All posts by natyliesb

Ian Proud: Ukraine’s ‘Busification’ — forced conscription — is tip of the iceberg

By Ian Proud, Responsible Statecraft, 11/4/25

“Busification” is a well-understood term in Ukraine and refers to the process in which young men are detained against their will, often involving a violent struggle, and bundled into a vehicle — often a minibus — for onward transit to an army recruitment center.

Until recently, Ukraine’s army recruiters picked easy targets. Yet, on October 26, the British Sun newspaper’s defense editor, Jerome Starkey, wrote a harrowing report about a recent trip to the front line in Ukraine, during which he claimed his Ukrainian colleague was “forcibly press-ganged into his country’s armed services.”

This case was striking for two reasons; first, that the forced mobilization of troops is rarely reported by Western mainstream media outlets. And second, that unlike most forced conscriptions, this event took place following the alleged commandeering of the Western journalists’ vehicle by three armed men, who insisted they drive to a recruitment center.

There, Starkey reported, “I saw at least [a] dozen glum men — mostly in their 40s and 50s — clutching sheafs of papers. They were called in and out of side rooms for rubber-stamp medicals to prove they were fit to fight.”

The process has drawn criticism after high-profile incidents where men have died even before they donned military uniforms. On October 23, Ukrainian Roman Sopin died from heavy blunt trauma to the head after he had been forcibly recruited. Ukrainian authorities claim that he fell, but his family is taking legal action. In August, a conscripted man, 36, died suddenly at a recruitment center in Rivne, although the authorities claim he died of natural causes. In June, 45-year-old Ukrainian-Hungarian Jozsef Sebestyen died after he was beaten with iron bars following his forced conscription; the Ukrainian military denies this version of events. In August, a conscript died from injuries sustained after he jumped out of a moving vehicle that was transporting him to the recruitment center.

Look online and you’ll find a trove of thousands of incidents, with most of them filmed this year alone. You can find videos of a recruitment officer chasing a man and shooting at him, a man being choked to death on the street with a recruiter’s knee on his neck. Many include family members or friends fighting desperately to prevent their loved one being taken against his will.

If videos of this nature, on this systemic scale, were shared in the United States or the United Kingdom, I believe that members of the public would express serious concerns. Yet the Western media remains largely silent, and I find it difficult to understand why.

In November 2024, Ukraine’s defense minister Rustem Umerov claimed that he would put an end to busification. It is true that Ukraine has been taking steps to modernize its army recruitment and make enlistment more appealing to men under the age of 25. Yet, there is little evidence that those efforts are having the desired effect. And after a year, busification only appears to be getting worse, yet remains widely ignored by the Western press.

The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War often reports on Russian force mobilization efforts but not on the dark and desperate aspects that lead to busification. You won’t find reports on this in the New York Times, as it conflicts with the narrative that with support from the West, Ukraine can turn the war around. It leans in instead on stories like Ukraine’s points for drone-kills game or the designer who cut the all-black suit that Zelensky now wears. Meanwhile, the Washington Post is softly banging the drum to recruit 18-year-old Ukrainians, despite this being a toxic political issue in Ukraine.

This is because busification is the tip of the iceberg. If the Ukrainians are finding it difficult to encourage young men to join the army voluntarily, then it is proving even harder to make them stay without deserting.

In January 2025, it was reported that around 1,700 troops of the Anna of Kyiv 155th mechanized brigade, trained in France and equipped with French self-propelled howitzers, had gone AWOL — 50 of them while still in France. In June 2024, a Ukrainian deserter was shot dead by a border guard while trying to cross into Moldova.

In the first half of 2025, over 110,000 desertion cases were reported in Ukraine. In 2024, Ukrainian prosecutors initiated over 89,000 proceedings related to desertion and unauthorized abandonment of units, a figure three-and-a-half times greater than in 2023. More than 20% of Ukraine’s one million-strong army have jumped the fence in the past four years, and the numbers are rising all the time.

Desertions appear in part driven by ever-greater shortages of infantry troops at the front line, which means soldiers rarely get rest and recuperation breaks. A lack of sufficient equipment is often blamed. And of course, the widespread and rising desertion rates from Ukraine’s armed forces only seem to provoke more violent recruitment practices and then civilian protests. On October 30 in Odessa, a group of demonstrators against a man’s forced detention overturned the recruitment minibus.

