By Uriel Araujo, InfoBrics, 2/6/25

Uriel Araujo, PhD is a writer and anthropology researcher with a focus on international and ethnic conflicts.

An Estonia court has recently convicted members of a neo-Nazi terrorist group called Feuerkrieg Division, which is known to plan attacks. Meanwhile the Slovak police issued a warning about a Nazi group plotting violent attacks. According to the Internal Security Service, such extremism has the potential to escalate and has been spreading over the last years.

Meanwhile, just last week the Slovak police issued a warning about a Nazi organization named “Valhalla” connected to violent attacks. I’ve written much about the reality of neo-Nazism and its role in post-Maidan Ukrainian politics, but there is a larger context: National-Socialist (Nazi) ideology and its variants remain a real problem in post-Soviet states in Eastern and Central Europe (including Baltic nations). This international far-right network has a presence in Western Europe, too, although it is particularly active in Central and Eastern Europe.

For instance, this year once again, as has been the case every February, hundreds of neo-fascist and neo-Nazi activists will soon gather in Budapest to commemorate the Nazi German 1945 failed attack against the Soviet army, calling it the “Day of Honour”. On that day German and Hungarian forces battled against Soviet troops. The event involves a music festival with various far-right bands, and the revenue is said to fund extremist organizations, including terrorist groups, as is often the case with such concerts.

In December last year a neo-Nazi musical event in Budapest co-organized by a “Nordic Sun Cultural Foundation” was raided by Hungarian authorities. One of the bands invited is named Der Stürmer, after the infamous anti-semitic German tabloid of the Reich period. It is part of the NSBM (National Socialist Black Metal) movement.

There is a recurring theme in all such groups and events, namely anti-Soviet speech, which translates itself into Russophobia. In a number of countries there are of course historical grievances involving some Soviet measures, and such politics of memory is employed to mobilize anti-Russian discourse and to fuel national and ethnic chauvinism.

In this context, Third Reich forces and its allies as well as Nazi collaborators are typically glorified as heroes in a sacred struggle against communism or Russian (and Jewish) domination, the way they often phrase it. The Soviet Union is thus equated with the Russian Federation.

In this context, monuments honoring Soviet soldiers of forces who fought against the Third Reich have been often vandalized. This happened recently in Kosice, for instance – Slovakia’s second-largest city. Such Slovakian monuments have also been painted with Ukrainian flags, interestingly enough. One could go on and on with similar cases.

The matter goes beyond radical groups, sometimes reaching state and official level. Such has been the case in Latvia, for instance, for many years. Every March 16, many Latvians parade the streets of Riga to celebrate their veterans of Second World War Two, who fought alongside Nazi forces against the Soviet Union. Albeit shocking to most of the Western world, this is rather common across Baltic countries: in 2019, for example, Cherrie Daniels, US diplomat, called on Lithuania to not glorify Holocaust collaborators. Such Waffen SS veterans were not just anti-Communists: they took part in massacring Jews.

It has been a huge controversy in Canada, as well. In 2018, Canadian public opinion was urging its government (which has soldiers based there) to denounce Latvia for such parades. Ironically enough, as recently as 2023 the Canadian parliament honoured Yaroslav Hunka, an elderly Ukrainian Canadian who fought in SS Division Galicia (Waffen-SS) of the Nazi Party. He proudly described having taken part in the struggle against Russia, drawing parallels with the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and got a standing ovation. The affair became a scandal.

The glorification of Nazi forces and collaborators and the attacks on the memory of those who fought against the Third Reich (including monuments) played a large part in the development of the tensions which escalated into the Donbass War, since the 2014 nationalist Maidan revolution in Ukraine. Ukraine in fact is an extreme case, where the far-right and even neo-Nazis, albeit a minority of voters, hold tremendous power, politically and also in the military and paramilitary realm (the Azov regiment being merely the most famous one).

The situation is contradictory to the point that a native Russian-speaking Jewish President, Volodymyr Zelensky, is literally hostage to ultra-nationalist militias and military, including Nazis, who are on the record stating, like Dmytro Yarosh, that Zelensky would end up “hanging on a tree on Khreshchatyk” if he ever “betrayed” Ukrainian nationalists by negotiating with Moscow to end the (Donbass) conflict.

It is no wonder Ukraine became a new hub for the far-right globally, as TIME magazine reported back in 2021. Moreover, the SITE Intelligence Group, a private organization that tracks extremist organizations, has warned about far-right militias in Europe joining Ukrainian nazis in their struggle. All the Nazi regalia and SS helmets routlined caught on camera among Ukrainian soldiers are quite real: those are not just fashion statements.

