All posts by natyliesb

Poll: Majority of Russians Would Oppose Returning Land Even if Putin Decides To Return it as Part of Peace Deal

By Simon Saradzhyan, Russia Matters, 10/17/24

A majority of Russians would support ending hostilities and launching peace negotiations, according to the results of a September 2024 poll by Russia’s Levada Center1 on Russians’ views on the war against Ukraine. However, when asked if Russia should make concessions in such negotiations, a vast majority answered in the negative. Moreover, when asked to evaluate the conditions of a hypothetical peace deal, vast majorities of respondents rejected returning territories to Kyiv, as well as Ukraine’s membership in NATO. In addition, when Levada divided its respondents into two groups, a majority in one of the groups said they would not support an end to the military conflict if it meant returning annexed territories, even if Vladimir Putin himself made such a decision. This obviously doesn’t bode well for those in the West seeking support for brokering a peace deal that would defer territorial issues in exchange for Kyiv’s membership in the Alliance.

Russians Not Ready for Meaningful Compromise

Like all but one of Levada’s previous polls on Ukraine since October 2022, the September 2024 poll shows that the percentage of respondents favoring an end to Russia’s so-called special military operation and launching peace negotiations (54%) is greater than that of those who support continuing the operation (38%). However, when asked whether Russia should make concessions to Ukraine to end the military operation and sign a peace agreement, the share of those who answered “definitely or probably yes” was 20% in September 2024. In contrast, 70% were opposed, after fluctuating in the range of 70%–73% last year.

Levada has also asked its respondents to weigh in on specific conditions that a peace accord would contain. It has found that 94% of respondents considered an exchange of POWs to be acceptable or preferable as of September 2024, and 78% of respondents considered immediate ceasefire to be acceptable or preferable. However, only 21% of these respondents found returning the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions to Ukraine to be acceptable or preferable, while 69% found such a return unacceptable. Additionally, 75% found returning the Luhansk and Donetsk regions to Ukraine unacceptable. Finally, the share of those who found Ukraine’s membership in NATO as acceptable or preferable was 15% in September 2024, while 73% found it unacceptable under any circumstances.

Russians Won’t Agree To Return Land Even if Putin Decides to Do So

As part of the September 2024 survey, the Levada Center once again repeated the following experiment. With the help of a random number generator, the respondents participating in the survey were divided into two equal groups, each of which was asked a question in one of two formulations. In Group 1, the respondents were asked if they would support or not support the president’s decision to immediately end the military conflict, without any conditions to support or not to support the president’s decision to immediately end the military conflict (without any conditions). In Group 2, the respondents were asked whether they would support Putin’s decision to end the conflict, but on the condition of returning territories to Ukraine. Some 73% in Group 1 in September 2024 said they would support Putin’s decision to end the conflict with Ukraine (in April 2024 it was 71%), while 19% said they would oppose it (20% in April 2024). In Group 2, 30% said in September they would support Putin’s decision to end the military conflict with Ukraine and return the annexed territories, while 60% said they would oppose such a combination.

Majority of Russians Believe Their Army is Succeeding in Ukraine

Perhaps, one reason why majorities of Russians reject concessions to Ukraine is that many of them believe the Russian armed forces are succeeding in Ukraine (60% in September 2024). In comparison, the share of those who believe that the campaign has been going somewhat unsuccessfully or extremely unsuccessfully totaled 23% in September 2024. This belief in the success of the Russian army may also explain why a significant majority of Russians continue to personally support its actions in Ukraine (76% in September 2024). As for what shaped that belief itself, one should keep in mind that, according to Levada, majority of Russians (60%) continue to learn ‘news’ from Russian TV channels, which are mostly owned by the authorities or their loyalists. These channels toe the Kremlin’s line in portraying Russia’s war against Ukraine as a success. For instance, they trumpet Russian advances while declining to mention how far away the troops are from fulfilling Putin’s orders on capturing the Donbas. That the Kremlin refuses to admit number of casualties on the Russian side (which Western and independent Russian sources estimate at 200,000–600,000) to the Russian public also influence the latter’s assessment of whether their army is successful in Ukraine.

Yet, Russians See More Harm Than Good in War

At the same time, even in spite of suppression of facts on the ground in Ukraine, Levada’s recent polls still show that the share of those who believe Russia’s war in Ukraine has generated more harm than good does not only exceed the share of those who believe the reverse, but their number has also increased. The share of those who believe the conflict has caused net damage went from 41% in May 2023 to 47% in Sept. 2024 (damage-seers). In the same period, the share of those who believe the conflict has generated a net benefit decreased from 38% to 28% (benefit-seers).

When asked an open question to specify what exactly they meant when they said that the special military operation has caused more harm than good, some 52% of damage-seers pointed to the death toll, victims and suffering caused by the operation. Military losses, specifically the deaths of soldiers, were highlighted by 21% of damage-seers. Economic concerns were also notable, with 18% citing the worsening economic situation and increased expenses as a significant harm. Some 13% of damage-seers viewed the operation as leading to widespread destruction, devastation and violence typically associated with war. Deterioration of international relations and isolation is a concern for 7% of the damage-seers. In contrast, when asked an open question to specify what exactly they meant when they said that the special military operation has generated more benefits than harm, 26% of the benefit-seers pointed to the “return of territories, new territories and larger population.” Closely following this were 24% of the benefit-seers who believe that the operation has succeeded in the “protection of the people of Donbass, Russians and Russian-speaking individuals.” Additionally, 16% of the benefit-seers feel that the operation has strengthened Russia’s global position. Some 11% of these respondents said that the operation “stopped NATO expansion, removed Western threats.” Some 10% of the benefit-seers highlighted that the operation “has strengthened the economy and production.”

It should also be noted that the share of Russians who follow the situation in Ukraine has not changed significantly this fall. The share of those who are following it very closely or fairly closely went from 53% in August 2024 to 54% in September 2024.