The growth of busification and rising desertions also track with a growth in support among ordinary Ukrainians for the war to end. Support for a negotiated end to the war has risen from 27% in 2023 to 69% in 2025. Likewise, support for Ukraine to “keep fighting until it wins the war” — a wholly deluded proposition — has dropped from 63% to 24% over the same period, according to Gallup poll results.

President Zelensky often claims that Ukraine’s military predicament is linked to a lack of guns, not a lack of people. Hoping to secure Western support to fight on for another 2-3 years, he’s quiet on whether he will have the troops or the political support to do so. For now, the message seems to be, “Don’t mention the press-gangs, in-detention killings, deserters and waning public support: just give me more money.”

Uriel Araujo: Kyiv wants land, not people: former US State Department adviser warns

By Uriel Araujo, InfoBrics, 10/29/25

Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

James Carden, former US State Department Russia Policy Adviser has faced criticism in certain circles over his otherwise underreported comments during a recent interview to Australian Sky News — especially for mentioning some hard truths about the ethnopolitics of Ukraine.

In that interview, Mr. Carden noted that, like HIMARS or F-16s, Tomahawks won’t be a gamechanger, and argued that Putin’s proposal — EU but not NATO membership — was a fair enough bargain. When the host replied that, in this case, that would involve land concessions as part of a land-for-peace deal, the former State Department Adviser argued that the land Kyiv would be ceding is a land that: “they themselves have been attacking since 2014. The Ukrainians are being a bit disingenuous here… They claim to want the land in the Donbass, Eastern Ukraine. But they don’t want the ethnic Russian citizens on that land. So they’ve been doing everything that they can to disenfranchise those people.”

These comments are not ill-informed or dishonest and they merit some attention. In fact, they are quite accurate.

For years, Kyiv’s policies have systematically sidelined a significant chunk of Ukraine’s population. According to the country’s last census in 2001 — the only one since independence in 1991 — “ethnic Russians” accounted for 17.3 percent of the populace, which is over 8 million people. The numbers don’t catch all the nuance here: Ukraine is, pure and simple, a deeply bilingual society, with Russian as the native language (in other surveys) for at least 29 percent nationwide, a percentage that gets far higher in the east and south.

It is true that a 2024 study by linguist Volodymyr Kulyk shows a decline in everyday Russian use in Ukraine since 2022, with streets renamed, statues of Russians taken down and “Russian literature taken off the shelves of bookshops”, as Lancaster University PhD researcher Oleksandra Osypenko puts it. While in 2012 only 44% Ukrainians primarily spoke Ukrainian and 34% Russian, by December 2022 Ukrainian had risen to 57.4% and Russian had fallen to 14.8%, with the remaining 27.8 percent reporting employing both. This means that 42.6% of Ukrainians (that is 14.8 plus 27.8) still use the Russian language routinely, even after three years of open war, with censored media, and all “pro-Russian” parties having been banned; and after at least 11 years of Ukrainization policies.

High rates of intermarriage blur the lines even further; and, from a social science perspective, many folks toggle between “Russian” and “Ukrainian” identities depending on the context, as I’ve noticed myself during fieldwork in 2019.

Yet, back in August 2021, President Volodymyr Zelensky told Donbass residents who ‘feel russkiye [ethnic Russians]’ to move to Russia. At the time, I argued that this was one of the most russophobic statements from a high-ranking Ukrainian official since World War II; which is an ironic enough twist, considering the fact that in 2019 Zelensky (a Russian speaker himself) was widely described as a candidate courting the Russian and pro-Russian minority, and rode to power on promises to protect precisely these Russian-identifying folks in the east.

The 2014 ultranationalist Maidan revolution, backed by Washington (despite its far-right elements), has ushered in a surge of Ukrainian chauvinism that verges on negationism about the country’s pluri-ethnic realities. Language laws tell part of the tale. The 2017 education reform made Ukrainian the sole public-school language; by March 2023, Ukraine expanded media censorship and raised TV Ukrainian-language quotas to 90% by 2024, while banning non-Ukrainian languages in key areas.

Oleksiy Danilov, then secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, put it starkly in a 2023 interview: “The Russian language must completely disappear from our territory.” No wonder Ukrainian philosopher Sergei Datsyuk warned that such moves could spark an “internal civil war” worse than the external one, and even Oleksiy Arestovich, Zelensky’s former adviser, echoed the alarm.