Post-Maidan Ukraine does not only fuel and promote neo-Nazism internationally – it also invites antagonism from competing ultra-nationalist forces. The chauvinistic nature of the current Ukraine regime, as I wrote, alienates its national minorities (not just ethnic Russian and pro-Russian ones) and thereby enhances tensions with neighboring countries such as Poland and Hungary, who in turn have their own problems with their own strands of irredentist ultra-nationalism.

To sum it up, radical anti-Russian feelings today are largely connected to an “alternative” pro-Nazi reading of World War II key events. If unchecked, these forces could unleash the total “maidanization” of Europe, a trend one can already see.

Reuters, 2/21/25

Summary

-Russia may concede frozen assets for Ukraine reconstruction, sources say

-Russia will demand some of the funds for territories it controls, sources says

-US and Russian officials met in Riyadh, not clear if frozen funds discussed

MOSCOW, Feb 21 (Reuters) – Russia could agree to using $300 billion of sovereign assets frozen in Europe for reconstruction in Ukraine but will insist that part of the money is spent on the one-fifth of the country that Moscow’s forces control, three sources told Reuters.

Russia and the United States held their first face-to-face talks on ending the Ukraine war on Feb. 18 in Saudi Arabia and both U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin have said they hope to meet soon.

After Putin sent troops into Ukraine in 2022, the United States and its allies prohibited transactions with Russia’s central bank and finance ministry, blocking $300-$350 billion of sovereign Russian assets, mostly European, U.S. and British government bonds held in a European securities depository.

While discussions between Russia and the United States are at a very early stage, one idea being floated in Moscow is that Russia could propose using a large chunk of the frozen reserves for rebuilding Ukraine as part of a possible peace deal, according to three sources with knowledge of the matter.

Swathes of eastern Ukraine have been devastated by the war and hundreds of thousands of soldiers killed or injured on both sides while millions of Ukrainians have fled to European countries or Russia. A year ago, the World Bank estimated reconstruction and recovery would cost $486 billion.

The sources spoke to Reuters on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the discussions and because discussions are only preliminary. The Kremlin declined to comment.

The idea that Russia may agree to using the frozen money to help rebuild Ukraine has not been previously reported, and may give an insight into what Russia is willing to compromise on as Moscow and Washington seek to end the war, at a time when Trump is pushing for U.S. access to Ukrainian minerals to repay Washington’s support.

Russia’s main demands to stop the fighting include a withdrawal of Kyiv’s troops from Ukrainian territory Moscow claims and an end to Ukraine’s ambitions to join NATO. Ukraine says Russia must withdraw from its territory, and wants security guarantees from the West. The Trump administration says Ukraine has unrealistic, “illusionary” goals.

Reuters could not establish whether the idea of using the frozen funds was discussed between Russia and U.S. counterparts in the Saudi meeting.

The Group of Seven stated in 2023 that the Russian sovereign funds will remain frozen until Russia pays for the damage it inflicted in Ukraine. Trump has said he would like Russia to return to the G7, a grouping of wealthy nations.

Russian Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina said on Thursday the bank was not part of any talks on lifting sanctions or unfreezing of Russia’s reserves.

Russia has previously said plans to use the funds in Ukraine amounted to robbery.

The Ukrainian foreign ministry and the White House did not immediately respond to requests for comment. The British Foreign Office declined to comment.

“Nothing about Ukraine and the EU can be decided without Ukraine and the EU,” said Anitta Hipper, a spokesperson for the European Commission. She said the EU and member states were helping Ukraine strengthen its position ahead of any talks, including with a new round of sanctions on Russia.

Renaissance Capital lead analyst Oleg Kouzmin said the differences between the United States and Europe, which controls most of the assets, would complicate a lifting of the freeze.

“It would require the European side to fully back the current stance of the U.S. aimed at dialog with Russia,” Kouzmin said, calling such a scenario “very optimistic”.

TWO THIRD SPLIT?

Russia’s frozen sovereign assets have been the subject of intense debate in the West with some proposing it be essentially given to Ukraine through a complex “repatriation loan”, opens new tab.

One source with knowledge of the discussions in Moscow said that Russia could accept up to two-thirds of the reserves going to the restoration of Ukraine under a peace deal, provided there were accountability guarantees.

The rest could go to the Russian-controlled territories in eastern Ukraine that Russia now considers to be part of Russia, said the source.