Conclusion

The latest polling by the Levada Center reveals a complex and somewhat contradictory stance among the Russian public regarding the war in Ukraine. While a majority favor ending hostilities and pursuing peace negotiations, this sentiment is undercut by a strong unwillingness to make concessions on key issues, such as returning annexed territories, or accepting Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Such a stand leaves little room for meaningful compromise in the near future, especially given that recent polls show that majority of Ukrainians are also unwilling to compromise on key issues (polls held this summer show that 55% of Ukrainians are opposed to making any territorial concessions while 59% reject the demand that Ukraine’s neutrality is codified). The Levada polling also highlights a lingering belief in the success of Russian military efforts, which also likely fuels resistance to compromise even though an increasing share of Russians believe the war has caused more harm than good. As noted above, a number of factors may be influencing this belief; including reliance of the public on pro-Kremlin TV channels for news and suppression of information on casualties. One also should not forget that Russia’s slide towards a hard authoritarianism has led to criminalization of freedom of speech on issues related to the war, among other things. This cannot help influencing what a Russian living in Russia says when a stranger introduces himself as a pollster and says she and her colleagues want to ask him or her such questions about the war, which has become one of the central organizing principles of Putin’s rule.

The author would like to thank RM editor Ivan Arreguín-Toft for reminding him of some of the significant constraints faced by pollsters and respondents in Russia. The author also thanks RM student associate Chris Conway and managing editor Angelina Flood for contributing to retrieving and structuring polling data for this blog post.

Footnotes:

The Levada Center remains the most respected of Russia’s independent pollsters in spite of increasing constraints on such activities in authoritarian Russia.

About 51,000 Ukrainians Have Deserted Armed Forces This Year

By Kyle Anzalone, Libertarian Institute, 10/21/24

The Ukrainian prosecutor’s office has opened 51,000 cases of desertion through the first nine months of 2024. The number of soldiers abandoning their posts is likely to double last year’s total. 

The Times of London reported data from the Ukrainian government showing that “51,000 criminal cases were initiated for desertion and abandonment of a military unit between January and September of this year.” El Pais previously noted that 45,000 Ukrainians were being prosecuted for desertion from the start of the year through August. Al-Jazeera says the number is at least 30,000 desertions. 

At the start of the year, Kiev was estimated to have between 500,000 and 800,000 active-duty soldiers and an additional 300,000 reservists. The Ukrainians have also sustained casualties fighting to defend from Russian advances and amid Kiev’s Kursk invasion. 

Kiev has struggled to fill its ranks with fresh soldiers, leading Ukraine to drop its conscription age from 27 to 25. As Kiev is still facing manpower shortages, American politicians are pushing Ukraine to drop draft age to 18. Ukraine has also resorted to allowing prisoners to leave jail if they join the military 

One Ukrainian who deserted told the Times that prison was a better option than the military because “at least in prison, you know when you will be able to leave.” 

The number of Ukrainians that Kiev is prosecuting for desertion has significantly increased throughout the war. In 2022, the number was 9,000, and it had more than doubled to 24,000 last year.

Russia Matters: Trump’s Ukraine Peace Deal Options All End Biden’s ‘As Long As It Takes’ Support to Kyiv, Nix Its Agency on Launch of Talks

Russia Matters, 11/8/24

  1. Donald Trump’s promise to end the war in Ukraine by his inauguration now puts the president elect in a position of having to choose between competing proposals from advisers united by a common thread—a sharp break from President Joe Biden’s approach of letting Kyiv dictate when peace talks should begin while arming Kyiv “as long as it takes,” according to WSJ. Instead, these proposals uniformly recommend freezing the war in place and forcing Ukraine to suspend its quest to join NATO for at least 20 years, this newspaper reported. One of these proposals is attributed to Mike Pompeo and is likely to push for a settlement that doesn’t appear to give a major win to Moscow, according to WSJ. In contrast, Richard Grenell’s proposal gives priority to Trump’s desire to end the war as swiftly as possible, even if it means forcing Kyiv into significant concessions. Throughout his campaign for the White House, Trump had bashed Biden’s handling of Ukraine, complaining that Kyiv “fleeced the U.S. by obtaining weapons worth billions of dollars free of charge,” and describing Zelenskyy as the “greatest salesman,” according to WSJ. Trump has also touted that he had a plan to resolve the conflict quickly, but noted “I can’t give you those plans because if I give you those plans, I’m not going to be able to use them.”
    1. The only way to achieve a swift end to Ukraine’s war against the Russian invasion would be to force his country into a defeat, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who had a phone conversation with Trump after the latter’s victory. The phone call included two surprises: Elon Musk was also on the line, and Zelenskyy was somewhat reassured by what he heard from Trump, two sources with knowledge of the call told Axios.
    2. After a significant wait, Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated Trump on his victory in the U.S. presidential election, stating he’s ready to hold discussions with the president elect on stabilizing U.S.-Russian relations, including the issues of Ukraine and strategic stability. “It seems to me, it deserves attention what was said about the desire to restore relations with Russia, to help end the Ukrainian crisis,” Putin said in his first comments on Trump’s re-election, which he made in the course of the third hour of his remarks at the Valdai conference on Nov. 7. In earlier comments, Trump said he is planning to speak to Putin.  
    3. Russian stock investors expressed cautious optimism over Trump’s victory. The Moscow Exchange Index rose by 3.6% Nov. 6 on news of Trump’s victory, with Russian energy giants Gazprom and Novatek among the best performers, both rising nearly 5% shortly after opening, according to Istories and FT. Meanwhile, JPMorgan’s Emerging Europe, Middle East and Africa Securities jumped 18.3%, its biggest daily rise in over two years, according to FT.[1] “All the talk this morning is about how to trade Russia and whether sanctions will be thrown off,” one portfolio manager told FT the morning after the Nov. 5 elections.
  2. At a summit this week, European Union leaders debated whether they can keep the Ukrainian war effort going if Trump decides to shut off support from the U.S., according to Bloomberg. While some EU leaders argued that the European Commission should be coming up with proposals on how the bloc will respond if U.S. aid is shut off, others were skeptical, according to this news agency. “Some EU leaders say that in such a case, the EU should take on full financial responsibility for Ukraine. I see this as impossible, and Slovakia will not agree to it,” Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico said. In spite of this disagreement, Zelenskyy, who attended the two-day summit in Budapest, urged European leaders to supply Kyiv with more weapons rather than pushing for negotiations with Moscow, according to Meduza
  3. “I have previously stated that we have reached red lines. The West’s calls to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, a nation with the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, reveal the reckless adventurism of certain Western politicians,” Putin told the annual conference of Russia’s Valdai Club. “Such blind faith in their own impunity and exceptionalism could lead to a global catastrophe,” he warned. When asked by a Pakistani general to share his vision for maintaining strategic stability after New START expires, Putin claimed that Russia “never refused to continue the dialogue in the field of strategic stability,” but the U.S. cannot hope for a dialogue in that field with Russia while seeking to inflict a strategic defeat upon it.” He then added, “Let’s see how the new future [U.S.] administration will formulate its proposals, if there are any at all.”
  4. This week multiplereportsemerged that North Korean troops had engaged their Ukrainian counterparts, fighting on the Kremlin’s side in Russia’s Kursk region, likely starting on Nov. 4. Russian and North Korean leaders continued to refuse to explicitly acknowledge the presence of a DPRK contingent in western Russia, in spite of these reports, accompanied by photos of purportedly wounded North Korean soldiers (who are reportedly paid $2,000 per month for participating in combat in Russia). However, the very fact that Vladimir Putin found time for a reportedly unscheduled meeting with North Korea’s visiting foreign minister, Choe Son-hui, while Russia’s Senate unanimously voted to ratify a mutual defense treaty with the DPRK, reaffirms how important the Hermit Kingdom’s support has become for the Kremlin in its aggression against Ukraine.
  5. In the past month (Sept. 30–Oct. 31, 2024), Russian forces have gained 206 square miles of Ukrainian territory, and in the first week of November, an additional 75 square miles, while Ukrainian forces have re-gained zero square miles, according to RM staff’s Nov. 8 estimate based on data provided for that period by the Institute for the Study of War.