The truth is that such “internal civil war” kicked off nearly a decade ago in Donbass, as scholar Serhiy Kudelia frames it, under artillery barrages that turned it into Europe’s “forgotten war” until 2022. Kyiv has been bombing Russians (in Donbass) for a decade, while disenfranchising them.

This is no hyperbole: experts like Nicolai N. Petro, a US Fulbright scholar in Ukraine in 2013-2014 and ex-State Department specialist on the Soviet Union, have documented how Ukrainian policies erode civil rights for ethnic minorities, especially Russian speakers.

The Venice Commission, Europe’s go-to body for democratic standards, criticized Ukraine’s 2022 Law on National Minorities for restricting publishing, media, and education in minority languages, urging revisions to meet international standards. Despite this, Deputy PM Olga Stefanishyna dismissed it all by claiming: “there is no Russian minority in Ukraine.”

Moreover, for many, Ukraine’s history is inextricably tied to Russia’s; a 2021 survey, taken six months before the full-scale escalation, found over 40 percent of Ukrainians nationwide — and nearly two-thirds in the east and south — agreeing with Putin that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people”.

Yet Ukraine’s rigid unitary state, with its top-down nationalism, clashes hard against Russia’s matryoshka model of multinational autonomy — with 22 ethnic republics within the Russian Federation. Granting Donbass similar autonomy, for instance, could have eased tensions, but it would have demanded a constitutional overhaul.

In the broader post-Soviet mess, Ukraine’s woes look less unique. Frozen conflicts across the region — Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh — show how borders remain volatile. In this context, Crimea and Donbass have been hot topics for decades.

The hard truth is that if Kyiv won militarily (unlikely), more Donbass shelling and displacement would likely follow. Carden’s point stands: without addressing internal ethnopolitics, Ukraine cannot secure peace; for peace means embracing all its people, not just the land they stand on.

Sylvia Demarest: The legacy of Dick Cheney: a privatized military, a discredited leadership class

By Sylvia Demarest, Substack, 11/5/25

Richard Bruce Cheney (Dick Cheney) died on November 4th at the age of 84. His death was greeted with a flood of commentary, much of it negative, regarding his political and business career. This essay will discuss an area that has not received enough attention: Cheney’s role in privatizing and outsourcing US military and intelligence functions. Under the banner of “cost saving” and “efficiency” Cheney advocated increased privatization and outsourcing of functions that had always been traditionally performed by military personnel, such as security, logistics, and even intelligence. Under Cheney’s guidance as vice president, these functions were increasingly contracted out to private companies, under the banner of increasing government efficiency.

Cheney promoted cost-plus contracts, advocated loosening oversight over these contracts, and a closer relationship between the military and private defense contractors. These changes led to a flood of outsourcing that now consumes up to 50% of defense and intelligence budgets. This massive increase in outsourcing also occurred during a corresponding massive increase in defense spending as wars of choice spread and cost savings failed to materialize.

US defense and intelligence now rely on private companies for the most essential of functions. The outsourcing and privatization of these functions has resulted in a system riddled with potential conflicts of interest and characterized by a complete lack of accountability. In essence, Cheney championed a system that prioritized privatization based on fake claims of efficiency and cost savings at the expense of transparency and cost control. Worse, it produced hundreds of politically powerful private companies, financially dependent on military contracts, who now lobby for increased military spending and for more war.

How Dick Cheney’s political career began

Larry Johnson wrote an essay on Cheney as a symbol of “everything that is wrong with Washington. He became wealthy, not because he was brilliant or creative, but because he had the right connections.” Those connections were, among other political operatives, with Bruce Bradley and Donald Rumsfeld. These men helped Cheney get his first political job, become Gerald Ford’s Chief of Staff from 1975 to January 20, 1977, and then get elected to Congress from 1979 to 1989. This history set Cheney up to be selected as Secretary of Defense in the George H. W. Bush administration from 1989 to 1993. It was as Secretary of Defense that Cheney advocated military and intelligence outsourcing and privatization.

