s fueled civil strife in the past?

I would like to highlight once again that what is called “de-Russification” is in fact Ukraine’s war against its own citizens for whom Russian language is a mother tongue and the Russian Orthodox Church is a religion of their ancestors. Most people in the southeastern regions of Ukraine and the overwhelming majority of Donbas residents, regardless of ethnic origin, use the Russian language in daily communication, with majority also claiming Russian as their native language. In a similar fashion, most people living in these regions, do not know any other religion but Russian Orthodox. I can imagine that the war might have changed the attitudes of many Ukrainian Russophones to many things related to Russia, but what we observe today is not a genuine manifestation of people’s will but a governmental experiment on social engineering—an aggressive de-Russification with an involvement of radicals who intimidate people, discouraging them from fighting for their rights. As mentioned earlier, this tradition of intimidating “others” traces its origin to the Maidan. The power of such intimidation was clearly demonstrated during the tragedy in Odessa, a Russian-speaking city located on the Black Sea, where on May 2, 2014, forty-eight anti-Maidan protesters, encircled by radicals, died in fire; more than 200 survivors were left with burns and other injuries. The horrible death of anti-Maidan activists was publicly celebrated by nationalists, and this became the moment of truth for Ukrainian Russophones. They simply realized that there is no space for them in the new Ukraine. To survive, they needed either to immigrate or to keep silence, accommodating themselves to new realities. What we observe now is just another act of their tragedy that started on the Maidan.

6. Is the Western public aware of these trends, do you think? Has Western media covered this subject sufficiently, and have Western politicians been forceful enough in condemning it or pressuring Ukrainian leadership to change direction?

I have been following the coverage of the Ukrainian crisis by global media since 2013—the beginning of the Euromaidan, which led first to the Donbas war and later to the disaster that we are witnessing today—and I can say with confidence that Western media have not been presenting their readers and viewers meaningful accounts of what has been going on. In an overwhelming majority of cases, Western journalists have not been incorporating the opinions of Ukrainians with alternative, anti-Maidan perspectives. Consumers of global media products had little chance to learn anything valid about the insurgency in eastern Ukraine except that the rebels were “Russia-backed separatists,” “modernization losers,” “barbarians,” “thugs,” and alike. This one-dimensional vision of the Ukrainian crisis, established globally from its very onset, had tremendously significant consequences not only for the people of Donbas, who have been living in a state of war since 2014, but also for the whole of Ukraine, which in February 2022 was plunged into full-scale military conflict. 

During the current war, Western journalists overwhelmingly take Zelensky’s words at face value. Zelensky likes telling his global audiences different scary stories, for example, about “hundreds of cases of rape” committed by Russian soldiers, including “small children and even babies.” He provides brutal details of these crimes that—obviously—disgust and shock any human being. The problem with these stories is that many of them (if not all—I am not sure about this) were invented by Ukraine’s ex-Ombudsman Lyudmila Denisova, who was fired for these fabrications in June 2022. You can easily find this information in Ukrainian media (https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/06/27/7354838) but not in Western ones. This is just one example, but there are many of them. 

7. What role can Ukraine’s Western partners play here? The US and EU have long used financial aid and the possibility of EU membership as inducements to get Ukrainian leadership to liberalise its economy and advance anti-corruption efforts – could we take the same approach to prevent a slide toward authoritarianism?

I am an ethnic Ukrainian; all my relatives still live in Ukraine; and we have been arguing about the role of the West in the Ukrainian tragedy since the Maidan, which was presented by Western powers and Western media as a fight of “Ukrainians” for democracy and freedom. As it should be clear now, this is an outright lie as there was no unified Ukraine in the name of which Western powers spoke and acted. As I already told you, half of the country, which did not support the Maidan, was disregarded completely, which at the end of the day brough today’s disaster. A similar story happened with the “liberalization of economy” that you mention. This “liberalization” brought nothing else but new neoliberal experiments that have deprived Ukrainians of their land and deteriorated their living conditions. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian citizens (up to 70%) opposed the “liberalization” of the land market, but has this stopped the reformers supported by Western powers? No, amid the protests of Ukrainians, the adoption of the land reform was celebrated by Western ambassadors lobbying the interests of Western corporations—not Ukrainian citizens. Have any anti-corruption efforts of the West stopped corruption in Ukraine? No, it became rampant, and the recent revelations of corruption in the Ukrainian armed forces are very illustrative in this respect. Why should I or my relatives living in the east of Ukraine expect Western powers to be successful in preventing the country from sliding into authoritarianism if it was the Maidan, encouraged by the West (suffice it to remember Victoria Nuland distributing bread among the protesters), that marked the beginning of Ukraine’s persecution of political and cultural “others”? For me, these questions are purely rhetorical. I have no grounds to greet further “humanitarian interventions” of foreign powers in the name of a better future of Ukraine.