Konstantin Remchukov: 10 facts the West must understand before talking to Putin

By Konstantin Remchukov, RT, 10/17/24

By Konstantin Remchukov, editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta. A former MP, he is regarded as a leading thinker in Russia.

1. Putin makes all fundamental decisions personally, on the basis of his own ability, expertise, and sense of historical responsibility. A vivid example of this was the president’s speech at the Russian Foreign Ministry on June 14, in which he outlined the key provisions of Russia’s foreign policy priorities and his vision for the formation of a new international order. Most participants in the meeting expected the head of state to speak for no more than half an hour. In practice, Putin spoke for almost 80 minutes on theses he had written out himself, which he later explained to journalists.

2. The task of ensuring the security of the country and protecting Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine, which Putin has been facing since 2014, has become the main existential factor of his rule. He will not hand over power to anyone before the final, internationally guaranteed settlement of this issue.

He cannot give up control until there is a final, globally recognized solution. Anything short of this would mean handing his successor a messy bunch of unresolved problems. Today, no one in Putin’s entourage is better at solving problems than the president. He knows this and is firmly convinced of it.

3. Putin will not resign. At the beginning of September, a schoolgirl in Tuva asked the president: “How would you spend your days if you were an ordinary man, i.e. not the president?” Putin replied succinctly and clearly: “It’s hard for me to imagine that now.” This is his most important message of recent times – both for Russians and outsiders. Putin is saying that in your own future planning, proceed from the basis that I will be in the Kremlin. In this way, the president has delivered a reality check to the many Western politicians and indeed Russian opposition activists who have been dreaming and deluding themselves, claiming that “if there is Putin, there is a problem; if there is no Putin, there is no problem.” The fact is, the president is here to stay.

4. It is now clear that after more than two years of a nuclear threat hanging over us all, the world is ready for real negotiations on this issue. However, there are doubts about whether talks will be successful. The most serious Western politician – and someone who actually understands the consequences of nuclear war – is US President Joe Biden. Sadly, he will be gone in a few months.  Neither Kamala Harris nor former President Donald Trump has the foreign policy credentials to even grasp the importance of this issue and the dangers involved.

5. The past years and months of the Ukraine conflict, the brutal sanctions, and the radical transformation of the driving forces of the Russian economy have clearly demonstrated that it is time for our own domestic public and political consciousness to decisively abandon the notion, once sown by the Polish/American thinker Zbigniew Brzezinski, that Russia’s greatness rests on its unity with Ukraine. If the country is torn out of Moscow’s sphere of influence, Russia’s status as a great power will come to an end, he warned.

But that was then, and this is now. Today it is obvious that Russia’s place in the world is guaranteed regardless of the degree of proximity to any country or group of countries. Liberation from speculative constructs in the minds of influential ideologues is a powerful factor in normalizing the development process and assessing fundamental risks and opportunities. Russia can be a great and important power regardless of the degree of integration with other states. The greatness of a country is measured by the level of well-being and opportunities of its citizens, by achievements in health care, education, science, and technology.

6. Talking about the Russian economy, we should keep in mind one simple detail: the federal budget submitted to the State Duma (parliament) is based on an oil price of $60 per barrel. According to forecasts, the average annual oil price in 2025 will be $69 per barrel. This is a very high level of conservatism, realism, and sober calculation on the part of the Mikhail Mishustin government. The Russian economy is expected to remain manageable and the pace of development will be sufficient to meet the challenges we face. The obvious structural and technological difficulties will not be decisive in 2025. At this level of industrial development, a balanced budget and currency stability are crucial.

7. Today’s fighting makes it clear that the main goal of Russian troops on the ground is to reach the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions. When listing his objectives, Putin increasingly uses the following words: the liberation of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, and Novorossiya. It can be assumed that Novorossiya is only part of the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions. The main issue here is the land connection with Crimea. If my observations are correct, it is possible to draw a more concrete picture that will allow us to say that the military operation has been completed and its goals have been achieved.

8. It should be stressed that in recent months there has been a clear change in the Russian leadership’s assessment of the nature of Ukrainian statehood. This is the main difference from February 2022. Today, Moscow recognizes that a significant number of Ukrainians voted for the current government, consider themselves Ukrainians, and do not want to see a future with Russia. In this way, the Kremlin recognizes the state of Ukraine. When the West promotes the narrative that Moscow wants to destroy Ukraine as a state, this is an obvious contradiction, given today’s realities. Moreover, it is this narrative that allows Western politicians to claim that by destroying Ukraine, Russia will move further into Europe – into Poland and the Baltic states.