In 1992, the Pentagon, then under Cheney’s direction, paid Texas-based Brown & Root Services (BRS) $3.9 million to produce a classified report detailing how private companies — like itself — could help provide logistics for American troops in potential war zones around the world. Later in 1992, the Pentagon gave the company an additional $5 million to update its report. That same year, BRS won a massive, five-year logistics contract from the US Army Corps of Engineers to work alongside American GIs in places like Zaire, Haiti, Somalia, Kosovo, the Balkans, and Saudi Arabia.

The BRS report that advocated privatization was leaked. The privatization proposal did not go over well with either the public or the military in the early 1990’s. Privatization was not politically popular, but it still became a reality during the war on terror.

KBR, BRS, Halliburton, and Dick Cheney

BRS had it’s start as a construction company in Texas in 1919. The company became close to Lyndon B. Johnson as he began his political career in 1937 by providing financial support for Johnson’s political campaigns. The relationship with Johnson helped BRS secure government contracts allowing the company to grow. In December of 1962, BRS was purchased by another Texas company, Halliburton. Please keep this in mind as Dick Cheney would serve as CEO of Halliburton beginning in 1995.

Lyndon Johnson was elected to the US Senate and become majority leader in 1952. During this time BRS was awarded contracts with the US military in Vietnam. From 1962 to 1972, for instance, the company-built roads, landing strips, harbors, and military bases in Vietnam.

In 1992 George H. W. Bush lost the presidential election to William Jefferson Clinton and Dick Cheney was out of a job. This was rectified in 1995 when Cheney was appointed CEO of Halliburton. Under Cheney’s guidance, Halliburton acquired M. W. Kellogg as part of its purchase of Dresser Industries. In 1998 Halliburton merged Kellogg with Brown & Root (BRS) forming Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR).

The merger of Kellogg and Brown & Root into KBR should also be noted because once Cheney became Vice President, KBR would go on to become the U.S. military’s largest contractor during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, providing staff and services to aid the lengthy U.S. occupations, including the costly efforts to rebuild both countries.

Cheney selects himself as Vice President

George W. Bush served as Governor of Texas for two terms, defeating a popular governor Anne Richards in 1994. Richard’s defeat marked a significant shift in Texas politics. Since then, no Democrat has been elected to statewide office. Bush proved to be a popular governor and had little trouble securing the Republican nomination for President in 2000. As a candidate, Bush ran as a president who would promote a “humble foreign policy” to secure a more peaceful world.

Bush was faced with the decision of who should be his vice president. He selected Dick Cheney to conduct a search and interview prospective candidates. Cheney, after a long and very detailed search, decided that he, Dick Cheney, would be the best Vice President. Thus, was born the Bush/Cheney ticket in 2000.

To run as vice president, Cheney had to leave Halliburton. His exit package included $34 million plus various other forms of compensation and stock options. This means that Cheney likely profited from the subsequent contracts awarded to KBR.

The 2000 election between Bush and Al Gore ended in a virtual tie. While that election is beyond the scope of this essay, it took months to resolve and was eventually decided when a 5-4 unsigned per curiam decision in the US Supreme Court halted the effort to recount the votes in Florida, handing Bush the presidency.

Cheney selects the Bush cabinet

As the new president-elect, Bush set up a transition team to organize the new Bush Administration and select cabinet members and appointed positions. Bush assigned Cheney the task of heading the team and reviewing and recommending candidates. As a result, Cheney filled the Bush Administration with people of his choice which included his long-time cronies such as Donald Rumsfeld, as well as various warmongers and neoconservatives, some of whom had worked on a study for Israeli politician Benjamin Netanyahu called “Clean Break”. Clean Break, among other recommendations, advocated enhancing Israel’s security by overthrowing several regional governments, especially Sadam Hussein in Iraq.

As a result, Cheney became the most powerful and consequential vice president in US history, essentially able to control the flow of information to the new president and indirectly control the range of available options. As a result of the various Cheney manipulations, the first Bush administration should be seen as a study of how to take over and indirectly control a presidency. The results proved to be a disaster for our country.

Cheney’s legacy

Cheney was an unabashed warmonger intent on promoting the “war on terror”, the Iraq War, and outsourcing as many military functions to private companies as possible. The result? 911 was not properly investigated, the Patriot Act was passed without debate, and we were lied into a disastrous war in Iraq by the “war on terror.”

As one of the primary architects of the war on terror, Cheney’s death toll could be in the millions. Cheney played a leading role in bombing Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Pakistan, Libya, and Somalia. He supported the firing depleted uranium shells in Fallujah leading to contamination and babies being born with deformities to this day. Cheney said he had no regrets about Iraq and that “we made exactly the right decisions”.

