Russia Matters, 11/14/25

1. Ukraine’s anti-corruption agencies (known by their acronyms NABU and SAPO) announced on Nov. 10 that they had uncovered a $100 million kickback and money laundering scheme at the Energoatom state-owned nuclear energy company.¹ The 15-month inquiry, which has been codenamed “Midas,”² focuses on allegations of illegal payments by Energoatom contractors—typically 10–15% of contract value—to retain business.³ Suspects reportedly include Minister of Justice Herman Halushchenko, Energy Minister Svitlana Hrynchuk and Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s onetime business partner, Timur Mindich.⁴ Mindich—who is suspected of having allegedly run the kickback scheme—fled Ukraine as investigators closed in, while the two ministers resigned. With arrests already underway (prosecutors named seven suspects, with five detained), Zelenskyy—who was elected president in April 2019 on a promise to root out the pervasive graft,⁵ but who then came under strong fire at home and in the West in summer 2025 for attempting to defangthe two anti-corruption agencies—called for arrests, promised a reset at Energoatom and sanctions on those involved. The scandal has fueled public outrage at home—particularly amid the ongoing blackouts caused by Russian attacks—and has increased pressure on Zelenskyy’s government to deliver lasting accountability.⁶
   1. European leaders issued warnings to Ukraine this week, saying that continued military and financial support depends on Kyiv taking decisive action against corruption. European Commission spokesman Guillaume Mercier called on Ukraine to protect its anti-corruption bodies and ensure clean handling of international financial support. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz told Zelenskyy that Europe expects Ukraine to advance anti-corruption reforms, while German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul stressed that Western aid hinges on stronger anti-corruption measures. Dutch Finance Minister Eelco Heinen also emphasized that EU aid packages are conditional on Ukraine’s fight against graft. Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini warned that more aid could prolong the war and worsen corruption. Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó called for a freeze on EU funds to Ukraine, while Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban declared that “the golden illusion of Ukraine is falling apart.” Asked if the disclosures have shaken EU confidence, Lithuanian Finance Minister Kristupas Vaitiekunas responded in blunt terms: “Maybe, but what other options do we have?” according to The Washington Post.
2. In the period of Oct. 14–Nov. 11, 2025, Russian forces gained 165 square miles of Ukrainian territory, an increase over the 154 square miles these forces gained during the previous four-week period, according to the Nov. 12, 2025, issue of RM’s Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. This week, Russian forces have been advancing into the eastern towns of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, which they are “very likely” to seize, according to ISW. Ukraine’s DeepState OSINT reportedly announced on Nov. 12 that Russia’s gain of 15 square miles (40 square kilometers), made in the preceding 24 hours, was the largest daily territorial gain by the Russian troops since the start of the year. DeepState also reported that Russian forces captured the following settlements in southeastern and eastern Ukraine on Nov. 7–14: Novoe, Novouspenivske, Rivnopillia, Uspenivka, Katerynivka, Novomykolaivka, Yablukove and, most recently, Stepova Novoselivka. Since Jan. 1, 2025, average Russian monthly gains have been 170 square miles, according to the RM card.
   1. Russia launched 98 ballistic missiles into Ukraine in October, a record since observations began in May 2023, with only 17 intercepted by Ukraine, according to the card.
3. Ukrainian prosecutors estimate that 290,000 cases have been opened for desertion or absence without leave since the start of the war, highlighting the severe manpower crisis facing Ukrainian forces, according to The New York Times. In October alone, nearly 20,000 such cases were recorded—the highest monthly figure this year—as Russian troops exploit gaps along thinly held lines in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, where just four to seven infantrymen defend each kilometer of the 1,000 kilometer frontline, according to Financial Times. “The result [of desertions] is that the [Ukrainian] land forces are not expanding but are actually declining in numbers,’’ Konrad Muzyka, director of Rochan Consulting, told FT.
4. A German federal police investigation has concluded that an elite Ukrainian military unit, directed by Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhniy, was responsible for the September 2022 Nord Stream pipeline bombings, aiming to disrupt Russian energy revenues and Moscow’s ties with Germany, The Wall Street Journal reported. Investigators relied on surveillance photos and boat rental records, issuing European arrest warrants for three Ukrainian soldiers and four divers.⁷ The findings have triggered diplomatic friction: Poland has refused to extradite one suspect, hailing him as a hero, while Italy is considering a similar extradition request, according to WSJ. The case has intensified political divisions within Germany—where the far-right has capitalized on public anger over energy prices—and across Europe, straining unity and stirring debates about continued aid to Kyiv. [As regular readers of this blog know, this narrative of who and how the Nordstream pipeline bombing was carried out is not very credible. Apparently, German authorities must decide on a narrative that doesn’t admit their own cravenness in allowing self-righteous allies to destroy their infrastructure and economy. – Natylie]
5. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that the Russia-China Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation remains fully relevant and that the approaching expiration date of July 16, 2026, will not go unnoticed by either side, according to Kommersant. Lavrov indicated that Moscow and Beijing are working on extending or updating the treaty as its term nears completion, according to Kommersant. It will be interesting to see if there will be new definitions of the Russian-Chinese relationship if the signatories update the treaty rather than extend it.*