9. Speaking of possible negotiations, the West fails to mention the question of the legitimacy of Vladimir Zelensky’s signature in Putin’s eyes. They say it is obvious because Zelensky is flying around the world with his ‘peace plan’. I would warn Western partners against simplistic interpretations of Putin’s remarks and his concern that the Ukrainian Constitutional Court might later rule that Zelensky had not properly renewed his credentials and that his signature was therefore invalid. ‘Cheated, deceived, hoodwinked, and then deceived again’ is something that won’t be allowed to happen again. The level of mutual trust is not even at zero. Total mistrust now makes it necessary to have full negotiating powers in terms of the legal certainty available.

10. It seems that the issue of a new international order that provides equal security for states is equally relevant today for the critical majority of countries in the world – in the West as well as in the East. The main question is whether it will be possible to create a new international legal framework for peaceful coexistence. Let us remember that the worlds of Versailles and Yalta-Potsdam were born on the ruins of the catastrophes of the First and Second World Wars. The situation is different now. But hopefully humanity has learned something.

Big Serge: The Forest and the Trees: Ukraine’s Strategic Dissipation

By Big Serge, Substack, 10/31/24

In virtually all eras of human history, protracted high intensity wars have been the most intricate and overwhelming challenges that a state can face. Warfare presents a multi-faceted strain on state powers of coordination and mobilization, requiring a synchronized, full-spectrum mobilization of national resources. It is no coincidence that periods of intense warfare have frequently spurred the rapid evolution of state structures and powers, with the state forced to spawn new methods of control over industry, populations, and finance in order to sustain its war-making. Even in a country like the United States, which likes to think of itself as relatively untouched by war, the eras of rapid state expansion and metastatic administrative growth have correlated with the country’s great wars: the federal bureaucracy grew in massive spurts during the Civil War and the World Wars, and the state security apparatus exploded to accommodate the Global War on Terror. War is destructive, but it is also an inducement to rapid technological change and state expansion.

The myriad decisions and tasks facing a state at war can easily boggle the mind, and they span the technical, tactical, operational, industrial, and financial realms. Choosing where this or that infantry battalion ought to be deployed, how much money to invest in this or that weapons system, how to acquire and allocate scarce resources like energy and fuel – all decisions made in a vast concatenation of uncertainty and chance. The scope of this coordination problem is astonishing, and readily becomes apparent in the context of hundreds of thousands, or even millions of men fighting on thousands of kilometers of front, disposing of incomprehensible quantities of ammunition and food and fuel.

The sheer scope of this coordination game brings the inherent threat of decision making paralysis and distraction, with a vast array of operational minutia and competing political concerns causing the focus of the army and state to dissipate. The war begins to absorb its own energies and become unmoored from strategic direction. The prototypical example of this, of course, is Nazi Germany, which by 1943 continued to wage war with extreme energy and intensity, but without a unified strategic animus or theory of victory. German effort and capacity never seriously slackened; the German army continued to fight and hold positions, German commanders continued to deliberate and argue about holding this salient and that river line, German industry continued to produce ammunition and advanced weaponry, and the German logistical apparatus continued to shuttle vast quantities of coal and fuel and supplies and human biomass back and forth across the continent. This enormous energy and intensity, however, was unmoored from a theory of victory, and Germany’s war became detached from any political or strategic sense about how the conflict could be ended in anything other than the destruction of the German homeland.

In other words, war as an enormous challenge of coordination and mobilization always brings about the dangerous possibility of losing the forest for the trees, as the expression goes. The dissipation of energy into tactical, technical, and industrial minutia threatens to separate the state from a coherent theory of victory. This threat becomes more pressing the more protracted a war becomes, as initial theories of how the conflict will unfold are upended by events, and become muddled and buried by subsequently unfolding plans, chance, and exhaustion.

As the war in Ukraine approaches its third full winter, the Ukrainian war effort now appears to be similarly directionless and listless. Previous efforts to seize the initiative on the ground have failed, the AFU’s carefully husbanded resources have been steadily exhausted, and Russia continues to methodically plow its way through Ukraine’s chain of fortresses in the Donbas. Ukraine’s war continues unabated, but its energies and focus increasingly seem dissipated and unmoored from a particular vision or theory of victory.

Blueprint of Desperation: The Victory Plan

For Ukraine, the central political development of October has been the dramatic unveiling of President Zelensky’s so-called “Victory Plan”, which laid out a tenuous roadmap for Ukraine to win the war without ceding territory to Russia. In many ways, the presentation of a “victory plan” more than two and a half years into the war is very odd. It may then be worthwhile to contemplate the war holistically and consider that this is not Ukraine’s first theoretical framework for victory; in fact, Kiev has now pursued no less than four different strategic axes, all of which have failed.

To begin, we must remember what “victory” means for Ukraine, within the confines of their own expressed strategic goals. Ukraine has defined its own victory to mean the successful re-attainment of its 1991 borders, meaning not only the ejection of Russian forces from the Donbas but also the recapture of Crimea. Furthermore, having succeeded in achieving these goals on the ground, Kiev expects NATO membership and the associated American-backed security guarantees as a prize for winning.

Understanding the lofty extent of Ukraine’s framework for victory, we can articulate several different “theories of victory” that Ukraine has pursued. I am labelling them as follows:

-The Short War Theory: This was the overarching strategic animus in the opening year of the war (2022), which presupposed that Russia was anticipating a short war against an isolated Ukraine. This theory of victory relied on the assumption that Russia would be unwilling or unable to commit the resources necessary in the face of unexpected Ukrainian resistance and a blitz of military support and sanctions from the west. There was a kernel of truth underpinning this theory, in the sense that the resources mobilized on the Russian side were inadequate in the first year of the war (leading to significant Ukrainian successes on the ground in Kharkov, for example), however, this phase of the war ended in the winter of 2022 with Russian mobilization and the shift of the Russian economy to a war footing.