Cheney was a self-described “proponent of enhanced interrogation techniques”, such as waterboarding. These barbaric practices proved not to work. Tortured prisoners do not provide reliable information, they will say what the torturer wants to hear. This meant the US was getting false information from prisoners in Guantanamo, some of whom turned out to be innocent.

Here’s Seymour Hersh: “With his early appearances on Sunday morning talk shows and his frank talk about the need to go to what he called “the dark side,” Cheney expanded CIA, NSA, and military intelligence operations here and abroad that shredded Constitutional limitations. Congress and the press and the public rolled over and endorsed the violations in ways that continue to have impact today.”

“The most highly classified data in the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq involved the constantly expanding authority for US special forces and covert troops in the field to assassinate suspect targets at will. Cheney and Rumsfeld were directly involved in such illegal actions, as I repeatedly reported in the New Yorker.”

“” He was smarter and more pragmatic than any president he served. He quietly shaped foreign policy behind the scenes and left few footprints.”

It should be pointed out that many of the actions Herch describes were carried out by private contractors.

Cheney should be seen as the poster boy for the failure of the post-9/11 wars. In particular, the Iraq War. It was his amassed power and special cadre of operators known as neoconservatives inside the Old Executive Office building and E Ring at the Pentagon, who used strategy and treachery to dominate the politics and intelligence necessary to accomplish the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and to proliferate a Global War on Terror that lasted well beyond both Cheney and George W. Bush’s tenure in office.

By all accounts it was the lies he promoted over weapons of mass destruction that propelled the rush to war in Iraq, followed by the blunders in choosing personnel, in failing to anticipate the Iraqi insurgency, in overlooking the loss of lives, or the cost of war. Cheney’s tenure included new method of warfare marked by extrajudicial killing, torture, secrecy, and endless war that discredited US leadership, and has transformed American society and politics, perhaps forever.

Conclusion

In Bush’s second term, Cheney’s power was finally curtailed as the reality of what had transpired began to set in, and Bush’s popularity continued to wane. By then, the damage was done, to the country, our finances, to our military and intelligence capability, to the Middle East, and to the public’s perception of the competency of US leadership.

Mark Episkopos: Trump’s most underrated diplomatic win: Belarus

By Mark Episkopos, Responsible Statecraft, 10/22/25

Mark Episkopos is a Eurasia Research Fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. He is also an Adjunct Professor of History at Marymount University. Episkopos holds a PhD in history from American University and a masters degree in international affairs from Boston University.

Rarely are foreign policy scholars and analysts blessed with as crystalline a case study in abject failure as the Western approach to Belarus since 2020. From promoting concrete security interests, advancing human rights to everything in between, there is no metric by which anything done toward Minsk can be said to have worked.

But even more striking has been the sheer sense of aggrieved befuddlement with the Trump administration for acknowledging this reality and seeking instead to repair ties with Belarus.

A recent New York Times report cited several experts who charged the White House with rushing to give away the farm to Minsk for nothing that they can put their finger on. But anyone who has reached this conclusion hasn’t looked very hard, or, as it were, not in the right places. The administration’s Belarus strategy has so far been remarkably effective and, if consistently pursued over the coming months, promises greater successes still.

Critics of the White House initiative to engage Belarus are keen to inveigh against the country’s authoritarianism, an argument curiously seldom deployed against U.S. cooperation with dozens of partners across the Middle East and Africa whose domestic politics hardly fits the liberal-democratic mold. One need not venture so far from Europe to happen upon the glaring inconsistencies of a “values-based” approach to Belarus. Azerbaijan is hardly any more aligned with the Western liberal-democratic model than Belarus, yet the very same European champions of democratization in Minsk have not the slightest qualms about striking deals with President Ilham Aliyev in Baku.

European leaders could respond, with full justification, that concrete interests are served by maintaining good relations with Azerbaijan, but the same has always been true when it comes to Belarus’ importance in Eastern European security issues. Even within a narrowly selective democratization framework, it’s been well established that the only way to advance a substantive dialogue on civil society with Belarus is through engagement, whereas punishment and isolation drives Belarus away from the West and thereby produces the opposite effect.

