YouTube link here.

I post, you decide. Personally, I’ll believe all this talk about a deal to end the Ukraine war when I actually see it happen. – Natylie

Trump reveals he’s spoken with Putin by phone, says Russian president ‘wants to see people stop dying’ in Ukraine war

By Miranda Devine, New York Post, 2/8/25

President Trump has spoken to Russian leader Vladimir Putin on the phone to try to negotiate an end to the Ukraine war, he told The Post in an exclusive interview aboard Air Force One Friday.

“I’d better not say,” said Trump when asked how many times the two leaders have spoken.

But he believes Putin “does care” about the killing on the battlefield.

“He wants to see people stop dying,” said Trump.

“All those dead people. Young, young, beautiful people. They’re like your kids, two million of them – and for no reason.”

The three-year-old war “never would have happened” if he had been president in 2022, Trump asserted.

“I always had a good relationship with Putin,” he said, unlike his predecessor.

“Biden was an embarrassment to our nation. A complete embarrassment.”

Trump said he has a concrete plan to end the war.

“I hope it’s fast. Every day people are dying. This war is so bad in Ukraine. I want to end this damn thing.”

Addressing National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, who joined him in his study aboard Air Force One Friday night, the president said: “Let’s get these meetings going. They want to meet. Every day people are dying. Young handsome soldiers are being killed. Young men, like my sons. On both sides. All over the battlefield.”

Vice President Vance will meet Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky at the Munich Security Conference next week.

Trump has said he wants to strike a $500 million deal with Zelensky to access rare-earth minerals and gas in Ukraine in exchange for security guarantees in any potential peace settlement.

On Iran, Trump told The Post:  “I would like a deal done with Iran on non-nuclear. I would prefer that to bombing the hell out of it. . . . They don’t want to die. Nobody wants to die.”

“If we made the deal, Israel wouldn’t bomb them.”

But he would not reveal details of any potential negotiations with Iran: “In a way, I don’t like telling you what I’m going to tell them. You know, it’s not nice.”

“I could tell what I have to tell them, and I hope they decide that they’re not going to do what they’re currently thinking of doing. And I think they’ll really be happy.”

“I’d tell them I’d make a deal.”

As for what he would offer Iran in return, he said, “I can’t say that because it’s too nasty. I won’t bomb them.”

***

The Coming Threat of Major Trade War
By Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Substack, 2/9/25

How About We Lift Sanctions

The first also relates to a story in the New York Post, a Murdoch paper that has been described as the “paper of wreckage,” that claims that President Donald Trump has told The Post that he has talked with Russian President Vladimir Putin and that the two are agreed that they will talk.

There is certainly room for doubt as to the accuracy of this story but Mercouris is inclined to believe the general thrust of it. Further, his Moscow source is telling him that there are conversations in the Duma as to the likely content of the US starting position. A fairly dramatic one, as one might expect from Donald Trump, which is that the US would remove all or almost all sanctions on Russia and allow Russia to resume pipeline gas supplies to Europe by Nord Stream, in return for a Russian ceasefire.

But, that if Russia does not agree to this, then the US will launch an all-out trade war against Russia and all countries that deal with Russia. According to Mercouris’ source, and it is the assessment of Mercouris himself, as it is mine, many Russians are disinclined to think that the Kremlin should take this seriously.

Calling the Bluff

First of all, why would they believe any promise that the US makes, given the country’s litany of failed promises in the past (Minsk, Istanbul)? Especially, why would they think Washington would be OK with a resumption of pipeline supplies when Washington has so adamantly opposed these ever since Putin and Merkel embarked on Nord Stream, and when Washington remains desperate to beef up revenues from the sale of LNG to Europe?

Second of all, an all-out trade war would force China and India, both of them heavily dependent on Russian oil and gas, to take sides between Washington and Moscow and there is nothing about either of these two countries that would lead one to expect that they are about to abandon the meta-program of the BRICS or to abandon Russia to its fate at the hands of the US (as they know that the US will be coming for them, too). They would be simply giving up to Washington their dream of a multi-polar world.

Thirdly, many Russians suspect that the US is bluffing and that Russia must call its bluff. An all-out trade war would help develop a stronger coalition of anti-US forces (which may now include former US allies such as Canada and Mexico) to combat its trade measures; it would prompt Russia to undertake a total mobilization for an economic and military war; it would greatly elevate prices of energy world-wide and on practically everything else, and this would be very damaging for US consumers and the US economy.