-The Crimean Isolation Plan: This theory of victory took primacy in 2023, and identified Crimea as the strategic center of gravity for Russia. Kiev therefore supposed that Russia could be crippled or knocked out of the war by severing its connection to Crimea – a plan which required capturing a corridor in the land bridge on the Azov coast through a mechanized counteroffensive, bringing Crimea and its linkeages within easy range of Ukrainian strike systems. This plan collapsed with the decisive defeat of the Ukrainian ground operation on the Orokhiv-Robotyne axis.

-The Attritional Theory: Presupposed that Ukraine’s defensive posture in the Donbas could impose disproportionate and catastrophic casualties on the Russian Army and utterly degrade Russia’s combat capability, while Ukraine’s own combat power was regenerated through western arms deliveries and training assistance.

-The Counter-Pressure Theory: Finally, Ukraine has postulated that a multi-domain pressure campaign on Russia, including the seizure of Russian home territory in Kursk oblast, a campaign of strikes on Russian strategic assets, and the continued strain of western sanctions, would promote the collapse of Russia’s willingness to fight.

Such “theories of victory” are critical to keep in back of mind, and should not be forgotten among all the discussions of the operational and technical particulars of the war on the ground (as interesting as they are). It is only when actions on the ground correlate to a particular animating strategic vision that they gain meaning. Excitement over the exchange of lands and lives in Kursk or in the urban settlements around Pokrovsk become meaningful when they are chained to a particular strategic concept of victory.

The problem for Ukraine is that, thus far at least, all of their overarching strategic visions have failed – not only in their own particular terms on the ground, but also in their connection to “victory” as such. A concrete example might be useful. Ukraine’s offensive in the Kursk region has failed on the ground (more details on this later) with the advance jammed up by Russian defenses early and now steadily rolled back with heavy losses. But the offensive also fails conceptually: attacking and holding Russian territory in Kursk has made Moscow more intransigent and unwilling to negotiate, and it has failed to meaningfully move the needle on NATO backing for Ukraine.

And this is Ukraine’s problem. It seeks the return of all its 1991 territories, including those that Russia now controls and administers, many of which are far beyond Ukraine’s realistic military reach. It is utterly inconceivable, for example, to contemplate Ukraine recapturing Donetsk with a ground operation. Donetsk is a vast industrial city of nearly a million residents, ensconced far behind Russian frontlines and fully integrated into Russia’s logistical chains. Yet the recapture of Donetsk is an explicit Ukrainian war aim.

Ukraine’s ongoing refusal to “negotiate” the surrender of any territory within the 1991 borders brings Kiev to a strategic impasse. It is one thing to say that Ukraine will not give up territories that it currently possesses, but Kiev has extended its war aims to be inclusive of lands that are firmly in Russian control, far beyond Ukraine’s military reach. This leaves Ukraine with no possibility of ending the war without losing on its own terms, because their own war aims fundamentally require the total collapse of Russia’s ability to fight.

And thus, we come to Zelensky’s tenuous “victory plan.” Perhaps unsurprisingly, the plan is little more than a plea for the west to go all-in on Ukraine. The planks of the victory plan, as such, are:

-An official promise of NATO membership for Ukraine

-Intensified western assistance to shore up Ukraine’s air defense and equip additional mechanized brigades

-More western strike systems and the green light to attack targets deep inside prewar Russia (something Ukraine has been doing anyway)

-A nebulous pledge to build a “non-nuclear deterrent” against Russia, which ought to be interpreted as an extension of the request for western assistance launching deep strikes on Russian territory

-Western investments to exploit Ukrainian mineral resources to economically rehabilitate the country

When you put it all together, the “victory plan” is essentially a plea for more help, asking NATO to rebuild Ukraine’s ground forces and air defenses, while providing enhanced strike capabilities, with long-term integration with the west via NATO membership and western exploitation of Ukrainian natural resources. When you add in a few ancillary requests (like integrating Ukraine into NATO’s real-time ISR), it’s clear that Kiev is pinning all of its hopes on some eventual trigger for direct NATO intervention.

And this, ultimately, is what has created Ukraine’s unsolvable strategic dead end. Kiev clearly wants NATO to intervene directly in the conflict, and this has put Ukraine on an escalatory path. Ukraine’s foray into the Kursk region, and their continued strikes on Russian strategic assets like airfields, oil refineries, and ISR installations, are clearly designed to draw NATO into the war by intentionally violating supposed Russian “red lines” and creating an escalatory spiral. At the same time, Zelensky has argued that Russian de-escalation would be a prerequisite for any negotiations – though, given his refusal to discuss ceding Ukrainian territories and his insistence on NATO membership, it’s not clear what there is to discuss anyway. Specifically, he said quite recently that negotiations are impossible unless Russia ceases its strikes on Ukrainian energy and shipping infrastructure.

We end up with a picture where Ukraine’s overarching strategic concept would appear to be pulling in two directions. Verbally, Zelensky has tied the prospects for negotiations to a de-escalation of the war on Russia’s part (while excluding categorically any negotiations relevant to Russia’s own war aims), but Ukraine’s own actions – attempting to double down on both long range strikes and a ground incursion into Russia – are escalatory, as are the various demands made of NATO in the peace plan. There’s a certain measure of strategic schizophrenia here, which all stems from the fact that Ukraine’s own concept of victory is far beyond its military means. Western observers have suggested that a prerequisite for negotiations ought to be the stabilization of Ukraine’s defenses in the Donbas – which in substance means containing and freezing the conflict – but the Ukrainian effort to expand and unlock the front with the Kursk incursion runs directly contrary to this.

The result is that Ukraine is now waging war as if – as if NATO intervention can eventually be provoked, as if Russia will crack and walk away from vast territories that it already controls, and as if western assistance can provide a panacea for Ukraine’s deteriorating state on the ground. It all adds up to a blind plunge forward in the abyss, hoping that by escalating and radicalizing the conflict either Russia will break or NATO will step in. In either scenario, however, Ukraine is counting on powers external to it, trusting that NATO will provide a sort of deus ex machina that rescues Ukraine from ruination.