Another source with knowledge of discussions said that Moscow would agree to using the money to rebuild Ukraine but that it was too early to say what the possible division might be. Two sources stressed that it was important to discuss which companies would get future contracts for reconstruction.

A different source, close to the Kremlin but not directly involved in the discussions, said that Russia would still demand the lifting of the freeze on the assets as part of gradual sanctions relief.

Several Western officials, especially in the German government and European Central Bank, have been reluctant to simply confiscate sovereign reserves, warning that such a move could face legal challenges and undermine the euro as a reserve currency.

Russian officials have repeatedly warned that the state confiscation of assets goes against free market principles, destroys banking security and erodes faith in reserve currencies. In retaliation, Russia has drafted legislation to confiscate funds from companies and investors from so-called unfriendly states, those that have hit it with sanctions. The bill has not yet been voted in Russia’s State Duma lower house.

EUROPEAN FREEZE

At the time the assets were frozen, Russia’s central bank said it held around $207 billion in euro assets, $67 billion in U.S. dollar assets and $37 billion in British pound assets.

It also had holdings comprising $36 billion of Japanese yen, $19 billion in Canadian dollars, $6 billion in Australian dollars and $1.8 billion in Singapore dollars. Its Swiss franc holdings were about $1 billion.

Russia reports its total gold and foreign exchange reserves as around $627 billion, including the frozen funds. The value of Russia’s frozen assets fluctuates according to bond prices and currency movements.

The bank’s biggest bond holdings were in the sovereign bonds of China, Germany, France, Britain, Austria and Canada. Russia’s gold reserves were held in Russia.

Around 159 billion euros of the assets were managed by Belgian clearing house Euroclear Bank as of early last year, Euroclear has said.

While the freezing of the funds has angered Moscow, some of Russia’s most outspoken war hawks have previously acknowledged Russia may eventually part with the frozen reserves, provided that the controlled territories stay within Russia.

“I propose a solution. They pay this money towards our purchase of those territories, those lands that want to be with us,” said Margarita Simonyan, head of the Russian state broadcaster RT, in 2023.

The Russian-controlled territories of Ukraine account for about 1% of Russia’s gross domestic product, but some economists believe that their share could grow quickly if they remain with Russia when the war ends.

The regions already provide around 5% of Russia’s grain harvest.

By Kyle Anzalone, Libertarian Institute, 2/24/25

President Donald Trump’s Middle East Envoy, Steve Witkoff, explained that talks on ending the Ukraine war are in the Istanbul Protocol Agreement framework. That protocol refers to a deal that was nearly signed between Kiev and Moscow that would have ended the war in Ukraine within a few months. 

Witkoff gave multiple interviews on Sunday, discussing ongoing negotiations about the Ukraine War. He told CNN that a deal was “very close” and could be completed in the coming week.

Witkoff said the current talks follow the Istanbul Protocol Agreement. “There were very, very what I’ll call cogent and substantive negotiations framed in something that’s called the Istanbul Protocol Agreement.” He continued, “We came very, very close to signing something, and I think we’ll be using that framework as a guidepost to get a peace deal done between Ukraine and Russia, and I think that will be an amazing day.”

In March and April 2022, the first months after the Russian invasion, US allies Israel and Turkey hosted talks between Ukraine and Russia. In Istanbul, the two sides agreed to the outline of an agreement. 

Under that deal, Russia would withdraw from territory seized after the invasion in exchange for Ukrainian neutrality and limits on its military. In addition, Kiev would recognize Crimea as Russian and its Western backers would lift sanctions on Moscow. 

However, Washington and London did want to end the war so soon after the invasion and promised Kiev to provide Ukraine with all the support it would need to win the war. At the time, some members of NATO saw the war as an opportunity to use Ukraine to weaken Russia. 

In April 2022, then-UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson traveled to Kiev and informed Ukrainian President Zelensky that he would not receive Western support if he signed the deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin. 

In the following two years, Russia has annexed four additional regions of Ukraine. It is unclear how the current deal would differ from the initial Istanbul Protocol Agreement, as Putin has said Russia will not return annexed territory. Since talks broke down, at least hundreds of thousands have died in the conflict, with President Trump asserting the true death toll is in the millions. 

On Monday, Trump indicated he would be willing to lift sanctions on Moscow, or at least begin to normalize the economic relationship between the superpowers, as part of a deal to end the war in Ukraine. “I am in serious discussions with President Vladimir Putin of Russia concerning the ending of the War, and also major Economic Development transactions which will take place between the United States and Russia,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. “Talks are proceeding very well!”