Fourthly, there is nothing being said by Washington at this time, that patently and in good faith picks up on the broader challenge of an agreement that would meet Russia’s legitimate security interests and addresses the issue of a European security architecture (or, as I have said several times in recent days) a global security architecture that would also address China’s legitimate security interests.

Finally, it is every day more obvious that Trump wants to get the US out of Ukraine. The US is even giving up the chair of the next NATO meeting in Ramstein, a position that is being eagerly seized by (“friends with Ukraine for 100 years) the UK in the form of its defense minister, so is unlikely to want to press very hard on any deal he is offering Russia.

Iran Deal Redux

A second issue that is touched upon both in the New York Post story of Trump’s interview and also by Mercouris’ source, has to do with Iran, in the light of recent statements by its Supreme Leader,Ali Khameini that repeat the long-standing prohibition by fatwa against Iran’s development of nuclear weapons something that has also been confirmed over many years both by the CIA and by the UN’s IAEA but that has been spread about ad nauseum for the past twenty years by Netanyahu and is every so often seized upon and amplified by elements of the Israeli lobby and its mainstream media mouthpieces as just recently in a New York Times article that claims that Iranian scientists are discussing a short-cut route to nuclear weapons.

Trump claims he wants to do a deal with Iran that would give Washington and Israel the security (which in effect it already has) that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons in return for which Washington will lift some or all of the sanctions that it has imposed on Iran.

Khameini, however, is saying, quite understandably, that Iran will not enter into negotiations with the US. Why would it? The last time it did so (leading to the JCPOA), Trump in his first term welched on the deal. However, Iran and Russia now have a strategic partnership arrangement which puts the lid on the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Russia, therefore, is now in a position where it can offer guarantees to Washington that Iran will not develop nuclear weapons in return for which Washington can remove its sanctions on Iran and, at the same time and in the context of a package deal, remove sanctions on Russia and accept Russian conditions for a ceasefire deal on the Ukraine conflict (Istanbul Plus, the terms laid out by Putin in July 2024).

Russian Security

In brief, Russia’s diplomatic status in the Middle East, which appeared wobbly after the implosion of Assad in Syria, is now strengthened, first because of the strategic partnership agreement with Iran and second because the latest news from Damascus suggests that the new Turkish-backed and Western-supported terrorist leader of Syria, al-Jolani now favors the continued presence of Russia in Syria and the maintenance of its naval base in Tartous and its military base in Khmeimim. This could pave the way to coordination between Russian and Turkish forces in Syria, making life more challenging for Kurds to the northeast and east, and Israel to the south and to suppression of the worst feature of HTS rule, their vengeful aggressions towards Alawites and Christians. As things stand HTS has very little control over Syria beyond Damascus, and the economic and security situation of the country is fast deteriorating.

Washington-Moscow Deal on Tehran

In the context of Iran, therefore, it is not implausible that a solution to what for Washington is the “problem” of Iran could be resolved by an agreement between the US and Russia, one in which the voices of China and India would at a later date need to be heard. Similarly, in the context of Ukraine it is not implausible that a solution to what for Washington is the “problem” of Russia’s SMO could be resolved by an agreement between Washington and Moscow, which at a later date would involve China and possibly India, while the voices of Europe and Ukraine would be marginalized since neither bloc at this time seems capable of addressing the root causes of the problem or of negotiating in good faith.

Israeli Obduracy

Of course, none of this will placate Israel for whom the issue is nothing really to do with nuclear weapons – these are just a pretext weilded by a country, Israel, that has hundreds of nuclear weapons. What worries Israel is that Iran is a threat to Israel’s regional supremacy and that one day Iran could revert back to being Washington’s BFF, as it used to be before the 1979 revolution. And that Iran could be an obstacle to Zionist ambitions for a Greater Israel. Iran’s support for (but not control of) Hezbelloh in Lebanon and Syria, and of Hamas in Gaza, is a strong additional consideration. Israel will not be pleased that Hezbollah will once again enjoy a presence in the Lebanese parliament.

And even as it pretends to take Trump seriously on the US taking ownership of Gaza, Isreal prepares for further war and genocide.