Ukraine stands today as a stark example of strategic dissipation. Having opted to eschew anything less than the most maximalist sort of victory – full re-attainment of the 1991 borders, NATO membership, and the total defeat of Russia – it now proceeds full speed ahead, with a material base and a gloomy picture on the ground that is utterly unmoored from its own conception of victory. The “victory plan”, such as it exists, is little more than a plea for rescue. It is a country trapped by the two myths that animate its being – on the one hand, the notion of total western military supremacy, and on the other the theory of Russia as a giant with feet of clay, primed to collapse internally from the strain of a war that it is winning.

Strangling the Southern Donbas

On the ground, 2024 has been a year of largely unmitigated Russian victories. In the spring, the front transitioned to a new operational phase following Russia’s capture of Avdiivka, which – as I argued at the time – left Ukrainian forces with no obvious places where they could anchor their next line of defense. Russian forces have continued to advance in the southern Donbas largely unabated, and the entire southeastern corner of the front is now buckling under an ongoing Russian offensive.

A brief look at the state of the front reveals the dire state of the AFU’s defenses. Ukrainian lines in the southeast were based on a series of well-defended urban fortresses in a change, running from Ugledar on the southernmost end, to Krasnogorivka (which defended the approach to the Vovcha Reservoir, to Avdiivka (blocking the main line out of Donetsk to the northwest), all the way up to the Toretsk-Niu York agglomeration. The AFU lost the former three at various points in 2024 and are currently holding on to perhaps 50% of Toretsk. The loss of these fortress has unhinged the Ukrainian defense across nearly 100 kilometers of front, and subsequent efforts to stabilize the line have been stymied by a lack of adequate rear defenses, inadequate reserves, and Ukraine’s own decision to funnel many of its best mechanized formations into Kursk. As a consequence, Russia has advanced steadily towards Pokrovsk, carving out a salient some 80 kilometers in circumference.

The picture that has emerged is one of highly attrited Ukrainian units being steadily driven out of poorly prepared defensive positions. Ukrainian reporting in September revealed that some Ukrainian brigades on the Pokrovsk axis are down to less than 40% of their full infantry complement, as replacements fall far short of burn rates, and ammunition has dwindled with the Kursk operation being given supply priority.

During the summer, much of the reporting on this front implied that Pokrovsk was the main operational target for the offensive, but this never really passed muster. The real advantage of the bursting advance towards Pokrovsk, rather, was that it gave the Russians access to the ridgeline to the north of the Vovcha River. At the same time, the capture of Ugledar and the subsequent breakthrough on the very southern end of the line puts the Russians on a downhill drive. The Ukrainian positions along the Vovcha – centered around Kurakhove, which has been a centerpiece of the Ukrainian position here for years – are all on the floor of a gentle river basin, with Russian forces coming downhill both from the south (the Ugledar axis) and the north (the Pokrovsk axis).

The Ukrainians are now defending a series of partially enveloped downhill positions, with the Vovcha River and reservoir acting as the hinge between them. On the northern bank, Ukrainian forces are quickly being compressed against the reservoir in a severe salient (particularly after the loss of Girnyk in the final week of October). Meanwhile, the Russians have forced multiple breaches on the southern line, reaching the towns of Shakhtarske and Bogoyavlenka. This advance is particularly important due to the orientation of Ukrainian defensive emplacements in this area. Most of the Ukrainian trench lines and strongpoints are arranged to defend against an advance from the south (that is, they run on an east-west orientation), particularly on the axis north of Velya Novosilka. What this means, in essence, is that the capture of Ugledar and the advance to Shakhtarske have outflanked the best Ukrainian positions in the southeast.

It is likely that the coming weeks will see Russian momentum continue, parsing through the thin Ukrainian defenses on the southern line while simultaniously advancing down the ridgeline from the Selydove-Novodmytrivka axis towards Andriivka, which forms the center of gravity pulling in both Russian pincers. Ukraine is facing the loss of the entire southeastern corner of the front, including Kurakhove, in the coming months.

The current trajectory of the Russian advance suggests that by the end of 2024, they will be on the verge of completely wrapping up the southeastern sector of the front, pushing the frontline out in a wide arc running from Andriivka to Toretsk. This would put Russia in control of some 70% of Donetsk Oblast, and set the stage for the next phase of operations which will push for Pokrovsk and begin a Russian advance eastward along the H15 highway, which connects Donetsk and Zaporozhia.

The methodology of the Russian advance has furthermore upset Ukraine’s calculations around attrition, and there is little evidence that the Russian offensive is unsustainable. Russia has increasingly turned to smaller units to probe Ukrainian positions, followed by heavy bombardment with guided glide bombs and artillery before assaulting. The use of small probing units (often 5 to 7 men) followed by the physical destruction of Ukrainian positions limits Russian casualties. Meanwhile, the constant presence of Orlan drones (now flying unmolested due to the severe shortage of Ukrainian air defense) gives the Russians unimpeded ISR, and increasing availability of ever larger and longer-range glide bombs has made the reduction of Ukrainian hard points much easier.

The shifting tactical-technical nexus of the Russian offensive has scuttled Ukrainian hopes of a winning attrition calculus. Western officials estimate that the Russian Army continues to intake some 30,000 new recruits per month, which is far more than they need to replenish losses. With Mediazona counting some 23,000 Russian KIA thus far in 2024, Russian margins on manpower are highly sustainable. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s pipeline for manpower is becoming ever thinner: even after passing a new mobilization law in May, their pool of replacements in training has fallen by more than 40%, and they currently have just 20,000 new personnel in training. The lack of replacements and rotations has left frontline units exhausted in both material terms and in their psychological state, with desertions and insubordination increasing. Ukrainian attempts to redouble their mobilization program have had mixed results, and have inadvertently increased casualties by prompting Ukrainian men to risk drowning to escape Ukraine.

In short, Russia’s 2024 South Donetsk offensive has thus far succeeded in driving the AFU out of its frontline strongpoints which it had defended doggedly since the beginning of the war: Ugledar, Krasnogorivka, and Avdiivka have fallen, and Toretsk (the northernmost of these fortresses) is contested with Russian control over half of the city. The two cities that formerly acted as vital rear area hubs for the AFU (Pokrovsk and Kurakhove) are in the rear no longer, and have become frontline cities. Kurakhove in particular is likely to fall in the coming weeks. The Russians are, in a word, poised to complete their victory in Southern Donetsk.