There is no government on either side of the Atlantic that does not accept, even if tacitly or grudgingly, the basic diplomatic principle that it is necessary to engage countries that differ from the West — itself far from a monolith — in their norms, values, and institutions. On what basis, then, is Belarus one of the few to be held to another standard? European leaders would counter that Belarus is different because it provided passage and logistical support to Russian troops in the opening stages of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. This argument shifts the debate from values back to security, which is where it should have always been.

The Europeans are quite correct that there are legitimate concerns stemming from what scholars have called the “Belarusian balcony,” or Belarus’ capacity to act as a staging ground for hybrid attacks or a full-scale confrontation between NATO and Russia. Such concerns are felt especially acutely by Belarus’ Western neighbors, Poland and Lithuania. But the best and only viable way to address these challenges is through sustained dialogue with Belarus, not by pushing for a change in government or punishing Minsk until it cuts ties with Moscow. The latter strategies were tried for the past five years and have been revealed as deeply counterproductive for reasons fully explained in the latest Quincy Institute brief on Belarus.

To the extent that the Europeans are interested in a stable Belarus-West relationship that reduces risks of escalatory spirals on NATO’s eastern flank, their current policy is akin to kicking in a wide open door. President Alexander Lukashenko has built his brand of “multi-vector” foreign policy precisely on the idea that Belarus’ sovereign interests are best advanced by hedging between Russia and the West not just to secure the best terms for itself but to assert itself as a regional stabilizer.

Minsk has long sought positive relations with the West as the only possible counterweight to what would otherwise be its one-sided dependence on Russia. Lest this be dismissed as an exotic arrangement, consider that the precedent for this style of hedging was set by NATO members themselves.

Turkish President Recep Erdoğan and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, for instance, have developed their own nuanced relationships with competitors, including Russia and China. These governments have layered their national interests on top of NATO’s overall priorities in ways that are not always complementary but are nonetheless accepted as part of their sovereign foreign policy decisions. There is no reason why Belarus, a Russian military ally, cannot engage in similar hedging behavior in its dealings with the West.

The White House, contrary to many skeptics’ claims, is not trying to conjure a diplomatic opening ex nihilo. Rather, it is exploiting a window for substantive diplomacy that has existed for decades. That window is premised on the crucial understanding, lacking under previous administrations, that severing Belarus’ tight-knit military, economic, and diplomatic ties to Russia is not just unviable but unnecessary. Lukashenko was well positioned to provide a backchannel for the kinds of signaling and trial balloons that paved the way for the Alaska summit between President Trump and Vladimir Putin in August. The White House rightly perceives that Minsk, beyond the POW exchanges and other services it is rendering now, has — by dint of geography if nothing else — a major postwar role to play in supporting a peace deal.

American interests toward Belarus extend beyond finding additional ways to advance the Ukraine peace process. The White House cannot conclusively accomplish its goal of retrenching away from Europe and prioritizing other theaters while NATO’s eastern flank remains a powder keg. Progress on a U.S.-led normalization track with Belarus can set the stage for a much-needed dialogue between Minsk and its Western neighbors building into a new set of security agreements.

This understanding can eventually be formalized into a binding commitment by Belarus not to enable, facilitate, or engage in aggression against any of its neighbors, something Minsk has consistently averred it has no interest in, as part of a normalization deal. An agreement along these lines does not violate any of Belarus’ treaty obligations to Moscow, which are purely defensive in nature, and carries positive deescalatory spillover effects for long-term deconfliction and confidence building between Russia and NATO.

If carried to its conclusion, the U.S.-Belarus track can be a template for a model of low-risk, low-cost American regional engagement that strikes a sustainable balance between U.S. ends and means. It would, in its novelty and boldness, amount to something that can be called a Trump Doctrine for NATO’s eastern flank.

Lucy Komisar: When Challenged On Ukraine, Hillary Clinton Lashes Out

By Lucy Komisar, The Realist Review, 10/14/25

Lucy Komisar is an investigative journalist based in New York. She won the Gerald Loeb, National Press Club and other awards for her expose in the Miami Herald of Ponzi fraudster Allen Stanford. Her articles have appeared in the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune and many other publications in the U.S. and Europe. Her website is https://thekomisarscoop.com/

A few days ago, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton replied to my question about Ukraine at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). She and John Sullivan, who served as Ambassador to Russia under both Presidents Trump and Biden, revealed themselves to be either liars or so ignorant of reasons for the U.S. Ukraine war as to be utter fools. [The full video can be found here].