Israeli Defense Minister Katz has ordered the IDF to prepare for the “departure” of Palestinians from Gaza, while framing this as “voluntary.” The plan will include “exit options via land crossings, as well as special arrangements for departure by sea and air.” Katz wants countries who have been critical of Israel’s genocide to allow Gazans to enter their territory. Not to do so, he claims, would be hypocritical. In other words, it is not just Egypt and Jordan that Israel would like to take Palestinians but also western countries like Ireland or Norway. Palestinians, Jordan and Egypt and other Arab countries are strongly opposed to such ideas as they are to a US takeover of Gaza. There is loose talk by the Trump administration about Palestinians leaving so that the land can be cleaned up for their return, but nobody seriously believes that Palestinians would ever be allowed to return.

Peace Talks, Zel and Europe

The prospect of being excluded from talks, along with clear indications from Washington that it wishes to get rid of Zelenskiy, if necessary by insisting that he call national parliamentary and presidential elections before the end of 2025, appears to be behind recent extremist statements from Zelenskiy about how Ukraine can develop its own dirty nuclear bomb and his persistent demands for more Western missiles and other weapons.

Zelenskiy appears not to want to proceed just yet with a bill that has already been prepared in the RADA that would lower the age by which men can be mobilized to 18, but instead favors a measure that would boost voluntary recruitment by offering better rewards. This may be because Zelenskiy understands that the mobilization measure would be deeply unpopular, and that if it led to the deaths of very large numbers of young people, as it well might, then he would be even less likely to survive than he already is. Also Zelenskiy must wonder whether the war will last for long enough to make it worthwhile for him to start an expensive, coercive mass mobilization right now.

Europe’s weakness continues to be undermined by turbulence in Germany over the flirtation between the CDU and its leader – and likely soon to be next chancellor – Merz, and AfD, which would conceivably give AfD some element of veto power over a continuation of the war with Russia over Ukraine.

In France the government of Francois Bayrou has just passed a budget by decree – the same, virtually, that brought down the previous government. The new measure has not, as was at first expected, led to a successful vote of no confidence, since it was not supported by Melanchon’s leftist bloc (now falling apart) with whom Bayrou had previously consulted and which has no reason to think it would do very well in a likely ensuing election to replace Macron at this time, while Marine Le Pen’s National Rally also calculated that its interests would not be best met if there were to be presidential elections just yet. Another vote of confidence is anticipated very soon in relation to government immigration proposals.

By Richard Connolly, RUSI, 1/22/25

Russia’s economic resilience is defying expectations, enabling the Kremlin to sustain its war efforts in Ukraine despite mounting challenges, and raising doubts about hopes for a swift resolution.

Russia regained the momentum on the battlefield in Ukraine last year. Although Russian progress remains slow and costly, the outlook for the year ahead is bleak. Ukraine’s energy system has been heavily damaged by Russian air strikes, and its forces continue to lose ground in southern Donetsk, where the heaviest fighting is taking place.

Perhaps most importantly, political shifts in some of Kyiv’s key allies – especially the US – could result in crucial financial and military aid being substantially reduced in the year ahead. Together, these trends raise the prospect of Ukraine being forced to accept a crushing defeat after three years of heroic resistance.

Against this lugubrious backdrop, many analysts have seized on what appears to be a rare bright spot: Russia’s faltering ‘war economy’, which – according to some – is ‘Putin’s greatest weakness’. An acute labour shortage, persistent and rising inflation caused by soaring military expenditure, and ever-tightening sanctions will – it is claimed – finally bring about an economic crisis that will force Moscow to abandon its maximalist aims in Ukraine and bring about an end to the war on terms more acceptable to Kyiv and its allies.

Sadly, these hopes are likely to prove misplaced. Russia’s economy has confounded expectations throughout the war and, despite suffering several complications, remains well-placed to support the Kremlin’s ambitions in Ukraine and beyond.

Dashed Hopes…

This is not the first time that Kyiv’s supporters have placed their hopes in Russia’s economy proving to be its Achilles’ heel. In the early months of the war, analysts forecast that Russia would suffer a severe and long recession that would cause living standards to slump and the state’s fiscal resources to dwindle. Moscow, it was hoped, would be forced to make an embarrassing retreat with potentially fatal consequences for President Vladimir Putin and the ruling elite.

But these hopes were soon dashed. The imposition of capital controls, a surge in federal expenditure, and the successful reorientation of foreign trade at breakneck speed arrested the signs of economic distress observed in the first months of the war.