It is important not to understate the operational and strategic significance of this. In the simplest terms, this will be a significant advancement towards Russia’s explicit war aims of capturing the Donbas oblasts (putting Russia in control of some 70% of Donetsk and 90%+ of Lugansk).

Wrapping the southeastern corner of the front will also greatly simplify Russian defensive tasks, both by pushing the frontline away from its vital rail linkages and shortening the southern front. Ugledar, while the AFU held it, was the Ukrainian position closest to the rail lines that link Donetsk City with the southern front and Crimea; pushing the front all the way out to the Vovcha eliminates this potential threat to the rail. Additionally, the shortening of the southern front reduces the potential for future Ukrainian offensive operations on this axis. If Russia can roll up the line to Velyka Novosilka, the total exposed frontage in the south will shrink by nearly 20% to some 140 kilometers, compressing the battlespace and making Russian defensive tasks much simpler.

We do not want to give the impression that the ground war in Ukraine is anywhere near over. After consolidating in southern Donetsk, the Russian Army will be move off its springboards at Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar to advance on Kostyantinivka, all as a prelude to a major operation aimed at the massive Kramatorsk-Slovyansk agglomeration. As a prerequisite, they will not only need to capture Kostyantinivka but also regain previously lost positions on the Lyman-Izyum axis, on the northern bank of the Donets River. These are all complicated combat tasks that will drag the war on until at least 2026.

Nevertheless, we do clearly see the Russian army making significant progress towards its goals. It will be able to write off much of the southeastern sector of front, with the AFU evicted from their powerful chain of prewar fortresses around the city of Donetsk. These losses raise an uncomfortable question for Ukraine: if they could not successfully defend in Avdiivka, Ugledar, and Krasnogorivka, with their long built-up defenses and powerful backfields, where exactly is their defense supposed to stabilize? We must also ask another salient question then: on the precipice of losing South Donetsk, with a full 100 kilometers of front unraveling, why are many of Ukraine’s best brigades loitering 350 kilometers away in Kursk Oblast?

Operation Krepost: Status Check

When Ukraine first launched its offensive into Kursk in August, the reaction from the western commentariat ranged from cautiously optimistic to enthusiastic. The operation was variously hailed as a humiliation for Russia, a bold gambit to unlock the front, and an opportunity to force Russia to negotiate an end to the war. Even the more measured analysis, which acknowledged the precarious military logic of the operation, praised the political calculus of the operation and the psychological benefits of bringing the war into Russia.

Three months later, the enthusiasm has faded and it has become clear that the Kursk Operation (which I nicknamed Operation Krepost as an homage to the 1943 Battle of Kursk) has failed not only in the operational particulars, but also conceptually (that is, in its own terms) as an attempt to alter the trajectory of the war by changing Russia’s political calculus and diverting forces from the Donbas. Krepost has not “turned the tide”, but has in fact caused the tide to come in faster for Ukraine.

A brief refresher on the progression of the operation on the ground will help us understand the situation. Ukraine attacked on August 6th with an assortment of maneuver elements stripped from their dwindling roster of mechanized brigades, and managed to achieve something approximating strategic surprise, taking advantage of the forest canopy around Sumy to stage their forces. The forested terrain around Sumy affords one of the few places where it is possible to conceal forces from overhead Russian ISR, and stands in stark contrast to the flat and mostly treeless south, where Ukrainian preparations for the 2023 counteroffensive were well surveilled by the Russians.

Taking advantage of this concealment, the Ukrainians took the Russian border guards by surprise and overran the border in the opening day of the assault. However, by Friday, August 9, the Ukrainian offensive had already been irreparably bogged down. Three important factors intervened:

1. The unexpectedly stiff resistance of the Russian motor rifle forces in Sudzha, which forced the Ukrainians to waste much of the 7th and 8th enveloping the town before assaulting it.

2. The successful defense of Russian blocking positions at Korenevo and Bol’shoe Soldatskoe, which jammed up the Ukrainian advance on the main highways to the northwest and northeast of Sudzha respectively.

3. The rapid scrambling of Russian reinforcements and strike assets into the area, which began to smother AFU maneuver elements and strike their staging and support bases around Sumy.

It is, unequivocally, not an exaggeration to say that the Kursk operation had been sterilized by August 9, after only three days. By this point, the Ukrainians had suffered an unmistakable delay at Sudzha and had failed completely to break out further along the main highways. The AFU made a series of assaults on Korenevo in particular, but failed to break the Russian blocking position and remained jammed up in their salient around Sudzha. Their brief window of opportunity, gained via their concealed staging and strategic surprise, was now wasted, and the front calcified into yet another tight positional fight where the Ukrainians could not maneuver and saw their forces steadily attrited away by Russian fires.

It initially appeared that the Ukrainian intention was to reach the Seim river between Korenevo and Snagost, while striking bridges over the Seim with HIMARS. In theory, there was the possibility of isolating and defeating Russian forces on the southern bank of the Seim. This would have given Ukraine control over the southern bank, including the towns of Glushkovo and Tektino, creating a solid foothold and anchoring the left flank of their position in Russia. In my previous analysis, I speculated that this was probably the best possible outcome for Ukraine after their lanes of advance were jammed up in the opening week.

Instead, the entire operation went sour for the AFU. A Russian counterattack, led by the 155th Marine Infantry Brigade, managed to completely crumple the left shoulder of the Ukrainian salient, driving the AFU out of Snagost and rolling back their penetration towards Korenevo. As of this writing, nearly 50% of the Ukraine’s gains have been retaken, and the AFU is still trapped in a confined salient around the towns of Sudzha and Sverdlikovo, with a perimeter of perhaps 75 kilometers.

Historical analogies are frequently overwrought and forced, but in this case there are clear parallels to Germany’s 1944 Ardennes offensive, and particularly the way that the American Army managed to render the German advance sterile by blocking up the major arteries of advance. In particular, the famous defense of the Airborne at Bastogne and the less well known and largely uncelebrated defense of the Eisenborn ridge managed to throw off German timetables and throttle their advance by denying them access to critical highways. The Russian blocking positions at Korenevo and Bol’shoe Soldatskoe did something very similar in Kursk, preventing the Ukrainians from breaking out along the highways and bottling them up around Sudzha while Russian reinforcements scrambled into the area.