This was a fly-on-the-wall event where you get to hear the delusions of the people who shape US foreign policy. The CFR meeting was hosted by the Dean of the Columbia School of International and Public Affairs, Keren Yarhi-Milo, who talked about the biases commonly found among policymakers and the intelligence community when they try to understand the intentions of US adversaries. She spoke about mirror imaging, which is what happens when you think that the adversary thinks in exactly the same way that you do; she spoke about the inability to empathize, she spoke about other biases that lead us to misunderstand and misperceive the intentions of our adversaries. She said it happens in the United States, repeatedly. All important.

But then Keren Yarhi-Milo veered into arm-chair psychology, telling the audience that in her view, ”[if] you want to understand the Ukraine, the decision to invade Ukraine, what’s driving this, you have to really understand Putin’s psychology, and the reference point, and how it’s all about, in his mind, regaining the Soviet empire.” So she knows what is in Putin’s mind, though he has never said that!

At the event, Ambassador John Sullivan, who also served as Deputy Secretary of State under Trump, echoed Yarhi-Milo, asserting that “you have to really understand Putin’s psychology” when evaluating his policy in Ukraine. He said, “I once had a conversation with my then-boss Secretary Blinken. And we were talking about what Putin is like. And, you know, he’s often compared to a gangster. And I didn’t want to make an ethnic reference, or if I made one it would be one that would be from my own tribe. So I’m from South Boston. And I started talking about Whitey Bulger.”

Bulger was a mafioso, murderer and a crook. Is that how Sullivan really feels about the Boston Irish?

“And I mean, you’ve got to understand, you can’t understand Putin unless you really understand where he’s from, what he’s about. He’s a tough kid from Leningrad, right? And not understanding who—his sense of grievance, his sense of loss.” He adds: “He is committed to the proposition that the great geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century was the demise of the Soviet Union. …He doesn’t lament the demise of Soviet communism. He famously says, if you’re not nostalgic for how we lived in Soviet days you don’t have a heart, but if you want to return to Soviet communism you don’t have a brain. I mean, it’s hard to be the richest person in the world with a billion-dollar palace in Sochi.”

So, Putin is like the Bulgar of the American politics, not Russia?

In fact, there is no evidence that Putin is richest person in the world (that seems to be Elon Musk) and there is also no evidence of this palace. But who cares about evidence! And even his “you don’t have a brain” quote contradicts what Putin said! But who cares!

For once, Clinton got closer to the truth when she said, “… it’s been our experience, and certainly the research shows, that you introduce, through this over-personalization, volatility. And really, the volatility becomes a greater driver than your credibility, your ability to really read this person, to manage this person, to try to shape the events.” But she didn’t challenge Yarhi-Milo or Sullivan on Putin. And she certainly didn’t like me raising the point when I asked her question:

My name is Lucy Komisar. I’m a journalist.

I was very impressed with the Dean’s analysis of how one should look with empathy and look at the other side. And then I saw in the discussion of Russia absolutely the oppositeI didn’t hear anybody talk about Kissinger and Kennan talking about not moving NATO one inch to the east, the 2014 American-sponsored coup that threw out an elected Ukraine head of government because he was too pro-Russian, the new government bombing the Russian speakers for eight years.”

David Westin of Bloomberg News, serving as moderator, then broke in:

There’s a question here, right? I’m sorry, ma’am, is there a question in here? Is there a question? This is a speech. I’m sorry.

[Here I would note that my comment was way shorter than others were allowed to make without interruption. But then again, those didn’t challenge the speaker.]

After the unasked for interruption, I continued:

Let me finish. That the Soviet Union, anybody that wanted it—that talked about it being collapsed, that it was a tragedy, but anybody that wanted to have it come back had no brain. Why did you not talk about any of these facts? And instead of that do a lot of armchair psychologizing about Putin and his motives?.

Enter Hillary.

Secretary Clinton, clearly annoyed by my daring to question the prevailing wisdom she has dedicated her career to crafting and selling replied:

First of all—(applause—of course there was applause, this was the Council after all)—I reject the premise of your question. I think you have gone into a lot of misstatements. (More applause). I don’t agree at all about a lack of empathy and understanding. You know, both John and I have spent a lot of time with Putin trying to understand. And what we finally understood is that he wants to destroy the West and destroy the United States.