Although Russia did not avoid a recession in 2022, it was much shallower than expected (GDP fell by only 1.9%) as the economy adapted to its new circumstances. Growth exceeded nearly all expectations in 2023 (3.6%), with this momentum continuing into 2024. Output is likely to have expanded by 3.6–4% last year.

…Raised Again

Nevertheless, the quantitative expansion of the last two years has been accompanied by growing signs of weakness on several important economic indicators, raising questions over the quality and sustainability of Russia’s better-than-expected performance.

Mounting labour shortages, fuelled by the demands of war, are just one factor that threatens to derail growth. The massive expansion of the military and defence-industrial production has drawn large numbers of men away from the civilian labour force.

Although Russia undoubtedly faces significant challenges, there is little to suggest that these will result in any significant political consequences that might prompt the Kremlin to rein in its ambitions in Ukraine

Along with rising demand from other sectors of the briskly growing economy, this has caused the supply of labour to tighten considerably. Unemployment reached 2.3% in October, a post-Soviet record low. Maintaining the current rate of economic growth will only be possible if Russia utilises its existing labour force more efficiently.

Labour shortages are not the Kremlin’s only problem. Western sanctions and a shrinking trade surplus contributed to a sharp depreciation of the ruble last year, causing import prices to rise and amplifying inflationary pressures.

At the end of November, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) recorded an annual inflation rate of 8.9%, well above the bank’s target rate of 4%. Even this rate likely understates the real extent of price growth, with some staple goods registering price increases in excess of 70%.

In an attempt to quell inflationary pressures, the CBR raised the key rate throughout the year, setting it at a post-Soviet high of 21% in October. Many businesses now find the cost of borrowing prohibitive.

Many analysts have attributed these signs of overheating to elevated spending on the war in Ukraine, pointing to record-high military expenditure which is expected to have reached over 7% of GDP in 2024. With defence spending expected to rise by nearly 25% this year, accounting for around 40% of federal government expenditure, some have raised the prospect of Russia slipping into ‘stagflation’, combining high inflation with low to no growth.

Finally, with new UK and US sanctions targeting Russia’s oil industry, and G7 states seeking to tighten the enforcement of the oil ‘price cap’, some hope that Moscow’s vital hydrocarbon revenues will be crimped even further, exacerbating the losses caused by the collapse of Russian gas exports to Europe and flagging coal sales.

Desperate but not Serious

Unfortunately, hopes of an imminent economic crisis are unlikely to be realised. Although Russia undoubtedly faces significant challenges, there is little to suggest that these will result in any significant political consequences that might prompt the Kremlin to rein in its ambitions in Ukraine.

The tight labour market has benefitted many Russians used to stagnant income growth in the decade before the war. Real wages have soared since 2022, fuelling the fastest sustained growth in consumer spending in over a decade. Soaring military production and record-high wages for soldiers have helped reduce some of Russia’s chronic regional inequalities.

Crucially, the absence of a large pool of latent labour need not constrain growth so long as labour productivity continues to rise. Russia’s low-productivity economy means that there are plenty of easy wins available for firms prepared to undertake simple organisational changes or investment in new machinery.

Inflation also has its advantages. Rising prices send important signals to firms to expand supply by investing in areas where prices are growing fastest. Investment – chronically low for most of the post-Soviet period – has grown faster than GDP since the war began. Rising prices have also helped swell public coffers, with turnover taxes like VAT growing at record levels and boosting the Kremlin’s fiscal position.

The CBR’s record-high key rate is not as damaging as it might be in a Western economy, either. Large swathes of Russian business – including those in strategically important sectors – can access state-subsidised loans at considerably lower interest rates. Even those firms unable to access subsidised loans will be able to use record-high retained earnings to finance investment.

Russian consumers have also benefitted from state support. Most mortgages offered during the recent housing boom were taken on at subsidised rates.

Even the extent to which Russia has a ‘war economy’ is exaggerated. While the broad NATO measure of military expenditure is likely to account for around 40% of federal spending this year, this will amount to closer to 20% of Russia’s consolidated state spending (that is, including both regional and national expenditure).

Although this is high, it is comparable to US military spending during the Vietnam War. The militarisation of the economy has undoubtedly grown. However, it remains well below the crippling levels observed in the ‘hyper-militarised’ Soviet economy.

Importantly, many of the features of true war economies – such as price controls, the centralised allocation of resources, and widespread nationalisation of private sector assets – have yet to appear in Russia. 

Sources of Resilience

If Russia’s weaknesses are not as severe as many hope, its sources of strength and durability also remain impressive.