Olga Baysha, associate professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, and author of Democracy, Populism and Neoliberalism in Ukraine. Branko Marcetic is a staff writer for Jacobin.

Emphasis in text below is mine. – Natylie

By Fred Weir, Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 2023

Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin’s summit in Moscow was nominally meant to be about bringing peace to Ukraine. But it appears to have strengthened the countries’ partnership against the West.

When Chinese leader Xi Jinping arrived in Moscow on Monday for a three-day summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, one of the most talked about items on their agenda was a Chinese-mediated settlement for the war in Ukraine.

As Mr. Xi’s plane departed on Wednesday, though prospects were discussed and Mr. Putin lauded a 12-point Chinese list of principles for establishing peace, no specific progress publicly emerged.

But what did become clear is that the intense geopolitical pressures triggered by the war have driven Russia and China closer together.

The two leaders spent hours in closed, personal talks and signed a raft of new agreements aimed at cementing a strategic partnership that has been tightening for years. The deals included stepped-up military coordination, expanded trade, a “nearly finalized” compact to build a major new gas pipeline that would permanently divert Russian gas supplies from Europe to China, and more concerted efforts to remove the U.S. dollar from their mutual economic transactions.

Whether or not China plays peacemaker – which Russian commentators say is not likely to be a possibility until after further developments occur on the battlefield – a potentially more important byproduct of the war in Ukraine is to cement Russo-Chinese bonds. The two countries’ burgeoning relationship is mostly driven by their mutual alienation from the West – and from the United States in particular – and by the need to have each other’s back if the East-West confrontation escalates.

“The really new thing here is that the Chinese appear to have concluded that their relations with the U.S. are headed for full confrontation, if not conflict. That was not obvious even at the beginning of the Biden administration, but now it is. Things are getting worse and worse,” says Dmitry Suslov, a professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow. “The understanding has dawned that the Russia-China partnership makes each stronger vis-à-vis the U.S., that consolidating this partnership is an existential issue for both.”

“China as a truly global player”

Last month, the Chinese Foreign Ministry published a hefty indictment of “US Hegemony and its Perils,” which spells out a list of historical grievances and a manifesto for a new multipolar world order that dovetails very neatly with the Kremlin’s thinking.

“Hence, the economic and strategic partnership [that Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin] are forging is not merely mutually beneficial,” Mr. Suslov says. “In every area, from agriculture to finance, we see that China and Russia are pledging to supply each other with the critical resources necessary for survival. Even if we should find ourselves in a situation of complete economic blockade, we will be able to help each other deal with the challenges.”

Another new factor is that any uncertainty about who will be leading China for the foreseeable future has been dispelled with Mr. Xi’s reelection to an unprecedented third term as leader. Mr. Xi, in turn, took the extraordinary step of telling Mr. Putin publicly that he believes the Russian people will support Mr. Putin in upcoming 2024 presidential polls. The signal, Russian analysts say, is that these two leaders expect to be around for quite awhile, and are prepared to hatch serious long-range strategic plans.

“There is a whole new level to the relationship,” says Andrey Klimov, deputy head of the International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council, Russia’s upper house of parliament. “Xi is now really leader of China, and not just another general-secretary. He is ready to build a long-term strategic partnership; we are no longer talking just about the near horizon.”

Analysts say China is increasingly worried that most of its trade with the outside world passes through the Strait of Malacca, which could theoretically be cut in any conflict by the U.S. Navy. Next door Russia, with whom China shares a 2,600-mile border, is a veritable cornucopia of raw materials, energy, and undeveloped arable land. Its rail network also offers a potential link to Europe, while the Northern Sea Route over the top of Russia potentially offers a U.S. Navy-free path to the Atlantic Ocean for Chinese shipping. Russian analysts say it’s no coincidence that most of those areas, including joint development of the Arctic shipping route, were the subjects of intense discussion and many of the agreements signed during the talks.

Andrey Kortunov, academic director of the Russian International Affairs Council, which is affiliated with the Foreign Ministry, says that the consolidation of relations with Russia is a part of a broader Chinese outreach to the world, which is moving beyond the economics-led approach embodied in the Belt and Road Initiative.