US and Russian offices are preparing to meet for another round of talks later this week.

YouTube link here.

Mises Wire, 12/12/24

[Provoked: How Washington Started the New Cold War with Russia and the Catastrophe in Ukraine, by Scott Horton, The Libertarian Institute, 2024; 690 pp.]

“A fox knows many things, but a hedgehog knows one big thing.” Scott Horton is the liberty movement’s foreign policy hedgehog, endeavoring to convince the American public of one essential truth: the folly of war. But within that sphere, Horton is a fox, weaving an encyclopedic knowledge of various conflicts into an elaborate and convincing tapestry that indicts elites, intellectuals, the military-industrial complex, and—with characteristic vitriol—neoconservatives in pushing the US toward unnecessary wars.

Provoked: How Washington Started the New Cold War with Russia and the Catastrophe in Ukraine, fits this mold to a tee—not because Horton contorts facts to a preconceived narrative. Rather, because it is often the same people pushing conflict after conflict who, unsurprisingly, resort to the same, well-worn playbook. Horton’s tome is riveting, from beginning to end. Here, I will focus on the early post-Cold War years, since this part of the story is oft-neglected in contemporary debates about the origins of the Ukraine war.

With the closing of the Cold War, and the USSR dissolving, the US faced a crisis of success: what use is the NATO military alliance without the Soviet enemy to align against? More broadly, what grand strategy should the US adopt now that containing communism was obsolete? For neoconservatives, whose answer post-Cold War was benevolent global hegemony, the solution was to adapt NATO. NATO must gradually absorb more European nations, while leaving Russia out in the cold—contained and encircled, in an even worse position than during the Cold War. NATO must expand its mission to keep European peace and expand Western democracy, or wither on the vine.

From George H.W. Bush to today, the record meticulously compiled by Horton demonstrates that US and other Western leaders communicated to Russia leaders and officials that NATO would not expand east—and could even allow for Russian membership in NATO. Various efforts like the Partnership for Peace and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe were promoted to foster this impression that Russia would be included in European affairs, alliances, and institutions, rather than these structures aligning against them. All the while, these same US and Western leaders took virtually the opposite positions internally, with the result that the US willfully misled the Russians. The exact internal and external postures waxed and waned over the years, but this ultimate pattern held firm. This was even though, all along, Russian officials warned about how they and the Russian people would react to NATO advancing east. What we see is, in terms with which Americans are well-familiar, “a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object.”

It began with George H.W. Bush, who promised Mikhail Gorbachev, after the fall of the Berlin Wall as the Soviet Union careened towards collapse, that the US would not take advantage of the situation. This was also reflected in a NATO resolution on June 7, 1991. Bush and his advisors promised that NATO would not expand if the Soviet Union would withdraw and allow German reunification. The 1990 settlement would only specify that the US would not put troops in East Germany, a nuance which Russia hawks have exploited to argue there was no promise not to expand NATO. But this does not fly. Horton asks the rhetorical question: what sense would it make for the Soviet Union to extract a promise not to put troops in East Germany, if the US had a free hand to bring the rest of Eastern Europe into a military alliance? This agreement only makes sense on a backdrop of agreeing not to expand NATO.

The sins of the Clinton years were legion. In the early 90s, the US sent economists from the Harvard Institute of International Development to Russia to enact what came to be called a “shock therapy” economic policy. It was so badly designed and had such poor outcomes that many Russian thought it must be deliberate. Unsurprisingly, this did not dispose ordinary Russians to view the West favorably. Throughout the decade, Clinton and his advisors duplicitously offered Russia promises that a “Partnership for Peace” process would be pursued rather than NATO expansion—and that NATO would lose its military character—all the while planning to expand NATO.

The Clinton administration was heavily involved in the Balkans wars of Bosnia and Kosovo, which present strong cases against “humanitarian” intervention. The result of Bosnia was that NATO proved itself capable of fulfilling a new mission, while the US solidified itself at the head of European affairs, each of which were necessary for subsequent NATO expansion. Kosovo further solidified NATO’s new role on the continent—even intervening in civil wars—while the bombing campaign against Serbia convinced Russians that the US was an aggressive, ruthless great power, who would violate international rules when it suited them. The US engaged in this aggressive war, in violation of the UN Charter, without approval of the UN Security Council (on which Russia sat). So much for the liberal rules-based international order. The US’s frequent remaking of the rules was a frequent complaint of Russia, including during the Iraq War.