Take the country’s balance sheet. Despite fighting the most intense war in Europe since 1945, Moscow has managed to fund the war with staggeringly modest budget deficits of between 1.5–2.9% of GDP since 2022. As a result, the Kremlin has barely had to borrow to fund the war. At around 15% of GDP, Russia has the smallest state debt-to-GDP ratio of the G20 economies.

Despite being cut off from most external sources of capital, Russia remains more than capable of financing domestic investment and government expenditure with its own resources. Over the past two years, Russia has recorded a surplus on its current account – that is, the gap between aggregate savings and investment – of around 2.5% of GDP. For as long as Russia can continue to export large volumes of oil, this is unlikely to change.

Designed to ensure that the Kremlin can pursue a sovereign foreign policy against the interests of the collective West, Russia’s economic system is doing its job

Crucially, the Kremlin’s fiscal position remains very healthy. Tax revenues generated by domestic activity have soared since the war began. Oil and gas revenues are forecast to account for 28% of federal government tax receipts in 2024, significantly lower than the 53% recorded in 2018.

Even if export revenues slump, perhaps due to a looming trade war or China’s spluttering economy, Russia has plenty of resources it could tap to maintain elevated levels of state spending. The largely state-owned banking system is sitting on piles of cash that could be paid as dividends to their owner: the state. Banks could also be directed to buy government bonds, as they were at the end of 2024. If all else fails, the CBR could buy government bonds.

Importantly, Russia’s resilience is not purely financial in nature. The foundations of the market economy built in the turbulent 1990s remain strong. Much of Russia’s unexpected adaptability has come not only from its well-trained and professional economic managers, but also from its large and growing class of private business.

Accustomed to operating in an often hostile and challenging business environment, privately owned firms have exploited the opportunities created by sanctions to supply soaring demand from the government and consumers. The number of registered private businesses has grown briskly since the war began, reaching a record high in 2024. It is this strong base of commercially oriented firms that will enable Russia to continue adapting to sanctions and the demands of war.

Calibrating Expectations

To be clear, Russia’s economic prospects are far from rosy. Property rights remain weak, and the state’s role in the economy is high and growing. The vagaries of the international oil market always retain the potential to generate a strong external shock. Western sanctions will also continue to raise the cost of doing business and restrict the flow of know-how to Russian businesses. As a result, Russia is unlikely to join the ranks of high-income countries any time soon.

However, the country’s poor long-term prognosis should not lead us to overlook its short-term resilience. Throughout its 500-year history, Russia’s economic system has rarely delivered broad-based growth or economy-wide innovation for long. Instead, the needs of the market have usually been subordinated to the needs of the state, often to enable the Kremlin to pursue security-related objectives.

Today’s system is no different. Designed to ensure that the Kremlin can pursue a sovereign foreign policy against the interests of the collective West, it is doing its job. The market is strong enough to give the system adaptability and dynamism. And the state is strong enough to ensure that sufficient resources are mobilised towards achieving its security objectives.

For as long as this equilibrium remains intact, Russia will be able to generate the necessary economic resources to sustain enough military power to wage war in Ukraine and, over the longer term, to rearm for a prolonged confrontation with the West. Any hopes that its economic vulnerabilities will bring it to the negotiating table are therefore unlikely to be realised.

YouTube link here.

USAID Funded Censorship, Smears of Americans (Excerpt)

By Lee Fang, Substack, 2/4/25

…The sprawling agency [USAID] has financed groups that have engaged in smear campaigns and efforts to silence prominent American dissident voices…

But most troubling, the foreign assistance agency has financed a network of groups in Ukraine that have spread unsubstantiated claims that American voices in favor of peace negotiations with Russia are agents of the Kremlin.

American government entities face restrictions on spreading such propaganda against domestic targets. The foreign nexus of USAID provides a convenient loophole. American grants and contracts flow, often through third-party intermediaries, to a network of foreign recipients, which can push to silence American journalists and politicians through outside advocacy.

In Ukraine, USAID, through its contractor Internews, supports a network of social media-focused news outlets, including New Voice of Ukraine, VoxUkraine, Detector Media, and the Institute of Mass Information. These news outlets have produced a series of videos and reports targeting economist Jeffrey Sachs, commentator Tucker Carlson, journalist Glenn Greenwald, and Professor John Mearsheimer as figures within a controlled “network of Russian propaganda.”