“We see the Chinese becoming more active in Africa and Latin America. The so-called Chinese peace plan for Ukraine is part of this much bigger effort to position China as a truly global player, second to none,” he says. “Many people in the Global South are looking for new arrangements, and the principles outlined in that Chinese plan are broadly applicable, not just about Ukraine, but about the way the Chinese think the world should be run.”

Playing the long game

The Chinese and Russian leaders reportedly spent quite a while discussing the conflict in Ukraine, but had little of substance to say about it in their lengthy final statement.

“China would prefer to empathize with Russia in its standoff with the West, rather than openly support it in the conflict with Ukraine,” says Mr. Kortunov. “China does hope, down the road, to position itself to mediate in the war. That requires maintaining good relations with Kyiv. It should be remembered that China has big investments in Ukraine, has been a major trading partner, and would obviously also want to be a major player in any reconstruction efforts,” he says.

At the same time, there was no mention of last week’s arrest warrant for Mr. Putin, issued by the International Criminal Court, in the public record of Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin’s meetings. Mr. Suslov argues that the warrant was an attempt to influence Mr. Xi on moral grounds that proved unsuccessful. “Xi made it clear that he will not listen, much less succumb to Western pressures,” Mr. Suslov says.

No one knows whether Mr. Xi and Mr. Putin discussed any of the nuts and bolts that would be required in an eventual peace settlement such as territorial concessions, demilitarization, reparations, and neutrality status. But neither Moscow nor Kyiv seems remotely prepared for any such discussion at this point, and both are looking to future battlefield developments to set any hypothetical future negotiating table. Analysts say China is playing a long game here, and positioning itself to step in as mediator when the moment arises.

In a practical way, however, China does already provide Russia with a lot of goods that help keep its war economy running, as well as bolstering Moscow’s budget by purchasing a lot of Russian energy. The U.S. government has worried out loud that China could start providing arms to Russia – a very real concern considering that most Chinese weaponry, particularly ammunition, is derived from Soviet designs, and thus compatible with contemporary Russian systems.

Mr. Kortunov argues that, despite the very upbeat tone of the summit, China is not yet ready to completely throw in its lot with Russia.

“Much will depend on the future course of U.S.-China relations,” he says. “If they continue to deteriorate, as they are now, we can foresee the world splitting into two economic blocs. Then the logic of consolidating the full partnership with Russia will become overwhelming for China. Right now, I believe China still has strong economic interests to protect, and real hopes that, through diplomacy, a full confrontation with the U.S. can be avoided.”

By Sarah Lindemann-Komarova, Echo of Siberia Blog, 3/8/23

The one-year anniversary is behind us and the “fog of war” has maxed out. People can’t even agree who the combatants are. Is this a war between Ukraine and Russia, Russia vs. the US/”collective West”, Russia vs. NATO, the old “rules based international order” vs. multipolar world, economic hegemony vs. globalized economy, good vs. evil, proxy war, “unprovoked” aggression by an imperial madman, regime change operation…?

Things are quiet, considering the enormity of events, how much the world has changed since a year ago. In the Siberian communities where I live (an Altai Village and scientific suburb of Novosibirsk), the war remains a part of everyone’s life, every day.

Instead of sanctions, news exchange involves battlefield stories from family or friends serving as career military, volunteers, mobilized, or prisoners offered early release for 6 months of service. The reports describing near death experiences and the camaraderie are similar to what you hear from all sides in all wars.

· Some people left the country to protect a son from the draft, others to avoid mobilization or protest against the politics in Russia. Some have returned.

· Some anti-war people who stayed express their anguish on social networks. Some who left post vacation like pictures in their new locales.

· There are still occasional Z’s and V’s on cars, t-shirts, and buildings. Billboards honoring lost soldiers have appeared along the highway and murals have been painted on an apartment building and school. There is talk of honoring some by renaming streets in Novosibirsk.

· People share videos on our Village chat and social networks. A recent one featured the Governor bringing donated goods to the men serving in the Donbass. Another portrayed life for the Altai troops on the frontlines with throat singing in the background.

· Not once have I been harassed or challenged in any way because I am American.

On the American front, I am estranged from a couple of people, I have been accused of being the equivalent of a diarist in Dresden 1942, and told that it was for the best that my high school would not accept the Sputnik vaccine at my reunion because America would not be a comfortable environment for me now. I am not complaining, I offer these examples as a statement of fact and wonder.