YouTube link here.

By Thomas Graham, The National Interest, 10/26/25

President Donald Trump’s proposed meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Budapest may never take place, and a final settlement of the Russia-Ukraine war may lie far in the future. Yet, it is not premature to consider how such a settlement should be framed to advance US interests in European security and in relations with Russia. Broadly speaking, two strategic approaches are available: containment, the preferred option of much of the foreign-policy establishment, and competitive coexistence. The choice between them depends on how the United States assesses Russia.

As during the Cold War, containment treats Russia as an implacable adversary with intolerable geopolitical ambitions in Europe and beyond. Echoing George Kennan’s logic, it assumes that thwarting Russian expansionist ambitions will eventually erode the foundations of the regime and yield a new Russia, a country more in tune with Western values and a potential partner for the United States. 

A strategy of competitive coexistence, by contrast, begins from the assumption that Russia is a permanent rival whose domestic system and strategic mindset the West cannot change through pressure or inducement. It sees the task of US foreign policy not as defeating or transforming Russia but rather as managing competition responsibly to prevent direct military confrontation, which could prove catastrophic for both sides.

Containment and competitive coexistence share the goal of preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and preventing further Russian aggression against its neighbors. Where they diverge is in their understanding of how to address the two central issues of this conflict: security guarantees for Ukraine and the disposition of disputed territory.

Containment: Moral Clarity and Strategic Rigidity

Applied to the current war, containment would take a principled stand in support of Ukraine’s right to seek NATO membership, even if that prospect remains remote for the time being. It would place no limits on Ukraine’s security cooperation with NATO or individual allies. It would reject any restrictions on Kyiv’s military capabilities beyond its voluntary commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. Any Russian objections would be dismissed out of hand.

Containment would also insist on Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognized 1991 borders, refusing to accept any political settlement that legitimized Russian gains since 2014. De facto Russian control of occupied territories might be tolerated as a temporary reality. Still, the United States would support Ukraine diplomatically, politically, and economically in efforts to recover them over time.

Containment thus satisfies the moral and legal imperatives of defending sovereignty and resisting aggression. Yet it carries costs. By denying Russia any face-saving exit or security assurances, containment risks prolonging the war. It could entrench a new Cold War dynamic, destabilize Europe, and impose devastating long-term costs on Ukraine, the very nation it seeks to protect.

Competitive Coexistence: Managing Rivalry to Avoid Ruin

A strategy of competitive coexistence, by contrast, would urge Ukraine to adopt a posture of armed neutrality as a way to secure its sovereignty while addressing Russia’s security concerns. Kyiv would forswear NATO membership and agree not to host foreign forces, while still developing its defense-industrial base—with Western investment and technology—to build the weapons needed for self-defense. It would limit Ukraine’s military capabilities, but only as part of a reciprocal arrangement imposing comparable restrictions on Russian forces within a defined zone along Ukraine’s border with Russia and Belarus.

On territorial questions, competitive coexistence would accept de facto Russian control over seized Ukrainian territory without recognizing it de jure. Rather than pursuing the restoration of the 1991 borders, it would instead favor a resolution grounded in the principle of local self-determination, allowing populations in disputed areas to decide their political affiliation through an agreed, internationally supervised democratic process. The outcome would not legitimize conquest but would instead reinforce a fundamental political right. 

This strategy is pragmatic rather than principled. It recognizes that Ukraine’s security ultimately depends not on Western moral commitment but on a stable balance of power. It would enable Ukraine to survive, rebuild, and integrate with Europe without becoming a permanent flashpoint for confrontation between nuclear powers.