The influence of these outlets extends far beyond the borders of Ukraine. VoxUkraine, for instance, is an official fact-checking partner to Meta and helps the social media giant censor so-called disinformation. Detector Media similarly produces English-language disinformation reports widely circulated through western media.

Despite branding as independent outlets, these organizations are heavily reliant on USAID…

Full article available here. (I have a paid subscription to Lee Fang’s Substack, so I think this full article may be behind a pay wall for non-subscribers. You can read his in-depth article from April of 2024 on this topic for free at Real Clear Investigations. – Natylie)

The above video episode was posted on 1/23/25

“Russian News, voiced into English. Here you will see Russian political news, statements and speeches of the President of Russia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, the Minister of Defense of Russia, the representative of Russia in the UN Security Council, as well as political news and analytical programs recorded directly from Russian television.”

https://www.youtube.com/@Russian_News_Ch/videos

By Andrew Korybko, Asia Times, 2/4/25

Trump’s confirmed interest in Ukraine’s critical and rare earth minerals is being interpreted by some as beneficial for President Volodymyr Zelensky amid uncertainty about the new US president’s commitment to Ukraine. One of the points from Zelensky’s so-called “Victory Plan” calls for letting his country’s allies to extract its minerals.

New Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently warned about the strategic advantage that China derives from its control over the world’s rare earth mineral supply chain so he might have influenced Trump’s views on the issue in relation to Ukraine.

US Senator Lindsey Graham raised awareness of Ukraine’s rare earth riches during his trip there last June, after which he claimed that Ukraine was sitting on US$10-12 trillion worth of such wealth.

Trump 2.0’s foreign policy focus on more muscularly containing China in all ways predictably predisposed him to appreciate the abovementioned point from Zelensky’s “Victory Plan.”

The problem, though, is that the bulk of Ukraine’s critical mineral wealth is under Russian control while Ukrainian forces continue to retreat.

At the same time, US Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia Keith Kellogg’s suggestion that Ukraine needs to hold long-delayed elections was seen as reflecting Trump’s interest in brokering a ceasefire, after which martial law can be lifted, the elections could be held, and a new Ukrainian government can then begin peace talks.

This expectation contrasts with what Trump said a few days later about his interest in Ukraine’s (largely Russian-controlled) rare earth mineral deposits and the attendant possibility for proxy escalation of the war.

Instead of abandoning his efforts to freeze the Ukrainian conflict by doubling down on military aid in the hope that Zelensky’s forces can then recapture these deposits from Russian control, which could perpetuate the proxy war and thus derail his foreign policy agenda, Trump might instead try to cut a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

One of the conditions that Trump could make for coercing Ukraine into withdrawing from at least some of the territory that Russia claims as its own might be for Putin to sell some of these rare earth and other critical minerals to the US.

Putin might agree to this depending on how far Trump is able to coerce Ukraine into withdrawing. There’s also a pragmatic argument in favor of this arrangement in that it could form a trust-building measure for the US one day, allowing the EU to partially resume some Russian gas pipeline imports.

The purpose would be to restore a degree of Russia and the EU’s pre-conflict economic interdependence, albeit this time under US supervision, as a reward for Russia complying with a ceasefire.

Russia requires capital and technology to fully exploit the rare earth deposits that are now under its control, both of which could be provided by the US, with the first possibly involving the return of some seized Russian assets so long as they are invested in this endeavor.

If successfully implemented, then this proposal could lead to more creative diplomacy of the sort suggested at the end of this analysis here for depriving China of Russia’s enormous resource wealth, which aligns with Trump’s foreign policy goals.

Ukraine wouldn’t be left completely in the lurch, however, since other smaller rare earth mineral deposits still remain under its control. These could be given to the US in exchange for continued military aid, even if the latter is curtailed compared to its height under the Biden administration in the run-up to summer 2023’s ultimately doomed counteroffensive.

If Trump reached an agreement with Putin on the Russian-controlled deposits, then Zelensky would have little choice but to agree to this deal.

Far from the full military support that he expected to receive in pursuit of recapturing those lost deposits, Zelensky would only end up with whatever the cost-conscious Trump administration determines is the absolute minimum that the US considers that Ukraine requires for keeping the peace.

This is the best outcome for those on all sides who truly want peace, but it will require substantial political will from both the US and Russia, along with the US coercing Ukraine into agreeing – none of which at this juncture can be guaranteed.