The majority of my friends in the US have learned how to navigate the complexities of maintaining a relationship with someone who lives in a place they have been told is uniquely evil. Lifelong seekers they follow the news and some of them check in to see if I am OK and ask questions. In the beginning it was, “tell me what I don’t know”, now the questions are more specific. Most recently, wanting to know if it is true college kids are being conscripted (it isn’t), about the economy because “Lots of people in the US think the economy is in chaos, people starving, etc. “ (not starving, no chaos), and confirmation that more Ukrainian refugees fled to Russia than any other country, “this…confounds the conventional wisdom” (Yes, 1,300,000 more than second place Poland). Most notes begin or end with “thinking if you” and that means a lot.

Meanwhile, the State Department issued a travel advisory upgrade, “U.S. citizens residing or traveling in Russia should depart immediately.” I contacted an American friend in Moscow to ask if something changed there, “no”. For 30 years I have experienced the dissonance between life in Russia and how it is portrayed in the US. In the 90’s, the gap was filtered through the rose-colored glasses of a love affair.

Then, never has a country gone from “in” to “out” faster than Russia did on September 11, 2001. Overnight, Russia “experts” in the form of pundits, talking heads, journalists, and academics became irrelevant, vanishing from the airwaves and front pages of newspapers in pre-social media America. The largest country on earth no longer mattered. Russian language disappeared from University course catalogues along with scholarships and travel funding for students interested in studying Russia.

The media, academia, and US government were always Moscow-centric. But, since the beginning of the century the lens has progressively narrowed as the voices of human rights and opposition activists and liberal media were increasingly amplified in America. At the 2006 Civil Society leaders meeting with President Bush, 13 of the 15 participants were Moscow human rights organizations. Still, efforts were made to get a first hand understanding of what was happening at a grassroots level in the regions. My community and NGO development Foundation organized regular visits to Siberia for Moscow USAID staff and US Ambassadors who attended events and met with government, business, and NGO representatives. I was occasionally invited to Moscow to debrief USAID on the status of civil society in Siberia.

The 2009 “Reset” ended almost all of that regional outreach and input and the American perception of civil society in Russia became increasingly grim. Words like “crushed” appeared in contrast to what we were experiencing which was more and more people becoming active and sources of indigenous funding for NGOs continuing to grow. When community development activist Obama spoke at the US sponsored Civil Society leader’s summit there were only 5 community development representatives and 31 human rights and liberal media participants. 79 of the 91 Russian participants were from Moscow where 7% of the population live.

This was frustrating but I didn’t consider it dangerous until 2011 when Putin threw his newly smooth face into the Presidential election ring and street protests mobilized in Moscow. Russia was BACK only this time like Jack Nicholson in the Shining. One of the “Reset” leaders wrote an op-ed saying that Putin had never done anything positive for civil society. I contacted him to ask why he didn’t think Law #131 “On Local Self-Governance”, that mandated citizen input on issues of local significance, was not a step forward. He had never heard of it. The narrative was set, Russia, the disappointing problem child. Who lost Russia became the refrain, as if it was ever America’s to lose. And in 2012, USAID lost it’s authority to operate in Russia.

Levada Center’s March 2012 survey registered 68% support for Putin. That number did not impress Moscow based journalist Masha Gessen. During an interview with Charlie Rose, she described the most likely and best case scenario for Russia as, “the protest movement continues, there’s a large scale protest, Putin orders the use of force, decisive use of force, not what has been done the last couple of days and the interior troops do not obey the order. At this point he feels that he has no recourse, he has to negotiate for an exit, he has to negotiate for immunity from prosecution. That is when we get a transitional government that would essentially be technocratic for a year or two, rebuild the institutions that have been destroyed under Putin and hold new elections.” Rose follows up with, “How long will it take for Putin to be out?” Her response, “I think it is a matter of months, maybe a year or two.”

This type of anti-Putin frenzy was quaint compared to what happened when Trump arrived and Russiagate was launched. Escalating propaganda and sheer madness (both meanings of the word) characterized the post-Trump election media environment. During a 2017 visit to America, MSNBC blared from enormous flat screened TVs in homes of friends where I never noticed a TV before.

This situation left people who actually knew something about Russia unable to respond adequately when given the rare chance. Commenting on a Time Magazine cover with the blood red of St. Basil’s Cathedral drenching the White House “Carrie” style, real experts were reduced to, “and they are calling them domes when they are, of course, minarets”, anything to elevate the dialogue. Only in this case, the whole concept was stolen from Mad Magazine and the genuine merging of American satire, foreign policy, and news had occurred.

In 2018 things grew even more ominous when my Russian husband and I went to dinner at a friend’s fiancé’s family in Maine. An American, he was our neighbor for years in Altai before returning to the US. The next morning, he told us the liberal matriarch said we were not welcomed back. He apologized saying, “ she gets her new from Rachel Maddow”. My teenage daughter asked me, “why are the Russians in American TV shows and movies always bad people?”