Pragmatism for a Multipolar World

Containment remains appealing because it expresses moral conviction and the confidence of a superpower that stands astride the global stage, as the United States did in the immediate post-Cold War years. But the world in which the United States could dictate outcomes has long since passed. A policy of competitive coexistence offers a more realistic framework for managing enduring competition with Russia in a multipolar system; the United States cannot dominate, as it faces a rival it cannot vanquish.

Competitive coexistence does not appease aggressors, as its critics claim, nor does it reward aggression. It contains it through balance, restraint, and diplomacy. It sees compromise—even with unsavory rivals—as an element of statecraft in an open-ended contest in which setbacks can be redressed and advantages accumulated over time. It seeks not decisive victory but durable stability, a peace of imperfect justice but one achievable in practice.

In the end, the United States must choose between a policy of moral clarity and one that works. Competitive coexistence, for all its ambiguities and imperfections, offers the surer path to a Europe at peace and a global order that advances US interests and values, if not as fully or as rapidly as some would hope.

By Mike Fredenburg, Responsible Statecraft, 10/27/25

The West likes to inflate the cost of Russian weapons as a way to suggest Moscow is in a financial bind and manipulate the narrative of a looming Ukraine victory — while also masking real inefficiencies in the U.S. defense industry.

By assuming Russian weapons have input costs similar to U.S. systems or conflating export prices with Russia’s internal costs, Western estimates produce misleading figures. These inflated costs bolster the narrative that the strain on Moscow is tremendous, while downplaying the increasing challenges for Ukraine and NATO to effectively counter Russia’s relatively inexpensive missiles and drones.

Moreover, these estimates obscure a stark reality: due to difficulties in expanding production of prohibitively costly Western missiles, combined with low real-world missile interception rates, even if the U.S. and Europe sent all their air defense missiles to Ukraine, they would fall far short of being able to stop most Russian missile and drone attacks.

Overstated costs, underestimated resilience

Western media and think tanks have consistently framed Russian missile expenditures to imply unsustainability. For example, Forbes Ukraine estimated Russia spent $7.5 billion on missiles in the war’s first two months — 8.7 percent of Russia’s 2022 defense budget. A Newsweek article, citing Forbes Ukraine, reported that an August 19, 2024 attack on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure cost Moscow $1.3 billion. In the same article, the Institute for the Study of War stated that Russia “is likely unable to sustain such large-scale missile and drone strikes with regularity.” Yet, Russia’s sustained high-tempo operations over the past six months cannot help but cast doubt on this assessment.

Many of the articles emphasizing the high cost of Russia’s massive missile and drone strikes rely on missile cost estimates from an October 2022 Forbes Ukraine article estimating some key Russian missile costs including the Kh-101 at $13 million, the Kalibr at $6.5 million, the Iskander at $3 million, the P-800 Oniks at $1.25 million, the Kh-22 at $1 million, and the Tochka-U at $0.3 million.

While some of the Forbes UA cost estimates seem reasonable, most of them seem to arrive at costs suspiciously close to what U.S. taxpayers would pay for a comparable missile. Finding such costs not credible, Defense Express Ukraine made a good faith effort to come up with more realistic missile cost estimates, including the Kh-101 at $1.2 million; the Kalibr, approximately $1 million; the Iskander R-500, $1 million; the Iskander 9M723 ballistic, $2 million; and the replacement for the legendary SS-N-22 “Sunburn, supersonic anti-ship cruise missile,” approximately $3 million.

While Defense UA does not give an estimate for the Kinzhal (Kh-47M2) hypersonic missile, given that it is essentially an air-launched variant of the Iskander 9M723, the cost should be similar, about $2 million.

Still to be fair, the Russian military budget’s lack of transparency means that in most cases one has to guesstimate. However, with input costs for weapons production and development being much lower than those for the United States, one would expect Russian missiles to be less expensive than the production of U.S. or Western European ones. Russian defense manufacturing labor costs average $1,200 per worker per month, compared to at least $4,000 for U.S. workers. Materials like steel, titanium, and composites are also less expensive in Russia. Russia’s defense industry prioritizes mass production and efficiency, unlike the U.S defense industry, where profitability and shareholder returns are of greater importance.

When it comes to weapon systems development, Russia typically adopts an evolutionary approach, incrementally improving existing systems, while the U.S. is far more likely to pursue revolutionary designs incorporating unproven technologies, inflating costs.