The Russian counterattack on the left shoulder of the penetration put the final nail in the coffin here, and the Ukrainian operation has been firmly defeated. They still hold a modest chunk of Russian territory, but the strategic surprise that empowered their initial breach is long gone, and a series of attempts to unblock the roads have failed. Ukraine is now allowing a large bag of premiere assets, including elements of at least five mechanized brigades, two tank brigades, and three air assault brigades to loiter in the grinder around Sudzha. Ukrainian vehicle losses are severe, with LostArmour tracking nearly 500 Russian strikes using lancets, glide bombs, and other systems. The compact space, located on enemy territory outside of the dwindling Ukrainian air defense umbrella, has left Ukrainian forces extremely vulnerable, with vehicle loss rates far outstripping other sectors of front.

It ought to be abundantly clear by now that the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk has failed in operational terms, with the left shoulder of their salient collapsed, mounting losses, and a large grouping of brigades wasting away hundreds of kilometers from the Donbas. All Ukraine has to show for this operation is the town of Sudzha – hardly a fair trade for Russia’s impending capture of the entire Southern Donetsk front. Unfortunately, the AFU cannot simply walk away from Kursk due to its own distorted strategic logic and the necessity of maintaining a narrative structure for western backers. Withdrawing from the firebag at Kursk would be a conspicuous admission of failure, and Kiev’s preference is to instead let the operation by extinguished organically – that is to say, by Russian kinetic action.

In more abstract strategic terms, however, Kursk has been a disaster for Kiev. One of the strategic rationale for the operation was to seize Russian territory that could be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations, but the incursion has only hardened Moscow’s stance and made a settlement less likely. Similarly, attempts to force a diversion of Russian forces from the Donbas have failed, and Ukrainian forces in the southeast are on the ropes. A large grouping of forces that might have made a difference at Selydove, or Ugledar, or Krasnogorivka, or any number of places along the sprawling and crumbling Donbas front, are instead loitering aimlessly in Kursk, waging war as if.

Strategic Dissipation and Focus

One of the clear narrative strands that has emerged in this war is the vast gulf in the relative strategic discipline of the combatants. Ukraine’s war is being pulled apart by strategic dissipation – that is, the lack of a coherent theory of victory, both in the way victory is defined and how it can be achieved. Ukraine has flitted from one idea to the next – flinging a large mechanized package at Russia’s fortifications in the south, attempting to attrit the Russians with powerful fortresses like Bakhmut and Avdiivka, launching a surprise attack at Kursk, and endlessly sending western backers new shopping lists full of wonder weapons and game changers.

Within the expansive reach of Kiev’s self-declared war aims, including the phantasmagorical return of Crimea and Donetsk, it has never been quite clear how these operations are correlated. Russia, in contrast, has pursued its war aims with consistent clarity and a great reluctance to take risks and allow its energies to dissipate. Moscow wants, at an absolute minimum, to consolidate control over the Donbas and the land bridge to Crimea, while trashing the Ukrainian state and neutering its military potential.

Strategic patience on Russia’s part – its reluctance to commit to a full de-energization of Ukraine, or to strike the Dneiper bridges – frequently exasperates its supporters, but it speaks to Russian confidence that it can achieve its aims on the ground without unnecessarily radicalizing the war. Moscow is loathe to either risk provoking western intervention or create undue disruption to daily life in Russia. This is why, despite possessing significantly greater capabilities thank Ukraine, it has consistently been the reactive entity – ramping up strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure as a response to Ukrainian strikes, embarking on the Kharkov operation in response to Ukrainian attacks on Belgorod, and adopting a wait-and-see attitude towards western weapons.

Russia has remained maniacally focused on the eastern front as the center of gravity for all its military operations, as the Donbas is the raison d’etre of the entire war. The war in the Donbas, for all its frustrating positional-attritional quality, with Russian forces methodically working through Ukrainian fortresses, has an intimate and well-defined relationship to Moscow’s theory of victory in Ukraine, and Russian forces in the southeast are on the verge of checking off an enormous box on this to-do list. Moscow’s theory of victory is clearly defined; Kiev’s is not, no matter the publication of the nebulous and speculative victory plan.

Ukraine, in contrast, is increasingly waging war “as if”. It is dissipating its scarce combat resources on remote fronts which have no operational or strategic nexus with the war for the Donbas. It has awakened to the fact that the war in the Donbas is simply a losing proposition, but its attempts to change the nature of the war by activating other fronts and provoking an expansion of the conflict have failed, because Russia is not interested in unnecessarily matching Kiev’s strategic dissipation. Its attempts to radicalize the conflict have failed, as neither the west nor Russia has seriously reacted to Ukraine’s attempts to breach red lines. The idea of a settlement to the conflict now seems incredibly remote: if Ukraine is unwilling to discuss the status of the Donbas, and if Russia believes that it can capture the entire region by simply plowing ahead on the ground, then it would seem that there is very little to discuss.

Taken as a whole, the events of 2024 are immensely positive for Russia and frightening for Ukraine. The AFU began the year trying to weather the storm in Avdiivka. In the intervening time, the front has moved from the doorstep of Donetsk, where the AFU still held its chain of prewar fortresses, all the way to the doorstep of Pokrovsk. Cities like Pokrovsk and Kurakhove, which previously functioned as rear area operational hubs, are now frontline positions, with the latter likely to be captured by years end. Ukraine’s great gambit to unlock the front by attacking Kursk was defeated in the opening days of the operation, with AFU mechanized elements jammed up at Korenevo.

It has now been more than two years since Ukraine last managed to mount a successful offensive, and a recapitulation of events reveals a sequence of defeats: failed defenses at Bakhmut and Avdiivka, the collapse of their line in the southern Donbas, a much anticipated counteroffensive shattered at Robotyne in the summer of 2023, and now a surprise attack on Kursk scuttled at Korenevo. Unmoored from a coherent theory of victory, and with events on the ground souring at every turn, Kiev might take comfort in waging war as if, but a reckless thrust at Kursk and blind trust in the Deus Ex Machina of NATO will not save it from the war as it truly is.