Distorting the reality in Russia to make it seem worse than it is has brought blowback to the very forces it was meant to support. It also set a precedent where the more complex truth became irrelevant and/or a victim in order to achieve an “end” that was often disconnected from the quality of life issues the majority of people consider a priority.

Flash forward to today and regardless of who you believe is fighting or for what noble cause, it is bringing us to the brink of WW III. I assumed there was a uniqueness to this insanity until I came across a letter from my Cousin Rennie who was a Marine in the early days of Vietnam (1966). He was responding to a question a former Soviet soldier who served in Vietnam asked me on a train to Krasnoyarsk in December 1999, what was it like from the American perspective? Rennie’s reply, “Marines hate doing combat landings next to sailors getting suntans. What kind of a war was this anyhow? …Nobody knew…. Then I realized what kind of a war it was. Nobody knew what kind of a war it was — that was the kind of war it was. There were no turning points., everything was a turning point. Who could tell?”.

Almost 50 years later and it’s deja vous all over again right down to the M113 armed personnel carriers and rumblings of a domino theory. I fear my life has its bookends.

RT.com, 4/4/23

The main suspect in the murder of prominent Russian military blogger Vladlen Tatarsky, Darya Trepova, has confessed to investigators details of her involvement in the incident, according to the news outlet Fontanka.

Tatarsky was killed in an explosion on Sunday at a cafe in St. Petersburg, after Trepova handed him a gift, a statuette, that contained an improvised explosive device (IED). The bombing, which also wounded 40 people, has been classified as a terrorist attack.

According to Fontanka, Trepova claims that it all started when she made friends with a certain activist online and was offered to move to Kiev to take up an editorial position at an unnamed media channel. Before she could be hired, however, she was told that she had to undergo an internship to “prove that she knows how to deal with Russian propaganda.”

Her first task was to go to the Listva bookstore in St. Petersburg and strike up a friendship with Tatarsky, who was holding an event there. Afterwards, she was reportedly told via Telegram that she had to travel to Moscow. There, a taxi driver, who was likely unaware of what he was doing, gave Trepova a package that contained a golden figurine.

Upon receiving the package, Trepova was instructed to go back to St. Petersburg to meet with Tatarsky at the Street Bar 1 café, where he was holding another event for his followers. She was allegedly told to give the figurine to Tatarsky as a gift, and “come up with something about the heroes of the Wagner PMC,” according to Fontanka.

“Then, we will act,” Trepova was reportedly told by her handlers, who said they had booked her a flight to Uzbekistan, where she would be transported to Kiev. Trepova reported her every move to her contact, sending messages such as “I’m arriving at the cafe,” “I’m about to present the figurine to Tatarsky,” and “I’ve handed it over.”

Trepova reportedly insists that she did not know the figurine contained a bomb and has repeatedly claimed that she was set up. Fontanka says her arguments seem plausible since she did not leave the building after handing over the statuette, and did not hesitate to sit next to it when Tatarsky invited her to join him on stage not long before it detonated.

Fontanka reports that explosives experts are now examining the blast site to confirm that the bomb was activated via SIM card, which would have made it possible to detonate it from anywhere in the world.

By Kit Klarenberg, The Grayzone, 3/12/23

A peer-reviewed paper initially approved and praised by a prestigious academic journal was suddenly rescinded without explanation. Its author, one of the world’s top scholars on Ukraine-related issues, had marshaled overwhelming evidence to conclude Maidan protesters were killed by pro-coup snipers.

The massacre by snipers of anti-government activists and police officers in Kiev’s Maidan Square in late February 2014 was a defining moment in the US-orchestrated overthrow of Ukraine’s elected government. The death of 70 protesters triggered an avalanche of international outrage that made President Viktor Yanukovych’s downfall a fait accompli. Yet today these killings remain unsolved.

Enter Ivan Katchanovski, a Ukrainian-Canadian political scientist at the University of Ottawa. For years, he marshaled overwhelming evidence demonstrating that the snipers were not affiliated with Yanukovych’s government, but pro-Maidan operatives firing from protester-occupied buildings.

Though Katchanovski’s groundbreaking work has been studiously ignored by the mainstream media, a scrupulous study he presented on the slaughter in September 2015 and August 2021 and published in 2016 and in 2020 has been cited on over 100 occasions by scholars and experts. As a result of this paper and other pieces of research, he was among the world’s most-referenced political scientists specializing in Ukrainian matters…

Read full article here.