For example, Russia’s battle-tested Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic missile builds on proven platforms, while the United States has yet to field a hypersonic missile due to projects like the U.S. AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) program, which began in 2018. It took a much riskier approach and is now over budget, behind schedule, and in danger of being canceled after over $1 billion invested.

But even if it is not totally canceled and is eventually fielded, the ARRW, at $15 million to $18 million each, will be many times more expensive per missile than the Kinzhal, will have a similar range, and does not pack the same punch. Yes, its unpowered glide vehicle will be more maneuverable than the Kinzhal, but using that maneuverability can significantly impact its terminal impact velocity and range.

Another example is the American PAC-3 MSE Patriot interceptor and Russia’s S-400 9M96E2 interceptor. Both are highly agile short-range missiles with similar ranges of about 100 km and both use active radar to track and hit their targets. Both have interception speeds of about Mach 5. Yet the PAC 3 MSE missile costs $4 million-$6 million and the estimated cost of the 9M96E2 missile is between $500,000 and $1 million.

But how do they perform? An October 2, 2025 Financial Times article gives a big hint, reporting that the Patriot interceptor rate stood at 37% in August, was slashed in the month of September to just 6%. Of course it is standard operating procedure to overstate interception rates. But even if you buy the initial 37%, it was taking five interceptors to reach a 90 percent chance of intercepting one Kinzhal. At 6%, that goes up to 38 Patriot interceptors needed.

According to Military Watch magazine and other publications, on May 16, 2023, a Patriot System system/radar and at least one of its launchers were destroyed by a Kinzhal hypersonic missile despite launching 32 Patriot interceptors in an effort to protect itself. Unsurprisingly, this particular report has been contested, but given the long history of governments and vendors grossly overestimating air defense effectiveness, lack of transparency/veracity on actual Ukrainian losses, and the incredible interception rates regularly reported by Ukraine Air Force, the report cannot be dismissed out of hand.

We don’t have much objective information on the 9M96E2’s performance, but Russia also has a history of hyping the performance of its S-400 air defense systems. Still, even if the 9M96E2 is as ineffective as the Patriot interceptors, it costs a whole lot less.

By overstating Russian missile costs, Western analysts exaggerate Russia’s financial strain, while providing cover for exorbitant missile prices being charged by Western defense contractors. This distortion obscures the reality that Russia’s cost-effective missile production provides a big advantage in sustainability, while high Western missile costs, combined with U.S. difficulties in rapidly expanding missile production, is a huge disadvantage in any kind of sustained conflict, and could be a fatal disadvantage in going up against a peer competitor that can throw thousands of missiles at our ships and even attack U.S. based military facilities.

By Lev Golinkin, The Nation, 10/27/25

Graham Planter’s problem is that he lives just a tad too far south. If the Democratic Senate candidate from Maine wanted to make all the hubbub about his Nazi tattoo go away, all he’d have to do is move to Canada.

The furor over Planter’s Totenkopf, or Death’s Head, tattoo stands in striking contrast to Canada, where both Nazi symbols and a shameful history of aiding Nazis is hushed over or, quite simply, blurred out. 

The footage shows a burly Ukrainian military trainer discussing his country’s “shadow war” against Moscow. The interviewer is a veteran Western journalist. The video quality is excellent. The only problem is the giant red swastika tattoos emblazoned across the trainer’s arm. 

After social media users began circulating stills with the swastikas, the Canadian Broadcast Corporation—the country’s government-owned media outlet—responded by blurring out the tattoos, sparing the readers the inconvenient truth that the man being presented as a hero fighting for a Canadian-backed military is a neo-Nazi. (In addition to the swastikas, he also has a winged odal rune popular with white supremacists.)

When reached for comment, a CBC spokesperson said, “The military trainer was provided to the reporter to speak generally about Russian tactics in Ukraine; we did not platform him, nor did we present him as a hero,” and pointed out that the network added a disclaimer that “a tattoo of an offensive symbol has been blurred.” 

The CBC didn’t appear to be concerned that interviewing a man tattooed with neo-Nazi iconography is being legitimized—only that the “offensive” material is kept from the public.

This literally Orwellian action by Canada’s government media is indicative of the country’s relationship to both neo-Nazis and their World War II predecessors. The dark reality lurking beneath the placid demeanor of America’s northern neighbor is that Canada’s institutions have spent decades protecting fascists and sweeping evidence under the rug. Canada’s elites guard this blood-stained legacy to this day. 