…And you may disagree with that. You may have a more benevolent view of what he did, invading—you know, first of all, making up Chechen war, invading Georgia, invading Ukraine twice, threatening his neighbors, being Assad’s air force. I could go on and on. So you have your view. I do not think it is the view supported by history. And certainly not the view of what we’re seeing today.

I would commend to you, if you’re willing to read it, a recent study out of the University of Munich talking about what if Putin could win. Because there’s no doubt, with his latest drone activity and what he’s trying to do to intimidate everybody from Poland to Romania to Denmark to Italy, he is sending a message that you had better back off from supporting Ukraine, a free and independent country that has every right to chart its own sovereign future—just like Poland did joining NATO, just like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania did joining NATO. Putin and Russia don’t have a veto over what free and independent nations can choose for themselves. It’s time he understood that and got over both his history and the greater history that has kept him imprisoned and kept Russia poor, an extractive commodity market that could do so much more on behalf of its own people. And you and I have a disagreement. (Yet more applause).

A few comments are in order.

I found Clinton’s remarks deeply misinformed, especially since it’s clear that it was Washington that started this new Cold War. As former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates wrote in his 2014 memoir “Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War” that, “When the Soviet Union was collapsing in late 1991, Dick [Cheney] wanted to see the dismantlement not only of the Soviet Union and the Russian empire but of Russia itself, so it could never again be a threat.”

There is no time here to go into her nonsense about the drones (some of which are coming from Ukraine and Poland); the Russian invasion of Georgia which actually was a response to Georgian aggression; and the war in Ukraine which was clearly provoked after 8 years of Ukraine’s war on their own ethnic Russian citizens. Her remarks about Romania, Denmark, Italy: Any evidence? And if Russia is so poor how can it invade Europe? And how is it that its extractive market-based economy have a higher growth rate than the U.S. and Europe?

And then there is, given her record, the biggest question of all: Why would anyone believe (much less applaud) what Hillary has to say on these matters?

After Clinton’s diatribe, Westin, good establishment lackey that he is, added:

I will add only that I am so happy for the Council and for the United States of America where we can have this sort of discussion… There are a lot of places in the world we could not have had this sort of discussion, which is only beneficial.

Clinton replied, Absolutely.

Well.

Following Westin’s assertion that at the Council one could have this discussion, I was threatened by the Council director of meetings that I could be defenestrated (removed from membership) for asking my question. This is relevant in an era where from cancel-culture to deportations, free speech in the U.S. is under attack.

Here is her email:

Subject: 10/8 CFR Event
Date: Thu, 9 Oct 2025 21:16:34 +0000
From: Nancy Bodurtha NBodurtha@cfr.org
To: LK@Dear Lucy:

Following your disregard of the moderator at last evening’s discussion with Secretary Clinton, Dean Yarhi-Milo, and Ambassador Sullivan, I write to remind you that CFR’s code of conduct is explicit in the expectation that members exhibit the highest levels of courtesy and respect toward speakers, moderators, staff, guests, and one another. CFR reserves the right to drop or suspend members for any conduct that is prejudicial to the best interests, reputation, and proper functioning of the organization.

Sincerely,
Nancy

Nancy D. Bodurtha
Vice President, Meetings and Membership
Council on Foreign Relations
58 East 68th Street, New York, New York 10065
tel 212.434.9466
nbodurtha@cfr.org www.cfr.org

Here is my response:

Following my remarks, Westin said: “I am so happy for the Council and the United States of America where we can have this sort of discussion. There are a lot of places in the world where we could not have had this sort of discussion, which is only beneficial.”

I guess you don’t agree. Should I ask him if my question was “prejudicial to the best interests, reputation, and proper functioning of the organization”? Of course, there are countries where questions like mine would not be allowed. Was your message to me directed by Mike Froman or your own idea? BTW, NOBODY intimidates me!

—and—

The best interest of the Council is to promote diversity of views and expression, not to try to shut down minority views.

Lucy Komisar

***

Council officials should inform Nancy Bodurtha that it is not appropriate to threaten journalist members for asking challenging questions of powerful political figures. I would add that it is actually hard to know if my views are those of the “minority” since CFR members have often thanked me for questions they did not raise themselves.