Moreover, when Russia went to war with break-away Chechnya, Clinton’s CIA and US allies supported Chechen rebels and separatist mujahideen fighters fighting on Chechnya’s side against the Russians, with the goal to disrupt an existing Russian oil pipeline running through Chechnya. This, too, Putin cited when invading Ukraine. (If this were all not bad enough, Horton shows how the Clinton administration supported the bin Ladenite terrorists in the Balkans wars and in Chechnya. Indeed, more than half of the September 11 hijackers were involved in these wars in the Balkans and Chechnya—often both.)

Putin’s rise was itself a consequence of the Clintonian interventions in the 1990s: from the “shock therapy” economic policy, to helping Yeltsin get reelected in 1996, to Kosovo and Chechnya. As Horton points out, ironically, Putin invoked the Kosovo precedent of intervening in a civil war to “protect” an ethnic minority to justify invading Ukraine. In one stunning example from the Kosovo war, Horton recounted how the Clinton administration ordered the bombing of a Serbian TV station. These actions still influence Putin’s thoughts about the West today. Putin’s strike on a TV tower in Kiev in February 2022 likely called back to that conflict.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 was another milestone in US duplicity toward Russia. It assured that NATO would not deploy nuclear weapons or “substantial” troops to new NATO nations’ territories. Importantly, the Clinton administration misled Russia into thinking the Founding Act would give Russia a genuine role in NATO deliberations—although it would not have a say within the NATO alliance itself—when, in the words of Clinton advisor Strobe Talbott, the US’s view was that “all we’re really promising them is monthly meetings.”

Throughout Clinton’s term, the Clinton administration fed Russia the lie that claimed NATO’s mission was becoming political, rather than military, so agreeing not to expand NATO would be admitting that NATO’s mission was to contain Russia. He even said he would leave open the possibility of Russia entering NATO. But Horton shows they had no intention to do any of this. To make matters worse, in July 1997 NATO and Ukraine signed an agreement that would provide for training Ukraine’s military and improve their interoperability with NATO, and in August 1997 planned a military exercise involving several former Warsaw Pact states and Soviet republics to simulate US military intervention in an ethnic conflict in Crimea.

No, this was not all. The US tried to cut out Russia from Caspian Basin oil by refusing to run a pipeline from Azerbaijan through Russia, pushing it to a Western route through Turkey instead. The US also backed the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) grouping to “speed European integration and exclude Russia influence from the South Caucasus,” according to Horton, which Russia strongly opposed, calling it an “Axis of Evil” in 2005. The Clinton administration also violated Bush and Gorbachev’s Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 1999, incredulously claiming that the “permanent US military bases in Bulgaria and Romania” were actually just temporary.

The close of the Clinton years began a wave of “color revolutions” in Russia’s backyard. The key thing about these “revolutions” is that they are heavily funded and supported by foreign governments or NGOs, such as George Soros’ groups. Rather than directly or covertly overthrow an existing regime, these organizations operate “above board,” meaning they avoid specifically endorsing candidates—since that would be illegal—and instead fund and assist groups that promote more generic, non-partisan efforts like “democracy.” In context, of course, their activities are geared to “benefit . . . a favored candidate or party.” A favorite tactic is using “parallel vote tabulation” or exit polls, which are used to dispute official election results. The dispute typically spills over into street demonstrations with the goal of ousting the ostensible victor.

The “revolutions” began in Serbia in 2000 with the ousting of Clinton’s bête noire Slobodan Milošević. As Horton sardonically comments, this culminated in the “sacking and burning of the [Serbian] parliament building in what would surely be called a violent insurrection by American Democrats if they had not been behind it.” Numerous other states would be targeted for color revolutions by the US and its Soros-backed NGO allies over the next decades.

Incredibly, this only begins to scratch the surface of these early, post-Cold War provocations toward Russia that Horton documents, let alone the follies and misdeeds that occurred during the George W. Bush presidency and thereafter. Horton has persuasively made the case that the US provoked Russia over the course of three decades, knowing that Russia would respond with hostility toward NATO expansion. Yet, with reckless abandon, US leaders and officials pushed on, achieving their wildest dreams of NATO expansion and setting their sights on what was always their crown jewel—Ukraine. It did not have to be this way, and it still does not. But time is ticking. Defying expectations, President Biden manages to reach new heights of absurdity in his escalatory policy toward Russia, ticking off a box on Zelensky’s deadly five-point “peace” plan. The war cannot end soon enough.