The CBC winding up whitewashing a neo-Nazi isn’t a coincidence. The soldier being interviewed is in what the program describes as the “elite” 3rd Special Assault Brigade. What the narrator omits is that the formation is led by Andriy Biletsky, Ukraine’s preeminent neo-Nazi who now has tens of thousands of men under his command. These men are trained, armed, and funded by the West. The CBC’s fawning profile says nothing about the unit’s neo-Nazi ties. 

These omissions would be shameful in any country. But the situation is far more dire than this. Canada’s antisemitism is so ingrained, the nation is incapable of something as straightforward as condemning Nazis. 

To examine Canada’s track record with the Third Reich is to enter a twisted world where following orders is a legitimate legal defense for participating in the Holocaust and SS fighters are portrayed as war victims. It’s a land where a street named for a German slaver isn’t considered problematic by the authorities and whose history of declassifying documents about harboring Nazis is worse than Argentina’s. 

Canada’s history of going to bat for Holocaust perpetrators stretches back half a century. In 1967, Pierre Trudeau—a future prime minister as well as father of Prime Minster Justin Trudeau—successfully opposed stripping the citizenship of a death squad leader responsible for murdering over 5,000 Jews. Three decades later, a Canadian court acquitted Hungarian collaborator Imre Finta, who had deported over 8,000 Jews to their deaths. The court deemed Finta’s plea of following orders an acceptable defense; it’s the only known such case in a Western nation.  

Two years ago, Canada’s House of Comments shocked the world by giving a standing ovation to 98-year-old Yaroslav Hunka, a veteran of the Waffen-SS, the military wing of the Nazi Party and one of the main perpetrators of the Holocaust. 

Hunka fought in the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (SS Galizien), a Ukrainian formation whose record of war crimes includes a 1943 massacre in which its subunits burned 500–1,000 Polish villagers alive. 

Hunka was one of 2,000 SS Galizien soldiers welcomed to Canada after the war. Unlike other collaborators who kept a low profile in the New World, SS Galizien veterans felt comfortable enough to celebrate themselves by erecting monuments with Third Reich insignia and establishing scholarships in their honor. The University of Alberta, one of Canada’s largest institutes, had nearly a dozen endowments memorializing Hunka and his fellow SS men. 

Images of Parliament enthusiastically applauding a Nazi soldier triggered international headlines and outraged the Canadian public. There were demands for UAlberta to eliminate its Nazi endowments. Then–Prime Minister Justin Trudeau ordered an inquiry into declassifying names of SS Galizien veterans admitted into Canada. For a moment, it seemed the country would face its dark past. 

But within weeks, a fierce backlash to the Hunka affair revealed the astonishing extent of the bonds between Canada’s institutions and the Nazi collaborators they had so long protected. 

Newspapers and even parliamentary testimony saw calls defending Hunka. The SS fighters were “in the wrong time at the wrong place,” averred a quote in one major outlet. All but one of UAlberta’s Nazi endowments remain. And after review, Ottawa refused to release the names of SS veterans welcomed into Canada, perversely citing privacy concerns: The same rationale used to protect children and sexual assault victims was invoked to hide names of Nazi collaborators. (By now, even Argentina has declassified its archives on sheltering Third Reich criminals.)

Canada’s elites have protected the original Nazis for the same reason Canadian media whitewashes their modern iteration in Ukraine: geopolitics. During the Cold War, Nazi collaborators were seen as a bulwark against Communism; as an additional benefit, the collaborators, eager for work and primed to hate anything that whiffed of socialism, were used to break the power of left-leaning unions. 

The latest example of Canada’s callous indifference to Holocaust victims took place this summer, when I broke the news of a London, Ontario, street named for German industrialist Max Brose, who had been awarded the title Wehrwirtschaftsführer, or industry leader, by the Third Reich. Brose’s company, a fixture of Hitler’s military apparatus, used slaves, including prisoners of war. 

London’s Max Brose Drive is the only known eponym to a Nazi Party member in the entire British Commonwealth, which includes Canada, Australia, and the UK, among other nations. Despite this and despite calls by the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s Canadian branch, a city representative confirmed that Brose’s street isn’t being considered for renaming. 

Whether it’s bloodstained fascists of last century or their modern iteration, Canada’s response is inaction, denial, and the occasional well-placed blur. It’s an insult to the over 45,000 Canadians who gave their lives to prevent Nazi tributes erected on Canadian soil and the latest indication of erosion of basic standards in Western media.